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Abstract
￿is thesis examines how to export liberal theories of Multicultural Citizen-
ship (MC) to post-violent con￿ict contexts, applying Kymlicka’s theory of MC to the
case of Cyprus.￿e thesis modi￿es Kymlicka’s normative theory in order to make it
applicable to contexts beyond those of its inception, focusing on cases where cultural
identities are highly politicised and securitised. It provides a new theory of MC, a
methodological approach for applying normative theories to di￿erent contexts, and
a multicultural constitutional alternative for Cyprus.
To facilitate the modi￿cation of Kymlicka’s MC and its application to Cyprus,
the thesis develops a methodological approach called the Reciprocal Model (RM).
￿e RM provides a systematic method for the re-examination of the fundamental
assumptions of normative theories, using input from empirical cases. ￿e RM also
provides the conceptual tools for extracting policy-relevant suggestions from nor-
mative political theories.
￿rough an immanent critique of Kymlicka’s theory of MC, a new multicul-
tural theory is developed that has an internationally facilitated process of recogni-
tion at its core.￿e theory defended in this thesis adopts an ethnically-blind role for
the state that dismisses rei￿ed notions of culture while also rejecting the exceptional
treatment of cultural identities. It places culture on a level playing ￿eld with other
individual identities and defends group-di￿erentiated rights to minority groups on
the grounds of equality of opportunity, replacing the autonomy-based defence of
Kymlicka.
￿e revised theory ofMC, advanced through the application of the RM to the
case of Cyprus, allowed for the development of a constitutional model for Cyprus
based on multicultural citizenship. ￿e multicultural constitutional model is de-
fended as an alternative to Bizonal Bicommunal Federation – the bicommunal con-
stitutional model underpinning the negotiations for a comprehensive solution to the
Cyprus problem.
x
Introduction
Multiculturalism has won, the defendants of multicultural policies say.￿ Since the
emergence of the ￿eld in the late-￿￿￿￿s, considerations for the respect of diverse
cultures have been embedded in the foundational documents of many states and
some of the most important international organisations. ￿e Lisbon Treaty of the
European Union and the Charter of the United Nations both include considerations
for diversity and cultural accommodation.￿ Advanced Western states like the US,
UK, Australia, Germany, and Canada, have all provided group-di￿erentiated rights
￿. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿ explains that the “desecuritisation of ethnic relations,
combined with the assurances provided by robust human rights protections, helps to explain why
dominant groups in the West have accepted demands for multicultural reform.”
￿. UnitedNations, International Covenant OnCivil And Political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, ￿￿December ￿￿￿￿; UnitedNations,General CommentNo ￿￿￿e
Rights Of Minorities CCPR/C/￿￿/Rev.￿/Add.￿, http://bit.ly/￿y￿PiYt, ￿￿ August ￿￿￿￿; United Nations,
Concluding Observations Of￿e Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights E/C.￿￿/￿/Add.￿￿,
http://bit.ly/￿rb￿ac, ￿ September ￿￿￿￿; United Nations, UNDP and Indigenous Peoples: A Policy of
Engagement, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/environment-energy/local_
development /undp- and- indigenous - peoples - a - policy - of - engagement/, ￿June ￿￿￿￿; UNESCO,
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, http : / /bit . ly / ￿vJHHkB, ￿ November ￿￿￿￿; UN Com-
mittee On￿e Elimination Of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation ￿￿, Rights Of Indige-
nous Peoples HRI/GEN/￿/Rev.￿, http://www￿.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/genrexxiii.htm, ￿￿￿￿;
European Union,￿e Oslo Recommendations Regarding￿e Linguistic Rights Of National Minorities,
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ February ￿￿￿￿; European Union, European Charter for Regional
orMinority Languages, ￿￿￿￿; EuropeanUnion,Conclusions Of European Council In Copenhagen, http:
//ec.europa.eu/bulgaria/documents/abc/￿￿￿￿￿_en.pdf, ￿￿-￿￿ June ￿￿￿￿; European Union, Guidelines
On￿e Use Of Minority Languages In￿e Broadcast Media, http://www.osce.org/hcnm/￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
October ￿￿￿￿; O￿ce for O￿cial Publications of the European Communities, Final Report: High Level
Group on Multilingualism, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/doc/multireport_en.pdf,
￿￿￿￿.
￿
to minority cultures, in the form of language-rights, exceptions from general laws,
self-governmental rights, recognition of past injustices, and territorial rights.
Nevertheless, victory has been too hastily declared. A backlash against multi-
culturalism can be observed, even in countries that have been pioneers in the accom-
modation of diversity. ￿e Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chan-
cellor of Germany rushed to proclaim that multiculturalism is “failed” and “dead”
respectively;￿ and in the United States, the a￿ermath of the New York attacks on the
World Trade Centre saw the government initiating a “war on terror” that led to the
marginalisation of the Muslim population of the country.￿
Pioneers of liberal multiculturalism, like Will Kymlicka, have expeditiously
declared the victory of multiculturalism in order to export liberal pluralism beyond
the aforementioned countries.￿ ￿e on-going and synchronousmulticulturally-related
con￿icts that take place around the world, generate a sense of urgency that drives the
theorists, who are eager to provide the expertise needed to facilitate the resolution
of the challenges of multiculturalism found beyond the archetypal examples of the
West. ￿e non-traditional examples are as diverse as they are urgent. Israel is using
the apparatus of its state to create a nation where there was none, people living in
the Crimea ask for independence, the Turkish-speaking population in Greece is ex-
￿. David Cameron, Speech at Munich Security Conference, http://www.number￿￿.gov.uk/news/
pms- speech- at -munich- security - conference/, ￿ February ￿￿￿￿; BBC, State Multiculturalism has
Failed, says David Cameron, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ February ￿￿￿￿.
￿. See Geneive Abdo, Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life In America A￿er ￿/￿￿ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿. Kymlicka’s work is found in these six books Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Cul-
ture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal￿eory Of
Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿); Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: National-
ism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Kymlicka, Multicul-
tural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity; Will Kymlicka and Magdalena
Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political￿eory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism
and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿
cluded from the public sphere, young Muslim Britons go abroad to ￿ght on the side
of the Jihadists, and the international order resembles a video game where ethnic
groups kill each other in the name of religion, land, honour, and history.
Alas, the ￿nality of the success stories is not representative of the current state
ofmulticulturalism and runs the risk of shi￿ing the emphasis away from the theoret-
ical challenges and towards the uncritical implementation of polices that were devel-
oped with di￿erent contexts in mind. Once victory is proclaimed the only question
becomes “how best to export the successful practices of the ‘West’ to the foreign
contexts?” ￿e endeavour of exporting theories of Multicultural Citizenship (MC)
beyond their dedicated contexts is driven by the false assumption that they will yield
similar outcomes to those in the countries of their inception; a fallacy driven by the
belief that theories of MC are exportable to alien contexts without the need for a
ground-breaking reconsideration of their foundational principles and assumptions.
￿is thesis challenges the claim that multicultural issues are settled, the view
that multiculturalism is failed and dead, and the premise that MC theory is ready
to be exported to new contexts without ￿rst questioning the principles and impli-
cations of the established theories. It will be argued that the philosophers, theorists
and political scientists who are interested in exporting liberal pluralism, should be
wary of the di￿erent contexts and the problems present within them, and should
not assume a priori that the experience of other cultures, and the standing of indi-
viduals within their societies, are the same as those that the dominant theories of
multicultural citizenship address.
￿e most challenging contexts for the application of MC are those charac-
terised by con￿ictual social relations, especially cases where the contention is driven
by a chronic disagreement over the identities of the population and their rights over
the land.￿is thesiswill focus onpost-violent con￿ict cases, andwill utilise examples
￿
fromCyprus, which is one such case, in order to problematise the uncritical applica-
tion of liberal pluralism. Cyprus exhibits the typical conditions of post-violent con-
￿ict situations, where national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities are highly
politicised. It is thus an interesting and challenging case for the application of MC.
Cyprus is stable enough to allow for long-term planning and will be a new addition
to the literature of exporting MC, which has been dominated either by examples of
ex-Soviet countries that found themselves in di￿cult ethnocultural conundrums fol-
lowing the collapse of the Union, or by typical cases, like those of the Catalans and
the Basques.
￿e theory whose exportability this thesis will assess is that of Will Kym-
licka. Multicultural Citizenship was the ￿rst and most authoritative theory of liberal
pluralism and the one most widely endorsed by philosophers, theorists and policy
makers. ￿e appeal of Kymlicka’s theory of MC is not limited to its popularity but
also to its author’s explicit attempt to export the theory beyond the dedicated con-
texts whose challenges it originally addresses. Kymlicka’s theory of MC became the
bedrock against which competing theories of the same kind have been developed.￿
As such, it was chosen as the framework for this thesis.￿e theory of MC defended
in this thesis, which provides suggestions on how to export liberal pluralism, will
be developed through a critical re-evaluation of Kymlicka’s theory driven by three
motivations: ￿rstly, the need to formalise and systematise how to assess the policy-
relevance of normative theories; secondly, the urgent need for a mechanism that will
facilitate the recognition of minority cultures at the core of any theory of MC; and
￿nally, the need to include additional safeguards to theories of MC in order to ad-
dress the challenges that emerge from the securitisation of identities in post-violent
￿. Kukathas developed his Liberal Archipelago as a response to Kymlicka’s MC. See Chandran
Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, ￿￿￿￿)
￿
con￿ict cases like Cyprus, where misrecognition is more prevalent.
￿e ￿rstmotivation of the thesis is to provide a principled and detailedway by
which to extract action-guidance from an ideal theory.￿e puzzle here is essentially
how we might reach policy-relevant conclusions, known as action-guidance, from
a theory that was developed using abstractions and hypotheticals that do not nec-
essarily resonate with reality. ￿e debate on ideal theory is usually advanced within
the domain of theories of justice, where philosophers seek to describe what a per-
fectly just society would look like.￿ ￿eories of MC face similar challenges because
theorists working on multiculturalism, in a similar manner as theorists working on
theories of justice, develop their arguments in abstraction of circumstances arising in
actual societies in order to tease out the basic normative principles that should gov-
ern the distribution of group-di￿erentiated rights amongst minority groups. ￿ey
simplify how societies work, how cultures are constituted, how individuals relate to
their cultures and other cultures, and how cultures interact with each other, in order
to provide principled responses to the challenges of diversity faced byWestern soci-
eties. Whereas there is an on-going debate on how to extract action-guidance from
ideal theories of justice, this debate does not extend to MC, and this thesis will ￿ll
that void.
In this thesis, a new methodological approach to the puzzle of extracting
￿. For the debate within the context of theories of justice see Onora O’Neill, “Abstraction, Ideal-
ization and Ideology in Ethics,” in Moral Philosophy And Contemporary Problems, ed. J.D.G. Evans
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿; Charles W. Mills, “‘Ideal ￿eory’ As Ideol-
ogy,”Hypatia ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Robert Goodin, “Political Ideals and Political Practice,” British
Journal of Political Science ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿; Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal￿eory: A Refuta-
tion,” Political Studies ￿￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal ￿eory In ￿eory And Practice,”
Social￿eory and Practice ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Zo￿a Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal-
￿eory,” Social￿eory And Practice ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Adam Swi￿, “￿e Value of Philosophy
in Nonideal Circumstances,” Social￿eory and Practice ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Laura Valentini,
“On￿e Apparent Paradox Of Ideal-￿eory,”￿e Journal of Political Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–
￿￿￿; Holly Lawford-Smith, “Debate: Ideal￿eory – A Reply to Valentini,”￿e Journal of Political Phi-
losophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Adam Swi￿ and Zo￿a Stemplowska, “Rawls On Ideal And Nonideal
￿eory,” in A Companion to Rawls, ed. Jon Mandle Reidy and David A. (Wiley-Blackwell, ￿￿￿￿).
￿
action-guidance from theories of MC is provided with step-by-step directions on
how the transition from ideal to non-ideal level works. ￿is approach, which I call
theReciprocalModel (RM), is novel because it is the ￿rstmodel to allow for empirical
observations to in￿uence the principles of an ideal theory, instead of merely limiting
the applicability of an ideal theory. It is through the use of the Reciprocal Model that
the examination of MC in relation to Cyprus and other post-violent con￿ict situ-
ations will take place. As such, the RM systematises and provides the means with
which MC can be exported beyond its dedicated contexts and applied to di￿cult
non-ideal situations.
￿e second motivation derives from the application of the Reciprocal Model.
Upon application, misrecognition is diagnosed as one of the core hindrances in the
process of successfully exporting MC.￿e success of exporting MC depends on the
implementation of a process of recognition at the core of every multicultural the-
ory. ￿is conclusion rests on the realisation that the rights that minority groups are
eligible for, depend on their initial classi￿cation at a pre-political level, prior to the
deliberation between majority and minority cultures. As it will be evident through
the application of the RM to the process of exporting MC, a theory of recognition
is needed; one that functions prior to, and is at the core of any discussion of group-
di￿erentiated rights, and one that provides amechanism that ensures that all cultures
take part in the process of their initial classi￿cation which happens prior to delib-
eration, guaranteeing that their voice will be suitably ampli￿ed in order for their
demands to be heard. As it will be evidently observed through the Reciprocal Model,
in countries like Cyprus minority cultures depend on the members of the major-
ity culture for their classi￿cation because the latter are typically in control of the
structures of the state. As such, the identities of minorities are ￿ltered through the
identities of the dominant societal culture. It is only when the minority identities
￿
do not challenge the security of the dominant culture that they are likely to avoid
misrecognition.
In this thesis, a mechanism of recognition is defended (one that functions
within, or under, the supervision of established intergovernmental institutions, such
as the United Nations or the European Union) in order to ensure that the process is
unbiased, and that the members of minority cultures are not forced to structure and
modify their claims and identities in accordance towhat themembers of themajority
culture will likely accept.￿e only way to avoid misrecognition is by controlling the
process by which majority cultures end up misclassifying minorities who challenge
their identities, and this can only be achieved through a consensus on an external
arbitration authority, whichwill make sure that certain preconditions to deliberation
are safeguarded and guaranteed.
￿e third motivation of this thesis derives from the second, and rests on
the premise that misrecognition is a far more likely practice and outcome in post-
violent con￿ict situations where national identities are a highly-securitised matter
and where constitutional rights are established on the basis of ethnic identities. To
this end, in order to examine howmisrecognition occurs in such circumstances, the
example of Cyprus is used throughout the thesis. In Cyprus a new constitution is
debated and misrecognition can be traced and demonstrated both historically and
in the constitution under negotiation. Moreover, the case of Cyprus presents chal-
lenges common to post-violent con￿ict situations, making it a very useful case-study
for testing the exportability of liberal multicultural theories.
Re￿ecting upon how MC can be applied to Cyprus, additional considera-
tions that need to be taken into account are introduced. It is demonstrated how, in
the absence of further theorising, the process of incorporating liberal multicultural
policies in post-violent con￿ict contexts risks enhancing the problems that these the-
￿
ories seek to address because minorities are denied the right to voice their demand,
given that the demands of each culture are conditioned by their initial classi￿ca-
tion – for instance, contrary to a religious association, a national minority can make
demands for self-governmental rights, and contrary to a national minority, an im-
migrant group can only ask for rights pertaining to the process of their integration.
In Cyprus one can ￿nd Roma which have been excluded from the process of negoti-
ation of the new constitution; Maronites who speak a language indigenous to Cyprus
and protected by UNESCO, which nevertheless was not recognised by the Republic
of Cyprus; and, most interestingly, various national minorities – Armenians, Latins,
Maronites – who are identi￿ed as such, yet they are treated as religious associations,
either because they lack a motherland (ethnic attachment), or because their ethnic
identities challenge the security of the Greek-Cypriot dominant societal culture. Fi-
nally, the case of Cyprus introduces a further distinction, not usually present in the
Western examples, where a national minority can have both a dominant and a mi-
nority status.
￿is thesis provides novel contributions to four domains of research.￿e ￿rst
is a contribution to normative political theory, and in particular in the theorisation
of ideal and non-ideal theory, where a systematic account that formalises the process
of extracting action-guidance from ideal theories is developed.￿eReciprocalModel
provides the means to evaluate the applicability of a theory, and the tools to modify
a theory so that it can be exported beyond its intended contexts of application.
￿e second domain is that of liberal multiculturalism. ￿e examination of
Kymlicka andKukathas’ theories in light of theReciprocalModel provide insights into
the socialisation of individuals within their cultures and in relation to the identities
pertaining to their culture, promoting a non-essentialist conception that disperses
with holistic and homogenising de￿nitions. Moreover, the defence of civic rather
￿
than ethnic citizenship adds to previous work in the ￿eld by providing practical sug-
gestions of how the liberal state should handle ethnic identities. Finally, the defence
of an equality-based argument in support of group-di￿erentiated rights to minority
cultures provides an alternative to Kymlicka’s autonomy-based defence, alleviating
minorities from the burden of proof of the value of their cultural context.
￿e third domain to which this thesis is contributing is Cyprus, where the
model of bicommunal constitutionalism used since the ￿￿￿￿s is challenged in favour
of an alternative constitutional model that disperses with notions of cultural excep-
tionalism. Negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem between the leaders of
theGCandTCcommunitieswere suspended inOctober demonstrating once against
the stalemate that has existed since the rejection of the Annan Plan in ￿￿￿￿.￿e al-
ternative constitutional model presented in chapter ￿, provides a radically di￿erent
basis for the negotiations for the comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.
A secondary contribution is made towards the ￿elds of security studies and
international relations. ￿e illustration of the dynamics of misrecognition that can
silence minorities, along with the emphasis for the need for an inclusive process of
recognition at the core of any theory of liberal pluralism, provide guidance to the role
that intergovernmental organisations need to play in upholding their commitment to
diversity. In doing so themeans are provided by which to introduce liberal pluralism
to post-violent con￿ict countries whose national identities are a securitised issue that
generates political contestation.
￿is thesis is divided into eight chapters, which address the literature of mul-
ticulturalism, with added emphasis on the recent attempts to export MC in other
contexts; followed by a methodological discussion on how these theories can apply
to contexts beyond those of their inception, providing the means by which to assess
the exportability of the dominant theories; and in the ￿nal chapters, an alternative
￿
model ofmulticultural citizenship is provided out of a sympathetic criticism of Kym-
licka’s authoritative multicultural theory.
￿e ￿rst three chapters are preoccupied with liberal multiculturalism in the-
oretical terms in order to provide the foundations for the subsequent discussion on
how to export MC in post-violent con￿ict countries like Cyprus. In chapter ￿, Kym-
licka’s theory of Multicultural Citizenship is outlined. His defence of autonomy is
presented. He argues that the liberal state is ethnoculturally biased in favour of the
dominant societal culture. Minority groups need assistance from the state in order
to protect their culture, which provides a context-of-choice for them. Without access
to a stable cultural structure, individuals are not able to make autonomous choices
and therefore culture should be considered a primary good. Once Kymlicka’s MC
is outlined, then its evolution over the years is traced: how Kymlicka responded to
his critics, and how in recent years he attempted to export his theory beyond the
countries of the West.
In chapter ￿ the theoretical underpinnings of liberal multiculturalism are dis-
cussed in order to understand the emergence of MC, the problems it addresses, and
the contexts within which it was developed. Kymlicka’s MC is presented as the suc-
cessor of liberal nationalism. ￿e remaining chapter is focused on explaining the
theoretical di￿erences and similarities between the two. ￿e main premises of lib-
eral nationalism are ￿rstly outlined: that the individual is a situated being and that
membership to an ethnic nation does not di￿er to the citizenship of a liberal state.
￿e dichotomy between ethnic cultures as involuntary communities of fate, and lib-
eral states as voluntary contractual associations is thus challenged. ￿e aim of this
chapter is to dispense with two competing narratives about liberal multiculturalism:
the ￿rst that liberal multiculturalism rejects nationality altogether, and the second,
that liberal multiculturalism bears almost no di￿erence to liberal nationalism. Lib-
￿￿
eral multiculturalism is presented as the culmination of the two, where liberal values
can only be promoted and protected a￿er appropriate measures are taken to coun-
teract the cultural bias of the liberal state, which promotes the social values of the
dominant societal culture and thus has a hidden nationalist agenda.
In chapter ￿ the relationship between liberal nationalism and liberal multi-
culturalism is further explored. Initially the theoretical premises of liberal nation-
alists are presented and particularly their rejection of liberal principles of justice in
favour of what they call the “morality of the community.”￿e account of justice they
reject, provided by John Rawls in his A￿eory of Justice, is subsequently outlined.
￿is chapter explains how Kymlicka’s theory of MC incorporates elements of both
liberal nationalism and liberal multiculturalism. Kymlicka’s commitment to liberal
autonomy, which relies on an endorsement of the Millean conception of freedom, is
explored, and this lays the foundations for an exposition and evaluation of three key
objections to his theory that have been developed in the critical literature. ￿e ￿rst
objection pertains to his account of agency. According to this line of critique, Kym-
licka falsely treats individual agency as synonymous to change.￿e second objection
is that Kymlicka’s reluctance to apply the Rawlsian principles of justice to ethnocul-
tural groups, results in the toleration of various oppressive practices against individ-
uals within their cultures. ￿e third objection accuses Kymlicka of exactly the op-
posite malice, namely, that Kymlicka’s commitment to liberal autonomy makes him
too eager to justify interventions into minority cultures, thus altering the identities
of such groups.
Once the theoretical origins and debates pertaining to MC have been ad-
dressed, a methodological discussion takes place in chapter ￿. Chapter ￿ provides
a systematic understanding of how to extract policy-relevant suggestions from ideal
theories, and how to evaluate their ability to provide action-guidance for the pur-
￿￿
poses of policy-making. ￿e main debates in ideal/non-ideal theory are presented,
in order to subsequently engagewith the twomost attractive accounts of ideal to non-
ideal transition; that of AndrewMason and Laura Valentini. Once the two accounts
are presented, a new method is outlined and defended. ￿e novel methodological
approach advocated in chapter ￿ is called the Reciprocal Model and details how the-
orists and scientists can extract useful practical suggestions from ideal theories.
Ideal theories use abstractions to simplify and make reality manageable, as
well as abstract thought experiments to tease out the principles at play in each chal-
lenging situation. ￿e Reciprocal Model emphasises the need to open ideal theories
to evaluation using empirical considerations. Not only does it provide the tools to
assess whether a theory can be applied to certain cases, but it also explains how dif-
ferent contexts can alter the foundational principles and fundamental assumptions
of a theory.￿e concession that the fundamental assumptions of a theory can be al-
tered in lieu of the context to which it applies, opens new avenues where theories like
that of Kymlicka’s MC, which are developed with speci￿c contexts in mind, can be
applied to other cases beyond those of their inception, contexts like Cyprus, which
face post-violent con￿ict and security-related challenges.
In chapter ￿ the case of Cyprus is presented. ￿e aim of the chapter is to
provide the necessary information for the subsequent application of MC to it. ￿e
challenges of diversity present in Cyprus di￿er considerably from the mainstream
examples that dominant theories of MC apply to, but are remarkably similar to the
challenges faced by other countries that have recently faced con￿ict and whose na-
tional identities are intertwined with security considerations. To this end, the his-
torical evolution of the identities of the di￿erent cultures of the island is presented.
Particular emphasis is given to how di￿erent cultures fare under the constitution
established in ￿￿￿￿, and on how the two largest cultural groups – the Greek- and
￿￿
Turkish-Cypriots – followed identical and competing nation-building practices af-
ter the division established following the Turkish invasion of ￿￿￿￿. Most importantly,
chapter ￿ presents the history of the minorities living in the country and the histor-
ical injustices that they have su￿ered through the practice of misrecognition.
In chapter ￿, the information presented in the previous two chapters – the
Reciprocal Model and the case of Cyprus – are combined to examine how liberal
pluralism can be applied to contexts beyond those that the authors of the theories
intended. In chapter ￿, three di￿erent arguments are promoted: the ￿rst against
the essentialism of culture, the second in favour of equality-based justi￿cations for
group-di￿erentiated rights, and the third in favour of a more inclusive system of
cultural recognition.
￿e ￿rst argument turns on an analysis of how theorists conceptualise cul-
ture. Di￿erent de￿nitions of culture in relation to the Reciprocal Model are exam-
ined, in order to explain how Kymlicka is, at times, employing an essentialist, holis-
tic and homogenising notion of culture. Once his conceptualisation of culture is
challenged, MC is re-evaluated. His view that culture provides a comprehensive
context-of-choice for all becomes the epitome of the ￿rst criticism. It is argued that
an equality-based justi￿cation for group-di￿erentiated rights to minority cultures is
preferable over the autonomy-based defence that Kymlicka provides. Following the
evaluation of Kymlicka’s principles, along with the criticism of his conceptualisation
of culture, the discussion proceeds to his tripartite typology of culture, where groups
are classi￿ed into national minorities, immigrant groups and aboriginal people.￿e
argument defended is that his classi￿cation of cultural groups can lead to the mis-
recognition and subsequent oppression of minority cultures that do not ￿t within
the pre-established typology.
￿e second argument turns on examples of misrecognition found in Cyprus
￿￿
to demonstrate in practical terms how misrecognition functions, and how it ad-
versely a￿ectsminority cultures.￿e case of theCypriot Romawho have been erased
from Cypriot history is discussed, along with how Armenians, Maronites and Latins
in Cyprus are treated as constitutionally inferior to the Turkish Cypriots and ￿nally,
how the process of recognition is driven by, and relies upon, the judgement of the
dominant societal culture. In light of this, a new process of recognition is suggested
and defended; one that resonates at the level of international institutions.
￿e third argument defends a new model of citizenship that diverges from
the orthodoxy of liberal multiculturalism, where ethnic identities are relevant to the
state. ￿ree alternatives are considered: to abandon ethnicity, to thin out and for-
malise the bundle of identities that form an ethnic whole or, ￿nally, to extend that
bundle to include more contemporary identities. ￿e chapter concludes with sup-
porting the ￿rst option, which favours the abandonment of ethnic nationalism in
favour of civic nationalism.
In chapter ￿ the theoretical model defended in chapter ￿ is applied to Cyprus
to demonstrate howmulticultural citizenship can replace bicommunal constitution-
alism. ￿e chapter distinguishes civic from ethnic conception of Greek-Cypriot
identity to illustrate how individuals who are not ethnic members are oppressed as
civic members of the GC culture. To this end, multicultural citizenship is defended
as the constitutional basis for the solution to the Cyprus problem, which will re-
place Bizonal Bicommunal Federation – the constitutional framework that led to
the post-￿￿￿￿ stalemate in the negotiations. It is demonstrated how multicultural
constitutionalism removes the main issues of contestation from the domain of the
constitution whilst retaining the core characteristics of BBF; namely, the federal state
with self-governmental and territorial rights to minority groups. Finally, the current
involvement of Intergovernmental Organisations is evaluated and suggestions are
￿￿
provided on how the EU and the UN can modify their practices to better facilitate
the negotiations for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem based on the
values of liberal pluralism.
￿￿
Chapter ￿
Multicultural Citizenship
Will Kymlicka was the ￿rst to create a complete theory of multicultural citizenship
that engages with abstract theoretical concepts like autonomy, toleration and free-
dom, andprovides policy-relevant suggestions for the promotion of group-di￿erentiated
rights for the members of national minorities, immigrant groups and indigenous
peoples. Kymlicka’s theory is important because it is a liberal defence of multicul-
turalism, whose impact ranges beyond the academic community, since it has been
incorporated into the Canadian national policy and has been discussed at the inter-
national level at the United Nations and the European Union.
Kymlicka’s work is divided into three periods: the original publication of his
theory in ￿￿￿￿, the period of responding to those who criticised his theory, and ￿-
nally, his most recent policy-oriented focus on exporting multiculturalism outside
the traditional Western contexts. In this chapter, the three di￿erent periods will be
explored in three di￿erent sections, in order to provide the theoretical context of
Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism to which this thesis is responding.
Kymlicka’s theorywill become the framework uponwhich the alternative the-
ory that will be defended in this thesis will be based upon. Once Kymlicka’s theory
￿￿
is presented and its theoretical underpinnings analysed, its assumptions in regards
with its exportability in non-traditional contexts will be challenged,￿ to tease out
what exactly needs to be reconsidered prior to such application. To this end, the
case of Cyprus will be used to test the applicability of MC to post-violent con￿ict
situations.
￿.￿ ￿e Initial￿eory of Multicultural Citizenship
￿.￿.￿ Situating the￿eory Historically
Kymlicka divides the evolution of the theorisation of multiculturalism into three
stages.￿ During the ￿rst stage, minority rights were defended on communitarian
terms and multiculturalism was discussed in contrast to liberalism. Liberalism, ac-
cording to communitarians like Vernon Van Dyke, is based on atomistic individu-
alism, which contradicts the culturally embedded view that communitarians main-
tain.￿ ￿e second stagewaswhenminority rights were ￿rst debatedwithin the liberal
framework.￿eorists like Je￿ Spinner-Halev, Yael Tamir andDavidMiller attempted
to reconcile nationalism and liberalism, trying to explain the importance and the
limits of nationalism within the liberal state.￿ During this second stage, Kymlicka’s
theory emerged, following Joseph Raz, who similarly to Kymlicka argued that indi-
￿. Non-traditionally Western, in this context, refers to areas outside the US, UK, Canada, Aus-
tralia, France and Germany, that these theories typically address.
￿. Will Kymlicka, “￿e New Debate Over Minority Rights,” in Politics in the Vernacular: Nation-
alism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿.
￿. Vernon Van Dyke, “￿e Individual,￿e State, And Ethnic Communities In Political￿eory,”
World Politics ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Je￿ Spinner-
Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal State (London:
JohnsHopkins University Press, ￿￿￿￿); DavidMiller,OnNationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿
viduals need access to their culture in order to form autonomous choices.￿ Kym-
licka’s book-long theory, Multicultural Citizenship, moved the debate to the third
stage, where the ethnocultural neutrality of the liberal state was challenged.
Using liberal arguments, Kymlicka supported group-rights for minority cul-
tures based on a new conception of the state, which he calls “the ‘nation-building’
model.” According to Kymlicka’s model, the state has positive duties towards minor-
ity cultures; it has a duty to allocate resources for the promotion of their cultures, in
the same way that it promotes the culture of the dominant majority group.
￿.￿.￿ Exposition of the￿eory
￿e nation is a “historical community, more or less institutionally complete, occu-
pying a given territory or homeland sharing a distinct language and culture.”￿ ￿e
modern state is o￿en multinational since it consists of more than one group with
a distinctive national identity. ￿ese additional groups are called national minori-
ties and are disadvantaged in comparison to the dominant majority culture, since
the state, contrary to the contemporary liberal assumption of cultural neutrality, is
ethnoculturally biased in favour of the dominant societal culture.
Kymlicka, promotes group rights for the purposes of cultural accommoda-
tion, since the maintenance of culture as context-of-choice is pivotal to individual
autonomy. ￿erefore, his theory of MC is a liberal one, since it is justi￿ed on the
grounds of freedom of conscience that treats autonomy as the “most basic liberal
right.”￿ Autonomy according to Kymlicka, is the ability to acknowledge and revise
￿. Joseph Raz, Ethics In￿e Public Domain: Essays In￿e Morality Of Law And Politics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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one’s beliefs and convictions. In this context, culture is the structure whose transla-
tional abilities provide meaning to the world. Hence, the existence of many cultures
as vehicles of interpretation, does not threaten the solidarity of the modern state,
since nationality is detached from patriotism and patriotism is de￿ned as a shared
commitment to diversity, rather than as a product of “a common national identity.”￿
In order to grasp the complexities of cultural pluralism, Kymlicka distin-
guishes immigrants from national minorities. Immigrants, in so far as they have
voluntarily entered the country, are expected to “participate within the public insti-
tutions of the dominant culture” and they are not “asking for a parallel society.”￿ ￿e
demands they put forward to the host state, are claims for recognition of their cul-
tural particularity in order to integrate better into the society. National minorities
on the other hand, o￿en articulate demands for political or territorial autonomy.
￿e group-di￿erentiated rights thatKymlicka promotes are self-governmental
rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights. Self governmental rights
are answers to claims put forward by national minorities who ask for “political au-
tonomy or territorial jurisdiction”; polyethnic rights are responses to demands ar-
ticulated by immigrant groups and can take the form of anti-racism policies like
modi￿cation of the educational curricula, funding, and exemptions from the law;
and ￿nally, special representation rights are seen as “corollary to self-governmental
rights” and are utilised in order to counterbalance the historical exclusion thatmem-
bers of disadvantaged groups experience.￿￿
In order to ensure that individuals enjoy freedom of conscience, Kymlicka
suggests that the liberal state should support external protections to minority cul-
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tures and at the same time reject internal restrictions.￿￿ By supporting external pro-
tections, the state must take action in order to ensure that the group is not treated
disadvantageously at the inter-group level. In the same way, the guarantee that no
internal restrictions take place, is to make sure that the basic liberties and freedoms
of individuals at the intra-group level are secured as well.￿￿
In defending his theory, Kymlicka introduces a modern twist to traditional
liberal arguments, demonstrating that group rights are not a threat to national con-
sensus or individual freedom. His argument is that group rights are justi￿ed based
on liberal principles, since liberalism should not be (and has not been) restricted to
universal individual rights, as it is o￿en uncritically assumed. Kymlicka advances
his theory by utilising John Stuart Mill’s argument in favour of solidarity through
national homogeneity and traces its evolution within the liberal (and socialist) liter-
ature in order to identify the roots of the commonly-held liberal view against group-
di￿erentiated rights.￿￿ He outlines three sources of discontent: ￿rstly, “a realpolitik
fear for international peace,” secondly, “a commitment to racial equality,” and thirdly,
“a worry about the escalating demands of immigrant groups.”￿￿ Kymlicka’s response
to these worries is that “ethnic revival involves a revision in terms of integration,
not a rejection of integration” and therefore, national and ethnic recognition are not
sources of division, but rathermeans for better integration on the grounds of equality
rather than on the grounds of assimilation.￿￿
In order to avoid assimilation, cultural membership must be maintained,
since culture is the structure within which a person is able to live a good life. A
good life, according to Kymlicka, is not restricted to freedom of choice, but rather
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is de￿ned as the life that re￿ects one’s interests, beliefs and desires, all of which are
open to reconsideration and revision.￿￿ ￿erefore, Kymlicka aligns cultural accom-
modation with traditional liberal principles like freedom of expression, association,
autonomy, and information.￿￿ Cultural membership is so important, because it “pro-
videsmeaningful options” and also “a￿ects how others perceive and respond to us.”￿￿
Moreover, culture as a source of identi￿cation is more secure because it depends on
“belonging and not [on] achievement,” and is directly related to our self-esteem and
dignity. Hence, “as long as polyethnic rights to immigrants and self-governmental
rights to national minorities secure access to a societal culture, then they contribute
to individual freedom.”￿￿
Kymlicka places special emphasis on language, in order to demonstrate that
the policy of “benign neglect” is neither realistic nor practically plausible, since ei-
ther deliberately or by implication, the state is bound to support one speci￿c societal
culture through the use of its language in public documents and institutions. Even if
the institutions of the state seem to be neutral, the ethnocultural background of the
national majority will be re￿ected in it decisions, leaving the members of minority
cultures exposed to the will of the majority.￿￿
Cultural minorities according to Kymlicka have a legitimate claim for group
representation under two conditions: ￿rstly, they must experience historical and
structural disadvantage, and secondly, they need to demonstrate that their claim
for self-government re￿ects the will of their members.￿￿ ￿e kind of representation
varies; it can either bemirror representation, where the group is represented by some
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of its members as is the case with women who are o￿en guaranteed ￿￿ per cent pro-
portional representation, or it can be like the case of Maori whose representatives
do not necessarily need to be Maori, as long as they are accountable to the Maori
voters.￿￿
Along the discussion of group representation comes the discussion of au-
tonomy and illiberal cultures. ￿e worry is expressed as follows: what if minority
cultures do not want more rights, but rather want to be le￿ alone? In other words,
what if these cultural groups ask for tolerance rather than autonomy. Even more
worryingly, how should the liberal state react to an illiberal culture that restricts its
members’ individual freedoms?￿￿
In reply to these worries, Kymlicka argues that the principle of autonomy
should be defended at all venues, public and private, political or civil, because it is
autonomy that makes liberal tolerance possible. As he claims, “what distinguishes
liberal tolerance is precisely its commitment to autonomy; that is, the idea that indi-
viduals should be free to assess and potentially revise their existing ends.”￿￿ ￿ere-
fore, he promotes a comprehensive account of autonomy, similar to the one sup-
ported by Mill rather than the one put forward by Rawls. Contrary to Rawls who
treats autonomy as fundamental only at the political level, Kymlicka promotes au-
tonomy as a value that must be endorsed at all the venues of human interaction.￿￿
Even though Kymlicka is not willing to drop his commitment to autonomy,
he is not eager to justify intervention into minority cultures. ￿e promotion of au-
tonomy or the abolition of illiberal and oppressive traditions is not a justi￿able rea-
son to intervene, he argues.￿￿ Liberal countries should treat illiberal cultures in the
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same ways as they treat countries whose laws are illiberal. Just as a foreign country
does not intervene in another country that might have oppressive laws, so should
the liberal state abstain from intervening in cultures whose practices are deemed as
illiberal by the majority.￿￿ Instead, the liberal state must provide incentives for liber-
alisation and integration, through deliberation and cooperation.￿is should not be
taken to its logical extreme, since intervention is not absolutely forbidden; rather, it
is justi￿ed only in “gross and systematic violation of human rights, such as slavery
or genocide or mass torture and expulsions, just as these are grounds for intervening
in foreign countries.”￿￿
It is by now evident that Kymlicka is well aware of the fact that groups might
have di￿erent conceptions of the good life upon which it is impossible to ground
social unity.￿￿ He also acknowledges that a shared commitment to political values
is not enough to settle the worries expressed by Mill and more recently by David
Miller, about the need for a common identity as a source of social unity. In response
to these worries Kymlicka proposes a theory of MC based on Taylor’s understanding
of “‘deep diversity’ where citizens must ‘not only respect diversity, but also respect
diversity of approaches to diversity”’.￿￿
For Kymlicka, neither secession nor assimilation is an option. In the case of
secession, the challenges of diversity are maintained since the newly created groups
rather than being homogenous, are rearranged entities that encompass within them
the same problems that existed prior to the division; and cultural assimilation is not
an option either, since as empirical data shows, cultural groups have been histori-
cally resistant to assimilation despite the variety of culturally imperialist forces that
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were utilised for their assimilation.￿￿ Additionally, as Kymlicka suggests, assimilation
is counterproductive, especially in the case of immigrants, since their integration to
the host country’s society is smoother and faster if their ethnic particularity is recog-
nised.
￿.￿ Kymlicka Responds to Criticisms
Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship became a point of reference within the theori-
sation of multiculturalism and any competing or revisionist theory, was advanced
as a commentary or as a response to Kymlicka’s book. ￿e most notable exam-
ple is Chandran Kukathas’ Liberal Archipelago,￿￿ a refutation of group-di￿erentiated
rights, which was mainly written as a response to Kymlicka. As a result, Kymlicka
spent the next years following the publication of his multicultural theory, respond-
ing to his critiques. ￿e most important responses have been collected in an edited
book titled Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship,
which was published in ￿￿￿￿.￿￿ During this intermediate period between ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿￿￿, Kymlicka articulated his understanding of the role of the state in the multicul-
tural era more clearly, and provided a more detailed explanation of the function and
importance of ‘societal culture.’ Moreover, he responded to critics who challenged
his insistence on liberal values, his categorisation of cultures, his unwillingness to
embrace cosmopolitanism and his reluctance to bestow ethnocultural justice upon
the Human Rights project.
It is necessary to examine the ￿ne details of Kymlicka’s theory, especially with
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regards to how he de￿nes societal culture, how he conceptualizes cultures, and how
his project relates to human rights. ￿e latter is of particular importance, because
in chapter ￿ it will be argued that the United Nations should become the facilitator
of a fair process of recognition for minority groups. ￿e case of Armenians, Latins,
Maronites and Roma found in Cyprus, will be used throughout the last three chap-
ters (￿-￿) to demonstrate howmisrecognition can deprive cultures of rights at a pre-
deliberative state, thus placing them at an impossibly disadvantageous state during
the democratic exchange of reasons for the cultural claims that they make.
￿.￿.￿ Societal Culture
Kymlicka’s response to his critiques was constructed around the defence of the im-
portance of “societal culture,” which he treats as central to individual autonomy and
as the bedrock of liberalism. A societal culture, according to Kymlicka, is
a set of institutions, covering both public and private life, with a com-
mon language, which has historically developed over time on a given
territory, which provides people with a range of choices about how to
lead their lives.￿￿
In order for the members of non-dominant cultures to have access to their societal
culture, the state must go beyond merely protecting the minority culture from be-
ing assimilated into the dominant majority. Rather, it must sponsor an alternative
nation-building on behalf of the minority culture.￿is means that the minority cul-
ture “must use the same tools that the majority nation uses in its program of nation-
building”; tools like “standardised public education” and “language requirements for
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citizenship.”￿￿
Ronald Dworkin described societal cultures as associations of people who
share a common “vocabulary of tradition and convention” that underpins every as-
pect of their social engagement and personal evaluation. Without access to societal
culture, people are le￿myopic, since they lack the spectacles needed to see the world
and appreciate or evaluate the options available to them.￿￿
Kymlicka employed the concept of societal culture in response to his cos-
mopolitan critics, to explain why he does not believe that the vision of one uni￿ed
and global culture is possible. Cosmopolitans, he explains, are mostly liberals who
are “almost by de￿nition, people who regret the privileging of national-identities in
political life, and who reject the principle that political arrangements should be or-
dered in such a way as to re￿ect and protect national identities.”￿￿ Kymlicka explains
that it is precisely the importance of one’s own culture that liberals and cosmopolitans
ignored. Liberals in general and cosmopolitans in particular, cannot explain why na-
tional minorities are so passionately trying to “maintain themselves as separate and
self-governing societies.”￿￿ According to the “cosmopolitan alternative” hypothesis
that cosmopolitan theorists like Condorcet advanced, the only logical outcome of
the increasingly interconnected world would be the emergence of a global culture,
which would undermine national and other “old” identities. Nonetheless, this is not
the case, since national minorities are ￿ghting hard to maintain their particularities
whilst at the same time they reform their cultures. Change for national minorities
takes place from within and their national cultures are not abolished in favour of
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an emerging global culture. Culture as a content changes and adapts to the reali-
ties of the world, but culture as a structure remains solid and strong, refuting the
“cosmopolitan alternative” hypothesis.
￿is resilience of national minorities cannot be explained by traditional lib-
eral literature because liberals, Kymlicka argues, have mistakenly di￿erentiated be-
tween civic and ethnic nationalism, promoting the former as opposite to the lat-
ter, suggesting that civic nationality is “forward looking” whilst ethnic nationality
“backward looking.”￿￿ In e￿ect, scholars like Pfa￿ and Ignatief “treat nationalism
as a matter of either political principle (civic nationalism) or ethnic decent (ethnic
nationalism)”￿￿ failing to examine and account for the dynamics of the relationship
between state and culture, since they reject a priori any possible coexistence of lib-
eralism and nationalism. ￿is is so, because they consider the state as an ethnically
neutral institution that is based on “democratic principles, without supporting a par-
ticular identity or culture,” hence providing no room for the explanation of “why na-
tional minorities are so keen on forming ormaintaining political units in which they
are a majority?”￿￿ ￿e traditional liberal explanation is that national minorities are
backward cultures that want to sustain an authentic and exclusionary vision of their
ethnic identity. Liberals therefore fail to account for all those national minorities
who are not backward-thinking and who re-evaluate their traditional doctrines by
reforming their internal structures. ￿is shortcoming of liberal literature is traced
back to the failure of liberal scholars to account for the signi￿cance of societal cul-
ture.
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In §￿.￿ Kymlicka’s challenge towards Ignatief – that the distinction between
civic and ethnic nationalism is counterproductive because it assumes the possibility
of an ethnically neutral liberal state – will be revisited, in support of an alternative
formulation in favour of civic nationalism, but with provisions that control for the
ethnic bias of the liberal state. One that only treats civic identities as important, but
distributes additional rights to minority cultures based on the exceptional treatment
that ethnic majorities receive in a given state. ￿is view is juxtaposed with two al-
ternative conceptions of citizenship, one with an extended-view of ethnicity and one
with a restricted view, both of which are rejected by the end of the chapter. In chap-
ter ￿, the model of nationalism supported is elaborated upon, and it is demonstrated
how it can ￿t within the currently negotiated constitutional framework in Cyprus.
￿.￿.￿ LiberalMulticulturalism and Categorisation of Culture
￿e employment of the concept of societal culture as a liberal justi￿cation for group-
rights has attracted the criticism of theorists like Bhikhu Parekh who is himself one
of the proponents of multicultural accommodation. Parekh questions Kymlicka’s in-
sistence on liberalismbeing the universal value-systemuponwhichmulticulturalism
ought to rely. He argues that most ethnocultural groups in the West are non-liberal
and as such, if any immigrant cultures are to share liberal values as Kymlicka main-
tains, then theywould by de￿nition be integrated, and by extension, any furthermul-
ticultural accommodation would be redundant.￿￿ Kymlicka disputes Parekh’s claim
that the core of the multicultural con￿ict is between liberal and non-liberal ways of
life. “￿ere is no evidence,” he argues, “that the convergences on liberal values be-
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tween majorities and minorities has diminished in any way the level or intensity of
con￿icts over the accommodation of ethnocultural di￿erences.”￿￿ In fact, “for better
or worse, the heart of multiculturalism in the West is about how to interpret liberal
democratic principles, not about whether those principles are legitimate.”
Kymlicka treats national groups and immigrant cultures di￿erently, despite
the fact that they are both under the same threat of assimilation by the dominant
culture, whose interests, values, traditions and history are maintained and promoted
by the institutions of the liberal state.￿is paradox attracted Iris Marion Young’s at-
tention, who criticised Kymlicka for being “too categorical.” ￿at is, Kymlicka was
accused of being too hung up upon his lenient division of the society into national
cultures, immigrant groups and aboriginal peoples.￿￿ Kymlicka therefore had to pro-
vide justi￿cations for two objections: ￿rstly, why did he insist on the categories in the
￿rst place, and secondly, why did he argue that each cultural category is entitled to
di￿erent rights?￿￿
In response to the ￿rst objection, he agreed with Young by saying that “there
are many cases of ethnocultural groups that do not ￿t into the two categories of le-
gal/naturalised immigrants and national minorities.”￿￿ Nonetheless, his theory is
based on this dichotomy since the two categories – immigrant and non-immigrant
cultures – receive di￿erent treatment. ￿e reason for suggesting that each cultural
category must receive di￿erential treatment is explained in relation to the di￿erent
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expectations that they each have. ￿e di￿erence in the expectations of cultural cat-
egories, can be accounted for by observing the di￿erent demands they each make.
As such, a normative theory of liberal multiculturalism, being one that ex-
plains and promotes the rights of cultural groups, is obliged to address these di￿er-
ences and promote solutions that are likely to be accepted by most of the relevant
parties. As Kymlicka explains, the two categories, immigrants and national minori-
ties, have di￿erent expectations, which are based on “di￿erent beliefs about what is
desirable, and about what they are rightfully entitled to.”￿￿ If immigrants were en-
couraged to create and sustain separate societies like national minorities (with insti-
tutions in their native language) then they would be marginalised further, since they
“lack the sort of territorial concentration or historical institutions needed to sustain
a vibrant societal culture.”￿￿ In short, immigrants want better terms of integration
that recognise their ethnic identities, whilst national minorities or aboriginal people
make demands for self-government, which usually re￿ect their historical marginal-
isation by the dominant culture. ￿eir di￿erent demands and expectations call for
di￿erent policies, hence Kymlicka’s categorisation of culture.
But what if an immigrant culture that lives in a geographically concentrated
area, seeks to become a national minority? Should that culture’s claims for self-
governance be met? Kymlicka answers this question by giving the example of Chi-
nese immigrants, whose geographical concentration andnumerical presence inWest-
ern countries is signi￿cant enough to make the scenario of ‘immigrant culture turn-
ing national’ realistic. In order for Chinese to become a national minority, he ex-
plains, they need Chinese-speaking public schools, universities, governmental insti-
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tutions, army-units, hospitals and so on.￿￿ It is therefore impossible for an immigrant
culture to become a national minority. For this reason, the emphasis of immigrant
cultures is not on whether to integrate or secede from a liberal state. Integration is
taken for granted; the demands they make are associated with the terms of the inte-
gration, not integration itself. As Kymlicka explains, “there is no evidence at all that
immigrant multiculturalism is promoting ‘balkanization’ or ‘cultural and linguistic
apartheid’ or ‘partial citizenship’.”￿￿
In chapter ￿, where the ideal to non-ideal transition is addressed, Kymlicka’s
approach to look into empirical cases to support his tripartite distinction between
national minorities, immigrant cultures and aboriginal peoples will be praised, and
the same practice will be extended to cover his conception of culture in order to
avoid essentialist conceptions of group and cultural belonging. For the moment, it is
important to note that Kymlicka’s defence for his cultural typology is an empirically-
grounded one.
￿.￿.￿ Multiculturalism and Human Rights
Once the division between immigrant and non-immigrant cultures is addressed,
the next question relates to the nature of the rights attributed to each of the two
categories. ￿e multicultural rights promoted by Kymlicka are individual rights,
since they provide to individuals access to a societal culture, in order to safeguard
their individual autonomy. Non-Western groups, the objection goes, want collec-
tive rather than individual rights; as such, to provide individualistic justi￿cations of
non-collective rights is to defend a multiculturalism that the members of the minor-
ity cultures – who will be the recipients of these rights – do not abide by. A related
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objection deriving from the individualistic critique, questions the necessity of mul-
ticulturalism as a set of individual rights. ￿e critiques claim that the protection of
the individual rights of citizens is already safeguarded by theUnitedNations through
the Human Rights project, and as such, to have a domestic body (the state) to also
protect individual rights seems redundant.
Kymlicka provides two responses. ￿e ￿rst refutes the argument that multi-
cultural accommodation is individualistic. He uses John Rawls’s defence of freedom
of religion to explain that although on paper the right to exercise one’s religion is an
individual right, in practice and in purpose it enables
religious groups to form and maintain themselves, and to recruit new
members. Basic human rights such as freedom of speech, association,
and conscience, while attributed to individuals, are typically exercised
in community with others, and so provide protection for group life￿￿
￿e second objection – why provide individual rights at the domestic level
if they can be provided universally by the Human Rights project whose function is
already to safeguard individual rights – is one that Kymlicka takes more seriously
and is featuring prominently in his subsequent work. His initial response in ￿￿￿￿
was that human rights were not enough to provide ethnocultural justice because
they promoted “negative rights of non-interference, rather than positive rights to
assistance, funding, autonomy, or public recognition” of minority cultures.￿￿
Moreover, some of the human rights are challenging the interests of cultural
minorities. For example, national governments have encouraged, rather than pro-
hibited, the geographical spread of members of national minorities (which disem-
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, “Human Rights and Ethocultural Justice,” in Politics in the Vernacular: Nation-
alism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, “￿eorizing Indigenous Rights,” in Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Mul-
ticulturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
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powers thempolitically). In other cases, they have encouraged themass geographical
relocation of new immigrants into geographical areas that have been traditionally
inhabited by members of a national minority in order to weaken their geopoliti-
cal power.￿￿ As Kymlicka explains, “there is nothing in the human rights doctrine
that precludes such settlement policies.”￿￿ Not only do human rights say nothing
about these injustices, they include guarantees in Article ￿￿.￿ of the UN Charter for
the “freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state”￿￿ which
might in e￿ect “exacerbate the injustice.”￿￿
A further issue important to cultural minorities that human rights were not
rephrase with at the time when these criticisms were addressed towards Kymlicka,
was the issue of linguistic accommodation. ￿e importance of survival of minority
languages was largely absent from the human rights project. Whereas the use of a
national minority’s language at the institutional level of the state is critical for the
maintenance of its societal culture, the United Nations required that “education at
the senior level [must] be in themajority language”, hence empowering the dominant
majority. In chapters ￿ and ￿ the case of CyprusMaronite Arabic will be presented. It
is a language indigenous to the Maronite community in Cyprus, o￿cially protected
by UNESCO since ￿￿￿￿, and only recognised as an o￿cial language by the Republic
of Cyprus in ￿￿￿￿. It will be demonstrated through the example of CMA how a
minority culture can be deprived of its linguistic identity if its is not promoted at the
level of the institutions of the state.
In short, the relationship between human rights and multiculturalism was
seen as both con￿icting and complimentary; a controlled symbiosis: human rights
￿￿. Kymlicka, “Human Rights and Ethocultural Justice,” ￿￿-￿￿.
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protect individual freedoms and cultural rights provide protection to freedoms that
are not included, or are even contradicted by the human rights doctrine. Kymlicka’s
interest in the international aspects of multicultural accommodation, and speci￿-
cally, the incorporation of multicultural policies by international organisations such
as the United Nations and the European Union, has been intensi￿ed in recent years.
Multiculturalism is no longer treated as a set of national policies complementary
(although sometimes contradicting) to the international policies promoted by the
United Nations, but rather as part of the human rights doctrine.
￿.￿ ￿eory to Policy and Domestic to International
￿e third stage of Kymlicka’s work onmulticulturalism is policy-based. In his recent
work, he treats the theoretical debates that preceded this period as settled, and goes
on to engage with International Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs) in order to
promote the employment of multicultural policies at the international level.￿￿ ￿e
abstract and theoretical debates outlined above are now considered resolved, since,
according to Kymlicka, both the international discourse on human rights and the
dominant theoretical perspective on multiculturalism are both in accordance with
liberalism. To use his words, “the emerging international discourses and norms are
fundamentally liberal in character” and multiculturalism is “a concept that is both
guided and constrained by a foundational commitment to principles of individual
freedom and equality.”￿￿
Nevertheless, some of the older issues are still emerging in Kymlicka’s recent
work, whilst new ones are also added to the agenda. ￿e issue of categorisation, for
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), p.￿￿.
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example, is a recurrent challenge to multiculturalism, which became more promi-
nent once universally applicable solutions were sought. ￿e fact that many minori-
ties do not ￿t the triple division of the society into national minorities, immigrant
groups and aboriginal people, led to “conceptual confusions, moral dilemmas, un-
intended consequences, legal inconsistencies and political manipulations,” but most
importantly, created a dilemma between ‘generic’ and ‘targeted’ approaches”; that is,
a dilemma as to whether to implement standardised rules and policies that ought
to be universally applicable, or whether to respond individually on a case by case
scenario.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Multiculturalism as an International Issue
An interesting addition to Kymlicka’s earlier take on multiculturalism is that now
minority rights are treated as a matter of international concern, and not as a mat-
ter relevant only to the countries that face minority problems.￿is is so because the
existence of ethnic minorities is largely an outcome of the breaking up of earlier Em-
pires, like the Russian and Ottoman Empire, that le￿ some groups on the wrong side
of the fence. In order to protectminorities like for exampleHungarians le￿ in Roma-
nia, or Germans in Poland, “bilateral treaties were established to ensure reciprocal
protecting of co-nationals in neighbouring countries.”￿￿ ￿e protection ofminorities
through bilateral treaties was formalized under the League of Nations, but did not
continue in the post-WWII era, since minority rights were then considered a threat
to national coherence and as such were completely excluded from the international
discourse and were not included either in the Charter of the United Nations or in
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, ￿.
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the ￿￿￿￿Universal Declaration of Human Rights.￿￿ In short, in the post-war period,
national minorities had no role in the international sphere and their only protection
was through individual rights based on the Human Rights Project.
￿is began to change in ￿￿￿￿s, following two directions, one for indigenous
peoples and the other for national minorities, when the international scene became
friendlier towards indigenous peoples. For example, the International Labour Or-
ganisation’sConvention ￿￿￿ “Concerning Indigenous andTribal Populations,”￿￿ which
was adopted in ￿￿￿￿ with the aim of assimilating indigenous peoples into the main-
stream cultures of the nation states, was redra￿ed during the ￿￿￿￿s into the ￿￿￿￿
Convention ￿￿￿, urging for the recognition and the empowerment of indigenous
people and for the abolition of the assimilationist policies against them.￿￿ ￿e same
trend was followed by other IOs as well, like the “United Nations Development Pro-
gram,￿￿ the World Bank,￿￿ the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,￿￿ UNESCO,￿￿ and recent UN World
Conferences.”￿￿ ￿e most important change was in Article ￿￿ of the “International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” which was reinterpreted in ￿￿￿￿ calling for
the adoption of positive measures for the accommodation of minorities.￿￿
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Similar commitments towards the accommodation of culturalminoritieswere
advanced within the European Union as well. As Kymlicka explains:
￿eOSCEwas the￿rst European body tomake an o￿cial declaration on
minority rights, in its Copenhagen Document of ￿￿￿￿ and the Geneva
Document of ￿￿￿￿. It also established the o￿ce of the High Commis-
sioner On National Minorities in ￿￿￿￿, and developed a series of impor-
tant Recommendations relating to minority rights in the sphere of ed-
ucation (￿￿￿￿),￿￿ language (￿￿￿￿),￿￿ e￿ective participation (￿￿￿￿),￿￿ and
broadcasting (￿￿￿￿).￿￿
Based in part on these OSCE norms, the Council of Europe adopted
a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in ￿￿￿￿,￿￿ a
FrameworkConvention for the Protection ofNationalMinorities in ￿￿￿￿,￿￿
and has subsequently established an Advisory Committee tomonitor its
implementations, and a ‘Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the
Protection of National Minorities.’￿￿
￿emost important step taken by the EuropeanUnion was to include respect
for national minorities in the Copenhagen criteria that every country must meet
en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, ￿￿ December ￿￿￿￿.
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prior to its accession into the Union.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Human Rights, Securitisation and Inequality
Kymlicka provides a relational timeline of the evolution of the aforementioned poli-
cies that contributed to the internationalisation of multiculturalism. He identi￿es
the establishment of the human rights project and the desecuritisation of ethnic pol-
itics as the most important historical developments that a￿ected the expansion of
multiculturalism at the global level. Kymlicka’s goal is to overcome what he calls
“methodological nationalism”; when theorists examine the emergence and evolu-
tion of multiculturalism only in relation to a speci￿c case-study, the conclusions of
which they then generalise, falsely assuming that they have a universal validity and
applicability.￿￿
￿e analysis ofmulticulturalism in relation to human rights and security pro-
vides the conceptual ground for the identi￿cation of further causal links. In this
subsection, an outline of these associations will be provided. For example, in exam-
ining the relationship between human rights and multiculturalism, we get insights
as to the association between multiculturalism, liberalisation and democratisation,
which is then related to the parallel examination of multiculturalism and security.
￿is further explains howmulticulturalism correlates with inequality, redistribution
and national solidarity, which in turn fuel or di￿use the fear of immigration and the
attitudes towards multicultural accommodation.
Kymlicka’s analysis of human rights during the third stage of his work is a
continuation from his previous analysis; human rights are seen both as an inspira-
￿￿. European Union, Conclusions Of European Council In Copenhagen, http : / / ec . europa . eu /
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tion and a constraint to the expansion of liberal multiculturalism. ￿e most impor-
tant positive contribution of the human rights project, according to Kymlicka, has
been the discontinuation of the hierarchy of ethnic and “racial” identities, through
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Article ￿, theDeclaration speci￿cally
states that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla-
ration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”￿￿
￿e deconstruction of these hierarchies has been further empowered by decolonal-
isation, since it signi￿ed a move away from European supremacist ideals, and paved
the road to the social rights movement. ￿ese three developments – abolition of
ethnic and racial hierarchies, decolonalization, and social rights – have “inspired
the struggle for minority rights and multiculturalism.”￿￿
Kymlicka identi￿es the impact of human rights not on the rights per se, but
rather on the function of human rights as a universal framework of political legit-
imacy. In other words, human rights provide the necessary limits to the nature of
the policies that are legitimate within a state. If a proposed multicultural policy vio-
lates or even challenges the individual rights protected by the human rights doctrine,
then it is very unlikely that it will get popular support, a￿rming in this way the role
that Kymlicka assigns to human rights as the gatekeeper of liberal democratic val-
ues.￿￿ For example, we don’t see any country that abides by the Charter of the UN
approving practices like female genital mutilation, sex selective abortion, or child
marriages; practices that as Anne Phillips explains have been defended as “cultural”
in criminal courts of liberal states yet have been explicitly rejected.￿￿
￿￿. United Nations,￿e Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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￿is new take on human rights is interesting because it moves the arena of
multicultural struggle from the domestic to the international. In Kymlicka’s earliest
formulation of his theory, ethnocultural justice was to be safeguarded at the level of
the multinational state, whose multicultural policies would provide additional in-
dividual freedoms that would compliment the freedoms protected at the interna-
tional level by the human rights doctrine. Now, the focus has changed, re￿ecting
in a way the general turn of national government away from group-di￿erentiated
policies and towards universalistic ones.￿e turn of governments away from group-
di￿erentiated policies, makes the international arena that is employed by interna-
tional intergovernmental organisations a suitable space for multicultural struggle,
since IOs increasingly gain more authority over national governments. Moreover,
the international nature of IOs gives them the ability and the authority to expand
the application of multicultural policies, since they are able to identify the most suc-
cessful applications of multiculturalism and promote them, coordinating in e￿ect a
spill-over of e￿ective multicultural policies across a wide spectrum of countries.
In putting his trust in IOs and speci￿cally on the human rights doctrine,
Kymlicka is rea￿rming his belief that liberalism is now the uncontested and default
value-system. “In many contexts,” he argues, “IOs have treated liberal multicultur-
alism not simply as the legitimate option amongst others, but as a preferred option,
even as the only legitimate option,” with the best example being the “decision of the
EU and NATO to insist on repect for minority rights as a condition of admission to
these organisations.”￿￿ ￿e old debates about whether liberalism was the appropri-
ate basis for multicultural policies are either settled because the empirical evidence
in support of liberalism is now overwhelming, or are irrelevant because there is no
￿￿￿.
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alluring alternative. All the important IOs, Kymlicka argues, are liberal and promote
the liberal values of freedom, tolerance, autonomy and equality across the globe.
￿ese values are the same values that underpin the multiculturalism he supports,
namely liberal multiculturalism, which is the only plausible multiculturalism that
can exist. “Really existing multiculturalism in theWest is liberal multiculturalism”￿￿
he says boldly, arguing that other forms of multiculturalism based on theorists like
Nietzsche or Herder are con￿ned to the academia and have no impact outside the
classroom, since they have no applicable policy-recommendations, and those who
do, have not been endorsed by policy-makers. So, liberal multiculturalism has won
by default, he argues. In chapter ￿ the Reciprocal Model will be outlined, to explain
how we can assess the claim of Kymlicka that liberal multiculturalism has won; to
question whether it is indeed the case that MC has been successfully embedded in
the foundational documents of intergovernmental institutions.
Kymlicka’s international take on multiculturalism is accomplished through
the lens of human rights and liberalisation, which in turn provide insights into their
relationship with securitization. Imagine it as an incremental cycle that involves lib-
eral democratic values, then human rights as the vehicle of promotion of liberalism
and democracy, and then desecuritisation of ethnic identities, which in e￿ect rein-
forces the adoption of liberal values that restart the cycle. In other words, because
human rights are based on liberal values and promote democracy and because they
have been very important in the abolition of ethnic and racial hierarchies, they cre-
ated a safe space in the domestic public spheres to deliberate upon ethnic issues. In
the past, ethnic policies were treated as a threat either to national solidarity or to
individual freedoms. ￿is misconception was perpetuated through what Kymlicka
calls the traditionalist view of culture. Traditionalists understand cultural claims as
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, p.￿￿￿.
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attempts to sustain an exclusionary, hierarchical, static and authentic view of cul-
ture.￿is perception is mistaken and misleading, since as Kymlicka explains “when
nationalist leaders say that their traditions of law and self-government should be re-
spected, they are really saying that their nation is capable of exercising the right to
decide on issues of law and government” and they do not mean that “they want to
exercise their rights in an ‘authentically traditional’ way.”￿￿
In fact, the traditionalist approach has been proven empirically false. ￿e
main contention against the allocation of self-governmental and territorial rights to
national minorities and indigenous people, as well as polyethnic rights to immigrant
cultures, was that they would shatter national solidarity and destroy the welfare sys-
tem, create ethnic con￿ict and widen social inequalities. Now there is research avail-
able to refute all three of these claims. Multicultural accommodation has not only
facilitated the harmonious coexistence of ethnic cultures, it has also proven to con-
tribute to the reduction of inequality and the spread of democracy and liberalism.
More speci￿cally, a study conducted by Banting and Kymlicka in ￿￿￿￿ demonstrates
the erroneous nature of the most common criticism of multiculturalism, most elo-
quently articulated by David Miller who argued that “radical multiculturalism,” like
the multiculturalism supported by Kymlicka, promotes a thin notion of citizenship
that is not enough to commit the citizens of a state to a redistributive scheme that
would promote equality. “In the absence of a shared identity,” Miller argues, the ma-
jority culture is “asked to extend equal respect and treatment to groups with which
they have nothing in common beyond the fact of cohabitation in the same politi-
cal society.”￿￿ ￿is claim is disproven by Banting and Kymlicka, who have presented
data showing that there is no correlation between strong multicultural policies and
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, ￿￿￿.
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di￿culties maintaining a redistributive welfare system.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Immigrant Multiculturalism and Eastern Europe
Once the debate over multiculturalism is examined through the viewpoint of hu-
man rights, securitisation and equality, the analysis enhances the understanding of
the most controversial and challenging issue of multiculturalism, which is the ac-
commodation of immigrant cultures. Immigration is now one of the most pressing
issues on the agenda of the European Union, where con￿ict-stricken non-Western
immigrant ￿ows, are perceived as a challenge to the ‘liberal way of life’ of the Eu-
ropeans. ￿ere is a view that non-European and non-Western immigrants are less
likely to endorse liberal values, and as such, granting them more recognition is a
threat to liberal-democratic values. “In fact,” Kymlicka explains, “non-European
immigrants today, at least in the New World countries of immigration, exhibit the
same basic tendency to internalise liberal-democratic values.” Hence, the fear that
multicultural accommodation might encourage illiberal ways of life is unwarranted,
since the evidence shows that immigrants do follow and respect the constitutional
rules of their host-country (which are liberal and tied to the human rights doctrine).
Steven Weldon, in a ￿￿￿￿ comparative analysis of states in Western Europe, con-
cludes that countries that implement liberal multicultural policies are more tolerant
than countries who do not, supplementing Kymlicka’s conclusion that immigrant
countries are much better in integrating immigrants, both with respect to democ-
racy and economic prosperity.￿￿ ￿erefore, immigrant multiculturalism in the age
￿￿. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Re-
distribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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of human rights promotes liberal democratic values like tolerance and equality and
not intolerance and segregation as it is argued in the dominant (mostly popular and
to a lesser extend academic) discourse.
On the opposite side of traditional countries of migration that have been the
pioneers of immigrant multiculturalism one ￿nds the countries of Eastern Europe
whohave been reluctant to accommodate immigrant cultures. Once immigrantmul-
ticulturalism is seen through the prism of human rights and securitisation, it is eas-
ier to derive inferences about the multicultural challenges that countries of Eastern
Europe face, and explain the monocultural perspectives that dominate Eastern Eu-
ropean politics. Most Eastern European countries are post-communist countries
that have experienced ethnic violence. In these countries there is still a prevailing
sense of injustice because historical wrongs have not been properly addressed and
reconciled. ￿is undue justice fuels a feeling of resentment that does not allow the
detachment of ethnic politics from security considerations (if not at a practical at
least at an emotional level), obstructing to some extend the potential application of
ethnocultural justice through multicultural accommodation.￿￿
Moreover, the power dynamics in Eastern Europe are di￿erent from the tradi-
tionalWestern examples.￿e historiography ofWestern countries was usually com-
prised of a dominant majority that oppressed the minorities, who were physically
subdued on themerit of their ethnic and “racial” inferior classi￿cation. Inmost East-
ern European countries, with the exception of Cyprus, the role of the oppressor was
undertaken by the minorities who were imposing themselves upon the majorities.￿￿
As such, the Eastern European examples highlight the importance of securitization:
that without the detachment of ethnicity and security, multicultural accommodation is
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, ￿￿￿.
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deemed to be unsuccessful. ￿is, in e￿ect, demonstrates how important the involve-
ment of international institutions is, especially those that can mobilise international
initiatives that would facilitate the alleviation of ethnic hatred.
￿e European Union has not remained idle towards the challenges present
in its Eastern part. It has promoted multiculturalism through four means: ￿rstly, it
promoted the most successful practices of multicultural accommodation; secondly,
it established across the border standards in relation to ethnic minorities that new
countries have to meet prior to their entrance to the Union (included in the Copen-
hagen criteria); thirdly, it formed “￿e O￿ce of High Commission on National Mi-
norities of the Organisation Security and Cooperation in Europe in ￿￿￿￿, which was
linked to OSCE mission o￿ces in several post-communist countries”; and fourthly,
the Council of Europe set up advisory bodies and evaluating mechanisms to mon-
itor the progress of multicultural accommodation across the Union, as part of the
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities.￿￿
￿e endorsement of considerations for territorial autonomy by the bodies of
the European Union was not enhanced further. In fact, there was a backlash since
the Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation ￿￿￿￿, which highlighted the need
to guarantee territorial autonomy. ￿is suggestion was rejected by the Framework
Convention and any subsequent reference to territorial autonomy was omitted.￿is
tendency was perpetuated in other EU bodies as well. As Kymlicka explains, “not
only is territorial autonomy not recognised as a ‘right’, it is not even mentioned as
a recommended practice.”￿￿ ￿e absence of any reference to territorial autonomy is
also continued in “Hague, Oslo and Lund Recommendations adopted by the OSCE
from ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿,” as well as to the dra￿ constitution of the European Union.￿￿
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating theNew International Politics of Diversity, ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿￿.
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￿e new hostile attitude of the EuropeanUnion towards territorial autonomy
is to approach it not as a preferred solution, but rather as a solution of the last re-
sort. ￿e European Union adopted the view of countries like France, Greece and
Turkey, who are particularly hostile to the idea of national minorities being enti-
tled to self-governmental and territorial rights. ￿e new discourse became one of
“inclusive” instead of di￿erential citizenship; the language of territorial autonomy
was dropped and the term national-minority became an umbrella term that covered
more than historical minorities with self-governmental and territorial claims. ￿e
new de￿nition no longer describes “one type of group amongst others in a taxon-
omy of minorities, but rather is becoming an umbrella term used to encompass all
ethnocultural groups.”￿￿
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, ￿￿￿
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Chapter ￿
Liberal Nationalism
Will Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism, which is a central theme of this thesis, is
based upon the assumption that liberalism and nationalism instead of being mutu-
ally exclusive are necessary to each other.￿e only way that the liberal state adheres
to the values of equality and freedom inherent to liberalism is through the accom-
modation of the nationalistic claims of ethnic groups. In Kymlicka’s formulation
of multiculturalism, the liberal state must meet the nationalist demands of cultural
groups in order to safeguard their freedom of choice.
In cases where the cultural identities are securitised, it is important to be able
to acknowledge the nationalist demands of di￿erent groups and accommodate them
within a framework of liberal rights; otherwise, neither the cultures themselves, nor
liberalism, or even the state will bene￿t, because the members of security-aware cul-
tural associations will resort to old-school exclusionary nationalism that will be eso-
teric to the group, and combatant towards other cultures. Whereas in the canonical
examples where theories of MC apply – UK, US, Australia, Canada, France and Ger-
many – the ethnic bias of the state is sometimes di￿cult to recognise, in countries
like Cyprus – a non-traditionally migrant country – the bias of the state towards
￿￿
the dominant ethnic group is ever more profound. As such, in order to be able to
accommodate diverse cultures, one should ￿rst be able to identify the structures of
privilege that govern the society. For this, one needs to disperse with abstract notions
of liberal neutrality, and liberal nationalism provides exactly the means necessary to
do so.
In this chapter, I will examine the theoretical basis of Kymlicka’sMulticultural
Citizenship that is based on the idea of liberal nationalism, pioneered by Yael Tamir
and Je￿ Spinner-Halev, whose work will also be presented here. According to Tamir,
liberal nationalism:
fosters national idealswithout losing sight of other human values against
which national ideals ought to be weighed.￿e outcome of this process
is a rede￿nition of legitimate national goals and the means used to pur-
sue them. Liberal nationalism thus celebrates the particularity of culture
together with the universality of human rights, the social and culture
embeddedness of individuals together with their personal autonomy.￿
￿is rather fresh idea of nationalism through the prism of liberal values, provides a
reformulation of the traditional liberal understanding of culture and the individual
– culture is neither a closed exclusionary society whose membership is determined
by fate, nor a merely voluntary association, and the individual is neither an isolated
abstract atom, nor an inseparable part of its cultural environment. Membership to
a culture is based on choice, but the nature of cultural membership is such that it
a￿ects the life-chances of the choice-maker (individual).
￿is chapter will analyse how liberal nationalism relates to more traditional
understandings of liberalism and nationalism, in order to explain the evolution that
￿. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
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led to Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism. ￿e analysis provided here will be use-
ful in later parts of this thesis, especially chapters ￿ and ￿, when the exportability
of MC will be discussed through the case of Cyprus. ￿is chapter will provide the
theoretical basis that will enable the reader to comprehend the limits of nationalism,
the non-ideal circumstances faced by minority groups in liberal states (discussed in
chapter ￿), and how liberal principles can provide practical action-guidance for lo-
cating the silver lining between liberalism and nationalism. Using the example of
Cyprus, introduced in chapter ￿ and elaborated therea￿er, it will become obvious
how ￿rstly, increased emphasis on the national identities of a group leads to the op-
pression of minority groups, like the Maronites, Armenians, Latins and Roma. Sec-
ondly, how the lack of acknowledgement of the situated nature of individuals leads
to their oppression, and to the escalation of violence, especially in situations where
the national identities are ￿ltered through security considerations for the survival of
a group whose members perceive it to be under a constant threat of extinction.
￿.￿ Individual and Collective Identity
Before discussing the speci￿cs of liberal nationalism, it is important to provide some
classi￿catory remarks as to the di￿erent civil identities that exist, in order to avoid
any categorical confusion. It is necessary to outline the di￿erence and relationship
amongst race, ethnicity and nationality, in order to demonstrate the importance of
nationalism to the liberal multicultural agenda. For liberal nationalists, the e￿ects
that race, ethnicity and nationality have upon the individual are such that they pro-
hibit the detachment of the individual from their constitutive identities. Je￿ Spinner-
Halev, whose work discusses the relationship between these three identities, adopts
Michael Sandel’s communitarian argument that “people cannot be separated from
￿￿
their ends [...] because their identities are constituted by their interests and ends,” to
explain why it is mistaken to abstract individuals from the settings that form their
identities.￿
￿.￿.￿ ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Nationality
Race
￿e ￿rst identity to discuss is race. Race is an identity that is most o￿en utilised
by the dominant culture to denote the perceived inferior status of the members of
a minority group. ￿e characteristic attribute of racial classi￿cation is the implicit
attachment of culture with biology.￿ Once culture is intertwined with biology, mem-
bership becomes a fact of fate; the individual is born in a culture and cannot escape
from it. ￿e racial classi￿cation is used to assert and maintain power hierarchies.
￿e most notable example is slavery. As Spinner-Halev explains, long before the ide-
ological justi￿cations for the existence of slavery in the United States developed, the
primary justi￿cation was that of biology.￿ ￿e slaves belonged to a race, which was
biologically inferior to the Europeans. As such, the racial classi￿cation had a dou-
ble role; it identi￿ed the members of the minority group and also positioned them
within the social hierarchy by establishing their biological inferiority.
Racism does not necessarily stem from the state, although when a racial clas-
si￿cation is used by the state to denote the members of a given group, then the racial
identity is rea￿rmed, minimising the ability of the members of the racially de￿ned
group to rede￿ne or negotiate the content of their culture.￿
￿. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism And￿e Limits Of Justice, ￿nd (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿; Je￿ Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality
In￿e Liberal State (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿￿.
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Ethnicity
Ethnicity is the second identity that will be discussed in this chapter, which contrary
to “race,” is not an imposed one, even though it might have originated “from with-
out”; that is, it might have originally been used by the members and institutions of
a majority culture to de￿ne the members of a minority, yet today, it is reclaimed by
the members of the minority, who use it to express the particularities of their way
of life.￿ In short, cultural members use ethnicity as a source of identity in order to
de￿ne their national origin and the traditions and history speci￿c to it. ￿erefore
ethnicity is important for cultural reasons.
￿is means that ethnicity is not a matter of fate. Whilst one is born into an
ethnic culture, they have the option to reinterpret or disassociate from it. Ethnicity,
contrary to “race,” does not lock its members ad in￿nitum and as such, does not use
biological justi￿cations for the maintenance of the ethnic identity. Instead, it uses
cultural reasons. Ethnic membership provides the moral framework upon which
the individual is based to form a life-plan, comprehend their options, and make in-
formed choices. Depriving the individual of that structure, it is to deprive them from
themeans to live an autonomous life.￿is, as we saw in chapter ￿, is the foundational
premise of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism. In chapters ￿ and ￿ di￿erent conceptions of
culture will be explored, to see ￿rstly, whether it is indeed the case that someone
can exit their ethnic group; secondly, that culture provides a context-of-choice for
all; and ￿nally, whether the bundle of identities that form the ethnic whole should
indeed be protected and promoted by the liberal state.
￿e members of immigrant and national cultures might both make ethnic
claims, where they both want their ethnic identities maintained and their cultural
￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿. ￿￿-￿￿.
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particularities recognised and respected. Whereas they both canmake ethnic claims,
their aspirations and desired outcomes di￿er. Members of immigrant cultures want
better terms of integration to themainstream culture, through the recognition – “cel-
ebration” – of their ethnic identity. ￿e more comfortable the liberal state makes
them feel, the easier their integration into their host society will be. National mi-
norities on the other hand, as we will see in the following subsection, ask for political
autonomy, seeking di￿erentiation rather than integration, since their perception of
their cultural identity is tied to a geographical area. ￿erefore, ethnic claims can be
exempli￿ed in two ways, either through demands for more integration or demands
for di￿erentiation and political autonomy.
It is important to grasp the di￿erence between national and ethnic minori-
ties. ￿ey both make claims in the name of their ethnic identity. ￿e reason and
the justi￿cation behind their claims, relate to the importance of the maintenance of
their ethnic identity. As such, both national and ethnic claims are claims related to
ethnocultural membership.￿e point where they depart relates to the nature of their
claims, and not to the justi￿cation of them. ￿ey are both making demands in the
name of their ethnic identity.
As it will be evident in chapter ￿ where the case of Cyprus will be presented,
some cultures might have all the attributes of a national group except for a sense of
ethnic belonging. ￿ese cultures, like the Cypriot Latins, are o￿en disadvantaged
because they don’t ￿t into the mainstream de￿nition of an ethnocultural group.
￿.￿.￿ Nationality
National claims are claims of ethnic cultures tied to a piece of land – when ethnic
cultures make demands of self-government and political autonomy, o￿en related
￿￿
to a speci￿c geographical area. “National claims are so much more explosive than
ethnic claims,” Spinner-Halev argues, “because the former are tied up with claims
to a certain piece of land and a desire for some sort of political autonomy”.￿ ￿e
most common and most authoritative de￿nition of nationality comes from Bene-
dict Anderson, who de￿nes the nation as “an imagined political community,” which
is “imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.￿ ￿e nation then is an imag-
ined, limited and sovereign community; attributes that we need to deconstruct in
order to capture the meaning of nationality.
Nationality is imagined because it does not rely on any other source of assess-
ment or approval, other than the collective imagination; the shared view ofwhat con-
stitutes a culture. “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuine”,
Anderson argues, “but by the style in which they are imagined.” It is also limited
because, whatever the size, a nation has a beginning and an ending. As Ander-
son explains, “the nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them,
encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has ￿nite, if elastic, bound-
aries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with
mankind.” Moreover, a nation is sovereign, because the very concept of the nation
emerged at a period when Enlightenment and Revolution destroyed “the legitimacy
of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.” Nations are self-ruling en-
tities, or groups which aspire to self-governance. Finally, a nation is a community,
because it is “always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” It is a fraternity
of people “willing to die for such limited imaginings”.￿
￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿-￿￿.
￿. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re￿ections On￿e Origin And Spread Of Nation-
alism, ￿nd revised (London: Verso, ￿￿￿￿), ￿.
￿. ibid., ￿.
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￿.￿.￿ Liberal Nationalist Identity
In chapter ￿ and ￿ the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism will be dis-
cussed in amore elaboratemanner, in order to tease outwhich of the two conceptions
of nationality are more suited to the purpose of cultural accommodation of minor-
ity groups in a liberal state. Having completed the discussion on the three identities
– “race,” ethnicity, nationality – mostly discussed in the context of public recogni-
tion, the next point of interest is the conception of nationality that is promoted by
liberal scholars, which guides Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism. Hence, a very par-
ticular conception of nationality will be discussed, called liberal nationalism, which
introduces the concept of the “situated individual” as an alternative to the “abstract
individual” traditionally present in liberal conceptions of the self. ￿e idea of lib-
eral nationalism is the one underpinning Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism, and
provides the ammunition with which he defends the demands of national cultures
for political autonomy within the liberal state.
￿e nationalist conception of individual identity, consists of two central fea-
tures, argues Yael Tamir.￿ese are “the need to live one’s life from the inside and the
need to be rooted.”￿￿ We cannot abstract the individual from their communal set-
ting, because outside that setting, the individual cannot be conceptualised. As such,
culture is necessary in understanding the individual, and therefore necessary for the
individual to understand the world. ￿is dualism employed in understanding the
modern individual, explains ￿rstly, the function of culture as a point of reference
and as vehicle of interpretation of the world, and secondly, the individual as a crea-
ture who needs a communal setting to lead a valuable life.
￿e aforementioned conception of the modern individual provides the justi-
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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￿cation for the rejection of the dichotomous classi￿cation of voluntary and involun-
tary associations.￿emainstream conception amongst liberal scholars is that ethnic
groups and nations are “communities of fate,” which are involuntarily assigned based
on birth right, whilst states are voluntary associations based on choice.￿is is false,
since membership both to a state and to a nation is “a matter of destiny rather than
choice,” because individuals are bornwithin these collectives. As such, to distinguish
between the two and classify the state as a choice-driven association and the nation
as fa ate-driven association ismisleading.￿ey similarly rely on both fate and choice,
and they both rely upon liberal principles of justice to ensure the right of their mem-
bers to disassociate themselves from the group (state or nation) or reinterpret the
content of their (civil or national) identity.￿￿
￿at being said, national cultures have not always respected the right of choice
of the individual, a fact that leads many liberals to reject nationalism altogether.
Spinner-Halev explains that nationalisms can be both good and bad. “￿e myth of
the nation-state and the exclusionary potential of nationalism and its expansionary
designs lead some to reject nationalism,” he argues, but that should not be gener-
alised, leading to an overall rejection of nationality, since there is both good and
bad nationalism.￿￿ Nationalism is “good,” when it materialises the struggles of op-
pressed populations for independence, leading to them overthrowing their oppres-
sors. Nationalism is “bad,” when it refuses equal rights of citizenship to non-national
members of a nationalist state. Based on this di￿erentiation between good and bad
nationalism, liberals have tended to favour nationalist movements rather than na-
tionalistic states. “Nationalist movements o￿en have a romantic side that attracts
liberals,” whilst nationalist states can be “exclusionary andmay also have expansion-
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿￿.
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ist designs,” although nationalism is overall considered contradictory to liberalism,
and it is only accepted in extreme cases.￿￿
To take such a negative stance towards all or most nationalistic claims would
be mistaken. It is sometimes in the interest of the liberal polity to decide to ac-
commodate nationalistic demands.￿e obvious reason to accommodate the claims
of a culture for self-governance, or even secession, is for the avoidance of violence.
Sometimes it is necessary to grant political autonomy to some groups in order to
avoid bloodshed. ￿ere are times where secession is the only option, where history
precludes any solution other than separation.
￿e other reason why separation might be preferable has to do with the us-
age of language. Anderson explains how the rise of nationalism was underpinned by
the printing press, through the spreading of print languages across large geograph-
ical areas. He argues that “print languages laid the bases for national consciousness
in three distinct ways.” First, they created “uni￿ed ￿elds of exchange and commu-
nication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars.” Secondly, printed books
enabled the sustenance of the “image of antiquity” that is necessary for the mainte-
nance of the imagined vision of the nation across time and geography. Finally, the
mainstream adoption of the printing press created “languages-of-power,” who sus-
tained ethnocultural dominance over the cultures whose languages were in a lower
position in the hierarchy of linguistic in￿uence.￿￿
Language provides a double justi￿cation for national demands for self gover-
nance. Firstly, the use of language has created a hierarchy of cultures, against which
the cultures whose languages are not mainstream print-languages need to take mea-
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
￿￿. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re￿ections On￿e Origin And Spread Of Nationalism, ￿￿-
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sures. Secondly, the evolution of print-capitalism has enabled the creation, suste-
nance and expansion of national cultures, and as such it explains why national cul-
tures want self-governmental rights in the ￿rst place.
￿e importance of language provides another insight into the nature of ethnic
claims. Language politics are claims for linguistic recognition and accommodation
in the public sphere. As such, they demonstrate that ethnic identity is not restricted
to the private realm, as it a￿ects the public life of individuals, whose language might
or might not be used by the institutions of the state. Hence, the language battles
of ethnic cultures make ethnicity a matter of both private and public consideration.
As such, those who consider ethnic identity as irrelevant to the proceedings of the
liberal state are mistaken, since they refuse to take notice of the e￿ect that the lib-
eral state can have upon ethnic minorities. Kymlicka understands the importance of
language, since it underpins his conception of ethnicity as an identity not con￿ned
to the private sphere. ￿e need for linguistic accommodation of ethnic minorities
is therefore a public matter and the state must take positive measures to ensure the
continuation of the language of cultural minorities, because language is connected
to the survival of the culture.
In §￿.￿, when the exportability of MC beyond its dedicated contexts will be
discussed, there will be a further probe into the role of language within the ethnic
whole, to question whether one can indeed argue that access to a cultural context
should be considered a primary good, even in those cases where individuals disas-
sociate from their cultures; the argument being that language, which is part of the
ethnic bundle of identities, is a necessary vehicle in the process of overcoming one’s
culture, and as such it ￿lters the options which one can comprehend, as well as her
ability to leave her culture behind.
￿e issue of the public nature of ethnic identity will be further discussed in
￿￿
the next section, where the role and treatment of ethnicity within the bounds of the
liberal state will be analysed.
￿.￿ Liberal Citizenship and the Failures of the Liberal
State
Liberal nationalists argue that ethnic identity ismistakenly dismissed by liberal schol-
ars as private. ￿e liberal state, they argue, weakens ethnic identity and as such, to
claim that it is neutral would be false. Moreover, the state implicitly adopts some
cultural norms; norms which are embedded into its institutions. As liberalism is
predominantly considered “a philosophy of institutions,” ethnocultural bias is in-
herent into the liberal state itself.￿￿ In this section, the demands and e￿ects of the
liberal state upon ethnic cultures and identities will be discussed, to explain why
liberal nationalists claim that the liberal state is obliged to take action towards the
accommodation of ethnic minorities.
￿e importance of conceptually grasping the ethnic bias of the liberal state
cannot be overstated, and will be even more evident in chapter ￿ where the di￿er-
ences between theory and practice will become more evident. ￿e di￿erence be-
tween the ideal conceptions of society and the everyday experience of individuals
will be highlighted, in order to demonstrate later in subsequent chapters, how cul-
tures in Cyprus and elsewhere have been oppressed because the innate bias of the
liberal state was not factored into the design of their institutions.
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿￿.
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￿.￿.￿ Liberal State and Ethnicity
￿e liberal state, Spinner-Halev argues, makes demand on its citizens. “Liberal citi-
zenship is far more robust that is usually acknowledged; it demands that liberal cit-
izens act toward their fellow citizen in a certain way, even if they want to act oth-
erwise.”￿￿ It prescribes how should citizens act in public – they should treat each
other with respect when they meet, and they should hide their prejudices when con-
fronting their fellow citizens and (at least) pretend that everyone is equal.￿ismeans
that liberal citizenship relies upon liberal values, which by de￿nitionmake liberalism
a theory that is not merely institutional and neutral. Liberal citizenship, according
to liberal nationalists is not only “a theory of pluralism” and it cannot “be neutral on
the good life and allow an in￿nite variety of ways of life to ￿ourish.”￿￿ ￿erefore, lib-
eral nationalists, ￿rst and foremost challenge the supposed neutrality and pluralism
of liberal theory, by assessing it through its practice, exposing its ethno-national bias
in favour of Western conceptions of the good life.
In doing so, the liberal state is shi￿ing the focus from the ethnic to the state
level. ￿is practice is not con￿ned to ethnic cultures since it also applies to non-
ethnic groups, which are encouraged to think themselves as part of a wider whole.
Spinner-Halev gives the example of “people of colour,” where Blacks, Latinos and
Asian Americans were encouraged to think themselves as “people of colour,” deval-
uating in e￿ect their individual identities as Blacks, Latinos or Asian Americans.￿￿
By shi￿ing the focus, the liberal state devalues the aforementioned ethnic and non-
ethnic identities. When people think more of the wider whole, they think less of
their own cultural group – the ethnic whole is fading in the side of the civil whole
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿￿.
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that is the state.￿is distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of identity will
further be discussed in §￿.￿, where di￿erent formulations of nationalismwill be con-
sidered, in deciding which can more e￿ectively underpin a theory of multicultural
citizenship that can be exported beyond the standard countries of application.
Liberal nationalists consider liberal citizenship a failed project, they consider
that it has failed because the liberal state does not and cannot achieve the ideals of
liberal theory. Je￿ Spinner-Halev gives three justi￿cations for the failure of the state
to stand true to its ideological values. Firstly, liberals do not use force to ensure the
transmission and adoption of their values. As such, they rely only on persuasion to
change people’s values, attitudes and beliefs. Secondly, liberals rely on laws to achieve
equality, so citizens need to go to court in order to defend their rights. Going to
court costs money and time, which not all members of a liberal citizenry can a￿ord.
￿irdly, the reliance on the law, “obscures howpowerworks.” Liberals, it is argued, do
not have the conceptual tools to understand “social pressures that work to change the
way people act”; they cannot understand how individuals might be theoretically free
but practically unable to perform certain actions that are guaranteed by the liberal
theory and would supposedly be protected by the liberal state.￿￿
￿is is what IrisMarionYoung de￿ned as the￿ve faces of oppression.￿￿ Young
identi￿ed exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural dominance and vi-
olence as ￿ve sources of oppression that exist within the liberal state, despite the
formal protections that are guaranteed by it. ￿e structures that lead to oppression,
will become central to the conception of MC that will be defended in the remainder
of this thesis.￿e justi￿cation of group-di￿erentiated treatment will be defended as
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿. IrisMarion Young, Justice And￿e Politics Of Di￿erence (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿
a way to counterbalance the unearned privilege that structural bias provides. ￿e
equality-based defence of cultural rights will be provided in §￿.￿.￿ and will be based
on the examples found in the case of Cyprus outlined in §￿.￿. A practical application
of the equality-driven conception of MC on Cyprus is attempted in the ￿nal chap-
ter ￿, where practical suggestions are given on how an equality-based conception of
cultural rights can be integrated into the negotiated constitution.
￿.￿.￿ Liberal State and Racial Groups
￿e most notable failure of the liberal state to live up to its theoretical standards is
the case of “people of colour.” Speci￿cally, the case of black people demonstrates
that there is a lot of room for illiberal practices within, but most importantly on
behalf, of the liberal state. People of colour did not merit the same standards of non-
discrimination and equality that the rest of the citizens of the liberal state enjoyed.
More speci￿cally, in the United States, blacks have been consistently excluded from
the mainstream society, by being subjected to all of Young’s sources of oppression.￿￿
￿e case of people of colour demonstrates the e￿ect of social exclusion. Whilst
ethnics are assimilated into the dominant cultures and gradually lose their distinctive
identity, people of colour, by being excluded, have created their own, parallel com-
munity; a community that stands within the bound of the formal state, but opposite
the mainstream society.￿￿
￿e fact that there is racismwithin the liberal state ￿￿ might lead to the wrong
￿￿. Young, Justice And￿e Politics Of Di￿erence; Martha Ackelsberg and Mary Lyndon Shanley,
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Culture And Equality: An Egalitarian Critique Of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, ￿￿￿￿),
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State, ￿￿￿.
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conclusion that racism and liberalism are the same, or that they are inevitably related.
Such conclusions would be mistaken. ￿e alternative view would be that racism
exists in a liberal state, despite the fact that the state is liberal. Racism is a failure of
the liberal state and not the cause of it.￿e reasons for the failure of the liberal state
in relation to racism are similar to above. Firstly, liberals￿￿ are democrats relying on
democratic institutions, which “cannot ensure that power is always used judiciously”;
as such, “a group of people can be oppressed by the government with little resource
if their fellow citizens do not care about them.” Secondly, the version of equality
most favourable to liberals is formal equality, meaning the enactment of laws that
treat everyone the same. Beyond that, the only function of the state is to cultivate a
culture of equality rather than actually enforce equality. Finally, liberals do not take
into account how the power-structure works, referring again to Young’s ￿ve faces of
oppression that go beyond the formal guarantees of the state.￿￿
In short, to summarise the main premise of the perceived failure of the lib-
eral state, as has been developed in this subsection through the example of people of
colour, is to argue that even if absolute equality and neutrality prevailed in the insti-
tutions of government and employment, the opportunities for white people would
be much more than those for black people, because the institutions, during their
initial design, were modelled based on the way of life of white people. As such, the
abstraction of the individual from their ethnocultural environment is mistaken.￿e
liberal political order. “Liberal state” is used in the context of challenging ideal conceptions of how
the liberal state ought to function.
￿￿. “Liberals” is used in its wider sense, encompassing people with vastly di￿erent conceptions of
liberalism.￿e term “liberals” as it is used here, is focused on the foundational premises of liberalism
defended by the pioneers of classical liberalism like Locke and J.S.Mill. Although it can be extended
to include extreme strands of liberals, like libertarians, the emphasis is placed on liberal egalitarians
who develop theories of distributive justice without taking into consideration the unjust structures
of society.
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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individual must be analysed within their social context according to liberal nation-
alists. ￿e most frequent way of performing this abstraction, causing in e￿ect the
aforementioned failure of the liberal state, is through the treatment of ethnic iden-
tity and national membership as a matter of private concern.
￿.￿.￿ Liberal Citizenship and Private and Public Dimension
Richard Rorty makes the traditional liberal argument in favour of the public and
private distinction. Ethnic and cultural considerations Rorty argues, should be le￿
at home, they should “simply be ignored for purposes of designing political institu-
tions.” Ethnic identity, Rorty continues, has “no place, although any individualwould
be free to live accordingly to his own cultural practices without either interference
or subsidy.”￿￿
A similar outcome is derived from Chandran Kukathas’s theory of multicul-
trualism. Kukathas argues that freedom of association is the fundamental principle
that should guide a free society. Two further principles are implied by freedom of
association – ￿rstly, the ability to disassociate from a group freely (Kukathas calls
it “the principle of disassociation”), and secondly, the mutual respect of all associ-
ations (“the principle of mutual toleration”). ￿e liberal state is a political society,
which is nothing more than another association. As such, the only authority that
the state has is related to the freedom of individuals, which means that its role is to
safeguard the aforementioned freedom of association and its two constitutive prin-
ciples. ￿erefore, the state can exercise no judgement upon the nature or identity
of associations. ￿e state cannot have an opinion about whether an ethnic associa-
tion is liberal or not, it should merely accept the fact that the culture exists and just
￿￿. RichardRotry,Objectivity, Relativism andTruth: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
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make sure that individual members can disassociate freely from it. In this formula-
tion of liberal theory ethnic identity is a matter personal to the individual, it is not
something that has room within the realm of the state.￿e individual is responsible
for their ethnic loyalties and the state ought to exercise no authority over individual
choice, since it has no authority to judge the ethnic “choices” of individuals because it
would violate their freedom of association, which would go against their freedom of
conscience. Freedom of conscience is the ability of the individual to choose what life
plan suits them best. If the liberal state forbids any version of the good life, then the
state does not treat the individual as free. So, when Kukathas says that “the princi-
ples of a free society describe not a hierarchy of superior and subordinate authorities
but an archipelago of competing and overlapping jurisdictions”, he means that the
state should be indi￿erent towards the ethnic identities of individuals, since they are
a private matter – individuals can choose their ethnic allegiances as they can choose
to interact with the state or not.￿￿
Rotry and Kukathas, following diametrically opposed routes and fundamen-
tally di￿erent justi￿cations, both suggest that ethnic identity is a private matter of
the individual. Liberal nationalists challenge this exact conclusion. ￿ey argue that
traditional liberals, like Kukathas, do not take into account the e￿ect that the lib-
eral state has upon individual identities. ￿e state is not merely another association
as Kukathas argues, but rather an overarching structure that a￿ects the individual
associations of its citizenry. It a￿ects their attitudes, their loyalties and their identi-
ties. Liberal citizenship is not as thin as Kukathas argues. Even if we were to follow
Kukathas, then the liberal state as it exists todaywould be illiberal.￿is demonstrates
that there is indeed a discrepancy between the idealised theory and the non-ideal ap-
￿￿. Chandran Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿.
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plication of the theory, which is something that liberal nationalists consider central
to their defence of nationality.
￿e private and public dichotomy is by no means particular to liberalism.
Marx himself, in his essay On￿e Jewish Question, di￿erentiated between the “uni-
versal” and the “egoistical,” between the private and public man. According toMarx,
the state should destroy the identities that cause di￿erentiation, because there is a
contradiction between the individual as part of a society and the individual as a pri-
vate being.￿e latter is eroding the public space that is the civil society and the state.
For this reason,Marxwas judgemental towards the liberal state for tolerating the pri-
vate identity of Jews, whilst allowing them to enjoy the privileges of citizenship.￿e
obligations towards the community are in con￿ict with the obligations towards the
state. As such, according to Marx, the state, for reasons of self-preservation, should
destroy the Jewish private identity for the common good, in order to avoid an ero-
sion of citizenship, which is something universal and should not be obstructed by
private, egoistical considerations, like the ones stemming from a membership to a
culture, ethnic group or religion.￿￿
Within liberal theory, the division between private and public is most beau-
tifully exempli￿ed in Locke’s work, speci￿cally in his Second Treatise of Government
and his Letter Concerning Toleration, which were both published in the same year.￿￿
In the latter, he gives a lucid justi￿cation of the public/private dichotomy based on
toleration and freedom of religion. In the Letter, Locke was addressing the con￿ict
between the di￿erent Christian denominations that existed in England. Locke sug-
gested that the a￿airs of the civil government be separated from the a￿airs of reli-
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿. John Locke, Two Treatises Of Government, Edited by Peter Laslett, Cambridge Texts in the His-
tory of Political￿ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]); John Locke,A Letter
Concerning Toleration (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]).
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gion.￿is was contrary to Hobbes, who argued that a state needs a uniform religion
to function well. Locke’s argument was that religious con￿ict in the public sphere
only causes civil unrest, and that the only way to prevent this unrest, was by separat-
ing religion and the public sphere, namely civil government.￿us, Locke, suggested
to make religion “politically irrelevant” so that peace was safeguarded.￿￿
Spinner-Halev suggested an alternative formulation of the private and public
split, which better explains the current situation regarding the ethnocultural bias of
the liberal state. According to Spinner-Halev, liberal theorists following Locke have
been wrong to insist upon the public-private dichotomy – instead, they should have
separated the spheres of interaction based on the trichotomy: private-civil-public.
￿e introduction of the notion of civil society can provide the conceptual means to
address the inequalities of citizenship that liberal nationalists employ to justify their
claims for group-di￿erentiated rights to ethnonational minorities. Civil society does
not have a concrete meaning, but generally it is used to “refer to institutions and
associations that are not controlled by the state but that serve the public in many
ways, institutions like the media, stores, factories, and corporations.”￿￿
￿e introduction of civil society explains how some institutions that are cast
as private in the public/private conundrum, become public when understood as
parts of the civil society. Institutions like education, religion and employment might
not be strictly under the public domain that is reserved by the state, but that does
not make them private, because they are communal and a￿ect people’s abilities.￿is
is where the principle of non-discrimination should apply, liberal nationalists argue.
Non-discrimination is understood as the guarantee that no one is excluded based
on their membership to a group, culture or association. Ethnic membership is one
￿￿. Spinner-Halev,￿e Boundaries Of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, And Nationality In￿e Liberal
State, ￿￿-￿￿.
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such association, which is public, because it provides a public context within which
individuals live their lives, and through which individuals make sense of the world.
To restrict religion or ethnicity to the private sphere is to reject the public nature of
these associations and the contextual understanding of the individual.
In order to fully grasp the problematic nature of the private and public di-
chotomy, the understanding of the state needs to be revised. An account of the rela-
tionship between the state and the nation is needed in order to explain how the role
of the state has changed since Locke’s defence of the private and public separation
based on tolerance and freedom of religion.
￿.￿ ￿e State and the Nation
In this subsection, the discussion will focus on the di￿erences of the modern state in
comparison to the Lockean conception presented above, analysing the relationship
between nationalism and the state, which according to liberal nationalists, is not as
contradictory as traditional liberals like to emphasise. ￿e discussion in this part
will be about the falsity of the contractual nature of the liberal state. A secondary,
underlying argument that will be presented in relation to the communal nature of
the liberal state, is that it is itself based on nationalist principles.
In order to understand how unjust structures generate privilege to members
of the dominant group, we need to examine how states function in non-ideal con-
texts, and speci￿cally, how the institutions of the state are used for the purposes of
nation building. ￿e case of Cyprus that will be presented in chapter ￿ will provide
ample examples of how the state can be used to promote the values of the dominant
group, thus supporting the view that the liberal state can only be neutral in ideal con-
ceptions of the state, leading to the conclusion that more emphasis is needed on the
￿￿
non-ideal cases. In this section, the evolution of the concept of nation-building will
be outlined, in order to provide a theoretically informed outlook of nation-building,
which will precede the subsequent examination of the case of Cyprus.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Banality of the Social Contract
￿e modern liberal state, Yael Tamir argues, is not an association based on contract,
but rather a community of people sharing similar values.￿￿ ￿e state is perceived
through the lenses of the nation, making the nation-state a community of individ-
uals instead of an association; a place that gives structure and resources to the indi-
vidual, rather than merely a framework of mutual disinterestedness.￿e state there-
fore, should not be understood in the traditional minimal understanding that social
contract theorists like Locke used, but rather as something more binding and com-
mitting; like a group of communities of situated individuals.
Contract implies choice and voluntary membership, yet one is born into the
liberal state. If one is the child of two British citizens, that child will by de￿nition
be a British National. If one is born a child of two practising Catholics, that child
will most likely be a Catholic. If a child is born by two Muslim British Citizens, that
child will be, most likely, a Muslim British Citizen. Membership both to states and
to cultures is not entirely voluntary, nor entirely a matter of fate. Tamir explains that
the traditional liberal distinction between voluntary and involuntary associations is
highly problematic. “￿e liberal tradition,” Tamir argues, “views states as voluntary
associations [...] while relating to nations and ethnic groups as communities of fate.”
￿is is mistaken, because membership both to a state and a national culture is of an
intermediary nature; it is neither voluntary nor involuntary, since “most individuals
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿￿.
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are born into a nation and a state, thus making membership in these associations a
matter of destiny rather than choice.”
Whilst this is so, liberal states have favoured “birthright over choice as a cri-
terion of membership.”￿￿ Liberal states grant membership to the o￿spring of their
members, even if the aforementioned o￿spring has never visited, or expressed any
interest in associating with the birthplace of their parents. Choice, in this context, is
absent, and birthright trumps any other criterion of membership.
￿e same applies in cases where individuals challenge the code of conduct
(the contractual rules) of the liberal state. Tamir gives the example of a militant an-
archist. ￿e liberal state is unlikely to challenge the status of that person’s member-
ship (citizenship) because birthright – the fact that the person in question had the
luck to be born in the said state – is stronger than choice; it refutes the fact that the
militant anarchist challenges the foundations of the state. In contractual terms, mem-
bership is a matter of consent; a person accepts the terms of the contract as binding.
If membership to a state were contractual, then those who do not follow the rules of
the contract would be breaching the contract, which would automatically mean that
their membership would be either suspended or terminated. “Liberals would not
agree with the suggestion that there could be circumstances under which the state
would be justi￿ed in denying citizenship,” and as such, the claim that membership
to a culture or a nation di￿ers from membership to a state insofar as the latter is an
association and not a community is profoundly mistaken.￿￿
￿e case of France is illuminating in demonstrating that the modern nation-
state is indeed a community that promotes certain cultural values. In France, the
scarf a￿air (l’ a￿aire du foulard) is a long-standing issue regarding the prohibition of
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
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religious clothing in schools. ￿e clash between the French authorities and Muslim
scarf-wearing students started in October ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ when three Muslim girls were ex-
pelled from their school in Creil (Oise) by the headmaster of Gabriel-Havez College.
￿e clash continued in November ￿￿￿￿ with the expulsion of further twenty-three
girls following the decision of the Conseil d’Etat (French Supreme Court, in Novem-
ber ￿, ￿￿￿￿). ￿e Supreme Court decided that wearing religious clothing violates
the “principle of laïcité,” which is a principle whose meaning intersects the concept
of secularism and state-neutrality. ￿is ￿￿￿￿ decision of the Supreme Court, caused
major social con￿icts amongst social actors (teachers, politicians, religious groups,
intellectuals and so on), which were further enhanced when the Minister of Edu-
cation François Bayrou on September ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ issued what became known as the
Bayrou Guidelines, which allowed students to wear “discrete religious symbols” in
schools, but excluded the scarf, since it was deemed as an unacceptable religious
attire.
￿e principle of laïcité is a national value endemic to France, originating in
the republican principles of the French revolution. Hence, as Tamir explains, it re-
￿ects their “civic national culture”; a set of national values that are endorsed, safe-
guarded and promoted by the French state, challenging the perceived neutrality of
the liberal French state. As Tamir puts it:
￿e separation of state and religion in French schools re￿ect their civic
national culture... In these cases, refusing individuals the right to express
their culture in the public sphere in compliance with the ruling culture
compels them to forgo their identity.￿￿
￿is explains why the French state ismore than a contractual association; instead it is
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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a community that promotes a certain set of cultural values. If the liberal state ought
to be neutral towards cultural values as traditional liberals argue, then it should be
committed to distributing a “fair share of cultural expenditure.”￿is means that the
state should allocate the same funds to themaintenance ofminority national cultures
as it does for the maintenance of the values of the majority culture. In this formu-
lation of the liberal nationalist argument in favour of rights to national minorities,
Tamir provides a justi￿cation based on liberal equality and freedom of choice. “￿is
approach”, she argues, “calls for distributing an equal number of cultural vouchers to
each citizen, and allowing individuals to consume culture according to each citizen,
and allowing individuals to consume culture according to their own preferences.”￿￿
￿e liberal state, as it has been demonstrated, is not a neutral contractual
association but a community of individuals who share institutions that are based on
collective values. As such, the state is a nation-state that engages in nation-building
practices. ￿at is, it engages in practices that support and promote these collective
values, as it has been demonstrated through the example of France. We now need to
understand what exactly is nation-building, and how did it take precedence in the
liberal state. Hence, in the next subsection, we will discuss how the state came to
embody the nation.
￿.￿.￿ Philosophical Origins of the Nation-State
￿e state and the nation are two concepts that have been combined, creating the
modern understanding of the nation-state. ￿e theoretical origins of the nation-
state are found inRousseau’s idea of the general will. Rousseau, in the Social Contract,
writes:
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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So long as several men united consider themselves a single body, they
have but a single will, which is concerned with their common preserva-
tion, and the general welfare.￿￿
Rousseau revolutionised the relationship between individuals and authority.￿e au-
thority lay in the will of the people, and not on the will of a king or a despot. ￿e
concept of the “general will” is the self-rule of the people. ￿e people are the state
and the state re￿ects the will of the people. When understanding the state as the em-
bodiment of the general will of the people, those who deviate from the popular will,
are challenging the state, and diversity of wills is threatening the welfare of the state,
and in e￿ect, the well-being of the people. Rousseau explains what happens when
the general will is undermined:
When the social knot begins to weaken; when particular interests begin
to make themselves felt and small societies to in￿uence the larger soci-
ety, the common interest diminishes and meets with opposition, votes
are no longer unanimous, the general will is no longer the will of all,
contradictions and disagreements arise, and the best opinion no longer
carries the day unchallenged.￿￿
￿erefore, according to Rousseau, the people are the state, and when the prevailing
view of the common good is challenged the state is in jeopardy. ￿is is so, because
the state is the nation and the nation embodies in itself a shared understanding of the
good. ￿e state therefore, is aligned with the nation, and it encompasses the values
and life-plan of the dominant cultural/national/ethnic group. ￿is is why measures
need to be taken in order to safeguard the general-will. ￿ose measures are what
￿￿. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ￿e Social Contract And Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge:
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we today call “nation-building,” which is the cultivation of a common set of values,
ideals and conceptions relevant to a common polity.
￿e communal aspect of Rousseau’s understanding of the state is described
in the ￿nal parts of Emile, where he provides a reformulation of the political theory
advanced in the Social Contract. Rousseaumight have been a social contract theorist,
but his idea of the contract amongst individuals is communal rather than atomistic.
￿is is obvious through his de￿nition of the body-politic which, as he describes, is
the outcome of the contract.
Each of us puts his goods, his person, his life, and all his power in com-
mon under the supreme direction of the general will, and we as a body
accept each member as a part indivisible of the whole.￿￿
Rousseau understood that the development of the consciousness of the “general will”
was not a straightforward a￿air and so he introduced the concept of the lawgiver.￿￿
￿e lawgiver is an imaginary perfect man, whose role is to help individuals evolve
from the state of nature and enter into a social contract; in e￿ect, the lawgiver is the
deus ex machine which shows people (the members of a future common state) their
common identity and shared interests. ￿e lawgiver will transform the individual
from a solitary being, to a member of a community. ￿at community is the state.
￿ere is no public space beyond the state. ￿e only alternative to the state, accord-
ing to Rousseau, is the family, which, as it is demonstrated in the raising of Emile,
provides the moral capacities necessary for the participation to the public sphere.
￿￿. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education (New York: Basic Books, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]), ￿￿￿.
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￿.￿.￿ Nation-building
Once the body-politic has been identi￿ed as the nation and the state as the embod-
iment of the nation, it is easy to understand how the modern understanding of the
state as a nation-state emerged. Now, I shall proceed to address the methods em-
ployed for themaintenance of the state; methods that have become known as nation-
building measures or techniques.
￿emost lucid description of nation-building comes from the political histo-
rian Eric Hobsbawm, who describes nation-building as “a set of practices, normally
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which au-
tomatically implies continuity with the past”.￿￿ According to Hobsbawm’s version,
nation-building relies upon invented traditions; upon the idea that the members of
a collective are bounded by a historical and cultural past, whose continuity is main-
tained through time, and as a result, its continuity to the future is necessary for the
maintenance of the self-image of the individual, which is directly related to that of
the nation.￿￿
Nation-building cannot be de￿ned as a speci￿c set of policies aimed at the
maintenance of a sense of commonness, since di￿erent states have promoted di￿er-
ent policies of cultivating a sense of common belonging. ￿erefore, to reduce the
concept of nation-building to a set of practices, would be to open the doors for dis-
agreements over its exact nature. For the purposes of this discussion, I take nation-
building to be the state-sponsored promotion of policies whose aim is to promote the
initial point of commonness of a collective and invent further points of intersection.
￿￿. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger,￿e Invention Of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
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I claim that the foremost feature of nation-building is to promote the initial point of
reference, because, as Tamir rightly argues, one collective cannot declare itself as a
nationmerely based on the will of its members. Nationhood derives from something
common like religion, history, language or traditions; as such, nation-building is the
promotion of one of these features and the invention of new ones. Predominantly,
themain aim of a nation-building policy is to “to create the illusion of a ‘natural’ unit
with a long, mostly glorious history and a promising future.”￿￿
So far, it has been argued that the liberal state sometimes allows or even
promotes illiberal practices and that it frequently implements measures of nation-
building. Moreover, that liberal nationalists claim that membership to a state and
membership to a cultural group is not qualitatively di￿erent, and that the state must
guarantee that a fair share of cultural expenditure for all its members was outlined.
￿e liberal state has been presented here not as a neutral contractual association but
rather as a community of shared values. As such, the maintenance of the commu-
nity that is the state, requires measures like the nation-building practices discussed
here. ￿ese measures, liberal nationalists argue, contradict the vision of the state
that traditional liberals depict, since they are based on nationalist principles. ￿e
maintenance of a shared commonness is what lies at the heart of liberal nationalism.
Liberalism, in this respect, is not contradictory to nationalism because it employs
the same practices.￿is is what will be discussed in the next subsection; liberalism’s
hidden nationalist agenda.
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Liberalism’s Hidden Nationalist Agenda
￿e liberal state according to liberal nationalists is following a disguised national-
ist agenda. In §￿.￿ the case of both north Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus will
be outlined, to demonstrate how both administrations have used the institutions of
authority to promote the values of the dominant societal cultures. ￿e case of the
Republic of Cyprus will be of particular interest to this thesis, because it is an in-
ternationally recognised state, member of the European Union, which is in denial
about its biased institutions that favour the Greek Cypriot majority group. In this
part, the theoretical routes of the aforementioned denial will be analysed.
Tamir makes the case for the nationalist denial of the liberal state through
three questions and two answers.￿e overarching claim is that liberals lack the nor-
mative arguments to explain the loyalty of individuals to their state, and as such,
they need a new conception of the individual and a new theory of justice, which ac-
counts for the e￿ects and the importance that community and culture have upon the
individual.
Tamir asks, ￿rstly, why does membership to a liberal state rely on birthright
rather than choice.￿en, she moves on to ask “why do liberals believe that individ-
uals owe political loyalty to their government – as long as it acts in reasonably just
ways – rather than to the government that is demonstrably the most just of all,” and
thirdly, she asks, why is resource redistribution local, why is it constrained within
the boundaries of the liberal state instead of becoming regional or even global?￿e
answer, or the lack of answer, to these questions, demonstrate that there are “national
values hidden in the liberal agenda.”￿￿
“￿e liberal vision,” Michael Sandel argues, “is not morally self-su￿cient but
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿￿.
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parasitic on a notion of community it o￿cially rejects”.￿￿ ￿e “self-image” of liber-
alism, he continues, is not adequate to explain the “mutual engagement” liberalism
demands from its citizens.￿￿ A further problem with the denial to admit the incor-
poration of nationalist values in the liberal agenda is that there is no explanation of
the core of social unity. ￿e Rawlsian justi￿cation of unity based on mutual agree-
ment on the principles of justice is too thin; it is not strong enough to explain the
origins of the “communal ties and loyalties” required for themaintenance of a highly
redistributive welfare state.￿￿
Tamir provides two justi￿cations for the embodiment of nationalist principles
within the liberal state. ￿ese are summarised under the titles “Demarcation” and
“Continuity.”
Demarcation: Since liberalism cannot provide a theory of demarcation, it has adopted
for this purpose the national ideal of self-determination.
Continuity: In order to sustain its character as a law-abiding and caring community,
the liberal state must view itself as a continuous community rather than as a
casual association of parties to a contract that could be rescinded at any time.￿￿
In order to reconcile theory and practice, liberalism needs to take into account the
individual as a situated being, rooted within their culture. Otherwise, one cannot
explain why liberals have chosen to focus on the members of a speci￿c society.￿is
is a paradox of liberal membership, one whose lack of justi￿cation explains the na-
tionalist underpinnings of the liberal state. Take Rawls’s second principle of justice
for example. Rawls argues that inequalities are permissible only when they bene￿t
￿￿. Michael Sandel, “￿e Procedural Republic And ￿e Unencumbered Self,” Political￿eory ￿￿,
no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
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the least advantaged members of a society. Why should we “give priority to the wel-
fare of the ‘least advantaged members of our society’ over the starving children in
Ethiopia?”￿ese questions can be answered only through the promotion of alterna-
tive nationalistic principles of justice, an endeavour which will by undertaken in the
next chapter.
￿￿
Chapter ￿
Multiculturalism and Principles of
Justice
Liberal nationalism has been presented as the theoretical ground from which Kym-
licka’s theory of MC has emerged. In this chapter Kymlicka’s departure from the lib-
eral nationalist canon will be explained, to fully grasp how liberal multiculturalism
reconciles liberalism and nationalism, and places group-di￿erentiated rights within
the domain of primary rights that liberal theories of justice must uphold.
Multiculturalism challenges the core of the liberal state since it questions its
fundamental principles of justice. When one questions whether the state must de-
mand that all parents educate their children up to a minimum level, or whether cul-
tural groups should be allowed to shun their members, then the debate becomes one
of justice; a questioning of the principles that apply to di￿erent social venues. Mul-
ticulturalism is all about de￿ning the boundaries of citizenship, which are drawn in
reference to the principles of justice.
In this chapter the principles of justice supported by liberal nationalists will be
presented, which will then be compared with the dominant theory of justice as it was
￿￿
originally presented in ￿￿￿￿ by John Rawls who singlehandedly conceived the canon
of liberal political theory. What will be argued is that the di￿erence between liberals
and liberal nationalists lies in their conceptions of human nature, which normally
underpins each theory of justice. Once the two competing approaches to justice are
accounted for, wewill inquire as to the position ofWill Kymlicka. What are the limits
of justice that Kymlicka sets? What is the authority of the state regarding cultural
minorities according to Kymlicka? Such questions will be brought to the attention
of this chapter, andwill be explored with reference to di￿erent conceptions of justice.
￿e chapter is responding to the previous one – whilst in chapter ￿ liberal
nationalism was presented as the basis of Kymlicka’s theory, this chapter will exam-
ine where Kymlicka departs from liberal nationalism and speci￿cally, the di￿erence
between liberal nationalist conceptions of ethnocultural justice and Kymlicka’s view
regarding the application of principles of justice in cultural a￿airs. To do so, follow-
ing the comparison of nationalist and liberal theories of justice, three objections to
Kymlicka’s application of justice will be presented. In responding to the three ques-
tions, the position of Kymlicka regarding ethnocultural justice will be explained in
relation to his commitment to liberal autonomy, as was originally presented in the
work of John Stuart Mill.
￿is chapter will thus analyse the ideal principles of MC, as well as how MC
relates to theories of justice. ￿is will be useful in later parts, especially §￿.￿ where
Rawls’ position on ideal and non-ideal theory will be considered, as well as in §￿.￿.￿
and chapter ￿ where Kymlicka’s defence of multicultural rights on the grounds of
autonomy will be challenged.
￿￿
￿.￿ NationalistMorality andPrinciples ofEthnocultural
Justice
In order to provide an account of the nationalist principles of justice, one needs to
discuss the moral principles behind a nationalist theory of justice, and more speci￿-
cally, its relation to the plurality of comprehensive doctrines. In order to do so, some
commonmisapprehensions must be addressed. Speci￿cally, the distinction between
a liberal version of nationalism and other generic versions must be highlighted, be-
cause it provides the basis of the conception of justice that liberal nationalists want
to advance. Cases of non-liberal applications of nationalismwill be presented in §￿.￿
through the examples in Cyprus, and as such the current section is important in teas-
ing out what distinguishes the two types of nationalism, as well as how can the two
conceptions of justice – of Rawlsians and liberal nationalists – be reconciled.
￿.￿.￿ Human Nature
Every theory of justice begins with an account of human nature. It discusses how
individuals are, and how they socialise with each other. What makes liberal nation-
alism special is that the communal rights of individuals are placed alongside their
liberal individual freedoms. In other words, the stronghold of the nationalism stud-
ied here, is that it is liberal.￿e principles it defends are placed on top of liberal prin-
ciples and the individual is analysed through an additional layer of embeddedness.
As Tamir explains, the liberal nationalistic conception of the person, conceives the
individual as someone who “embodies both the liberal virtue of self-authorship and
the national virtue of embeddedness.”￿ ￿is understanding of human nature ties in-
￿. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿￿
dividuality with sociability, bringing together nationalism and liberalism. ￿is new
hybrid account of human nature is at the core of liberal nationalism. Any political
analysis within this framework, begins with the understanding of the person as a
“situated individual”; that is, with emphasis on the liberal rights of the individual, as
experienced through his or her membership to a national culture.
Why is the “situated individual” conception of human justice a better basis
for a liberal theory of justice, a critique might argue. A￿er all, the history of nation-
alist movements and nationalistic states is tainted with accounts of suppression of
di￿erence, exclusion, and hostility towards pluralism. Liberal nationalists acknowl-
edge the fact that in the name of nationalism, many liberal rights have been histori-
cally supressed. What they claim is that liberal nationalism has nothing in common
with the aforementioned nationalisms that are o￿en associated with many historic
atrocities. Indeed, liberal nationalism, its proponents argue, provides a conception
of citizenship that allows formore pluralism than traditional liberal theories allow.
￿.￿.￿ Pluralism in Liberal Nationality
In order to deconstruct the claim that liberal nationality is more pluralistic than tra-
ditional liberal citizenship, we need to compare the two. Take for example JohnRawls
and his idea of the “overlapping consensus.” Overlapping consensus, according to
Rawls, is necessary for the stability of the liberal state. Overlapping consensus is the
commitment to a common set of principles of justice that all members of a liberal
state bind themselves under. ￿ese principles might be justi￿ed based on the com-
prehensive doctrines of each individual. Individuals live their lives based on di￿erent
doctrines. In the Rawlsian overlapping consensus, individuals end up with a list of
principles that can all potentially agree with. ￿ey start from di￿erent standpoints,
￿￿
having di￿erent comprehensive doctrines, but they end up with the same principles
of justice.￿is consensus is neither strict nor perfect; the only condition is that it sat-
is￿es what Rawls calls “the conditions of reciprocity.” As he explains, to meet these
conditions, “both sides must believe that however much their conceptions of justice
di￿er, their views support the same judgement in the situation at hand, and would
do so even should their respective conditions be interchanged”.￿
￿ose who are outside the Rawlsian overlapping consensus are marginalised,
liberal nationalists argue. “Whenmembership is based on an overlapping consensus
of shared values,” Tamir explains, “those outside the consensus can be marginalised
and their membership questioned to the point of turning them into outcasts as was
the fate of Communists in the United States.” Contrary to the Rawlsian account of
liberal membership that is based on an overlapping consensus, the nationalist mem-
bership described here is based on national, cultural, historic, religious or linguistic
attributes, which allow for internal disagreements because they do not rely upon
normative agreement on any subject. Liberal nationalistic citizenship, according to
Tamir, provides plenty of space for “normative diversity” because it is based on his-
tory and descent rather than on agreement. Hence, according to this account liberal
nationality is more pluralistic than traditional liberal citizenship. ￿is is so, its pro-
ponents argue, because national belonging and national membership cannot be dis-
associated, even when there are extreme clashes upon normative judgements. “Since
the roots of unity in national communities are outside the normative sphere, they can
accommodate normative diversity, and in this sense be more pluralistic than groups
held together by shared values.”￿
A further reason supporting the claim that liberal nationalism is pluralistic is
￿. John Rawls,A￿eory of Justice, revised (Cambridge,MA.: Harvard University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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its polycentricity; that is, the nationalist perception of a world asmade up of di￿erent
national groupswho have particularistic conceptions of the good, who together form
an array of nations that di￿er in context but are similar in respect to the nature of
their demands and the value of their cultures. In other words, liberal nationalism is
more pluralistic, because every nationalist group believes that every other nationalist
group is entitled to exactly the same rights.
￿is account of citizenship contradicts the liberal depiction of nationalism as
exclusionary and sel￿sh. ￿e liberal criticism maintains that each national culture
is so predisposed in dealing with its particular demands (for example, focused on
the terms of membership and on the external threats to its survival) that has no
room to consider anyone beyond its cultural members. In other words, nationalist
cultures are seen as indi￿erent and egotistical. Liberal nationalists do not refute this
claim; they acknowledge that this might sometimes be the case, but they explain that
what liberals ignore is the pluralistic justi￿cation of the particularistic claims of each
national culture. ￿e demands of national groups are grounded upon the universal
right for self-determination “articulated in the United Nation’s charter in order to
gather support and justify their own particularistic struggle.”￿
Nevertheless, the defence of liberal nationalism as a “pluralist” advanced by
Tamir cannot be easily sustained. ￿e majority of liberal nationalists believe that a
shared national identity should be based on shared values – contra Tamir who be-
lieves that unity in liberal nationalist societies is not based on agreement. And a
public culture that relies on a set of shared values, cannot be accommodating to im-
migrant groups, since the latter will not share the values that underpin the national
identity and as such, will be excluded. ￿e response to this objection would be that
a public culture based on shared values is preferable over a society that is based on
￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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lineage, geography, history and ethnicity, because it would be by de￿nition exclu-
sionary (the argument being that societies based on shared values welcome new-
recruits that share the common values and principles, whereas in societies based on
history and ethnicity, alien member are excluded from the outset). ￿us, these are
two contradictory conceptions of liberal nationalism that can both be challenged for
not su￿ciently respecting plural ways of life. ￿e ￿rst because it excludes from the
very beginning those that are not members (born into) the national community, and
the second, because it excludes people who do not share the common values upon
which the public culture is based.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Morality of Community
Liberal nationalism has yet to persuade of its disassociation with its intolerant past.
￿e way to achieve this is by considering the ethical values of nationalism, what
is described as “the morality of community.” ￿e morality of community is not a
framework of moral rules that aspires to replace liberal morality. ￿e morality of
community is supplementary to liberal morality. It adopts the ethical guidelines of
liberalism and applies them to the situated individual. In other words, the liberal na-
tionalistic ethos, respects the liberal individual freedoms, but goes one step further,
to recognise the individual as part of the community.￿e community is important to
the individual because it cultivates themoral abilities necessary for the apprehension
of liberal values.
A manifestation of this morality is presented through the feeling of euphoria
experienced by members of a community for the success of a fellow member. ￿e
boost in “self-esteem and well-being” associated with someone else’s success, can be
￿￿
explained only through the morality of national membership.￿ Since these remarks
arewritten in the a￿ermath of theOlympicGames in London, one canmore emphat-
ically associate with the feeling of pride for the success of a co-patriot.￿ Obviously,
none of us non-athletes has done anything to deserve the feeling of pride experi-
enced when a member of our country receives a medal, yet we cannot help but feel
proud for that person’s achievements, as if we somehow contributed to their success.
￿is feeling can only be explained through reference to the community.
￿e importance of community is not something alien to liberalism. In fact, it
is a central theme in John Rawls’s A￿eory of Justice. During his account of the rela-
tionship between goodness and principles of justice, Rawls explains that our natural
attributes are linked with out sense of justice.￿ According to his theory, our urge to
act justly is tied with our willingness and moral psychological disposition towards
giving “justice to those we care for.” ￿is disposition is also experienced when we
feel sadness or happiness for the successes or failures of those we love. ￿ese ties
are not limited to our immediate environment of family and friends, since they ex-
tend to the community and the institutions that underpin it. As Rawls argues, “in a
well-ordered society these bonds extend rather widely”; they encompass our fellow
members of a society as well as the institutional arrangements that surround us.￿
Rawls’s emphasis on the importance of communal ties is not as strong as that
of liberal nationalists. Tamir argues that it is rather doubtful that positive duties can
derive fromRawls’s account of community. Nonetheless, it is enough to demonstrate
that “when faced with an exclusive choice of alternatives between helping strangers
or members of my group – be it my family, my community, or my nation – I have a
￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
￿. I identify citizenship with nationality for the sake of the analogy, knowing that the one is not
proportional to the other.
￿. Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
￿￿
strongermoral duty to help those towhom I feel close rather than to help a stranger”.￿
Hence, Rawls and liberal nationalists are not diametrically opposed in their concep-
tion of the individual and the community, since they both emphasise the role of soci-
ety in the development of the moral imperatives necessary to realise the importance
of being just.
￿.￿ Kymlicka and Liberal Nationalists
￿e disagreements between Kymlicka and liberal nationalists are not centred on the
principles of justice, as it is the case with Rawls and Tamir. Kymlicka does not choose
sides in their disagreement, although he is explicit about the importance of culture
and about the communal nature of the individual. Instead of engaging in the debate
about the principles of justice, Kymlicka stays focused on his conception of liberal-
ism, which follows exactly from the work of John Stuart Mill. In Kymlicka, one can
￿nd what J. S. Mill would hypothetically say, were he presented with the contempo-
rary challenges of multicultural citizenship. In order to avoid misrepresenting Kym-
licka’s position, it is imperative to examine his multicultural theory with reference to
theMillean account of liberty. Only throughMill, can we understand his position in
relation to intercultural and intracultural justice and respond to the three challenges
that liberal nationalists put forward.
In this section Kymlicka’s ideal principle of (Millean) autonomy will be pre-
sented, before considering, in chapter ￿, howpractical suggestions – action-guidance
– can be extracted from such ideal theories.￿is will provide themeans to then con-
sider in chapters ￿ and ￿ how an alternative theory ofMC can be developed, one that
is based on the principle of equality rather than Millean freedom, and one that can
￿. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ￿￿.
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be exported to countries like Cyprus, which face challenges di￿erent than those in
the archetypal multicultural states that theories of MC adhere to.
￿.￿.￿ ￿ree Objections
￿ere are three main theoretical objections levelled by liberal nationalists against
Kymlicka. ￿ey will be presented in order to be analysed through the Millean con-
ception of liberty, in order to tease out the speci￿c principles that underpin Kym-
licka’s theory, which will be subsequently challenged in later chapters. In particular,
the response to the third objection will provide a clear understanding of the role and
the limits of the state as conceived by Kymlicka, whose theory is evaluated in this
thesis for the purpose of exporting it.
￿e ￿rst objection comes from Tamir. She argues that although Kymlicka
adheres to the liberal values of autonomy and free choice, he mistakenly associates
choice with change. Kymlicka, Tamir argues, only sees agency where there is change,
andmisses all those situations where the active choice of individuals is not to actively
change or alter their a￿airs. ￿e example given by Saba Mahmood is illuminating.
Mahmood discusses her encounter withNadia, a local educated woman in the Egyp-
tiam mosque’s women movement. Mahmood was shocked when Nadia advised an-
other woman named Sana to consider an o￿er to marry a man who was already
married to another woman. Mahmood documents her discussion with Nadia, who
explains that within her culture, unlike the western tradition, an unmarried woman
is equivalent to a (socially) disabled person. ￿e discussion of Mahmood with Na-
dia shows that it is wrong to assume that Sana is merely a passive recipient of an
oppressive culture without ￿rstly examining her ability to acknowledge her options.
￿erefore, one should not assume that Sana lacks agency merely because she refuses
￿￿
to live socially isolated.￿is example demonstrates that agency must not be de￿ned
in terms of actions against the established norms but rather as the “capacity to re-
alise one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will
or other obstacles.”￿￿ Kymlicka, it can be argued, does not have the normative argu-
ment to account for the complexity of agency and he rather reduces agency to action
against the established norms. ￿is is the ￿rst criticism: that Kymlicka does not see
any choice when there is no change, missing the complexity of agency.
￿e following objection comes from Tamir, who argues that Kymlicka does
not apply the criteria of justice to intercultural a￿airs. ￿is is so, Tamir explains,
because Kymlicka interprets the right of culture as the right to preserve an authentic
version of that culture, at all costs. ￿ese costs, which according to Tamir’s reading
of Kymlicka, are worth bearing, might involve the sacri￿ce of the individual rights of
citizens. Hence, in defending the communal rights of cultural members, Kymlicka
ignores their individual rights, since he fails to apply the liberal principles of justice
to intercommunal a￿airs.￿￿
￿e third challenge comes from Je￿ Spinner-Halev, who argues that the prob-
lem with Kymlicka is that his focus on individual rights fundamentally changes the
character of minority cultural groups. When Kymlicka discusses culture, Spinner-
Halev explains, he engages in a more abstract understanding, where culture is inter-
preted as a structure and not as content. Kymlicka is engaged in a contradiction –
on the one hand, he argues that culture is important since it provides the content of
choice for the individuals, yet on the other hand he insists that the liberal autonomy
of cultural members is important because it provides themeans to examine one’s op-
tions, irrespective of whether some cultures do not endorse liberal autonomy.￿is is
￿￿. Saba Mahmood, “Feminist￿eory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Re￿ections on
the Egyptian Islamic Revival,” Cultural Anthropology ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
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contradictory because some cultures are not based on the liberal value of autonomy,
or are even based on the refutation of liberal autonomy. Holding liberal autonomy
as the foundation of the liberal state can potentially lead to the modi￿cation of the
very nature of these cultures. ￿e case of the Amish is paradigmatic. If they are
guaranteed the strict version of liberal autonomy that Kymlicka promotes, then the
cultural content of the Amish culture will change fundamentally. Kymlicka should
protect the freedom of exit of people from cultures that he considers illiberal and
refrain from trying to instil in them liberal ideals. Kymlicka, one could argue fol-
lowing Spinner-Halev, applies his principles of justice to all cultures, irrespective of
whether some cultures are not full members to the liberal polity. Cultures like the
Amish are partialmembers and as such, it would be unfair to expect them to live up
to principles of justice that they do not subscribe to only because the majority of the
population cohabiting the same country chooses to live by them.￿￿
￿ese objections need to be addressed. DoesKymlicka indeed associate choice
with change and if sowhy? Also, how comeTamir and Spinner-Halev interpret Kym-
licka’s relationship to the principles of justice so di￿erently? Is one of the two mis-
taken, or have they both ignored something?
￿.￿.￿ Disagreement ￿￿: Individuality and Choice
In order to answer the questions addressed, we need to account for Kymlicka’s use of
liberal autonomy, as it originated in Mill, whose essay On Liberty is considered the
foundation of liberal citizenship. In On Liberty Mill discusses his ideal of political
autonomy, which is the value that Kymlicka treats as central to liberalism.
￿￿. Je￿ Spinner-Halev,￿e BoundariesOfCitizenship: Race, Ethnicity, AndNationality In￿e Liberal
State (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿. See pp. ￿￿-￿￿ for Kymlicka’s distinction
between culture and content, pp. ￿￿-￿￿ for partial citizenship, and pp. ￿￿-￿￿￿ for Amish
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￿e ￿rst objection questions whether Kymlicka’s understanding of liberal au-
tonomy is synonymous to change. Autonomy, according to Mill, is “liberty of ac-
tion” for all members of a society.￿￿ ￿e autonomy of the individual can be violated
only when that individual harms any other member of the society. One could argue
that action indeed implies change, and as such, the Millean autonomy employed by
Kymlicka, is such that dismisses any other kind of agency. ￿is conclusion would
be premature, as Mill is very explicit about the nature of harm – both action and
inaction can cause harm to others, and as such, an individual can exercise agency
by refusing to take direct action towards an end. As Mill explains “a person may
cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he
is justly accountable for the injury.”￿￿ Since harm can be caused by both action and
inaction, what logically follows is that agency, which is indeed one of the causes of
harm, is not tied to change, since it can be expressed through passive means. Hence,
the ￿rst criticism can be refuted from the o￿set. Nevertheless, further examination
is warranted on why such an interpretation, which wants autonomy to be associated
with change, has arisen.
Millean liberal autonomy emerges through a criticism of custom. “Society
has expended fully as much e￿ort in the attempt (according to its lights) to compel
people to conform to its notions of personal, as of social excellence” Mill argues.￿￿
Mill, in developing his idea of autonomy, was responding to the puritan norms of his
age, namely to Calvinist and Augustinian notions of self-control, where the individ-
ual was urged to exercise restraint by conforming to the dominant Christian norms.
Independent thoughts are lost in the fear of being immoral or irreligious.
￿￿. John StuartMill,On Liberty;With￿e Subjection OfWomen; And Chapters On Socialism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]), ￿￿, emphasis mine.
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Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising
intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any
bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them
in something which would admit of being considered irreligious and
immoral?￿￿
Mill is not criticising those who do not change their opinions. Mill is criticising those
who do not even consider what their opinions are, those whose opinion amounts to
an unre￿ective appropriation of the dominant (at the time religious) social norms.
I do not mean that they choose what is customary, in preference to what
suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any incli-
nation, except for what is customary.￿￿
￿e only way to get out of this is through originality, which can only exist
through individuality. ￿e Millean ideal person, is one which self-develops; those
who have the capacity to evaluate their options, and act accordingly. ￿e action
might be inaction, yet it is a choice nonetheless. ￿e origin of the confusion of the
association of autonomy and change lies in the fact that custom is o￿en an obstacle
to individual autonomy, because the individual is oppressed in the name of the sur-
vival of the collective spirit. “Individuals are lost in the crowd” and public opinion is
“collective mediocrity” Mill argues. Mill’s political project was the creation of a con-
ception of the state whose powers would be restricted enough, so that the individual
will have room to self-develop, and avoid, or overcome, what he called the “tyranny
of opinion” that rules society.￿￿
￿￿. Mill, On Liberty; With￿e Subjection Of Women; And Chapters On Socialism, ￿￿.
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Individuality is so ￿ercely guarded byMill, because only through individual-
ity, can the three foundational freedoms be maintained. ￿ese freedoms are ￿rstly,
liberty of conscience: the freedom to think, feel, form an opinion or sentiment about
any subject; secondly, liberty of tastes and pursuits: the freedom to plan our life as
we see ￿t and to pursue our goals irrespective of the opinion of others, provided that
we do not cause them any harm; and ￿nally, the liberty of association of individuals:
the freedom of individuals to unite for any reason other than to cause harm.￿￿
If we don’t question our a￿airs, we live by false doctrines. ￿is is why in-
dividuality is important; because it enables individuals to search for the truth. For
individuality to ￿ourish, a society needs to be governed by an open attitude towards
diversity of opinion.￿at is, it needs a public spherewhere deliberationwill take place
freely, and where opposite opinions will be exchanged. No opinion is to be classi-
￿ed a priori as false, and most importantly, no opinion is to be silenced because it
contradicts the popular sentiment. ￿e overall Millean project, as presented in On
Liberty, is aiming at guaranteeing liberty; at establishing that no person will be si-
lenced because he holds views that are objectionable, no person would be silenced
because he is considered sacrilegious or immoral, and no person will be restricted in
any form and for any other reason besides the avoidance of harm to others. If, there-
fore, we interpret the position of Kymlicka in relation to change and agency through
the Millean prism, then the objection is not sustained.
Mill’s view On Liberty and his emphasis on respecting diversity of opinion
will be a central theme of the remainder of this thesis, which will argue, in §￿.￿,
§￿.￿.￿, and chapter ￿, following Mill, that a process of recognition needs to be estab-
lished in order to guarantee that minority cultures will not be silenced by dominant
majorities. ￿is argument will be defended in §￿.￿ and §￿.￿ through the examples
￿￿. Mill, On Liberty; With￿e Subjection Of Women; And Chapters On Socialism, ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿
of the minority cultures found in Cyprus, where silencing through constitutional
misrecognition has lead to the assimilation of the diverse characters of the cultures
found in the island.
￿.￿.￿ Disagreement ￿￿: Diversity, Truth and Intracultural Justice
Why is diversity of opinion important though? Why should citizens in liberal coun-
tries put up with doctrines that seem obviously false? What is the added value of
“allowing” opinions that might be false to be exchanged in society? In answering
these questions it is important to understand why Kymlicka is willing to allow illib-
eral cultures within the liberal state, in order to subsequently address whether Tamir
is right in accusing Kymlicka of failing to apply the liberal principles of justice to the
internal a￿airs of cultures.
￿e reason both Kymlicka and Mill are willing to allow obviously false opin-
ions relate, most importantly, with the quest for truth. “To refuse a hearing to an
opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the
same thing as absolute certainty,” Mill argues.￿￿ Every opinion must be heard, and
every opinion must be examined. Even fallible opinions are products of judgement,
and good judgement is the product of criticism. A good judgement is the realisa-
tion of the potential of being wrong.￿e “assumption of infallibility” is to refuse the
individual to exercise his or her judgement.
It is important to allow potentially false opinions, because truth does not
manifest itself in absolute form.￿ere are no absolutely true or absolutely false opin-
ions. Two opinions can be similarly true, yet not quite true enough to take an ab-
solute form, but because the one might be popular in society, it will be perceived
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as de￿nitely true, and will be contrasted with the other opinion, to demonstrate the
latter’s fallibility. As Mill notes,
such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when rest-
ing on a true foundation, every opinion which embodies somewhat of
portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be consid-
ered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth
may by blended.￿￿
￿is is why the state must maintain the right of all individuals to think freely, and ex-
press their thoughts without any fear of condemnation.￿e state needs to maintain
these freedoms, because it is the nature of mankind to be single-sided. ￿e human
mind is not trained to seek the truth in everything; rather, humans tend to pick sides
and stick to them. Diversity is necessary in order to overcome this barrier of human
thinking.
￿e relationship of diversity and truth as advanced by Mill, is one that ad-
dresses truth not as a matter of veri￿cation or falsi￿cation of opinion, but rather as
a matter of antagonism. ￿is is why the state needs to guarantee the diversity of
opinions and not a priori condemn them. As he says,
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of
the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds
su￿ciently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an ap-
proach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a
struggle between combatants ￿ghting over hostile banners.￿￿
￿is is underpinning Kymlicka’s treatment of cultural groups. He refuses to label
cultures as illiberal and employ the coercive mechanisms of the state to suppress
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them. Similarly toMill, he sees utility in diversity. Most importantly, they both share
the belief that false doctrines, once exposed to criticism and scrutiny, will go away
since truth will prevail. If we use the means of the state to suppress the opinions that
we might consider false, we will not eradicate them; they will rather be disguised in
another socially acceptable form. ￿ey will be excluded from the public sphere of
judgement, and will not be given the chance to be proven wrong. As Mill says “our
merely social intolerance kills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to
disguise them, or to abstain from any active e￿ort for their di￿usion.”￿￿
One can criticise Kymlicka for having a rather naïve perception of the power
of truth, but not for being unwilling to apply the principles of justice to the communal
a￿airs. A￿er all, the individual rights of the people, what was addressed above as the
Millean liberty (liberty of conscience, of tastes and pursuits, and of association), is
guaranteed at all venues, whether in the family, the culture, or the state-level. It
is the foundational principle of Millean liberty, and as such, does not di￿erentiate
amongst the varying venues of interaction. If one harms his family, then the state is
allowed to restrict that person’s liberty.￿e same would apply to a cultural elite that
might harm a cultural member. Or, to useMill’s example, one will not be prosecuted
because he likes to get drunk all the time, but rather will be prosecuted if, because
of drinking, fails to take care of his family.￿￿ Drinking is an individual choice and
therefore an individual right. ￿e individual can make his or her own choices, and
live with the consequences. A person is accountable for his bad actions, not because
society disapproves of them, but because those actions might cause harm to other
members of the society. ￿e principle of harm applies to all venues of society, and
as such, it is unfair to say that considerations of justice are absent from Kymlicka’s
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version of cultural membership.
Moreover, there is another issue that is central to Kymlicka’s theory, which
again originates in Mill, and which demonstrates Kymlicka’s consideration of the
principles of justice in cultural a￿airs. ￿is is freedom of exit, which is central to
both Mill and Kymlicka. Mill, in discussing slavery, and speci￿cally the right of a
person to sell himself, declares that “it is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his
freedom.” One cannot deny the freedom of freedom, and as such, safety mecha-
nisms must be in place to guarantee that a person who is a voluntary member of an
oppressive collective, has the right to disassociate from it any time he wants. ￿is is
central to the case defended here. An individual is allowed to enter, or continue to
participate in an association that might restrict some foundational liberal freedoms;
Kymlicka allows this as long as the freedom of exit of the individual is guaranteed, and
as long as the principle of harm is upheld. ￿ese two guarantees are substantial and
are not negative freedoms. In the exchange among Kymlicka and Kukathas, Kym-
licka di￿erentiates between the formal freedom of exit advocated by Kukathas, and
a more active version, what he called substantive right of exit, where the state indeed
takes action to accommodate the right of individuals to depart from their cultural
context.￿￿ Hence, to argue like Tamir that Kymlicka does not take any measures to
guarantee that principles of justice are applied to intercommunal a￿airs, is to neglect
the nature of Kymlicka’s theory; to neglect the fact that Kymlicka does not want to
violate the Millean liberties of the people by prohibiting their right of association.
￿￿. ChandranKukathas, “Are￿ere AnyCultural Rights?,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿;
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￿.￿.￿ Disagreement ￿￿: Education and Cultural Content
If Tamir is wrong to argue that Kymlicka does not apply the principles of justice to
cultural groups, does that mean that Spinner-Halev was right? Spinner-Halev’s crit-
icism of Kymlicka was that the latter interfered too much into cultural a￿airs. Kym-
licka, according to Spinner-Halev, by placing demands of liberal citizenship upon
illiberal cultures like the Amish, changes the content of their culture, and in con-
sequence a￿ects the identity of the culture at a foundational level. ￿is question
can be answered again, through reference to the Millean autonomy that underpins
Kymlicka’s thought. To address the question, we need to re￿ect on the relationship
between the demands of liberal citizenship (like, for example, the demand that all
children receive a certain level of education) and the e￿ects of such demands upon
the diversity of cultures (how these demands a￿ect the particular identities of ethnic
groups).
Diversity is linked to improvement; the more diverse opinions exist in the
society, the more chance there is to get to the truth. ￿e paradox of diversity is that
it eventually leads to less diversity. Di￿erent opinions are being scrutinised, some
of them accepted as true, others exposed as false. People are rational agents who
want to learn the truth, and as such accept true opinions as true doctrines. Whilst
diversity of opinion leads individuals closer to the truth, at the same time, by gen-
erating “undisputed truths,” leads to less divergence of opinion, and in consequence
less originality and individuality. Mill expressed his scepticism as follows:
though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is
necessary in both senses of the term, being at once inevitable and in-
dispensable, we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its conse-
￿￿
quences must be bene￿cial.￿￿
He is critical of the assimilation of opinion that results from the refutation of false
doctrines.￿is worry is shared by Spinner-Halev, who argues that if the liberal state
exposes cultures to liberal values, then their cultural content will be altered irrevo-
cably. If, for example, cultures are forced to expose their traditional doctrines to
the scrutiny of liberal autonomy, then the individual cultural members might re-
ject (totally or partially) those doctrines and either change their culture, or become
alienated from it.
￿is argument seems to suggest that the Millean autonomy is synonymous
with the adoption of a speci￿c set of liberal values, which are contradicting the cul-
tural values of the individuals. ￿is would be a misguided conclusion. Kymlicka,
following Mill, is not trying to force people to adopt a speci￿c way of life. ￿e Mil-
lean liberal autonomy is strict about how important it is to teach children the “results
of human experience.”￿￿ ￿is does not mean that individuals are forced to accept the
outcomes of human experiences. It is up to them “to ￿nd out what part of recorded
human experience is applicable to [their] own circumstances and character.” Tradi-
tions and customs are the result of human experience. Individuals must have knowl-
edge about these experiences so that they can assess them. ￿ey can interpret them
in a way contradictory to the customary understanding, or they can decide that they
are not suited for them. On the other hand, they can accept them as true, following
an examination of their validity.￿e problem is not centred around cultural values,
or on customs and traditions. When a custom is accepted as an outcome of choice
and re￿ection, it is bene￿cial to individual because they exercise their critical facul-
ties.￿e problem is not the acceptance of the custom, but rather the acceptance of a
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custom because it is a custom.￿￿
Spinner-Halev seems to bemaking a valid criticism.￿e requirement to have
knowledge of the human experiences seems like an imposition from outside. ￿e
Millean demand for autonomy seems to be violating the communal rights of indi-
viduals by altering their cultural content. As it will be henceforth explained, this is
not the case.
Mill, in devising the concept of liberal autonomy, was aware of the threat of
assimilation that bearers of non-dominant opinions were under. He was aware, like
Spinner-Halev is, that the popular social norms become the default view, which are
then imposed upon individuals (or cultures) through a variety of di￿erent mecha-
nisms. ￿e mechanisms of assimilation are the establishment of uni￿ed education,
the innovation in communications, the popularisation of commerce, and most im-
portantly of all, the promotion of the dominant opinions by the state. Mill comments
on the endorsement and promotion of the popular social norms by the state accord-
ingly:
Amore powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general
similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and
other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State.￿￿
￿is assimilation is exactly what Mill tries to avoid in his ideal society. His version
of autonomy is one that promotes liberty without violating the individuality of citi-
zens, and most importantly, one that favours (and even prohibits) the imposition of
public opinion upon other people.￿is awareness is underpinning Kymlicka’s treat-
ment of illiberal cultures. He shares the Millean view that no community or culture,
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whatever its size or power, “has a right to force another to be civilised.”￿￿ Kymlicka’s
unwillingness to force people to abide by liberal values is what motivated Tamir’s
earlier criticism. Spinner-Halev’s criticism (that Kymlicka is making demands upon
cultures that alter their cultural content) originates in the fact that liberal auton-
omy demands that individuals are aware of their options; an awareness that is only
achieved through knowledge of the experiences of mankind.
Spinner-Halev is making a fundamental mistake in failing to di￿erentiate be-
tween enforcing an opinion through imposition, and trying to alter an established
opinion through persuasion. Kymlicka, following Mill, is very careful not to inter-
vene in illiberal cultures so that he does not violate the liberty of individuals. A soci-
ety bound by the value of liberal autonomy, is one that is not allowed to intervene and
impose one’s opinion upon others. ￿ere is a qualitative di￿erence between trying
to in￿uence people to forego a habit from banning the practice altogether. Mill gives
the example of gambling to demonstrate this point. If a state considers gambling to
be wrong, that state is not allowed to prohibit its citizens from gambling, as it would
violate their individual right to gamble. Provided that they harm no one but them-
selves, the state has no power of intervention. Such intervention would be a clear
violation of the autonomy of individuals. What the state can do is to prohibit the
creation of public gambling houses.￿￿ Hence, the state can only indirectly discourage
the conduct that it considers questionable. It can use its powers of non-intervention
to persuade individuals, but it cannot use its powers of coercion to impose a ban
upon individuals.
￿ere is one domain though, where persuasion takes amore substantial form,
and which might warrant Spinner-Halev’s criticism that Kymlicka intervenes in mi-
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nority cultures, speci￿cally the non-liberal ones. ￿is is the relation between state
and education, or, to be more precise, the requirement of the liberal state for a min-
imum level of education of all its citizens.￿e fact that the state requires (forces, ac-
cording to some) education of its youngest members is a violation of the communal
right of their parents to refuse the education of their children following their cultural
traditions. Before the issue of education is addressed and before a judgement is cast
on whether Kymlicka violates the communal rights of individuals, it is necessary to
￿rst re￿ect upon the communal protections that liberal autonomy guarantees.
Firstly, the individual is recognised as a communal being; a premise that, as
discussed in chapter ￿, is not accepted by many traditional liberals. According to
Mill, “no person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do any-
thing seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least
to his near connections, and o￿en far beyond them.”￿￿
Secondly, the individuality, which is so central to Millean autonomy, is justi-
￿ed in communal utilitarian terms. Individuality is not an atomistic feature; rather, it
is the means that would make an individual useful to society. As he argues, “in pro-
portion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable
to himself and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.”￿￿
Finally and most importantly, the Millean liberal autonomy that is endorsed
by Kymlickamakes the right to community central to liberty. Individual liberty, Mill
argues, “implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate
by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no person by
themselves.”￿￿ ￿is means that the right to reach a mutual agreement on anything
that does not harm others is part of liberal autonomy. As long as freedom of exit
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is guaranteed, then individuals are free to engage in whatever sort of association
(cultural or otherwise) they see ￿t. AsMill explains, “uncontrolled freedomof action
[...] requires that those who become bound to one another, in things which concern
no third party, should be able to release one another from the engagement.”￿￿
If liberal autonomy protects the individuality of persons by prohibiting the
state from intervening in their a￿airs, then why does Spinner-Halev argue that the
Millean autonomy, as endorsed by Kymlicka, alters the content of cultures which are
not subscribing to liberal citizenship?￿e answer lies in education. In order for citi-
zens to be able to assess their options, they must be educated in a way that cultivates
their critical faculties whilst at the same time they gather knowledge about human-
ity’s past experiences.￿is concept of informed choice through education is central
to liberal autonomy and has been key to the disagreements between nationalists and
liberals. ￿is is where the heart of the disagreement between Spinner-Halev and
Kymlicka lies. If the Amish are expected to “expose,” their children to liberal edu-
cation, then the core of Amish culture, which is based on the rejections of modern
means of life, would be undermined, goes the argument.
To address this argument one needs to examine what kind of education is re-
quired for an individual to meet the standards of liberal autonomy; that is, re￿ection
is warranted upon the correct content of educational material according to liberal
autonomy. ￿e detailed requirements of education need to be addressed, because
failure to do so leads to the misinterpretation of the requirement of education, and
inadvertently to the wrong conclusion that parents are forced to enlist their children
into mainstream liberal or secular schools. ￿is is not what Mill is advocating. Mill
does not want a universal state-run system of education. Nor is he advocating for
an alternative system of home-schooling. What he prefers is for the responsibility
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for the education of children to lie with their parents rather than with the state. If
the state is responsible for the provision of education, then the state would provide
identical education to all its students, irrespective of their needs or desires. ￿is
would hinder their individualism by suppressing their originality. A uni￿ed system
of education would be a backlash to the diversity that is so central to Mill’s polit-
ical project. Instead, Mill wants the parents to be responsible for deciding where
would they like to educate their children. Additionally, the parents are also the ones
to choose whether their o￿spring will be taught a speci￿c religion. Hence, it is ul-
timately a parent’s decision where and what will be taught to their child. ￿e only
requirement placed upon them by the state, is that the child must pass yearly tests
administered by the state, in order to con￿rm that the parents are meeting their re-
sponsibility for educating their child. As was mentioned before, the education pro-
vided must guarantee that the student has su￿cient knowledge of the world and a
su￿ciently cultivated ability to critically evaluate competing or complementary op-
tions.
￿is is of course a substantial requirement. It is important to note though, that
the state is not putting a barrier to what the children or the parents are allowed to
teach; rather, it introduces a minimum threshold for making autonomous choices.
￿e state is also not enforcing any opinion upon its students. In fact, Mill is very
emphatic about the potential of endorsing an opinion as true without exposing it to
scrutiny. Even if an opinion is true, he argues, and even if it has been proven true
a￿er examination of all existing evidence and contradictory views, it should not be
considered absolutely uncontested, since it will stop being “a living truth” and will
become “a dead dogma.”￿￿
￿is attitude towards diversity and individualism is what underpins educa-
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tion in a society based around the value of liberal autonomy. Education can promote
values through persuasion or through force. Only persuasion is accepted in the Mil-
lean state. Self-regarding values should be cultivated only through education; one
that is based on “disinterested benevolence” rather than on force or might. As Mill
explains
education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion,
and it is by former only that, when the period of education is past, the
self-regarding virtues should be inculated.￿￿
Diversity is important even in education, thus putting limits on the intervention of
the state. ￿e state, according to liberal autonomy, is not allowed to “bias the con-
clusions of its citizens on disputed subjects.”￿￿ Its only function is to make sure that
the students have the ability to make decisions for themselves.
Spinner-Halev’s objection has therefore been addressed. Whilst education is
a substantial demand laid upon cultures, one that could potentially alter their char-
acter, it is by no means as intrusive as Spinner-Halev makes it in his criticism. ￿e
education that Millean liberals like Kymlicka promote, is such that allows for con-
tradictory life-plans to ￿ourish. Contrary to what Spinner-Halev suggests, Millean
autonomy does not promote sameness, and does not force culturalmembers to abide
by the dominant liberal norms. Diversity, individuality and originality, are themeans
to progress, and as such, are the principles guiding the educational system in a soci-
ety organised around the value of individual autonomy.
￿e liberalism of Mill, which inspired a liberal like Kymlicka, and which is
central to this thesis has now been su￿ciently addressed. It will underpin the subse-
quent discussion in the remainder of this thesis, where the role of the liberal state, of
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the educational system and most importantly, of the constitution, will be addressed
in relation to those values, to examine how liberal multiculturalism can be exported
beyond its dedicated contexts, and speci￿cally to Cyprus.
￿￿￿
Chapter ￿
From￿eory to Practice
￿is chapter examines how political theories can be used to provide policy-relevant
suggestions known as action-guidance. Amethodological examination of themerits
of Rawls’ ideal framework is conducted, comparing it to Sen’s alternative comparative
approach. A hybrid framework is then provided, called the Reciprocal Model, that
reconciles the two methods, allowing for empirical facts to alter the foundational
assumptions of ideal theories.
To this end, this chapter will be divided into ￿ve di￿erent sections. ￿e dis-
tinction between idealisation and abstraction will ￿rst be addressed. Abstractions
are permissible because they enable political theorists to make sense of complex sit-
uations and idealisations and not because they distort reality or human nature. In
the second section themain idealised assumptions of Rawls’ theorywill be addressed
since Rawlsian-type ideal theory became the de facto framework upon which politi-
cal theorists, Kymlicka included, develop their theories. In the third section the focus
will shi￿ to action-guidance to question whether ideal theory and action-guidance
is a contradiction in terms, before proceeding, in section four, to discuss the practi-
cal dimension of the transition from the ideal to the non-ideal. In the ￿￿h and last
￿￿￿
part, the Reciprocal Model will be presented – a novel methodological account of the
transition from the abstract to the practical.￿e model will be used throughout the
remainder of this thesis, in explaining how facts (empirical observations) can in￿u-
ence the fundamental characteristics of a theory. ￿e Reciprocal Model is novel in
that it allows for the evaluation of philosophical principles by empirical facts during
the design of a theory that aspires to provide action-guidance.
It is only through a detailed step-by-step account of the transition from the
ideal to non-ideal level that one can begin to contemplate how theories that were
developed with speci￿c contexts in mind, can be exported to di￿erent areas, an en-
deavour which will be attempted in chapters ￿ and ￿, where MC will be revised ac-
cordingly to enable its application to the case of Cyprus. Without thismapping of the
ideal/non-ideal spectrum, it would be impossible to decide what parts of the original
theory need to be revised.
￿.￿ Idealisation and Abstraction
￿.￿.￿ Useful and Bad Idealisations
Multicultural Citizenship is the ￿eld of political theory that addresses the challenges
of diversity that modern societies face. As such, it is the discipline that provides
principled theoretical responses to claims of self-government, recognition, and spe-
cial treatment.￿e role of a multicultural theory is to explain the limits of the power
of the government, the obligations that it has towards the majority andminority cul-
tures that reside within its bounds, and the rights that minority cultures can right-
fully claim. ￿e role of theory in multiculturalism is to provide the principles on
which to base these decisions. As a consequence, the theory of multicultural citizen-
￿￿￿
ship is both ideal and action-guiding.
It is ideal because it abstracts from the complexities of contemporary societies
in order to test the di￿erent principles that will later be used to guide practical action.
A theory that is abstracted might assume certain qualities that individuals in real
societies lack for the purposes of simplifying the analysis. One such assumption
o￿en used in the context of ideal theory, especially in theories of justice, is that of
full-compliance. Full-compliance is the assumption that all individuals will comply
with the requirements of justice; an assumption that is obviously false since people
might object or partially comply with them.￿ ￿e purpose of these abstractions is to
simplify the analysis in order to make it manageable.
How should one distinguish between useful and bad idealisations?￿ Onora
O’Neill distinguishes between theories that abstract from reality in order to reduce
complexity and theories that do not.￿ ￿e former are abstractions and the latter
idealisations. Abstractions are useful, idealisations are not. ￿e theories that make
abstractions from reality are successful insofar as they don’t idealise reality or human
nature. Ideal theories are successful when they abstract but not when they idealise.
Abstraction according to O’Neill is “amatter of bracketing, but not of denying, pred-
￿. For example see John Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, revised (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
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that almost any set of principles for the organisation of society, and certainly any principles of justice,
arc going to be burdensome for its members and so are not going to attract universal compliance.”
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icates that are true of the matter under discussion”.￿ Idealisation, on the other hand,
is when “an assumption, and derivatively a theory, [...] ascribes predicates – o￿en
seen as enhanced ‘ideal predicates’ – that are false of the case in hand, and so denies
predicates that are true of that case.”￿
￿.￿.￿ Should Political￿eorists Consider Empirical Facts?
Even though not everyone agrees with the distinction of useful and bad idealisations,
or the distinction of idealisations and abstractions, the view that some abstractions
are more useful than others is now commonplace.￿e challenge now is to ￿nd ways
to assess the e￿ectiveness of these abstractions and ￿nd ways to extract practical-
action-guidance from ideal theories.￿is is o￿en referred to as the ideal-to-nonideal
transition.￿ It is important to explore the dynamics of this transition – the knowledge
gathered here, will then be employed to assess the non-ideal applicability of MC, as
well as its exportability; namely, to consider what assumptions need to be revised
in order for a theory to apply to contexts beyond those intended by its authors, as
will be the case with MC, whose application will be considered not with UK, US,
Australia, Germany, France and Canada in mind, but rather with Cyprus, which
diverges signi￿cantly from the aforementioned dedicated examples.
￿e belief that there are useful and bad abstractions is only commonplace
between theorists that believe that philosophy should have “some impact on reality.”
￿. O’Neill, Towards Justice And Virtue, ￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿. ￿e twomost relevant discussions on the transition from ideal to non-ideal theory can be found
in the work of Ingrid Ingrid Robeyns, “Ideal￿eory In￿eory And Practice,” Social￿eory and Prac-
tice ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿ who discusses the transition, arguing that injustices should be factors
in our theory far before their non-ideal application. Also Zo￿a Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About
Ideal-￿eory,” Social￿eory And Practice ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿-￿￿￿ explains that there is no real con-
￿ict between ideal and non-ideal theories – the work of Rawls, she explains, contains both aspects of
ideal and non-ideal theorisation.
￿￿￿
For instance, Jonathan Wol￿ urges fellow theorists to pay “more attention to issues
of transition” in order to systematise the process of extracting practical suggestions
from idealised theories.￿
On the opposite side, we ￿nd theorists like G. A. Cohen who do not accept
that political philosophy should aim at providing practical suggestions. “￿e ques-
tion for political philosophy” he famously argued, “is notwhatwe should do butwhat
we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical di￿erence”.￿
For the purposes of this chapter, there will be no engagement with “pure” the-
orists like Cohen. Instead the focus will placed upon theorists that aim to provide
some sort of action-guidance.￿ ￿us, this chapter will limit its scope to theories that
abstract rather than idealise reality; theories that bracket out certain features of ev-
eryday life, in order to make the systematic consideration of competing values more
manageable by temporarily reducing the complexity of settings of social and political
interaction.
￿e purpose here is to work out a practical application of what David Miller
describes as “philosophy for earthlings”; philosophy that needs to be sensitive “not
only to general facts about the human condition but also to facts of a more speci￿c
kind, facts about particular societies, or types of societies.”￿￿ Nevertheless, there will
￿. JonathanWol￿, “Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos,” Philosophy and Public A￿airs ￿￿,
no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿. Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles,” Philosophy and Public A￿airs ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿. ￿is kind of hyper-ideal fact-insensitive “pure” theory raises questions that are even more di￿-
cult than the questions raised by other types of ideal theory” argues Robeyns. Similarly, Laura Valen-
tini, distinguishes between fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive theories, deciding to preoccupy herself
with the former, excluding theories like those of Cohen. Valentini writes: “Before proceeding further,
let me then re￿ne the target of my investigation, and distinguish, following G.A. Cohen, between
two types of theorising about justice, both of which are present in contemporary liberal egalitarian
thinking: fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive.” See Laura Valentini, “On ￿e Apparent Paradox Of
Ideal-￿eory,”￿e Journal of Political Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿ and Robeyns, “Ideal￿eory In
￿eory And Practice,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. David Miller, Justice For Earthlings: Essays In Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿￿￿
be a departure from Miller in regards to his distinction between the ideal and the
non-ideal level. Miller supports a top-down approach to normative theory where
the basic principles are designed in isolation to empirical facts. According to Miller,
empirical considerations are factored in a theory during its application and only to
determine how far each principle should apply to that theory. Miller argues that:
the basic principles of political philosophy are to be established without
reference to empirical questions. But in order to apply these basic prin-
ciples and come up with some practical rules for ordering society, we
have to bring in factual evidence about the kind of society in which the
principles are going to be applied. Empirical evidence about the society
will determine, for example, how far each of the basic principles can be
implemented.￿￿
￿is top-down approach does not allow for the empirical facts to alter the principles
of the theory. Miller is therefore half-right. He is right insofar as he allows for con-
siderations of human nature and social venue to be accounted for at the normative
level, but not so right when he shields the principles of ideal theories from empirical
evaluation at the level of their design.
To put it slightly di￿erently, it is not clear whether empirical facts can have
an impact on the normative design of the theory, and if so, how that process would
unfold. Even though Miller argues that normative principles are fact-dependent, it
is not clear what to make of theories that have been designed with a speci￿c social
context in mind, yet they are exported to other contexts where the social norms or
the political circumstances are di￿erent.￿￿ As it will be evident in chapter ￿, exporting
￿￿. Miller, Justice For Earthlings: Essays In Political Philosophy, ￿￿.
￿￿. All we get from Miller is the argument that: [...] “We can see directly how a principle depends
on the truth of certain claims about the human condition without having to explain this dependency
￿￿￿
a normative theory of multiculturalism beyond its dedicated contexts without ￿rst
revising its normative assumptions, can lead to the marginalisation of the minority
cultures that the theory wants to protect.
Having discussed the di￿erence between abstraction and idealisation, the dis-
tinction between useful and bad ideal theory should by now be clear. ￿e two next
issues to be addressed are fact-sensitivity and empirical considerations of normative
political theories. ￿e ideal/non-ideal considerations present in the work of Rawls
will be presented, to illustrate how an ideal theory can incorporate considerations of
human nature and political organisation in its ideal-level design.
￿.￿ Rawls and Ideal￿eory
Everyone that deals with political theory has at some point come across the work
of John Rawls, one of the most in￿uential philosophers of the previous century. In
this section his work will be used as an example of an ideal theory, to illustrate how
a theory can be both ideal and fact-sensitive. ￿is will be the prelude to the main
theme of the chapter, which is how to extract action-guidance from an ideal theory.
￿.￿.￿ What makes Rawls’ ToJ ideal?
Rawls considers his￿eory of Justice to be an ideal theory. A theory is ideal inso-
far as it considers the principles that would govern “a perfectly (or nearly perfectly)
just society,” what Rawls describes as a “well ordered society.”￿￿ Non-ideal theory is
in utilitarian or quasi-utilitarian terms. Or to make the same point from the other side, principles
re￿ect facts because by applying a principle of a certain kind – justice or liberty, say – we presuppose,
usually tacitly, that the context in which we apply it displays certain empirical features.” Miller, Justice
For Earthlings: Essays In Political Philosophy, ￿￿.
￿￿. Adam Swi￿ and Zo￿a Stemplowska, “Rawls On Ideal And Nonideal￿eory,” in A Companion
to Rawls, ed. Jon Mandle Reidy and David A. (Wiley-Blackwell, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿; Rawls, A￿eory of Justice,
￿.
￿￿￿
theory that considers what principles to “adopt under less-happy conditions.”￿￿
It is important to avoid the simplistic interpretation of this division. To argue
that injustices should be completely absent from an ideal theory since it is impossible
to include injustices in a perfectly just society would be mistaken. Rawls takes into
account “social and economic inequalities,” which make up his second principle of
justice.￿￿ In this sense, then, Rawls’ theory is fact-sensitive. It takes into account
certain realities of everyday life, like social and economic inequalities and puts them
at the core of his theory.
Rawls has created an ideal theory that works beyond real societies. Rawls
admits from the outset that his theory is con￿ned to the “basic structure of society”
and therefore it is not directly applicable to real societies. ￿e departure from real
societies is marked by his three fundamental assumptions. ￿ese assumptions are
labeled as: (a) strict compliance, (b) favourable conditions, and (c) absence of natural
limitations and accidents of life.
(a) the assumption of strict compliance: that “(nearly) everyone strictly complieswith
[...] the principles of justice”.￿￿
(b) the assumption of favourable conditions: the conditions that will “make a consti-
tutional regime possible”;￿￿ conditions that are “determined by a society’s cul-
ture, its traditions and acquired skills in running institutions, and its level of
economic advance (which need not be especially high), and no doubt by other
things as well.”￿￿
￿￿. Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿. First seen in Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, ￿-￿, quote from p. ￿￿.
￿￿. Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded (New York: Columbia University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
(c) the absence of “natural limitations and accidents of human life”:￿￿ the assumption
“that persons and citizens have all the capacities that enable them to be cooper-
ating members of a society”￿￿ – abstracting away conditions such as childhood
and disabilities.
It is important to note that Rawls’ three idealisations are not what Simmons
describes as “idle utopianism”; as Stemplowska and Swi￿ explain, Rawls is describing
a “realistic utopia,” an “achievable world.”￿￿ His abstractions only serve the function
of temporarily bracketing complications of real-life; issues that can be considered
at a later stage without altering the theory. Rawls is clear about the function of his
abstractions. To argue otherwise, would be to support that a perfectly just society can
only be attained if children and people with severe mental disabilities (abstraction
c) are somehow removed from society, which is an obviously ludicrous conclusion.
Rawls’ importance in this debate goes well beyond his theory. His framework
of conducting political philosophy has dominated the discipline. It is of great impor-
tance for the purposes of this thesis, since it is the basis upon which liberal multi-
cultural theories are constructed. Rawls provides an elaborate discussion on how to
extract action-guidance from ideal theories, explaining the limits of the ideal and its
function in guiding action in real societies. According to Rawls, ideal theorisation
is necessary in providing guidance for non-ideal thinking, ￿rstly, by identifying the
goal and the ￿nal target that non-ideal theorisation should aim for and secondly, for
prioritising the urgency of the inequalities present in real societies, thus providing
￿￿. Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, ￿￿￿
￿￿. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.￿￿
￿￿. A. John Simmons, “Ideal And Nonideal￿eory,” Philosophy and Public A￿airs ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿):
￿. Swi￿ and Stemplowska, “Rawls On Ideal AndNonideal￿eory,” ￿￿￿ point to Rawls and explain that
“the depictedworld is ‘achievable’ when, among other things, it coheres with ‘the actual laws of nature’
andwhen its principles are ‘workable and applicable to ongoing political and social arrangements’ (PL,
￿￿-￿￿).” ￿is realistic utopia “must thus describe a society that is ‘feasible and might actually exist, if
not now then at some further time under happier circumstances’ (PL, ￿￿).”
￿￿￿
the means to decide which inequalities to tackle ￿rst at the non-ideal level.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Epistemological and Practical Philosophy
Many have challenged the fact-sensitivity of Rawls’ work and his (un)willingness to
consider the application of his theory beyond the ideal level. Colin Farrelly, for in-
stance, asks “how can the principles of justice that are (arguably) appropriate in a
scenario where concerns of patriarchy, global poverty, healthcare, multiculturalism
and reasonable pluralismdo not arise by the same principles of justice that are appro-
priate in a society where such concerns do arise?”￿￿ Charles W. Mills asks a di￿erent
question along the same lines. Why, he asks, did Rawls “in the thirty-plus years up
to his death,” never preoccupy himself with the “injustices of partial compliance,”
which he considered a “pressing and urgent matter? [..] Why was this promised
shi￿ of theoretical attention endlessly deferred, not just in his own writings but in
the vast majority of his followers?”￿￿
￿e aforementioned two criticisms are misguided because they fail to take
into consideration the distinction between “epistemological” and “practical” inter-
ests of political philosophy.￿￿ Epistemological are the inquiries that aim to ￿nd “the
truth about justice” and practical are the considerations that are “action-guiding and
justice-promoting” rather than “(merely) truth-seeking.”￿￿
￿￿. Rawls, A￿eory of Justice, ￿￿ describes how ideal theory describes a well ordered society that
should “provide some guidance in thinking about nonideal theory, and so about di￿cult cases of how
to deal with existing injustices. It should also help to clarify the goal of reform and to identify which
wrongs are more grievous and hence more urgent to correct.”
￿￿. Colin Farrelly, “Justice in Ideal￿eory: A Refutation,” Political Studies ￿￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿. He also
adds that: “Rawls; principles of justice they do not deal with the issue of making reasonable trade-
o￿s between di￿erent primary goods” (p. ￿￿￿) and that “even the most a￿uent liberal democracies
cannot escape a cost-bene￿t analysis of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.” (p. ￿￿￿).
￿￿. Charles W. Mills, “‘Ideal￿eory’ As Ideology,” Hypatia ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): p.￿.
￿￿. Adam Swi￿, “￿e Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” Social￿eory and Practice
￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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Swi￿ takes issue with the sort of practical action-guidance the critiques like
Farrelly andMills demand of political philosophers. Epistemological considerations
and action-guidance are not mutually exclusive, he explains. To satisfy critics like
Farrelly and Mills, a political theorist is expected to be a social scientist. ￿is is
not the sort of action-guidance that we should be expecting from political theorists.
Swi￿ explains. “Philosophy provides the careful conceptual and evaluative thinking
needed to rank the options that social science tells us to be within the feasible set”,
he argues, and “only by bringing the two approaches together can we sensibly judge
what to do.”￿￿ It is therefore problematic to expect political philosophers to also be
social scientists, like Mills and Farrelly seem to suggest.
Although Swi￿ is right to suggest that political philosophers and social sci-
entists need to work together, it is not clear how this collaboration should take place
and indeed the cases where the two disciplines interact are, if not rare, then a cel-
ebrated minority of the overall cases.￿￿ ￿e question then becomes, what kind of
action-guidance should one expect from political philosophers, and to what extent
should considerations of feasibility, compliance and implementation in￿uence our
normative principles? In the next section these questions will be addressed.
￿.￿ Action-guidance in￿eory
In this section the spatial relation between normative principles and action-guidance
will be addressed.￿e top-down approachwill ￿rst be outlined, before proceeding to
the comparative. In the next section, the discussion of how to practically think of the
￿￿. Swi￿, “￿e Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Celebrated because high-pro￿le philosophers that discuss practical issues, like animal rights
and environmental justice are famous examples of such collaborations, yet do not represent the ma-
jority of political philosophy.
￿￿￿
transition from the ideal to the non-ideal will take place where the theoretical part of
action-guidance will be addressed; how Rawlsian top-down ideal-to-nonideal tran-
sition is challenged by Sen’s comparative approach.
￿.￿.￿ Top-down Approach￿rough Metaphors
Rawls and his followers adopt a top-down approach.￿ey move from the ideal form
of a just society to the non-ideal application of the principles generated from it.￿ey
provide guidance to non-ideal action in two ways: ￿rstly, they identify the desirable
outcome that non-ideal theorists aim for and secondly, they provide a systematic
framework for the evaluation of what injustices non-ideal theorists should tackle
￿rst.
Robeyns and Stemplowska provide metaphors that explain this relationship
between ideal and non-ideal, illustrating how action-guidance can derive from ideal
theories. Imagine a “mythical Paradise Island,” Robeyns invites the reader, one that
no one has ever visited.￿￿ ￿ere is no precise map of how to get there; we only have
a rough idea. We know that it’s the perfect island, the perfect destination. Searching
for the route to the paradise island is the action-guiding function of ideal theory. It
provides the ideal and then we need to ￿gure out how to get there.
Stemplowska uses themetaphor of the perfect partner tomake the samepoint.
It is good to have an idea of what a perfect partner should look like, not only in order
to recognise one or to avoid psychopaths, but rather, “because such re￿ection, when
￿￿. Robeyns, “Ideal￿eory In￿eory And Practice,” ￿￿￿ explains: “We dream of going there, and
ask ourselves how we could get there, and in which direction we should be moving in order to even-
tually reach Paradise Island. [...] It gives us the direction in which we should be moving to reach a
(minimally) just society, or a society that is just with respect to a particular domain. In other words,
whether partial or comprehensive, ideal justice allows us to determine whether (partial) justice is
achieved. Ideal theory speci￿es a number of conditions that have to be met before we consider a
certain state of a￿airs as just.”
￿￿￿
done properly, helps us understand which seeming vices might be virtues (even an
ideal partner would have them), and which vices, even if unavoidable among the
available candidates, are truly regrettable.”￿￿
￿e two metaphors have in common an ideal image that we, the incomplete
non-perfect humans, look up to and bene￿t from, either because we navigate in the
direction of the perfect island, or because we know which qualities to look out for in
searching for partners.￿e characteristic of this approach is its top-down nature.
Amartya Sen is a critic of this approach. He argues that we should abandon
the search for perfect justice (or partners, or islands) and rather focus on improving
our existing circumstances. He condemns the top-down approach and argues for a
comparative one, that aims at mitigating existing injustices rather than envisioning
a perfect society without injustices.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Comparative Approach
Amartya Sen calls Rawlsian-inspired ideal theories “transcendental theories” and
traces them back to the work of Hobbes. He argues that transcendental theory is
neither necessary nor su￿cient.￿￿
Firstly, on raising the su￿ciency criticism, he asks “is the speci￿cation of an
entirely just society su￿cient to give us rankings of departures from justness in terms
of comparative ‘distances’ from perfection, so that a transcendental identi￿cation
might immediately entail comparative gradings as well?” In other words, with ideal
theory one knows what the best scenario is. Yet, the knowledge of the best (“‘tran-
scendental’ right”) cannot explain how to evaluate principles in comparative situa-
￿￿. Stemplowska, “What’s Ideal About Ideal-￿eory,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Amartya Sen, “What DoWeWant FromA￿eory Of Justice,”￿e Journal of Philosophy ￿￿￿, no.
￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿. Sen expanded his view of comparative justice in his ￿￿￿￿ book￿e Idea of Justice.
￿￿￿
tions – how to decide which choice is better?; one only know which choice is best.￿￿
Sen uses the analogy of paintings. ￿e fact that one considers Mona Lisa to be the
best painting in the world, tells her nothing in deciding whether Gauguin is better
than Van Gogh. As Sen argues: “the search for transcendental justice is an engaging
exercise in itself, but irrespective of whether we think of transcendence in terms of
the gradeless ‘right’ or in the framework of the graded ‘best,’ it does not tell us much
about the comparative merits of many – indeed typically most – of the di￿erent so-
cietal arrangements.”￿￿
Secondly, on the necessity criticism, Sen argues against “totalist” theories, like
that of Rawls, where “incompleteness tends to appear as a failure, or at least as a sign
of the un￿nished nature of the exercise.”￿￿ Instead, Sen argues that incompleteness
should be a feature of any theory. As he explains: “Incompleteness may be of the
lasting kind for several di￿erent reasons, including unbridgeable gaps in informa-
tion, and judgmental unresolvability involving disparate considerations that cannot
be entirely eliminated, even with full information.”￿￿ In other words, Sen argues that
in an imperfect world one should not be looking for perfect theories. It should be
both legitimate and desirable to have theories that are incomplete, since life involves
con￿icts that cannot be resolved, situations where perfect knowledge is lacking, and
many other obstacles that might prohibit us from forming perfect judgment.
￿￿. Sen, “What Do WeWant From A￿eory Of Justice,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿ Also see Amartya Sen, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason,”￿e Journal
of Philosophy ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Amartya Sen, “Incompleteness and Reasons Choice,” Synthese ￿￿￿
(￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿.
￿￿. “Since a theory of justice invokes agreement between di￿erent parties (for example, in the ‘orig-
inal position’ in the Rawlsian framework), incompleteness can also arise from the possibility that dif-
ferent persons may continue to have some di￿erences (consistently with agreeing on a lot of the com-
parative judgments). Even a￿er vested interests and personal priorities have been somehow ‘taken
out’ of consideration through such devices as the ‘veil of ignorance,’ there may remain possibly con-
￿icting views on social priorities, for example in weighing the claims of need over entitlement to the
fruits of one’s labour.” Sen, “What Do WeWant From A￿eory Of Justice,” ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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An intermediate position is more appealing. Sen is right that in some cases
ideal theory does not allow the evaluation of competing values in non-ideal contexts,
like for instance in the examples with the paintings that was presented above. Also,
he is right that in some cases a comparative method might be more suitable than a
“totalist” approach. He is wrong in arguing that ideal theory is unnecessary, for he
assumes that the twomethods are mutually exclusive, which as will be demonstrated
in §￿.￿ is not the case.
￿e issue of necessity that Sen raises is important to address. Is ideal theory
necessary, and if not, then should one abandon the Rawlsian approach?￿e answer
to this question should be negative. Ideal theory, for reasons that will be explained
immediately, is necessary, although, comparative elements of non-ideal implemen-
tations should be integral parts of the initial theory design and not something that is
deferred to the good will of social scientists, who given the disciplinary boundaries,
rarely bother with such theories.
An example given by Cohen might be of use to this discussion, since it il-
lustrates the usefulness of ideal theory.￿￿ In his book, Why not socialism?, Cohen
describes a camping trip and explains how socialist principles are most appropriate
for that speci￿c setting. He realises that these principles might not be applicable to
general society for reasons of feasibility, human nature, or poor social technology￿￿
but registers his agnosticism on what the future bears – whether future people will
￿￿. I understand that Cohen has attacked Rawls for his fact-sensitivity, hence the ‘irony’. ￿e ex-
ample is useful in illustrating the usefulness of ideal theory altogether, not of distinguishing (at least
here) what sort of ideal theory should we preoccupy ourselves with. See Gerald A. Cohen,Why Not
Socialism? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿. Cohen explains: “￿e camping trip’s con￿ned temporal, spatial, and population scale mean
that, within its con￿ned, the right to personal choice can be exercised, without strain, consistently
with equality and community. But while that can happen in the small, we don’t know how to honor
personal choice, consistently with equality and community, on a large scale. But I do not think that
we now know that we will never know how to do these things: I am agnostic on that score.” ibid.,
Section IV, pp. ￿￿-￿￿, quote from ￿￿.
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be able to apply or not apply the principles of the camping trip to a greater (socially
wide) scale. It is important to have such theories, if only to examine as alternatives
when the existing paradigms fail. It is important, on the one hand to have these the-
ories, and on the other hand, to assess them at the non-ideal (comparative) level, in
order to reject them for the time being.
To have the one without the other is equally problematic. To reject ideal the-
ory and only adopt a comparative approach, means that one is locked in the existing
paradigms – Elster coined the term “adaptive preference formation” but it can also
be found outside philosophy, by social scientists which talk about “discursive insti-
tutionalism” and “ideational novelties.”￿￿ On the other hand, to have highly abstract
ideal theories without subjecting them to empirical scrutiny and evaluation risks ap-
plying principles to facts that yield undesirable outcomes. We need to devise an extra
step where we subject our ideal principles into empirical and practical scrutiny.
To this end, in the next section the gradual abstraction and binary abstrac-
tion theses will be presented; two alternative accounts of the transition from ideal to
non-ideal theory that will demonstrate how di￿erent theorists have tried to explain
the relationship between ideal principles and their non-ideal applications. ￿e two
views that will be brie￿y discussed adopt di￿erent understandings of the practical
side of this transition. ￿e most preferable of the two methods will be decided in
the next section, in order to proceed to the one a￿er it to consider how they can be
amended to include a bottom-up scrutiny to abstract ideal principles. In doing so,
a new understanding of the transition that diverges from the two theories will be
presented, called the Reciprocal Model, which will subsequently guide how theories
￿￿. Martin B. Carstensen, “Conceptualising Ideational Novelty: A Relational Approach,” British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, ￿￿￿￿, ￿–￿￿; Vivian A. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas And Dis-
course Seriously: Explaining Change￿rough Discursive InstitutionalismAs￿e Fourth “New Insti-
tutionalism”,” European Political Science Review ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿–￿￿; Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies
In￿e Subversion Of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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of MC can be exported to post-violent con￿ict cases like Cyprus.
￿.￿ Action-guidance in Practice
In this section two accounts of how the transition from the ideal to the non-ideal
is made will be presented, and as such, how action-guidance can be extracted from
ideal theories. ￿e discussion revolves around two con￿icting views. ￿e ￿rst ap-
proaches the transition from the ideal to the non-ideal level as a move from a com-
plete and ￿nite conception of an ideal to its direct practical application; a view that
will be called the binary abstraction thesis. On the opposite side, lies the gradual ab-
straction thesis, which understands the relationship between the ideal and the non-
ideal level as a gradual relationship. It will be argued that what makes the gradual
abstraction thesis more appealing, is its conception of ideal theory as incomplete;
one cannot extract direct policy-relevant guidance without considering the non-
ideal implications. ￿e binary thesis on the contrary, considers the ideal level as a
complete and independent stage, which is capable of providing practical suggestions.
￿.￿.￿ Binary Abstraction
Valentini has tried to resolve what she called “the apparent paradox of ideal theory,”
which is expressed as follows: “(a) Any sound theory of justice is action-guiding. (b)
Any sound theory of justice is ideal. (c) Any ideal theory fails to be action-guiding.”￿￿
In formulating this paradox, Valentini is responding to the challenge that is consid-
ered here; namely, how to extract action-guidance from ideal theories and how to
assess the success of these theories. In addressing this issue she uses the standard
examples of Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue and Rawls’ A￿eory of Justice to argue that
￿￿. Valentini, “On￿e Apparent Paradox Of Ideal-￿eory,” ￿￿￿.
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these two theories are successful because they remain intact when applied to non-
ideal situations.￿￿ ￿e ability of a theory to survive the transition from the ideal
to the non-ideal level without fundamentally altering its principles is what makes it
successful according to this view.
Valentini contrasts her two successful examples with Rawls’￿e Law of Peo-
ples and Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship.￿￿ ￿ese two theories are failed ideal
theories, she argues, because the facts that are abstracted at the ideal level “cannot
be re-introduced at the level of their application while leaving the theories intact.”￿￿
Her thesis, which will be called the binary abstraction thesis, tests the consistency
across theory and application; that is, it evaluates the success of a theory based on
whether it is applying its ideal principles at the non-ideal level.￿￿
Kymlicka’s treatment of illiberal cultures lies at the centre of Valentini’s cri-
tique. ￿e unwillingness of Kymlicka to intervene and protect the autonomy of the
individual citizens who are members of such illiberal cultures seems paradoxical to
Valentini, who interprets it as an abandonment of his ideal principle.
In order to address this criticism one needs to examine the rationale behind
Kymlicka’s policy of non-intervention. Kymlicka is not merely arguing that the lib-
eral state should not get involved with the a￿airs of illiberal cultures. If he were to
suggest that, he would have held the position that non-intervention facilitates the
￿￿. Rawls,A￿eory of Justice; RonaldDworkin, SovereignVirtue:￿e￿eory And Practice Of Equal-
ity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. John Rawls,￿e Law Of Peoples, With “￿e Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal￿eory Of Mi-
nority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. Valentini, “On￿e Apparent Paradox Of Ideal-￿eory,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. For a response to Valentini, see Lawford-Smith, “Debate: Ideal￿eory – A Reply to Valentini.”
Lawford-Smith refuted all three of Valentini’s propositions. I do not address Lawford-Smith’s criti-
cisms because my speci￿c interest is with theories that aim at providing action-guidance. I do not
object that ideal theories have other functions besides action-guidance – e.g. being explanatory, jus-
ti￿catory or comparative. ibid., ￿￿￿-￿￿￿Neither do I object that “there may be multiple ideals” or that
“there can be ‘better’ words without there being a ‘best’ word” ibid., ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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survival and ￿ourishing of illiberal cultures, which is an undesirable outcome, con-
sidering that they could gain enough supporters and potentially erode and dismantle
the liberal state. If Kymlicka were indeed arguing this, then the criticism that he has
abandoned his commitment to autonomy would be valid.
What Kymlicka suggests is two-fold. First, there is the underlying view that
it is impossible to fundamentally alter people’s beliefs. One cannot alter signi￿cantly
the behaviour of grown adults that are set into their ways.￿e challenge is to change
the attitudes of the new generations. ￿is seems to be underlying Mill’s account of
autonomy that Kymlicka is endorsing as well. In the later parts of Mill’s essay On
Liberty, Mill is focusing on cultivating “self-regarding virtues” through education
and in that way promotes his ideal of freedom. ￿e ￿rst point then should be that
change and liberalisation is not something that can or should be imposed but rather
something that is part of a gradual process that spans through time.
￿e second point that underpins Kymlicka’s support of non-intervention is
that institutional change, the creation of institutions that promote diversity, will grad-
ually in￿uence the members of illiberal cultures. Kymlicka is clear that interaction
with a liberal polity is a process that alters cultural traditions and cultural contexts. It
is for this reason that it is important that the state guarantees the survival of societal
cultures. Without the active support of the state, the process of interaction is one
that imposes the view of the majority culture upon the minority ones.
In the case of illiberal cultures, both majority and minority cultures accept
the values of liberalism and as such will inevitably in￿uence the illiberal minority.
In Kymlicka’s account, the liberal minorities are guaranteed the survival of their cul-
ture by the state. ￿at is, they are protected from the cultural assimilation of the
dominant majority.￿e liberal state does not have such obligations towards illiberal
cultures. If they are not supported they are le￿ exposed to a process of gradual liber-
￿￿￿
alisation through interaction with the rest of the society. It is therefore mistaken to
say, as Valentini did, that Kymlicka abandons his ideal principle of autonomy, since
non-intervention means the continuation of the process of interaction between lib-
eral and illiberal cultures that will lead to the latter’s liberalisation. ￿erefore, by
refusing to directly intervene, Kymlicka promotes autonomy through gradual liber-
alisation by interaction without violating other liberal values (like freedom of con-
science). What the analysis of Kymlicka’s two-fold commitment suggests is that he
provides an account of an active social process that facilitates the promotion of lib-
eral values; a conclusion that goes contrary to Valentini’s assessment that Kymlicka
passively accepts illiberal cultures by abandoning his commitment to autonomy.
In refusing to directly intervene in the a￿airs of illiberal cultures, Kymlicka is
applying the non-ideal considerations of feasibility, implementation and weighting
of di￿erent values to his ideal theory. Had he advocated for direct intervention, he
would have violated illiberal cultures’ freedom of association and freedom of con-
science. Moreover, rather than altering their views in favour of liberal values and
practices he would have reinforced a reactionary attitude, pushing them towards a
more fundamentalist position of defence, thus empowering their hostility towards
liberalism.
￿.￿.￿ Gradual Abstraction
Andrew Mason provides a di￿erent account of abstraction that contrasts Valentini’s
binary account.￿￿ Instead of understanding the ideal to non-ideal transition as a two-
step process of theory and application, he makes a threefold distinction between the
levels of analysis of an ideal and treats the shi￿ from theory to practice as a gradual
￿￿. AndrewMason, “Just Constraints,” British Journal of Political Science ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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multi-levelled process.￿is view will be called the gradual abstraction thesis, which
contrasts Valentini’s binary abstraction view. According to Mason, at level ￿, princi-
ples are discussed in their most abstract sense and are not subject to any feasibility
constraints. ￿e only constraint is that they do not place unreasonable demands on
individuals. At level ￿, constraints of feasibility and limitations of human nature are
factored in the design; in other words, worries of implementation and political psy-
chology are to be taken into account. ￿e ￿nal level ￿ is divided into two stages. In
the ￿rst stage, the relational position of the principle under consideration is exam-
ined, where the principle is weightedwith other principles in order to position it next
to or in opposition to them. ￿en in the second stage of level ￿, the principle under
consideration is balanced with other principles in light of feasibility constraints. As
Mason argues “moving from the ￿rst level involves increasing the number of con-
straints that are taken into account.”￿￿ ￿e transition from the ￿rst to the third level
of theorising resembles the transition from the ideal to the non-ideal level. What is
unique in Mason’s account is that he quanti￿es abstraction. According to Mason’s
gradual abstraction thesis, abstraction is a matter of degree and not merely a matter
of fact where you either abstract or you don’t.
￿e gradual abstraction view is more appealing, since it accepts that there is
more to action-guidance than what Valentini suggested. A theory cannot just pass
or fail the action-guidance test. Action-guidance is both a matter of degree and a
matter of kind. As one can see through Mason’s three levels, there are varying de-
grees of abstraction, where in each level more real life considerations are entered
into the equation. An absolutely action-guiding theory is one that is ready to be ap-
plied to policy, a￿er having analysed the practical implications of its application and
weighted all the opportunity costs involved and all the external consequences that
￿￿. Mason, “Just Constraints,” ￿￿￿.
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its implementation might cause.
￿.￿.￿ Human Nature and Di￿erent Kinds of Action-guidance
Two classi￿catory remarks need to be reiterated at this point, before further address-
ing the transition from the ideal to the non-ideal and back to the ideal. ￿e ￿rst, is
a clari￿cation with a proviso on Mason’s level ￿ where fact-insensitivity is endorsed
and the second, has to do with the kinds of action-guidance that referred to here.
Mason, in his level ￿, follows G. A. Cohen, in claiming that political philos-
ophy can be done without reference to constraints of human nature. ￿ere are no
particular reasons to object to this, given that a proviso is made that for the extrac-
tion of action-guidance human-nature considerations need to be factored into the
theory. Mason’s level ￿ is what was discussed above as fact-insensitive theorising.
For the purposes of this chapter, a discussion of fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive
theories will be avoided.
Firstly, because Pogge’s criticism of Cohen has been persuasive enough. Co-
hen argued that “all principles that re￿ect facts re￿ect facts only because they re￿ect
principles that don’t re￿ect facts, and the latter principles form the ultimate foun-
dation of all principles, fact-re￿ecting principles included.”￿￿ Pogge explains that
“one can be clear-headedly committed to fact-sensitive principles without also being
committed to fact-insensitive ones,” through an elaborate discussion that I will not
reproduce here.￿￿
Secondly, because fact-insensitive theorising can take place at a step prior to
￿￿. Gerald A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿ argued that all fact-sensitive principles in the end fall back to a fact- insensitive principle.
Cohen didn’t actually provide an argument but rather a dare for anyone to prove him otherwise. Here
I amnot particularly interested in this discussion since I focus on practical action-guidance that needs
to factor in considerations of human nature, implementation, feasibility constraints and so on.
￿￿. ￿omas Pogge, “Cohen To￿e Rescue,” Ratio ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
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the one that this thesis is preoccupied with. For instance, a Rawlsian theory, based
onMason’s three-step typology of abstraction, would feature in level ￿.￿eories that
start at level ￿ are not troubling for the purposes of this thesis, insofar as they pass
through the next steps before they provide practical action-guidance. Likewise, there
is no objection for philosophers who refuse to engage with facts altogether, as long as
they don’t claim that their theories are action-guiding. As Lawford-Smith aptly ex-
plains in her response to Valentini, political theories have various functions beyond
action-guidance; for instance they can do “explanatory, justi￿catory, and descriptive
work,” without aiming at being action-guiding.￿￿
A small reservation remains though, about whether there can be fact insen-
sitive theories, or whether fact insensitivity is merely selective fact reliance; whether
philosophers that engage in that sort of theorizing are cherry-picking the facts that
they want to include in their theories. ￿e cherry-picking referred to here can be
explained as follows. A theorist that engages in fact-insensitive theorising chooses
to isolate some facts about a certain condition, in order to examine her principles at
that controlled abstract environment. In other words, the philosopher, very much
like scientists in laboratory experiments, sets up her variables. For example, a vari-
able usually set at the controlled abstract setting that the philosopher conducts her
experiment in is full compliance.￿e philosopher places an entity loosely related to
humans – humans have this innate tendency not to comply fully with (shared) rules
and principles – in that controlled setting, through the declaration of variables that
regulate both the attributes of the abstract human and the setting of the interaction
of those hypothetical beings.
￿e problem is that all variables le￿ undeclared are, inevitably, ￿lled in by
experiences present in the human world; the world that the reader is part of. Even
￿￿. Lawford-Smith, “Debate: Ideal￿eory – A Reply to Valentini,” ￿￿￿.
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in cases where a variable is declared, the speci￿cs of that variable are still dependent
upon the experiences of the reader. For instance, if a theorist invites her readers
to imagine a world invaded by aliens who took humans under captivity, the men-
tal image of aliens that readers construct in their head, relies on the visual images
they have stored by watching movies and other cultural illustrations of how aliens
supposedly look like. Similarly, the Gods in Ancient Greek mythology, are all an-
thropomorphic, sharing the same physical and emotional characteristics of human
beings, illustrating the point defended here: that without an extensive de￿nition of
all the abstract variables, humans tend to ￿ll in the gaps through references to their
own experiences.
￿us, it is not clear how absolutely fact-insensitive theories can exist without
spending thousands upon thousands of pages declaring all the variables associated
with that imaginary world, if at all possible. Yet the potential of there being such
theories remains open, but is set aside as something that is not relevant to the current
inquiry.
￿e second classi￿catory remark pertains to the kind of practical action-
guidance that is being discussed. As it was outlined above, Adam Swi￿ has dis-
tinguished the practical action-guidance that philosophy can give from the action-
guidance that the critics of ideal theory demand, his argument being that coopera-
tion and division of labour is needed between political philosophers and social sci-
entists. To satisfy the critics of ideal theory the philosopher must become a social
scientist, which is neither possible nor desirable according to Swi￿.
Swi￿ is right in suggesting that more cooperation is needed between political
philosophers and social scientists, yet he has been too eager in his dismissal of the
critics of ideal theory. To ask a philosopher to give policy-relevant suggestions does
not entail turning her into a social scientist. ￿e current debates on climate justice,
￿￿￿
for instance, illustrate how philosophers can produce high quality theories whilst
taking into consideration practical challenges and limitations.￿￿ ￿e factual con-
siderations are factored into the design of the theories, which predominantly aim
at providing solutions for existing (or future) problems emerging through climate
change, or to provide principled responses to how to distribute the costs associated
with climate change. Examples with real e￿ects, in need of real solutions, situated
in the real world with all its constraints and limitations, could be the basis of the
discussion, and abstraction can take place only to simplify those scenarios in order
to derive principles that should guide action towards resolving the problems.
￿e example of climate justice is indicative of the action-guidance relevant to
this thesis; one that can take into consideration basic characteristics of human na-
ture, feasibility constraints, problems of scarcity and issues implementation, before
providing policy-relevant suggestions.
Having discussed the function of idealisation, the consideration of constraints
of human nature and real-life, along with the roadmap to action guidance provided
byMason and Valentini, the account that will be adopted by this thesis will be devel-
oped.￿e distinguishing characteristic of themethod, called theReciprocalModel, is
its ability to use empirical facts to scrutinise and potentially modify the principles of
an ideal theory.￿e case of Cyprus will be used in the next chapters to illustrate how
the facts of a case can call for the revision of the abstract assumptions and principles
of a theory.
￿￿. For example, see Simon Caney, “Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing
Burdens,” Journal of Political Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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￿.￿ ￿e Reciprocal Model
In the previous sections, Valentini’s suggestion as regarding how to evaluate the suc-
cess of the action-guiding abilities of an ideal theory was outlined. Ideal theory
is successful insofar as it maintains its ideal-level principles at the non-ideal level,
Valentini has argued. ￿is view assumes that the distinction between the ideal and
the non-ideal practical level is binary and distinct. In this section, a contrasting view
will be o￿ered; one that considers the relationship between ideal theory and its non-
ideal implementation as a continuum. It will be argued that the continuum involves
traveling back and forth, rather than adopting a sequential, step-by-step, approach.
￿is disagreement is a signi￿cant one, as it puts the view defended here at odds with
the majority of political theories; the orthodox view is to treat the ideal level as (a)
the necessary starting point of any normative theory and (b) one that cannot be re-
vised once the steps from the ideal to the non-ideal is taken.￿e argument presented
here will contradict both these points, taking the view, ￿rstly, that one can formulate
a consistent theoretical view from empirical observation that can then lead to the
formulation of normative principles, and secondly, that these principles are not im-
mune to further empirical scrutiny. Contrary to the orthodox Rawlsian view, it will
be maintained that non-ideal considerations should be able to do more to a theory
than merely condition the extent of the application of its principles.
Although Mason’s gradual abstraction thesis is attractive, it will be reformu-
lated in such a way as to allow for the reconsideration of assumptions made at the
ideal level, right a￿er these assumptions are confronted with empirical facts. ￿e
theorists thus far discussed have all objected to this view, either explicitly or im-
plicitly. Cohen explicitly rejected the object of rethinking ideal-level assumptions in
light of empirical facts by arguing that his theory might suit a di￿erent setting than
￿￿￿
the one challenged by empirical realities (e.g. the camping trip) and Rawls rejected it
implicitly by describing how non-ideal considerations can only limit the application
of his ideal principles.￿￿ Yet, for the purposes of this thesis these views are problem-
atic since they do not allow for the exportability of theories beyond their dedicated
contexts.
Mason argues that the only limitation at the highest level of abstraction (level
￿) of an ideal theory is the avoidance of placing unreasonable demands on individu-
als. Mason, in his level ￿, followsCohen’s distinction ofwhat an ideal theory looks like
and does not include limitations of human nature.￿e starting point of the Recipro-
calModelwill be themomentwhen considerations of human nature are factored into
the design of the theory. Hence, in the discussion of the model, the highly abstract
level described by Mason in level ￿ will be le￿ out.￿￿ ￿e Reciprocal Model includes
the potential of empirical facts to alter the foundational assumptions of a theory. It
it thus not called “gradual” since it does not assume a gradual process where distinct
steps are taken in a sequence. It is called the Reciprocal Model in order to empha-
sise the departure from the orthodox top-down sequential view of ideal to non-ideal
transition, and highlight the bottom-up aspect of it, where empirical facts can poten-
tially alter ideal-level assumptions. ￿e Reciprocal Model, whose various steps and
loops will henceforth be described, is one that adopts the top-down view but permits
a loop by which empirical facts can modify the theory at the ideal level.
￿.￿.￿ Fundamental Human Nature – level ￿
￿e ￿rst level of an ideal theory that aspires to guide practical action needs to take
into consideration foundational features of human nature. Whether stated or not,
￿￿. See §￿.￿.￿
￿￿. See §￿.￿.￿
￿￿￿
political theories are guided by certain assumptions about what humans look like
and what their abilities are.￿omas Hobbes, for instance, in Leviathan, argued that
a state of “mere nature” is “a condition of Warrre of every man against every man,”
giving what many described as a deeply pessimistic view on human nature.￿￿ Locke,
de￿ned state of nature as “living together according to reason, without a common
Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them.”￿￿ Without this authority,
Locke argues, “every Man hath a Right to punish the O￿ender, and be the Execu-
tioner of the Law of Nature.”￿￿ Rousseau defended the view that people are fun-
damentally “free agents” that are put in chains once they enter society.￿￿ Hume in
similar vein explains how humans have “the propensity [..] to sympathise with oth-
ers, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however
di￿erent from, or even contrary to our own.”￿￿
￿e human nature referred to here is a very basic – a fundamental, cross-
cultural – conception. It refers to the basic abilities of human beings, and not to
the ways societies of human beings are organised, for such societies vary and could
not be summed into a list of attributes. ￿is is why this view of human nature, lo-
cated at the ￿rst part of the Reciprocal Model, refers to fundamental human char-
acteristics that de￿ne us as a species. An objection to the selection of fundamental
￿￿. ￿omas Hobbes, Leviathan, Rev. Student Ed., Cambridge Texts In ￿e History Of Political
￿ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]), ￿￿.
￿￿. John Locke, Two Treatises Of Government, Edited by Peter Laslett, Cambridge Texts in the His-
tory of Political￿ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]), ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Quote from the SecondDiscourse Jean-Jacques Rousseau,￿e Discources AndOther Early Politi-
cal Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political￿ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿]), ￿￿￿. Rousseau explains how men evolved from a primitive state of being to
modern complex societies. His view onman in human nature and in society, runs e￿ectively through
the whole body of his work (it is how he beings the Social Contract ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿] and how he concludes
Emile ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿], where in the latter part he reiterates the political project and assumptions found in
the Social Contract.
￿￿. David Hume,A Treatise Of Human Nature, ￿nd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿ [￿￿￿￿]),
quote p. ￿￿￿. Also on this see pp. ￿￿-￿￿, ￿￿, ￿￿-￿￿.
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human nature as the core of every action-guiding inspired ideal theory, can be the
following: if the conception of human nature is “fundamental” enough, then it will
be undistinguished amongst di￿erent theorists; how many ways are there to de￿ne
homo-sapiens, a critic might content?￿e short answer would be that di￿erent peo-
ple have di￿erent conceptions of what humans are fundamentally like. ￿is can be
seen through the examples referred to above. ￿ere is no room for neutrality or
agnosticism since everyone has an underlying view of what characteristics people
tend to have, that conditions the expectations that a theory can bestow upon them.
Rousseau, in his Second Discourse, has put it as follows: “so long as we do not know
natural man, we shall in vain try to ascertain either the Law which he has received
or that which best suits his constitution.”￿￿
￿e relationship of feasibility constraints of fundamental human nature is
only one of the di￿erent kinds of feasibility constraints that an ideal theory needs
to consider. ￿us, in the beginning of the process, a theory must take into account
fundamental human nature characteristics. ￿ese characteristics are de￿ned, either
explicitly or implicitly, by the author of the theory, and are constraints that the the-
ory needs to address, or comply with; conditions that must be met for it to be within
the realm of what individuals are capable of, in order to avoid placing upon them
unreasonable demands. For example, if one holds that humans are inherently in-
capable of living together as equals without a superior authority on earth, then that
author is unlikely to be able to defend a theory that will in the end provide principled
action-guidance for an anarchistic society.￿￿
￿us, in the ￿rst stage of the Reciprocal Model, the constraints of feasibil-
ity are not ￿xed – they are conditional upon the view that each author holds about
￿￿. Rousseau,￿e Discources And Other Early Political Writings, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Notice that I am not arguing for or against a speci￿c conception of human nature.
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what humans are fundamentally like. In this ￿rst step, then, the author needs to
reconcile her theory so that it is in accordance to her view on fundamental human
nature. If she gives highly optimistic or a grossly pessimistic accounts of human na-
ture, then she can be challenged to justify her view. ￿e justi￿cation can take two
forms, neither of which are mutually exclusive: it can rely either on facts (history) or
in scienti￿c/psychological discoveries.
In the end, one has to either accept or reject that person’s take on fundamen-
tal human nature. If she rejects it, then it is highly improbable to accept the basic
principles of the theory. ￿is is one of the reasons that fundamental human nature
should be the ￿rst feasibility constraint challenging an ideal theory.
￿.￿.￿ Socialisation – level ￿
￿e ￿rst level of the ReciprocalModel sets the foundational principles of a theory and
makes sure that it does not go beyond fundamental human abilities, thus shielding
it from placing unreasonable demands on individuals. As it was noted above, the
￿rst stage addresses limitations of individuals and not of groups, and is, for lack of
better word, cross-cultural. ￿e second level is context-speci￿c and has to do with
the societal characteristics of the context that the theory will provide guidance for.
￿ese characteristics of social interaction must be taken into account in the early
stages of the normative process. By considering the societal characteristics of the
context that a theory will apply to, the injustices that are present in said society can
be considered.
￿e next step is to consider how the process of embedding considerations of
socialisation will work. If the theory of interest is one about Multicultural Citizen-
ship, then the ￿rst steps of the Reciprocal Model would be as follows: initially, at level
￿￿￿
￿, an abstract account of what a culture is and how individuals socialise within and
amongst di￿erent cultures can take place. In the second level the di￿erent kinds of
groups must be accounted for. ￿e analysis shi￿s to the group-level, to ￿nd out the
di￿erent kinds of cultures along with the norms that guide their socialisation (e.g. is
there peaceful coexistence, and if not, what additional principles should be devised
to facilitate the application of the theory in order to yield the intended – desirable –
outcomes?). Central to this process, is the realisation that an ideal theory at the level
￿ of analysis is incomplete; thus, partly adopting Sen’s view, in support of his critique
of “totalist” theories.
In this second level, considerations of sociability are factored into the theory;
questions like what sort of political order exists, what groups of individuals inhabit
it, and what speci￿c demands each group makes.
￿e second stage of the Reciprocal Model, where it deals with issues of socia-
bility, includes a loop: a cyclical process that re-runs the output of the ￿rst stage,
through additional input. Within this second stage, empirical input is added to a
process that ￿lters the conclusions reached at level ￿. ￿us the principles that have
been the output of level ￿ and then (re)examined against feasibility constraints of fun-
damental human nature alongside feasibilities of sociability of the speci￿c context.
￿us, the assumptions made at level ￿, are now reconsidered at level ￿, in light of the
empirical input. At the end of this process two possible outcomes can emerge, anno-
tated here in a YES or NO boolean form. If YES, then the empirical facts validate the
abstract assumptions that lead to the principles. If NO, then we have two options:
either alter the empirical input at level ￿ – apply the theory to amore suitable context
– or go back to level ￿ to modify the assumptions made.
￿is does not result in a prima facie need to alter the principles reached at level
￿.￿e principles can remain intact as long as their assumptions are modi￿ed in such
￿￿￿
a way as to (a) still justify/result in the principles and (b) pass the level ￿ test.￿e Re-
ciprocal Model adopts a hybrid mode, that combines the traditional top-down ideal
to non-ideal transition, whilst putting the theory through loops to verify its empir-
ical relevance; thus, subjecting the gradual process of ideal to non-ideal transition,
to an empirically-grounded bottom-up validation, calling for the re-examination of
either the principles themselves or their assumptions.
￿.￿.￿ Relational positioning – level ￿a
Once the second step is completed, a theory no longer places unreasonable demands
on individuals, since its demands are in accordance with fundamental human char-
acteristics (level ￿). Also, the principles and outcomes of a theory at the end of the
second step address a speci￿c context, ensuring that their application is context-
speci￿c and will not yield undesirable outcomes (level ￿).
Stemplowska described this process as one that yields AD-recommendations;
recommendations that are both achievable and desirable. ￿e ￿rst two levels of the
Reciprocal Model ensure that the action-guidance that they provide will yield the de-
sirable outcomes intended by the ideal principles.￿ey also guarantee that the sug-
gestions generated will be achievable, since they do not place unreasonable demands
upon individuals and they are in accordance with fundamental human nature. But
the achievability test goes beyond constraints of human nature and sociability, and
this is what will be addressed in the third part of the model.
￿e level ￿ of the model, relies heavily on Mason’s distinction in his gradual
abstraction thesis. Mason’s approach will be used as the basis of this discussion. De-
tails will be provided for the di￿erent processes that take place, in order to provide a
full methodological account of how to extract action-guidance from an ideal theory.
￿￿￿
Two things will be considered here. Firstly the relational position of the principles of
an ideal theory will be considered in order to look into how they are positioned in re-
lation to other desirable principles. Secondly the relational position of the principles
vis-à-vis constraints of scarcity will be examined.
Level ￿ is made of two parts: ￿a and ￿b. Most normative political theories,
especially those that are or claim to be liberal, are constructed upon a framework of
shared principles that broadly de￿ne a liberal conception of rights and duties.￿ese
shared principles are desirable because they regulate the conduct of individuals be-
tween themandwith the state. Political theorists, especially thoseworkingwithin the
same paradigm (in the current case the liberal), have di￿erent views on what prin-
ciples are more important, and how rigorously they should be adopted, especially
when this adoption comes with an opportunity cost that entails the compromise of
other liberal principles that they consider more important.
In the case of liberal scholars, and particularly in the context of multicultur-
alism, the two principles o￿en seen in contrast to each other are those of autonomy
and toleration. It would be absurd to suggest that a proponent of autonomy might
not endorse the principle of toleration. Likewise, theorists that uphold tolerance as
the dearest liberal value that should regulate the conduct of di￿erent individuals and
cultures in a multicultural society, still accept autonomy as a necessary ingredient of
a liberal polity; albeit to a lesser, limited extent. ￿e classic example of this contrast
of liberal principles in multiculturalism can be found in the work of Kymlicka who
defends group-rights on the grounds of autonomy and Kukathas who defends the
right of individuals to lead a life that is not regulated by the state on the grounds
of toleration.￿￿ We can see how the two principles are in con￿ict with each other
￿￿. See their discussion in the JournalPolitical￿eoryChandranKukathas, “Are￿ereAnyCultural
Rights?,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Will Kymlicka, “￿e Rights of Minority Cultures:
Reply to Kukathas,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Rights
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– the proliferation of the one takes place at the expense of the other – yet they are
both necessary (but not su￿cient since other principles are also needed) to describe
a society as liberal. ￿e debate is about the emphasis of each principle gets, not on
whether it should be present in a liberal polity.
If principles are to be applied in a real society, they should not be assumed to
exist in a vacuum; they should be analysed in relation to other desirable principles.
￿e question that remains is whether level ￿a has the ability to call for the modi￿-
cation of the principles decided at level ￿. ￿e answer to this is negative. ￿e third
level can only have an impact on the application of a principle – the extend of its
application – but not on the essence of the principle; it cannot modify it.
Empirical facts have been already injected into the theory at level ￿. ￿us, in
level ￿a the principal interest is ￿nding out how the principles subjected to the limita-
tions of level ￿ and ￿ relate to other desirable principles.￿is process, will determine
the extend to which the principles can be applied. If the ideal principle cannot be
applied at all because to do so would violate other fundamental principles, then we
can safely conclude that as far as action-guidance is concerned, the ideal theory is
a failed one; it can only be improved by starting over through the use of di￿erent
assumptions that will yield principles that are in accordance to fundamental human
nature (level ￿), that re￿ect the social context to which they aspire to guide action
(level ￿) and principles that can coexist with other desirable principles (level ￿a).
￿.￿.￿ Relational Scarcity Considerations – level ￿b
￿e second part of level ￿ considers constraints of scarcity, in order to decidewhether
the principles can be applied in a society with ￿nite resources. ￿is is the “can we
Again: A Rejoinder To Kymlicka,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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a￿ord it?” question, along with the “is it worth it?” consideration of opportunity
cost.
￿e ￿rst issue to address is why consider scarcity at level ￿ and not earlier,
and why frame it within the discussion of relational positioning? Not many, if any,
principles should be applied at all costs; thus, the only way to examine the scarcity
considerations of the application of a principle requires the positioning of that prin-
ciple within the totality of available resources and desirable principles. Only then
can one have a clear view of the availability of resources.￿e next step is to consider
the opportunity cost of applying the principles of a normative theory.
￿e work done at level ￿a, provides insights as to the importance of the ideal
principle in relation to other principles. Nevertheless level ￿a is cost agnostic. ￿e
issue of howmuch it costs to apply a desirable principle has not yet been considered.
￿is is level ￿b’s purpose: to answer the question “is applying X principle worth it?”
Whether it is worth it or not will be determined by the importance of the principle
and its cost, and both of these considerations require a comparative approach.
Di￿erent principles have di￿erent costs associated with them – the resources
needed for the application of each principle are di￿erent. One needs to consider
how much variation exists between the cost of applying these principles, and then
one needs to relate that cost to the evaluation that took place in level ￿a – in ￿a the
importance and urgency of each principle in relation to the other desirable principles
have been assessed. If the variation ratio is small – if, therefore, there are no great
discrepancies between the costs of our desirable principles – the next step is to utilise
the results of ￿a to guide the distribution of available resources.
Complications arise when the cost of applying our ideal principle varies con-
siderably from the costs of other principles (high variation ratio).￿us, the question
“is it worth it?” emerges. To answer this one needs to look back to ￿a, to determine
￿￿￿
whether the relational position of the ideal principle is strong; whether it features
high in the list of desirable principles. If not, then one can conclude that the appli-
cation of the principle might not be achievable due to scarcity constraints, despite it
being desirable. If it is ranked highly in the relational comparison of level ￿a, then a
redistribution of available funds should take place, to make room for its application.
￿us, in order to decide whether the opportunity cost of applying the ideal principle
is worth it, one will have to look at the comparative-relational evaluation that took
place in level ￿a.
So far in level ￿, the issue of whether to apply our principles or not in light of
scarcity and relational positioning has been addressed. ￿e next step is to examine
what function level ￿ has in determining the extent to which principles should be ap-
plied; especially principles that come at high cost and are thus unlikely to be applied
to their full extent. It is here that Sen’s objection of the second best is most relevant.
At level ￿b the ideal principle in relation to other principles have been con-
sidered in light of scarcity constraints. For the purpose of demonstration, assume
that a principle passes the test at ￿a – so it can be applied to a society alongside other
desirable principles. If it were to be applied at level ￿a as it is, it would yield the out-
comes that were deemed as desirable at level ￿, since it passed the tests of level ￿ and
￿a. ￿en, the next step is to move on to level ￿b, to consider the feasibility of the
application of the relational positioning of the principle; in other words, to consider
whether it is a￿ordable to apply the principle to its full extent. Continuing with the
demonstration, assume that it is not a￿ordable. According to the calculations made
at level ￿b, there are not enough resources to apply the principle as it is presented
in level ￿a. ￿e question then is whether one should limit the extent of the princi-
ple’s application. Sen argued that there might be various second-best solutions, and
that the restricted application of the ideal principle is not necessarily the optimum
￿￿￿
second-best solution.
￿e focus should not be on whether to apply the principle to its ideal or to a
quali￿ed form. Rather, one should ask whether the original or quali￿ed application
will yield the intended outcomes as have been outlined at the ideal formulation of
the theory. If the application of the principle, following the quali￿cation of the con-
straints, yields outcomes that are desirable – similar to those envisioned at the ideal
level – then they should be applied at their quali￿ed form.
￿is solution is inelegant – it leaves the Reciprocal Method susceptible to the
challenge that the quali￿ed application of the principlemight not be the ideal second-
best solution. ￿e possibility for this is acknowledged, and the theory is opened up
to alternative theories and principles, that upon their non-ideal application yield the
intended outcomes of the current theory (as they have been speci￿ed in level ￿) in a
better andmore e￿ective way.￿is admission is not su￿cient to render the model as
unnecessary or useless, as Sen argued. Rather, it should urge political philosophers
to be more cautious and modest about the limits of political theory. ￿e distinctive
bene￿t of the model in the context of MC is that an alternative theory might yield
the same outcomes in a more e￿cient and cost-e￿ective manner.
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Chapter ￿
￿e Case of Cyprus
Having explained themethodology that will be utilised to explain the transition from
the ideal to the non-ideal and having explained how an empirical case can in￿u-
ence the theory in chapter ￿, it is time to outline the case study, which will be used
throughout the rest of the thesis, in support of the modi￿cations to Kymlicka’s Mul-
ticultural Citizenship. Examples from the case of Cyprus will be used throughout
the remaining of this thesis, in demonstrating how a theory of MC would in￿uence
the cultural realities of the island.
To this end, more than twenty interviews with political and cultural elites of
both the majority and minority cultures have been conducted, as well as two focus-
groups with members of the Maronite community. Although there is very limited
bibliography on identity formation on the island from a political theory perspec-
tive, there is a lot of useful work done in history and education departments. ￿e
historians try to provide a roadmap to the creation and evolution of the identities
that exist today and the education scholars provide an assessment of how govern-
ment policy has impacted the identity formation of children. Besides historians and
educators, this chapter draws upon the work of linguists who provide insights into
￿￿￿
the languages used in the island, transcending several myths that want Cypriots to
be solely Greek- or Turkish-speaking. ￿us evidence will be provided from sources
that transcend the disciplinary boundaries of political theory and science, and draw
upon history, education, linguistics, Turkish studies, sociology and even constitu-
tionalism.
Cyprus is a post- violent con￿ict case, which faces challenges that are not
present in the UK, US, Australia, Canada, France and Germany – the countries
whose multicultural challenges theories of multicultural citizenship address. ￿e
cultural hierarchies in Cyprus are more complex than those found in the archety-
pal multicultural cases, and the initial classi￿cation of cultural groups largely deter-
mines the outcome of their multicultural claims. As such, examples from the case of
Cyprus, which will be presented here, will be used in chapter ￿ and ￿ to demonstrate
howMCneeds amore transferable and inclusive conceptualisation of culture if it as-
pires to be exported (§￿.￿), one that is underpinned by an internationally mandated
process of recognition (§￿.￿), in order to avoid oppression through misrecognition
(§￿.￿), as it is the case in Cyprus, where ethnicially-driven bicommunal exception-
alism leads to the marginalisation of non-dominant minority groups (§￿.￿). ￿e
material present in this chapter will then enable the extraction of practical action-
guidance for Cyprus in chapter ￿, with practical suggestions for the negotiated con-
stitutional framework in Cyprus.
￿is chapter is divided into four di￿erent sections. In the ￿rst, an account of
the di￿erent empires that have invaded Cyprus is provided in order to demonstrate
the multicultural character of the island through these external in￿uences. In the
second, the con￿ict between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots is outlined, tracing it
back to the Ottoman Empire and to the transition between the millet system of gov-
ernmentality to the British-inspired system of bicommunalism.￿e focus will be on
￿￿￿
the two communities, which largely dominate the politics on the island since then.
In the third section, a￿er the historical facts surrounding the con￿ict between the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots are presented, the role of the two states in the mainte-
nance of this con￿ict is discussed. How, for instance, did the politics of recognition
limit the interactions between the two communities, what mechanisms did the two
states utilise in the maintenance of their myths and what was the role of education in
this process In the fourth section, the other cultures found on the island, the Latins,
Armenians, the Maronites and the Roma will be presented, to show that their his-
torical presence on the island is one that cannot be refuted.
Before the four sections, a preliminary terminological remark must be made.
￿e case of Turkish Cypriots is peculiar and invites a linguistic challenge. Turk-
ish Cypriots are a minority culture when compared to the majority Greek Cypriot
culture, yet they are a dominant culture when compared to Armenians, Latins, Ma-
ronites and Roma since they havemore constitutional rights than them, rights which
are comparable to those of the Greek Cypriots. ￿us, when there is a reference to
“dominant cultures,” it will mean both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. When the
term “dominant minority” is used, it means only the Turkish Cypriots. When the
term “dominant culture” is used singularly, it describes the Greek Cypriots and ￿-
nally, the term “non-dominant minorities,” refers to all the minority cultures except
the Turkish Cypriots.
￿.￿ Ruler Come, Ruler Go
Cyprus has been conquered, bought, sold and colonialised by a long list of empires
and countries. Its strategic geographical location places it at the cross-roads of three
continents, making it an attractive place to occupy – either for using it as a military
￿￿￿
base, or as a trading hub, or even as a place of refuge.￿
￿e island has changed hands repeatedly since its colonalisation of theMyce-
neans in the ￿￿th century BC. It went from the Neo-Assyrian Empire in the ￿th cen-
tury BC, to the Egyptians in the ￿th century BC and to the Persian Empire in the
same century. A￿er various revolts, Evagoras tried to establish himself as an inde-
pendent ruler on the island with the support of the Athenians, which ￿nally agreed
to hand it over to the Persian Empire in ￿￿￿BCunder the Treaty of Antrakidas. In the
￿th century various revolts against the Persian Empire took place and independent
kingdoms – Cyprus was not a uni￿ed political entity, it was comprised of di￿erent
kingdoms – went under the rule of Alexander the Great. More revolts took place and
by the end of the century, Cyprus was under the hands of the Ptolemaic Dynasty. It
was not until the ￿st century BC that Cyprus changed hands again when it became a
Roman province, thus ending the Ptolemaic reign on the island.
It was in the ￿st century AC that Christianity was ￿rstly introduced in Cyprus,
when the Roman governor Sergius Paulus converted to it. In the ￿nd century, the
KitosWar took place, with ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ casualties during amessianic Jewish revolt, which
resulted in the expulsion of all the Jews from Cyprus.
￿e nextmilestone for Cyprus is at the end of the ￿th centurywhen it changed
hands once again, this time becoming part of the Byzantine Empire until the ￿th
century, when the Arabs occupied the island.￿e Arab occupation ended in the ￿￿th
century, at which time Cyprus became once again part of the Byzantine Empire.
In the ￿￿th century we have the ￿rst instance of British presence in Cyprus,
right a￿er the seven-year rule of Isaac Comnenus ended, who had brie￿y established
￿. ￿e material brie￿y summarised in ‘Ruler Come, Ruler Go’ has been taken from three books,
which are amongst the most authoritative in Cypriot history and archaeologyVasos Karageorghis,
Cyprus From￿e Stone Age To￿e Romans (Ancient Peoples And Places) (London:￿ames / Hudson,
￿￿￿￿); VasosKarageorghis,Cyprus: CrossroadsOf EasternMediterranean, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿bc (Athens: Kapon,
￿￿￿￿); David Hunt, Footprints In Cyprus: An Illustrated History (London: Trigraph, ￿￿￿￿).
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Cyprus as an independent empire.￿ In ￿￿￿￿ Richard I of England captured the island
and sold it to the Templar Order, which then sold it to Guy of Lusignan, who estab-
lished and ruled Cyprus as an independent kingdom until the ￿￿th century.
It was then, in ￿￿￿￿, that Cyprus became part of the Venetian Empire. For
the remaining time, until ￿￿￿￿ when the Venetian rule o￿cially ended, Cyprus and
its Venetian rulers were repeatedly attacked by the Ottomans. On September ￿, ￿￿￿￿,
￿￿,￿￿￿ Cypriots – amongst them Greeks and Latins – were killed and another ￿,￿￿￿
sold as slaves by the Ottomans. In ￿￿￿￿ the Venetians abandoned the island alto-
gether. ￿e bloody uprisings continued all the way throughout the ￿￿th century, up
until themiddle of the ￿￿th century, when the islandwas tormented by plague, which
eliminated half of its living population.
In the ￿￿th century Cyprus took part in the Greek revolution against the Ot-
tomans that begun in ￿￿￿￿.￿e Ottomans executed the ￿gure-heads of the local elite
– mostly clergy – in retaliation. ￿ese events led to the mass-migration of ￿￿￿,￿￿￿
Christians.
It was in ￿￿￿￿ that the British took over the occupation of the island from
the Ottomans.￿ ￿e agreement was that the British would shield the Ottomans from
the Russians in exchange for Cyprus, which was useful to the British for protecting
their sea route to India (it was nine years a￿er the opening of the Suez Canal). In
￿￿￿￿ Britain annexed Cyprus a￿er Turkey supported Germany in World War I and
in ￿￿￿￿ Cyprus became o￿cially a British colony.
In ￿￿￿￿ the ￿rst riots against the British are recorded. Greek Cypriots started
demanding Union with Greece (“enosis”) and burned down the house of Sir Ronald
￿. PeterW. Edbury,￿e Kingdom Of Cyprus And￿e Crusades, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿. For a detailed account of the presence of the British in Cyprus see Andrekos Varnava, British
Imperialism In Cyprus ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿:￿e Inconsequential Possession (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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Storrs, the British Governor. Following the instigation of martial law, order was re-
stored and harsher measures were taken to suppress the popular demand for enosis,
like for instance the ban of theGreekNationalAnthemand theGreek￿ag. It was dur-
ing the ￿￿￿￿s that the terms Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot started to be used
by the people living in the island – formerly self-identifying by their religions – a￿er
the British started classifying the locals based on their ethnic group, thus upgrading
the religious identities to ethnic and institutionalising for the ￿rst time nationalism.￿
￿e nextmilestone and the last to be addressed in this section, was the Second
World War, where Cypriots fought on the side of the allies. A￿er the end of the war,
Cypriots were more pressing about their demands to the British, feeling entitled for
having fought on their side. Greek Cypriots demanded union with Greece (“enosis”)
and Turkish Cypriots demanded that the British rule continued in the island – a
demand that later became substituted with rights for self-government.
￿.￿ ￿e Greek and Turkish Ethnic Claims
￿.￿.￿ From the Ottomans to the British-led Nationalism
Having established that Cyprus was always multicultural, the most important con-
￿ict of the island will be addressed, which a￿ects the inhabitants to this date, namely,
the con￿ict between theGreek- andTurkish-Cypriots. In this section, the events that
lead to the con￿ict and the events surrounding the con￿ict will be outlined.
￿e source of the con￿ict is to be found in the introduction of nationalism on
the island, when the British introduced ethnicity as the identity marker adopted by
￿. For a discussion on the emergence of nationalism see Ernest Gellner,Nations And Nationalism,
￿nd (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, ￿￿￿￿); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations And Nationalism Since ￿￿￿￿ (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger,￿e Invention Of
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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the government, encouraging the formermembers of the Christian andMuslim reli-
gions to self-identify as ethnic subjects, Greeks and Turks respectively, rather than as
Christians andMuslim.￿ ￿e British colonialists, Varnava explains, created the space
for the evolution of the religious identities of the two dominant groups (Orthodox
Christians and Muslims), into ethnic identities (Greeks and Turks), allowing them
to apply “their own ideas of ethnicity and race” into their ethnic identity.￿
Although ethnic identities became institutionalised in the ￿￿￿￿s by theBritish,￿
their initial occurrence can be traced back to the beginning of the ￿￿th century, when
GCs “increasingly saw their destinies as linked to the ancient Hellenic past of Cyprus
and their future to its revival through uni￿cation with Greece.” TC nationalism be-
gan as a response to the GC nationalism, out of fear and anxiety for the possible
uni￿cation of Cyprus with Greece.￿
Tounderstand how these identities occurred the transition from theOttoman
to the British rule needs to be accounted for. During the Ottoman Empire the mil-
let system was based upon freedom of religion and religious conversion was mostly
exercised for political reasons (for example, it was the most e￿ective way to get a
divorce) and rarely for religious ones.￿ Non-Muslim religious groups were free to
￿. For a thorough discussion on the emergence of nationalism in Cyprus see Yiannis Papadakis,
Nicos Peristianis, andGiselaWelz, eds.,Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics (Bloomington:
Indianna University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿. Andrekos Varnava, “￿e State Of Cypriot Minorities: Cultural Diversity, Internal-Exclusion
And ￿e Cyprus ‘Problem’,”￿e Cyprus Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Varnava, British Imperi-
alism In Cyprus ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿:￿e Inconsequential Possession.
￿. John Reddaway, Burdened With Cyprus:￿e British Connection (London: Weidenfeld / Nicol-
son, ￿￿￿￿).
￿. Neophytos G. Loizides, “Ethnic Nationalism And Adaptation In Cyprus,” International Studies
Perspectives ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿. Kamel S. Abu Jaber, “￿e Millet System In ￿e Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” ￿e
Muslim World ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Colin Imber,￿e Ottoman Empire, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿:￿e Stucture
of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ￿￿￿￿); Ronald Jennings, Christians And Muslims In Ot-
toman Cyprus And￿eMediterraneanWorld, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (NewYork: NewYorkUniversity Press, ￿￿￿￿);
Standford J. Shaw, “￿e Ottoman Census System and Population, ￿￿￿￿–￿￿￿￿,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Stavro Skendi, “Crypto-Christianity In￿e Balkan Area
Under￿e Ottomans,” Slavic Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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exercise their religious and other customs, provided that they paid a tribute to the
Empire. As amatter of fact, religious conversion was discouraged and even declined,
since it diminished the income of the Empire (less Christians meant less tribute to
the Empire). ￿￿
In the ￿￿￿￿ Census, the religious categories in Cyprus during the Ottomans
listed “Mahometan,” “Greek Church,” “Roman Catholic,” “Maronite,” “Gregorian,”
“Church of England” and more. A￿er the British colonialists seized control of the
island in ￿￿￿￿, identity politics changed. ￿e British modernised the millet system
by imposing a dual ethnic division for the sake of governmentality. As a result, in
the ￿￿￿￿ census, the categories were now ethno-religiously based, and were reduced
to “Moslem Turkish” and “Greek Orthodox.” In the ￿￿￿￿s constitution, the division
became institutionalised and all non-Christian and non-Muslim groups of the is-
land were to choose among the “Greek” and “Turkish” ethnicity. As Constantinou
explains, “categories such as ‘free-thinker’, which measured only one person in the
￿￿￿￿ Census, progressively disappear when the matter became ethnic and therefore
not something one could opt out of.”￿￿
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Emergence of Nationalism and the Ethnic Terror in the
￿￿￿￿s
￿e nationalisms found in Cyprus are antagonistic from their conception.￿￿ Greek
nationalism was a product of the ￿ght against the Ottoman Empire, whilst Turk-
ish nationalism was a response to “the big idea” (megali idea – the creation of a
￿￿. Cypria Excerpta, Materials for a History of Cyprus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “Aporias Of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity And ￿e ‘Cyprus
Problem’,” Cooperation and Con￿ict ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Papadakis, Peristianis, and Welz, Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity and Politics.
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Greek state encompassing all the areas where Greek population lived) a century later.
Hence, the local identity was ignored￿￿ by the ethnic antagonism and Cyprus was di-
minished into an “irrelevant geography”￿￿ that waited either for Greece or Turkey to
rescue the locals.
￿e GC demand for uni￿cation emerged right a￿er WWII. Following the
end of the war, the GCs felt that they were entitled to self-government as a reward
for their support to the British. ￿e Turkish Cypriots reacted to this proposition,
calling for the return of Cyprus to Turkey in case the British le￿ the island. As such,
in ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ TCs marched in support of the return of Cyprus to Turkey.￿us, the
ethnic con￿ict reached a climax during and immediately a￿er the course of WWII,
which reinforced the GC hopes for uni￿cation with Greece.￿￿
Kizilyürek uses the term “political myopathy of the Cypriot elite” to describe
the approach of the two nationalisms. ￿e ideology of Greek nationalism created a
direct relationship between ethnic origin and politics, encouraging the TC ideology
of separation, which enabled their claim for partition (taksim). Especially a￿er the
end of theWWII, the TC elite and the British colonialists realised that Turkey needed
to get more involved in the proceedings of the TC community in order to act as a
safeguard against the threat of union.￿￿
As the claim for union became stronger, the disagreements between the two
communities were ampli￿ed, and the nationalist divisions and aspirations became
￿￿. An account of the di￿erent sides of nationalism amongst the Greek Cypriots can be found in
Caesar V. Mavratsas, “￿e Ideological Contest Between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism And Cypriotism
￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿: Politics, Social Memory And Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿), where he
describes the con￿ict between Greek Nationalism and Cypriotism, explaining that in the post-￿￿￿￿
period, nationalism returned in the form of Greek-Cypriot nationalism. Also see Leonard W. Doob,
“Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism,”￿e Journal of Con￿ict Resolution ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. NiyaziMustafa Kizilyürek,Cyprus beyond the Nation [in Greek] (Nicosia: I. G. Kasoulides / Son,
￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. Loizides, “Ethnic Nationalism And Adaptation In Cyprus.”
￿￿. Kizilyürek, Cyprus beyond the Nation [in Greek].
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more profound and mainstream.￿￿ ￿e GCs were eager for union, whilst the TCs
were eager for division as a way to avoid the results of the union with Greece, which
were perceived to be the cultural (and also the biological) death of the TC com-
munity. ￿e ethnic polarisation subsequently led to the creation of two nationalist-
oriented terrorist organisations, TMT and EOKA. It is important to note, that espe-
cially amongst theGC side, the term “terrorist organisation” is rarely used to describe
EOKA, despite EOKA ￿tting easily within Schmid’s de￿nition of terrorism.￿￿ ￿eGC
EOKA (National Frontier of Cypriot Fighters) was created in ￿￿￿￿ and the TC TMT
(Turkish Resistance Organisation) in ￿￿￿￿. EOKA was ￿ghting both for union with
Greece and for the removal of the British Colonialists from Cyprus, excluding the
TCs who did not want union and the le￿ who wanted a political rather than a mil-
itary response against the British. TMT was ￿ghting in favour of partition (taksim)
in order to create a sovereign Turkish state in Cyprus.￿￿
￿e GC ￿ghters of EOKA were killing TCs under the pretext that they were
cooperating with the British. EOKA, as Loizides explains, adopted the ideological
symbols of mainland Greece and was considering its ￿ght against the British as a
￿￿. DianaWestonMarkides, Cyprus ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿: From Colonial Con￿ict To Constitutional Crisis:￿e
Key Role Of￿e Municipal Issue (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiringmethod of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clan-
destine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in
contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. ￿e immediate hu-
man victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (repre-
sentative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.￿reat- and
violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and
main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror,
a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or pro-
paganda is primarily sought.” Alex Peter Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New
Guide ToActors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases,￿eories, And Literature (Amsterdam:North-Holland
Publishing Group, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. During the ￿￿￿￿s there was a shi￿ in the way TCs reacted to the GC demand for union (eno-
sis). Instead of demanding their incorporation into the Turkish state by calling for the revival of their
Ottoman status, they requested partition (taksim) through the geographical and political separation
of Cyprus into two ethnic states. See Varnava, British Imperialism In Cyprus ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿: ￿e Inconse-
quential Possession.
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continuation of the historical ￿ght for Greek freedom. Moreover, the military leader
of EOKA, Georgios Grivas, was a renounced anti-communist who considered com-
munists a threat to national solidarity. Grivas, with the support of the Church and
many GC conservatives, used EOKA to pursue a dual goal: eliminate the commu-
nists and unite Cyprus with Greece while eliminating TCs as well. According to
Makarios Droushiotis, EOKAhas killedmore GCs than British soldiers during ￿￿￿￿-
￿￿￿￿.￿￿ It is important to note that Grivas’ double-target was communicated to the
masses as a struggle against the British colonialism and in favour of the romanticised
ideal of union with Greece. ￿erefore, even though Grivas determined the political
agenda of EOKA, the majority of the people that took part in it subscribed to the
romanticised version of union rather than in Grivas’ dual goal.￿￿
Loizides, following Peter Loizos, argues that “incendiary speeches contribute
to an environment where societies become tolerant towards war crimes committed
against ethnic others,” explaining howmotherland nationalism evolved from the ab-
stract ideological level to the practical and violent events that followed in the ￿￿￿￿s
and onward.￿￿ In the course of this con￿ict, the Republic of Cyprus was created in
￿￿￿￿. It was an attempt to create a common state amongst people who aspired to live
with their motherlands rather than with each other.
￿.￿.￿ Independence and Sovereignty
In ￿￿￿￿ the Republic of Cyprus became recognized as an independent state, with
the Greek and Turkish as the two main national groups. Maronites, Armenians and
￿￿. ￿e Federation of EOKAFighters, whose long time president is￿asos Sophocleous, stubbornly
refuses to provide details about the executions of GCs and TCs during ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Robert Holland, Britain And￿e Revolt In Cyprus, ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. Peter Loizos, “Intercommunal Killings in Cyprus,”Man [New Series] ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿;
Loizides, “Ethnic Nationalism And Adaptation In Cyprus,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
Latins were recognised as “religious groups,” having ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿members
respectively. ￿e new constitution was agreed upon on ￿￿ February ￿￿￿￿, between
the GC and TC leader, Archbishop Makarios III and Dr. Fazil Küçük respectively,
as part of the Zurich-London agreements. Cyprus became o￿cially an independent
state on August ￿￿th, ￿￿￿￿.
Although Cyprus was recognised as a sovereign state, in reality it was a semi-
sovereign state, “a ‘realpolitik compromise’, a ‘reluctant republic’, a ‘self-determination
substitute’, an ‘unwanted child’, a ‘sham’ and other more or less felicitous terms that
turned into sound bites and historical clichés.”￿￿ Cyprus was never a sovereign state,
as it has always been transferred from one empire to the other. As such, the locals
never claimed independence as the ideal state of a￿airs. Instead, they fought against
the idea of self-government and in favour of either union with the motherlands, or
continuation of the British colonial rule.￿￿ ￿erefore, the Republic of Cyprus was
never realised as sovereign and it was treated as the middleman to another “imag-
ined community.”￿￿
￿erefore, given the ethnic, religious, military and cultural dependencies,
Cyprus did not follow the usual course to full sovereignty that most ex-colonies fol-
lowed, becoming an exceptional case in international territory. James Crawford has
described sovereignty on Cyprus as “internationalisation by the back door.”￿￿ ￿e
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “Cypriot In-Dependence And ￿e Problem Of Sovereignty,” ￿e
Cyprus Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿.
￿￿. Peter Loizos,￿e Greek Gi￿: Politics in a Cypriot Village (New York: St. Martin’s Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿e ￿rst academic ethnographic study in Cyprus took place over the course of thirty years, by Loizos,
who studied a village in the north, years later identi￿ed as Arghaki. Loizos shows how post-colonial
politics a￿ected the identities of the locals and their perception of the ideal state of a￿airs in Cyprus,
which in turn shaped both their everyday lives and their political choices.
￿￿. ￿e term ‘imagined communities’ refers to Anderson’s analysis of nationalism, found in
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re￿ections On￿e Origin And Spread Of Nationalism,
￿nd revised (London: Verso, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. James Crawford,￿e Creation Of States In International Law, ￿nd (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
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front door displayed a sovereign state with international recognition, whilst at the
same time foreign powers (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain) enjoyed constitutional
privileges over the seemingly sovereign state (backdoor).
￿e sovereignty instituted in Cyprus, is such that “entails inter alia the abil-
ity to go beyond the law yet to remain within the law, or to legislate exceptions that
justify state action contrary to previous laws or simply so as to escape the responsi-
bilities of an inconvenient legal regime.”￿￿ Constantinou gives three examples that
can support this bold claim: the British bases, the exclusion of TCs from the RoC
and the creation of the TRNC.
Firstly, the British bases in Cyprus are considered sovereign ground. As such,
Britain used to claim that the Bases were not part of EU territory despite bothCyprus
and UK being members of the EU.￿is changed in ￿￿￿￿ a￿er the acceptance of the
referral of the European Court of Human Rights.
Secondly, a￿er ￿￿￿￿, the TCs were excluded from the proceedings of the Re-
public of Cyprus through the suspension of constitutional articles and the introduc-
tion of emergency laws. ￿erefore, since then, the Turkish Cypriots have no power
in the RoC, despite the latter claiming sovereignty over all of Cyprus and over all
Cypriots. As a result, the position of the vice-president along with the TC seats in the
parliament are empty, despite them being constitutionally guaranteed to the elected
representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community.
￿irdly, the internationally unrecognisedTurkishRepublic ofNorthernCyprus
also claims sovereignty over TCs and over the north part of Cyprus, undermining
the international sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. As Constantinou explains,
TRNC claims sovereignty (amongst others) to legitimise the appropriation of GC
property.
￿￿. Constantinou, “Cypriot In-Dependence And￿e Problem Of Sovereignty,” ￿￿.
￿￿￿
Constantinou argues that “the exercise of an ethnocratic form of sovereignty
– with the people or the demos progressively de￿ned in terms of a single ethnicity –
had adverse e￿ects not only for the ‘enemy’ ethnicity but also for the various ethno-
cultural groups that were caught in between theGreek- Turkish divide.”￿￿. For exam-
ple Maronites, Armenians, and Latins, became reduced to religious groups, despite
them being national groups with equal status as Christians and Muslims in Cyprus.
￿erefore, the exceptionalism of Cyprus sovereignty legitimised the oppression of
the national and cultural identity of minority groups.
Finally, another side e￿ect of the partial sovereignty of Cyprus is the legiti-
macy of the political and social power that the Church enjoys.￿￿ As such, the Or-
thodox Christian Church in Cyprus is the richest legal person and one of the most
powerful political actors of the island.
￿e new independent state, the Republic of Cyprus, was not sovereign in the
traditional sense and it was contested by both the GCs and the TCs.￿e lack of sup-
port behind the new state, led to an attempt tomodify its constitution that resulted in
the withdrawal of TCs from the government, their isolation to enclaves, violence be-
tween the two sides and eventually, the ￿￿￿￿ invasion by Turkey and the subsequent
division of the island.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Dismantling of the State and the ￿￿￿￿Division
￿e relations between GCs and TCs worsened a￿er ￿￿￿￿, when the president of the
RoC, the GC Christian Orthodox ArchbishopMakarios, suggested ￿￿ constitutional
changes. ￿e period a￿er ￿￿￿￿ up until ￿￿￿￿ when the two communities became
￿￿. Constantinou, “Cypriot In-Dependence And￿e Problem Of Sovereignty,” ￿￿.
￿￿. For a discussion on the role of the Church and its leaders, see Andrekos Varnava,￿e Archbish-
ops of Cyprus in the Modern Age:￿e Changing Role of the Archbishop-Ethnarch, their Identities and
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿).
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geographically and politically isolated, was one of the darkest periods in the history
of the island, as the TC TMT was terrorising TCs who supported the RoC, while at
the same time various paramilitary GC organisations were targeting TCs and GC
le￿-wingers who were against the ethnic separation.￿￿
In ￿￿￿￿ a coup d’état against the GC president Archbishop Makarios took
place, leading to the Turkish invasion, which divided Cyprus into the south, the in-
ternationally recognised Republic of Cyprus now administrated by Greek Cypriots
and the north (which to this day remains unrecognised by the international commu-
nity). In ￿￿￿￿, Turkey declared the north as an independent state, named the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. TRNC is considered to be an invalid state (a state who
is internationally unrecognised) under the UN Security Council Resolution ￿￿￿.￿￿
Since ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿, the status quo remained between the two sides, despite
the numerous e￿orts for reuni￿cation.￿emost notable of which were (i) the agree-
ments betweenMakarios andDenktaş in February ￿￿th, ￿￿￿￿ and in ￿￿￿￿, where they
agreed that the future constitution of a united Cyprus would be a federal one with
self-governmental rights to each community under one united state, an agreement
that forms the basis for every solution plan to this day; (ii) “Ghali’s set of ideas,” a￿er
the Secretary General of the UN Boutros Gali in ￿￿￿￿; and then (iii) the ￿￿￿￿ “An-
nan Plan,” named a￿er the then Secretary General of the UN Ko￿ Annan. Annan
plan was the only one put to referendum. It was rejected by the GCs (only ￿￿% voted
YES) and accepted by the TCs (an overwhelming ￿￿% voted YES).
￿e most notable changes that took place between ￿￿￿￿ and today are (i) the
accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, with the May ￿￿￿￿ enlargement,
￿￿. James Ker-Lindsay, Britain And￿e Cyprus Crisis: ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. United Nations, Security Council Resolution ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿–￿￿. For a discussion on the status of
the TC regime, before and a￿er ￿￿￿￿ see Stefan Talmon, Recognition Of States In International Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿.
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(ii) the opening of the borders in April ￿￿￿￿ under the initiative of the late leader
of the TCs Rauf Denktaş, (iii) and the legal battles regarding the Cyprus problem.
￿e last is important because it resulted in the creation of the Immovable Property
Commission (IPC), a court of Turkey, operating in the north, under the mandate of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), that deals with disputed property
in the north, o￿ering restitution, exchange, or compensation.￿￿ ￿e IPC is highly
controversial in the south yet it is important because claims of property can no longer
be addressed to the ECtHRwithout going through the IPC, raising various problems
of “recognition.” For instance, how can a court function in the TRNC if it is not a
recognised state; or, similarly, how can a Turkish commission be instituted by the
ECtHR to operate in the north, despite Turkey having no international legitimacy to
be in the north per the resolutions of the United Nations.
￿￿. “￿e Immovable Property Commission was set up under the Immovable Property Law (No.
￿￿/￿￿￿￿) in accordance with the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey. ￿e purpose of this measure was to establish an e￿ective domestic rem-
edy for claims relating to abandoned properties in Northern Cyprus.￿e European Court of Human
Rights, with decision on ￿ March ￿￿￿￿ as to the admissibility of Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey
found that Law No. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿ provides an e￿ective remedy and rejected the complaints of applicants
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. ￿e Immovable Property Commission o￿cially began its
activities on ￿￿March ￿￿￿￿, upon the appointment of its President, Vice-President and members by
the Supreme Council of Judicature among persons nominated by the President of the Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus and re-established in accordance with the LawNo. ￿￿/￿￿￿￿.￿e Commission
consists of Mr. Güngör Günkan, President, Mr. Ayfer Erkmen, Vice-President, Mrs. Sümer Erkmen,
Mr. Hans C. Kruger, Mr. Romans Mapolar, Mr. Daniel Tarschys and Mrs. Saskia Yorucu members.
￿e Immovable Property Commission examines claims for restitution, compensation and exchange
according to the provisions of the law no ￿￿/￿￿￿￿. Its considerations are based on the principles of
bi-zonality and bi- communality which have been common elements of the ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ High Level
Agreements as well as plans for a settlement of the Cyprus Issue prepared by the United Nations. It
seeks to satisfy the legitimate claims of property owners without prejudice to the rights of the Turkish
Cypriot Community.” Immovable Property Commission, http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ ￿e Nation-building of the Two Administrations
￿e two administrations have used the mechanisms of their states to maintain their
own separate historiographies of Cyprus, each depicting the other as the aggressor.
In this section, the di￿erent historical narratives, the o￿cial disputes over recogni-
tion and the di￿erent education curricula will be addressed.
￿.￿.￿ Di￿erent Historical Narratives
￿e RoC and the TRNC both use the apparatus of their states to instil upon their
citizens a common sense of belonging.￿ey both promote their own account of the
history of Cyprus, aiming at presenting the “other” as the assailant, whilst making
sure to exonerate themselves of any wrong-doing – they whitewash history, provid-
ing narratives that facilitate and go in accordance with their nation-building, the
theoretical origins of which have been discussed in §￿.￿.￿.
￿e ￿rst publication that provided ￿rst-hand account of this whitewashing,
was published in ￿￿￿￿ and documents the ethnographic study of a GC academic,
Yiannis Papadakis, the ￿rst academic to cross the border and to stay in the north
for extended period of time. Beginning in March ￿￿￿￿￿￿ Papadakis, a social anthro-
pologist, who became both the researcher and the subject of his research, produced
a detailed account of his ten-year anthropological research of Greek- and Turkish-
Cypriots. Papadakis focuses on the narratives of people living on the island, rather
than on the elites and enables the reader to see the same events through the eyes
of GCs and TCs respectively. ￿e contradictory perspectives of GCs and TCs, were
identical in nature; they were the product of the nation-building of the two states,
￿￿. It was not until the opening of the checkpoints in ￿￿￿￿ that unrestricted movement between
the north and the south was possible and this makes Papadakis study rare and very valuable.
￿￿￿
through o￿cial propaganda and education curricula.￿￿
Papadakis describes how Greek and Turkish Cypriots chose di￿erent histor-
ical periods to focus on and how they ignore those events that do not satisfy their
ethnic nation-buildingmyths sustained by the government.￿￿ For example, the Turk-
ish Cypriots focus on the “Bloody Christmas” of ￿￿￿￿, when two TCs weremurdered
inNicosia and also focus on the period of their geographical isolation in the enclaves
(￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿). ￿e GCs on the other hand, focus on the role of the foreigners and de-
scribe the pre-￿￿￿￿ period as one of peaceful coexistence between the two communi-
ties. What is also very interesting is that many of the TCs that Papadakis interviews
still believe that GCs ultimately want uni￿cation with Greece.
Despite the di￿erences in the way that events are selected and presented by
GC and TC elites, Papadakis highlights that the policies the two communities fol-
lowed since the ￿￿￿￿ invasion are identical. Both communities have created symbols,
ethnic maps, detailed accounts of murders and heroes, and a conception of the other
as the ultimate enemy whose existence on the island comes at the expense of “our”
existence. Both have tried to curtail communication between the two sides, creating
social taboos that are used to prohibit people from talking to others across the check-
points, from fear of being identi￿ed as traitors, or of being accused of “recognising”
the other state.
￿.￿.￿ Identical and Opposed Discourses of Recognition
￿e issue of recognition is one that is based on the assertion that if the o￿cials of the
Republic of Cyprus (RoC) meet with the o￿cials of the “Turkish Republic of North-
￿￿. Yiannis Papadakis, Echoes From￿e Dead Zone: Across￿e Cyprus Divide (London: I. B. Tau-
ris, ￿￿￿￿). Also see Rebecca Bryant, Imagining￿e Modern:￿e Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus
(London: I.B.Tauris, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿. Papadakis, Echoes From￿e Dead Zone: Across￿e Cyprus Divide, ch. ￿.
￿￿￿
ern Cyprus,” or if GC individuals meet with TC individuals in the north, then this is
a step towards the recognition of the unrecognised state that is the TRNC.￿e o￿-
cial line is that if one crosses the border to the north and shows proof of identity to
the TC o￿cials, he or she will in e￿ect recognise the authority of the TC o￿cials and
the status of the TRNC as a state. Such rationales have been used to demonise any
reconciliation initiatives both at the formal and civil society level.￿￿ ￿e approach of
the argument for recognition is obviously problematic. Firstly, it “oversimpli￿es and
popularises the international principles concerning state and government recogni-
tion” and secondly, it imposes holistic and negative understandings of the other.￿￿
￿e history of the discourse of recognition in Cyprus is traced back to ￿￿￿￿.
At the time, the inter-ethnic con￿ict resulted in the withdrawal of TCs from the gov-
ernment and their isolation to self-governed enclaves.￿e TCs following their con-
stitutional and geographical exclusion, created the TC General Committee in ￿￿￿￿,
which was later replaced in ￿￿￿￿ by a Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration.
In other words, during the period of ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿ “the government of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus came totally under Greek Cypriot control, in principle representing
the Turkish Cypriots, but not in practice,” so argues Constantinou.￿￿ Following the
￿￿￿￿ coup d’état against the GC president Archbishop Makarios, the Turkish inva-
sion took place, which divided Cyprus and led to the ￿￿￿￿ declaration of the creation
￿￿. One recent event that illustrates the challenges of recognition took place on ￿￿ January ￿￿￿￿.
During the talks inGreentree atNYamongst PresidentChristo￿as and theTC leader Eroğlu under the
supervision and guidance of the SecretaryGeneral of theUNBanKi-Moon, the special representative
of the SG in Cyprus, Alexander Downer, referred to the Cyprus presidency of the EU in ￿￿￿￿ as “the
presidency of the Greek Cyrpiots” instead of saying “of the Republic of Cyprus.” All the GC parties
reacted and with the exception of AKEL and DISY all asked for Mr Downer’s removal from the case
of Cyprus. Despite the extreme claim for the removal of Downer, his selection of words denotes
a political shi￿ rather than a slip of tongue (he repeated it three times), illustrating the politics of
recognition through the use of language about Cyprus.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou and Yiannis Papadakis, “￿e Cypriot State(s) in Situ: Cross-Ethnic
Contact and the Discourse of Recognition,” Global Society ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
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of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Since ￿￿￿￿, symbols and labelling became an integral part of the Cyprus dis-
course about recognition, creating irrationalities and contradictions. ￿e starkest
contradiction as Constantinou and Papadakis explain, are the two national anthems:
whilst both sides want to promote the recognition of their own independent state,
both use the national anthems of their respective motherlands instead of having one
of their own. Moreover, any reference to the north is to be described as “pseudo.” For
example, TRNC is a “pseudo-state”with “pseudo-ministers” and “pseudo-universities.”
If one goes to the hospital, then that person went to a “pseudo-hospital.” ￿e TC
leader is sometimes called a “pseudo-president.” Since even “pseudo-president”might
leave traces of potential recognition, the term “Turkish Cypriot leader” rather than
the “TurkishCypriot president” is preferred.￿e same applies for the “GreekCypriot
leader of the Greek Cypriot Government,” as TC o￿cials refer to the president of the
RoC.
AsConstantinou andPapadakis argue, “the two regimes sharemore than they
care to admit.” Despite recognition usually being a “reference to certain ‘objective’
legal prerequisites,” inCyprus it has been “invariably interpreted and sometimes only
selectively applied” to ￿t the political agenda of the two elites.￿￿
￿e agenda of the elites of both sides has been promoted, not only through
symbols, historiographies and the discourse of recognition, but also with the use
of education curricula. Education has been used to sustain national myths and to
condition ethnic members that associate with the ideals of their nation.
￿￿. Constantinou and Papadakis, “￿e Cypriot State(s) in Situ: Cross-Ethnic Contact and the Dis-
course of Recognition,” ￿￿￿.
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￿.￿.￿ Education Curricula
History and education is used in the formation of national identities.￿e common-
ness amongst people of the same ethnic nationality is exempli￿ed and reproduced
on the back of historical narratives through school teaching. As Schissler and Soysal
argue:
Textbooks do not just convey knowledge; they represent what genera-
tions of pupils will learn about their own pasts and futures as well as the
histories of others. In textbooks, we ￿ndwhat a society wishes to convey
to the next generation...￿e analysis of textbooks is an excellent means
to capture the social and political parameters of a given society, its social
and cultural preoccupations, its anxieties and trepidations. [...]. History,
geography, and civic textbooks, though simpli￿ed, lay out for us the ba-
sic temporal, spatial, and discursive organisation of regions, nations and
the world.￿￿
As Gregoriou explains de-hellenization has been a dominant term in the GC
educational discourse as a counter-hegemonic practice, projecting Cyprus as a proxy
of the Hellenic nation, creating sense of “marginality” and “martyrdom,” which sab-
otaged the creation of an indigenous Cypriot identity.￿￿
￿e post-colonial fascination with roots and derision for otherness has
been marked by a double colonial legacy: the colonial “Othering” of
￿￿. Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal Hanna Schissler,￿e Nation, Europe, And￿e World: Textbooks And
Curricula In Transition (New York: Berghahn Books, ￿￿￿￿), ￿-￿. Reference from Stavroula Philip-
pou and Andrekos Varnava, “Construction Of Solution(S) To￿e Cypus Problem: Exploring Formal
Curricula In Greek Cypriot State Schools,” in Reunifying Cyprus:￿e Annan Plan And Beyond, ed.
Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (London: I. B. Tauris, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Zelia Gregoriou, “De-Scribing Hybridity In ‘Unspoiled Cyprus’: Postcolonial Tasks For ￿e
￿eory Of Education,” Comparative Education ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
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Cypriots and a “hybrid genus,” and the resistance to colonial usurpa-
tions of educational control by tainting every cultural contact under or
through colonial rule as de-Hellenization.￿￿
Today it is almost impossible to revise the history books and it is not surpris-
ing that all attempts to do so have failed. In order to revise the history books, certain
taboo issues need to be revisited; for example, the “killings of innocentGreekCypriot
le￿-wingers between ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ when the right wing EOKA organisation was ￿ght-
ing against the British colonial rule, [..] the atrocities against the innocent Turkish
Cypriots in the early ￿￿￿￿s, and [..] the Greek Coup in ￿￿￿￿ which opened the door
for the Turkish invasion” are issues that need to addressed.￿￿
If this is to happen, then the entire basis upon which the contemporary RoC
nation-building was based on will collapse. Another side-e￿ect is that the image of
the “other” as the “ultimate enemy”who is to be blamed for everything that happened
in Cyprus will be destabilised, and as such the self-image of the GC community will
also be challenged, threatening national solidarity amongst GCs.
￿e same challenges are present in the TC part, where the nationalist dogma
was based on the premise that GCs and TCs cannot live together.￿is argument was
put forward by the National Union Party of Rauf Denktaşwhowas in power up until
￿￿￿￿ and a￿er ￿￿￿￿. GCswere the source of all the evil that happened in Cyprus, and
the TCs were the victims of the GC demand for union with Greece, although a￿er
the opening of the borders on ￿￿April ￿￿￿￿, this dogma has largely been challenged
￿￿. Gregoriou, “De-Scribing Hybridity In ‘Unspoiled Cyprus’: Postcolonial Tasks For￿e￿eory
Of Education,” ￿￿￿. ‘Othering’ is described as “the process by which, through shi￿s in position, any
given group can be ignored, trivialized, rendered invisible and unheard, perceived as inconsequential,
de-authorized, ‘Other’ or threatening, while others are valorized.” Martha Gever, “Foreword,” in Out
￿ere: Marginalization And Contemporary Culture, ed. Russell Ferguson et al. (New York:￿e New
Museum of Contemporary Art, ￿￿￿￿), ￿.
￿￿. Guðmundur Hálfdanarson and Niyazi Kizilyürek, “Two Islands Of History: ‘History Wars’ In
Cyprus And Iceland,” in Constructing Cultural Identity, Representing Social Power, ed. Kim Esmark
et al. (Pisa: Pisa University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿.
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by the bicommunal contact of the people in civil society.
Derya examines the “Turkish nationalist historiographical/pedagogical nar-
rativisation of Turkish Cypriots and Cyprus in order to demonstrate the ways in
which Turkish Cypriots were objecti￿ed as the historical objects of Turkish national
pedagogy.”￿￿ Derya shows how the creation of the “evil other” serves as a dual am-
pli￿er since it “displaced the cultural di￿erences between Turkish Cypriots and Ana-
tolian Turks” and at the same time situated the problem as one amongst Turks and
Greeks. In this process, GCs are de￿ned as ancestors of those Greeks who tried to
break the Ottoman Empire apart. ￿is narrative leads to the logical conclusion that
Turkish Cypriots are descendants of Anatolian Turks, emphasising the sameness be-
tween TCs and contemporary Turks and strengthening the idea that Turkey is the
motherland of the TC community.
￿is historical narrative subsequently became an axis of reference against
which contemporary historical events were codi￿ed. For example, the struggle of
the GCs for union with Greece was codi￿ed as a struggle for the re-establishment
of the Byzantine Empire, hence reviving demons of the past to feed the future. As
Derya wonderfully argues:
nationalist imagination can only be possible when the nation (as a nar-
rative strategy) absorbs the heterogenous character of politics and the
cultural di￿erences between the imagined nation-people bymelting dif-
ferent temporalities inside the horizontal temporality of nation, by turn-
ing the patches of everyday life into the invented patches of the national
life and by creating a continual slippage into the analogous through cre-
ating a linear, historicist equivalence between the even and the idea. In
￿￿. Doğuş Derya, “North Cyprus As￿e Phantasmatic Space Of Turkish Nationalism: A Discur-
sive Inquiry Into ￿e O￿cial Turkish Historiography In Cyprus,” in Constructing cultural identity,
representing social power, ed. Kim Esmark et al. (Pisa: Pisa University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿.
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this sense, the pedagogical narrativisation of Cyprus should be taken
into consideration as a narrative strategy that produced the possibility
of imagining a Turkish nation in Cyprus. ￿is was elaborated through
an ahistorical equalisation between the twodi￿erent historical cases (the
Turkish War of Independence and the interethnic con￿icts in Cyprus),
as well as between the two di￿erent communities (the Turkish Cypriots
and the Anatolian Turks).￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Evaluating the Success of Ethnocentric EducationCurricula
In §￿.￿.￿ the role of education in a liberal multicultural society was discussed in rela-
tion to Millean freedom that underpins Kymlicka’s theory of MC. In this section the
educational system in Cyprus will be evaluated, in order for the reader to juxtapose
it to the ideal sketched in §￿.￿.￿. In chapter ￿ practical suggestions on the function
and limit of education in a liberal multicultural state will be provided, which will be
in accordance with the theory outlined and defended in chapter ￿.
￿e o￿cial historical narratives found in GC and TC formal education cur-
ricula are similar since they portray each other as the aggressor, refusing personal
blame and silencing the pain of the other, in e￿ect reducing the historic existence of
the “other” on the island, rea￿rming the dominant discourses of Cyprus beingGreek
or Turkish.￿￿ ￿e studies conducted in the North are not available in English, so for
the purposes of the remaining of the section, GC studies will be used to demonstrate
the e￿ect of national conditioning through education.
Philippou and Papadakis identi￿ed fourmechanisms of ethnocentric identity
￿￿. Derya, “North Cyprus As ￿e Phantasmatic Space Of Turkish Nationalism: A Discursive In-
quiry Into￿e O￿cial Turkish Historiography In Cyprus,” p.￿￿
￿￿. Yiannis Papadakis, “Narrative, Memory And History Education: A Comparison Of School-
books In the “History of Cyprus",” History and Memory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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formation through education curricula. ￿e ￿rst is the language used in the GC
textbooks which is representative of the way identity is created through education;
the term “Greek” and “Cypriot” is used interchangeably, suggesting that they are one
and the same, denoting to an extent that Cyprus is Greek and non-Greeks are not
Cypriots, therefore, Turkish Cypriots are Turkish, hence foreigners, who being an
eternal enemy to the “Greek Nation,” are an enemy of “us” the Greek/Cypriots.￿￿
￿e second mechanism is the historical narrative, which overemphasises the
Greek element of Cypriot identity, reducing the TCs from a political community to a
cultural and religious group, “undermining the sense of political equity that various
solutions to the Cyprus problem require.”￿￿
￿e third mechanism is the content of Cypriot identity, which is fundamen-
tally di￿erent from the Greek. Whilst the latter is de￿ned in national and ethnocul-
tural terms, marking the distinctiveness between Greek and Turkish identity follow-
ing the loyalty of each to its respective motherland along with its myths and sym-
bols, the Cypriot identity is de￿ned as a civil identity, “which attaches Cypriots to
the Republic of Cyprus as a state and as a place of residence with no emotional or
psychological appeal.”￿￿
￿e fourth mechanism is the use of Europeanisation to rea￿rm the Greek
ethnocultural identity. Cyprus is presented as European because of its Greek-Roman
culture and Christian heritage. Hence Europe is understood through the ethnocul-
tural nationalist content, which assumes that the “European civilization” is a contin-
uation of the Greek and Roman history.
￿￿. Loris Koullapis, “￿e Subject Of History In ￿e Greek Cypriot Educational System,” in Clio
In￿e Balkans:￿e Politics Of History Education, ed. Christina Koulouri (￿essaloniki: Center for
Democracy / Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Niyazi Mustafa Kizilyürek and Panicos Chrysanthou, Our wall, Film or Broadcast, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Philippou and Varnava, “Construction Of Solution(S) To￿e Cypus Problem: Exploring For-
mal Curricula In Greek Cypriot State Schools,” ￿￿￿.
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￿e most prominent result found from the analysis of the history books is
that responsibility is always allocated to the other side. For example, responsibility
for the ￿￿￿￿ civil war is only traced to the Turkish side.￿e plan “Akritas,” a strategy
conceived by the GC elites in order to achieve enosis is never mentioned. ￿e plan
was to amend the negative provisions of the ￿￿￿￿ constitution, cancelling the Treaties
of Guarantee and Alliance that provided for Greek, Turkish and British intervention
when the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus was in jeopardy. ￿e plan
of the GC elites was that once the Treaties were abrogated, the GCs would seek in-
ternational support for their right to self-deamination, which would eventually lead
to the uni￿cation of Cyprus with Greece. ￿is plan, although discussed in the for-
mer GC president Glafkos Clerides’ book My Deposition I is rarely acknowledged
and it is maintained as a “common secret.”￿￿ ￿e same applies to the events in Agios
￿eodoros and Ko￿nou in ￿￿￿￿, where ￿ghting between the GCNational Guard and
TMT resulted in the death of more than two hundred unarmed TC civilians.￿￿
“Appropriating blame to others was closely linked [..] with the second theme,
that of the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus. [...] ￿e post-￿￿￿￿ case of Cyprus
is clearly constructed as a case of violation of state-hood of an internationally recog-
nised state by a foreign state”.￿￿ ￿is policy achieves two ends – the ￿rst is to avoid
responsibility for the events prior to the ￿￿￿￿ Turkish invasion and the second is to
allocate responsibility to an “outside” entity, Turkey, presenting the problem as one
of military intervention, dismissing the bicommunal con￿icts of the ￿￿￿￿s, EOKA,
TMT, the undermining of the RoC by the GC and TC elites and so on.
By refusing to accept any responsibility and transferring the totality of the
￿￿. Glafkos Clerides, Cyprus: My Deposition I (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
￿￿. Philippou and Varnava, “Construction Of Solution(S) To￿e Cypus Problem: Exploring For-
mal Curricula In Greek Cypriot State Schools,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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blame to others – the Turkish invasion, British imperialism, or the Greek Junta –
in the end rede￿nes the Cyprus problem as a humanitarian issue, presenting GCs
as those whose human rights have been violated following the ￿￿￿￿ military inter-
vention. Similarly, one thing that is kept out of the public sphere in relation to the
￿￿￿￿ events that led to the Turkish is invasion, is that during the ￿rst and second face
of the Turkish invasion, Turkey issued a proposal in Geneva for a solution (based
on bi-communal, bi-zonal separation), stating that if it was not accepted they would
proceed to a second military operation.
For the GCs the Cyprus problem is reduced to a critique of an uncooperative
Turkey whose absolutely and solely responsible for the fate of the GC people, who
are the obvious victims as human rights have been violated without them having
anything to do with it. Moreover, as Varnava and Philippou explain, “the occupied
areas are portrayed as currently empty, waiting for their Greek Cypriot owners to
return; as if this will happen in an unproblematic manner and without the political
changes required for a federal state, the agreed political basis for a solution, to come
into existence.”￿￿
Education curricula are also used to ￿lter newly-negotiated identities, like
the European one.￿￿ Two studies explain how students in Greek Cypriot schools
negotiate their identities – what they perceive their identity in relation to ethnicity,
language, religion, how these identities are classi￿ed, how they are used to appropri-
ate new forms of identities – e.g. of being a European. ￿e two studies that will be
￿￿. Philippou and Varnava, “Construction Of Solution(S) To￿e Cypus Problem: Exploring For-
mal Curricula In Greek Cypriot State Schools,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ￿is is contrary to the analysis made by Anastasiou, who argues that the more Cyprus becomes
Europeanised, the less will be the prominence of the dual-nationalisms. ￿e studies presented here,
show that the course to Europeanisation is ￿ltered through and assimilated by the ethnocentric na-
tional narratives. See Harry Anastasiou,￿e Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Con￿ict And
￿e Quest For Peace In Cyprus, Volume ￿: Nationalism Vs Europeanisation (Syracuse: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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brie￿y outlined explain how education is used to construct national identities and
how these identities are used to explain new identities. Most importantly, the two
studies assess the success of the education curricula in instilling the sense of national
belonging that their elites want in the children and provide insights on how each of
the personal identities – ethnicity, language, religion, gender – relate to each other.
Stavroula Philippou, an education scholar, conducted both of the studies. In
the ￿rst she wanted to ￿nd “the ways in which ￿￿￿ ￿￿-year-old Greek-Cypriot pupils
constructed their national and European identities.”￿￿ WhenGC childrenwere asked
to hierarchically classify their identity, the religious identity was the most important
of all. Following their identi￿cation as “ChristianOrthodox” next came their Cypriot
and gender identities. ￿e other national identities employed the middle ground,
with the GC being more important than the Greek one.
When the attitude of theGC children in respect toGreek people was assessed,
the children answered that they liked the Greeks very much because of their many
similarities.￿e discussion of the sources of familiarity, indicated that “hellenocen-
tricism [..] permeated pupils’ talk of their national identity.”￿￿ Whilst the Greek ele-
ment is central in their perception of their national-identity, it is important to notice
that the Greeks were referred to as “them” instead of “us,” meaning that there was a
clear identi￿cation of the “otherness” of Greek people. ￿e “otherness” was under-
minedwhen issues of religion entered the discussion. As Philippou explains, the feel-
ing of “Greekness”was justi￿ed and explained using the commonality (and centrality
as an identitymarker) of religion. Religion is considered part of the national-identity
and the national-identity is exclusive to one religion; as such, the one reinforces the
other and strengthens the dominant ethnocentric nationalism that underpins the
￿￿. Stavroula Philippou, “Constructing National And European Identities: ￿e Case Of Greek-
Cypriot Pupils,” Educational Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
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GC pedagogy.
“Space”was a justi￿cationusually employed in explaining the support of some
identities over others, like the adoption of Greekness as part of the national-identity,
but this was not the case with other space-related identities like the Mediterranean
or the European.￿is exposed a further shortcoming, which was the inability of GC
pupils to adopt multiple identities. Instead, GC ￿￿ year olds, adopted as Philippou
explains:
an essentialist and a-historical understanding of their national identity,
permeated by Hellenocentric elements [where] “Greekness” was con-
strued in essentialized, a-historical and primordial terms of kinship and
blood bonds, as well as perceived ethno-cultural, religious and historical
commonalities.￿￿
￿e religious and national identities are the most salient, whereas the Euro-
pean identities are considered at best irrelevant, at worst a threat to their national
and religious identities. Europe was conceived either as a tool that could be used in
favour of the GC side, or a threat to the Hellenic heritage of the island. When asked
whether Cyprus was European or not, the answer was positive, following the general
positive feeling towards EU accession. Interestingly, when the children were asked
to justify why Cyprus belonged to Europe, they answered that it was because of the
Greek origin of Cyprus; Cyprus and Greece being European versus Turkey being
non-European, demonstrating that even the European identity was realized through
the dominant nationalist and religious identities. ￿erefore, Philippou concludes
that GC children understand “Cyprus [as] monocultural and Greek,” and assume
“that Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots are non- European”, revealing “an intolerance to-
￿￿. Philippou, “Constructing National And European Identities: ￿e Case Of Greek-Cypriot
Pupils,” ￿￿￿.
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wards ‘others–Turks’, the latter representing the East and Islam as opposed to the
West (Europe) and Christianity”.￿￿
￿e relation between the national andEuropean identity ismore complicated.
It is necessary to consider that the studywas done before Cyprus’ accession to the Eu-
ropean Union. As such, whilst the children considered the European identity to be
in con￿ict with their national-religious one, they were not opposed to a future adop-
tion of the European identity when Cyprus became a full EU member. At the same
time, even though the possibility of the further adoption of the European identity
was not excluded, Europe was de￿ned as “large” and “big,” whilst Cyprus as “weak”
and “small.”
￿is study shows that national, cultural and religious identities are compli-
cated, multi-layered and most importantly, arbitrary, verifying that education plays
a central role in the process of identity formation and along with religion (which in
the case of Cyprus is integrated into education) are the key elements that shape the
self-categorisation of the school-children in Cyprus.
Philippou continued to research the relationship between the national and
the European identity of GC pupils, asking the question What makes Cyprus Euro-
pean?￿￿ A recurrent theme in her article is the secondary question of whether the
Habermasian sense of national solidarity – civic patriotism in a post-national state
– is possible in Cyprus and the e￿ect that Europeanisation has in this process.￿￿
￿e results are divided into three parts. ￿e ￿rst conclusion is that the Eu-
ropeanism of Cyprus is justi￿ed through Hellenocentrist and Hellenocypriocen-
￿￿. Philippou, “Constructing National And European Identities: ￿e Case Of Greek-Cypriot
Pupils,” ￿￿￿-￿.
￿￿. Stavroula Philippou, “What Makes Cyprus European? Curricular Responses Of Greek-Cypriot
Civic Education To ‘Europe’,” Journal of Curriculum Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship And National Identity: Some Re￿ections On￿e Future Of Eu-
rope,” in￿e Condition of Citizenship, ed. Bart Van Steenbergen (London: SAGE, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿.
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trist discourses by emphasising the Greekness of Cyprus and excluding all non-
Greeks (national minorities and immigrant groups) from any legitimate entitlement
to Cypriot citizenship. In this context, Cyprus is Greek and anyone who is not of
Greek origin is not Cypriot.￿erefore, Cyprus is portrayed as a monocultural state,
where multiculturalism poses a threat to the local Greek character of Cyprus and
undermines the national identity. According to this narrative, Europe is used to em-
power the Hellenocentric national identity and as such, even when Europe is dis-
cussed, it is within this framework of monocultural ethnic discourse.
￿e second conclusion, which follows from the ￿rst, is that any discussion
about constitutional patriotism through the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus,
involves civic nationalism. ￿erefore, even if Cypriocentrism were to underpin a
“common community of shared democratic values,” this attempt would be blind to
the constitutional oppression that certain minorities face. For example, the Turk-
ish Cypriots perceive the ￿￿￿￿s constitution as one that reduces them to a religious
group and treats them unequally, exposing them to gradual assimilation by the GC
majority.
￿e third conclusion is that the discourses of “Eurocentrism” and “Helleno-
centrism” are not static. “Europe” has been employed in the justi￿cation of modi￿-
cations in educational curricula and in the implementation of multicultural policies.
At the same time, multiculturalism and the need for intercultural dialogue is increas-
ingly becoming prominent, especially a￿er the Annan Plan and the opening of the
borders in ￿￿￿￿.
Finally, Europeanisation in Cyprus has been an ambiguous process since it
began in the context of European Imperialism but then became interwoven in the
nationalistic narratives; on the one hand of Cyprus being Greek and Christian and
on the other hand, of Europe beingChristian. Both the British and theGCpoliticians
￿￿￿
have emphasised the Ancient Greek heritage of the island, and as such, perplexed the
relationship between Europeanisation, national identity, religion and nationalism.
Having discussed the relationship between the two communities, the events
that caused the con￿ict and the policies of the two states towards the other, as well
as the way the two regimes used nation-building and education curricula to instill
their own historiographies upon their people, this thesis will now turn to examine
the status of the other cultures of the island, in order to examine what was the impact
of the bicommunal con￿ict and the Turkish invasion on them; speci￿cally on their
cultural survival and constitutional status.
￿.￿ Non-dominant Minority Cultures
￿e minority national cultures in Cyprus have been internally excluded because of
the antagonisms of Greek and Turkish foreign nationalisms and because of British,
American, Greek and Turkish imperialisms.￿￿ In this section, the di￿erent minor-
ity cultures in Cyprus will be presented – their history, their treatment by the two
dominant cultures, and ￿nally, their assimilation into the dominant societal culture
through their constitutional misrecognition in ￿￿￿￿.￿e cases of the minorities pre-
sented here, will be utilised in chapter ￿ to illustrate how misrecognition works and
to consider in accordance with the process outlined in chapter ￿ concerning what as-
sumptions need to be considered beforeMC can be exported to post-violent con￿ict
situations like Cyprus.
In ￿￿￿￿, the Republic of Cyprus became recognised as an independent state,
with the Greek and Turkish as the two main national minorities. Maronites, Arme-
￿￿. Varnava, “￿e State Of Cypriot Minorities: Cultural Diversity, Internal-Exclusion And ￿e
Cyprus ‘Problem’.”
￿￿￿
nians and Latins were recognised as “religious groups,” having ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿
members respectively. ￿￿ ￿e reduction of Cyprus’ national minorities into religious
groups disadvantages them in two ways.
Firstly, they are disadvantaged because the constitutional framework of the
￿￿￿￿ Republic of Cyprus internally excludes them. ￿eir cultural identity is sup-
pressed and assimilated under the utilisation of “ethnicity” as themarker for national
identity. As Varnava explains, the term “ethnicity” and “ethnic minority” did not ex-
ist prior to the British colonialists and as such, the creation of the two ethnicities
developed “a￿er a period of decades when British policy, institutions, Greek nation-
als, and Hellenised Cypriots spread Hellenic identity to the island, to which Muslim
elites, in￿uenced by Atatürk’s reforms, reacted in kind to advocate Turkish national
identity.”￿￿ In this process, the other minorities of the island became excluded and
their identity was only maintained if it did not pose a threat to the dominant nation-
alisms.
Secondly, non-dominant minorities were negatively impacted by the bicom-
munal con￿ict, because during the period of ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, when GCs and TCs fought
against each other in a civil war, the three national minorities su￿ered displacement.
For example, Cypriot Armenians were forced to leave the centre of the old city of
Nicosia in ￿￿￿￿ and the Maronites because of the Turkish military intervention in
￿￿. Article ￿ (￿-￿) of the ￿￿￿￿ constitution is clear about the classi￿cation of non-Greek or Turkish
minorities as religious groups. It writes: “(￿) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Re-
public who are of Greek origin and whose mother tongue is Greek or who share the Greek cultural
traditions or who are members of the Greek-Orthodox Church; (￿) the Turkish Community com-
prises all citizens of the Republic who are of Turkish origin and whose mother tongue is Turkish or
who share the Turkish cultural traditions or who are Moslems; (￿) citizens of the Republic who do
not come within the provisions of paragraph (￿) or (￿) of this Article shall, within three months of
the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution, opt to belong to either the Greek or the
Turkish Community as individuals, but, if they belong to a religious group, shall so opt as a religious
group and upon such option they shall be deemed to be members of such Community”
￿￿. Varnava, “￿e State Of Cypriot Minorities: Cultural Diversity, Internal-Exclusion And ￿e
Cyprus ‘Problem’,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿, le￿ their villages in the north and joined the GC side.
￿e most important issue that the national minorities face, is their political
isolation from the RoC. Although they are allocated limited seats in the parliament
of the RoC, they cannot have a decisive impact upon any decision, since they are par-
ticipating as non-voting observers. As such, even when issues that are only relevant
to the minorities are discussed, the minorities have no voice.￿eir only option is to
lobby and in￿uence the GCMPs, assuming of course that their claims do not contra-
dict the interests of the MPs in question. ￿erefore, even when laws that a￿ect only
national minorities are up for discussion, the minorities have no way of in￿uencing
the outcome, since they have no voting rights.
￿.￿.￿ ￿ree Types of Minorities
￿e non-dominantminoritiesmentioned above, can be classi￿ed in three categories:
nationalminorities (Armenians,Maronites, Latins), non-recognisedminorities (Cypriot
Roma) with historical presence on the island and ￿nally, hybrid cultures (Linobam-
bakoi) that are also not recognised by either side.￿e three types will henceforth be
outlined, before their historical presence in Cyprus is discussed in more detail in the
remaining parts of this chapter.
￿e ￿rst group are national minorities like the Latins, Armenians and Ma-
ronites, all of which were given a three-month period to choose the nationality to
which they wanted to enter into with the creation of the RoC in ￿￿￿￿. ￿e case of
Maronites is especially interesting as the Vatican intervened a￿er ￿￿￿￿ resulting in
them having rights in the north, despite having chosen the Greek ethnicity. ￿ey
were arbitrarily labelled as Greek Cypriots, nevertheless they had to renegotiate their
identity both in the north and in the south, in order to avoid the social stigma and the
￿￿￿
associated negative status that resulted from their “right” to move across the divide.
￿e second case is that of the Cypriot Gypsies (Roma) who were never an or-
ganisedminority, although their presence on the island can be traced back to the ￿￿th
century. During the establishment of the RoC in ￿￿￿￿, the Gypsies did not choose
to join either of the two ethnicities. ￿e Muslim-Gypsies became assigned to the
Turkish ethnic group and the Christian-Gypsies to the Greek one. ￿e ￿￿￿￿ separa-
tion found some Gypsies living in the north and some in the south part of Cyprus.
￿ose living in the north were situated at Morphou and as newly-found Turks, were
assigned the TC nationality. In the early ￿￿￿￿s, unemployment in the north was very
high and as a result many Gypsies decided to migrate to the south in order to seek
employment (as every citizen of the RoC has the right to do). At the beginning, there
was confusion amongst the RoC o￿cials as to whether Gypsies should be treated as
TCs (and therefore as equal citizens of the RoC).￿is confusion led to the imprison-
ment of many of themwho did not hold o￿cial documents.￿ose imprisoned, were
paradoxically treated as illegal immigrants. At the social level, they were accused of
espionage because like Maronites, they were able to cross the divide. As a result,
no community or village was willing to accept them. ￿e RoC transferred them to
Kotsiatis, next to the Nicosia rubbish site, and then to a geographically isolated TC
village in Paphos (Makounta) and to the TC section of Limassol.
￿e third case is that of Linobambakoi, who were Cypriots with hybrid reli-
gious beliefs. As Constantinou explains:
these people participated in each other’s religious rituals and festivi-
ties, partook in the surrounding spiritual menu, without necessarily or
consciously becoming ‘Muslims’ or ‘Christians’, or even Linobambakoi,
which in any case was rarely a self-designation. Associating religion
￿￿￿
with exclusivist ethnic identity rendered strange such theological hos-
pitality.￿￿
￿e case of Fatma Usta in Potamia is illuminating and was presented in the docu-
mentary Our Wall.￿￿ Usta, was a TC resident in the RoC, a Muslim who wore the
black attire typical for Greek-Orthodox widows, and
crossed herself, smoked the house in Christian fashion and occasionally
joined mass. She also tried to receive communion, though this was de-
nied to her. She still visited the mosque when she went to the north and
has been buried in the Turkish cemetery of Potamia. In her single-room
house, three pictures were prominent and quite revealing: Archbishop
Makarios, Kemal Attaturk and King George.￿￿
Such cases have been excluded from the historiography of both sides. ￿e
cosmopolitan nature of Linobambakoi was reduced to the understanding that they
were Greeks who not withstanding the oppression of theOttoman Empire converted
to Islam.
￿.￿.￿ History of the Armenians
￿e ￿rst time Armenians came to Cyprus was during the end of the ￿th century
AD, a￿er the military campaigns of the Byzantine Maurice against the Persians in
Southern Armenia.￿￿ Armenians were sent to Cyprus to defend and cultivate the
￿￿. Constantinou, “Aporias Of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity And ￿e ‘Cyprus Problem’,”
￿￿￿.
￿￿. Kizilyürek and Chrysanthou, Our wall.
￿￿. Constantinou, “Aporias Of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity And ￿e ‘Cyprus Problem’,”
￿￿￿.
￿￿. Gerard Dedeyan, “￿e Armenians In Cyprus During And A￿er ￿e Ottoman Conquest,” in
￿e Minorities Of Cyprus: Development Patterns And￿e Inclusion Of￿e Internal-Exclusion, ed. An-
drekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, andMarina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub-
￿￿￿
land. Later, in ￿￿￿, Cyprus along with Crete was utilised as a docking station for the
ships of the (Armenian origin) Macedonian dynasty during their attack against the
Arabs.
A century later, in ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿, Armenians were sent to Cyprus under the lead-
ership of emperor John II, in order to join the dynasty of Comneni, then under Isaac
Comnenus.￿e Armenians sent in defence of Cyprus along with the Greeks fought
against King Richard the Lionheart of England who conquered the island in ￿￿￿￿.
By the ￿￿th century, Armenians had established themselves in Cyprus, mostly
working as serfs, concentrated in the village of Arminou, specialising in vineyards.
Moreover, their presence in the army was signi￿cant enough to be recorded in the
documents of theGenoese attack of ￿￿￿￿, guarding the PaphosGate inNicosia.￿eir
presence on the island became more profound during the ￿￿th century, when many
Armenian immigrants ￿ed to Cyprus following the Mamluk attacks against Cilicia.
Also, because the rulers of Cilicia favoured and promoted latinising policies, many
Armenianmonks came toCyprus and by the end of the ￿￿th century they had created
churches and monasteries. It is important to note that the Armenian Church was
represented in Cyprus by two bishoprics, the one situated in Nicosia and the other
in Famagusta.
During the Ottoman Rule, although Armenians did not challenge the estab-
lishment of the Ottoman Empire, they did not assist the Ottoman conquerors either,
contrary to what many GCs suggest. In fact, as Dedeyan explains “the Ottoman Oc-
cupation of Cyprus was regarded in wider Armenian circles as a calamity for Chris-
tianity.”￿￿
￿e intercommunal tensions started under Venetian rule and were main-
lishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿ provides a historical outline of the presence of Armenians in Cyprus, during and
a￿er the Ottoman Conquest.
￿￿. Dedeyan, “￿e Armenians In Cyprus During And A￿er￿e Ottoman Conquest,” ￿￿.
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tained during the reign of the Ottoman Empire. ￿ese included disputes between
Greeks and Armenians over mostly religious monuments. A￿er the Ottoman Em-
pire, the number of Armenians declined along with their political in￿uence.
￿.￿.￿ History of Latins
Latins are Roman Catholics who came to Cyprus and founded their church in ￿￿￿￿,
under the papal edict of Pope Celestine III.￿e established Roman Catholic Church
was dissolved when the Ottomans conquered Cyprus, although the Roman Catholic
clergy did not give up their o￿ces.
￿e in￿uence of the Roman Catholic clergy was tempered by international
and internal consequences. Internationally, the Ottoman Empire engaged in wars
against Spain, Venice and the Austrian Empire, all of which were Roman Catholics.
￿is created the hostile attitude of the Ottoman rulers of Cyprus against the local
Roman Catholic community and their religious leaders. Internally, although many
Christian Orthodox bishops favoured the Roman Catholics, this friendly sentiment
was not transferred to the masses, because the Orthodox high clergy were afraid
of the Ottoman rulers. Moreover, some of them, being in￿uenced by Calvinism,
adopted the hatred that existed between the two strands of Catholicism and became
strongly opposed to Roman Catholicism. Another reason for the failure of Roman
Catholics to become dominant within the Cypriot public sphere was their internal
disputes – Observant Franscisian friars were in opposition to the Latin episcopy of
the island.
As a result of these circumstances, the Latins in Cyprus did not manage to
“convert a signi￿cant number of Orthodox Christians to Roman Catholicism and
thereby to become a church with a mainly indigenous ￿ock as opposed to one con-
￿￿￿
sisting preponderantly of Western Europeans.”￿￿
￿.￿.￿ History of Maronites
Maronites ￿rstly resided in Cyprus in ￿￿￿, when theMardaites were forced fromMt.
Lebanon by Justinian and settled in Satalia on the southern coast of Asia Minor.￿￿
Once the Ottomans took over the control of the island, they changed the social and
political system, replacing it with Islamic and Sharia laws.￿eMillet System also re-
placed the feudal system, andminority groupswere granted religious freedom. (Ten-
sions because of rivalry and prejudice existed, but overall the coexistence of various
religious groups was peaceful).
When the Ottomans came to the island, the orthodox Christians revolted
against their Latin landowners (the Venetian Empire that predated the Ottoman),
whereas the Cypriot Maronites expressed allegiance to their Latin coreligionists.
￿is allegiance was to be recalled once the island came under the total control of the
Ottomans, since the latter were brutal against all Christians, killing clergymen and
transforming churches into mosques. Paradoxically, the largest Christian Church,
theGreekOrthodox, was of interest to theOttomans, as it was “a ready-made admin-
istrative machine, suitable for both political and ￿scal administration, and a struc-
tured hierarchy through which even remote communities were within easy reach.”￿￿
Once the Orthodox Church regained the power that it had lost during the Latins, it
￿￿. Nicholas Coureas, “Stunted Growth:￿e Latin Clergy Of Cyprus In￿e Ottoman Period,” in
￿e Minorities Of Cyprus: Development Patterns And￿e Inclusion Of￿e Internal-Exclusion, ed. An-
drekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, andMarina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Pub-
lishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
￿￿. Guita G. Hourani, “￿e Maronites Of Cyprus Under Ottoman Rule,” in ￿e Minorities Of
Cyprus: Development Patterns And￿e Inclusion Of￿e Internal-Exclusion, ed. Andrekos Varnava,
Nicholas Coureas, and Marina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿),
￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
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retaliated against both Latins and Maronites by con￿scating their churches and ac-
cusing them of plotting against the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to reinstate the
Venetian Empire.
With the establishment of the Ottomans on the island, the economy declined,
forcingmanyChristians to convert to Islam for economic andpolitical reasons.￿ese
converts were described as Linobambakoi – “a composite Greek word that means
linen and cotton [..] a fabric woven with cotton and linen which had two di￿erent
sides corresponding thus to the two aspects of these people’s faith who overtly were
Muslims and covertly kept their Christian beliefs.”￿￿
As a result, from ￿￿￿￿ to ￿￿￿￿, the Maronites were le￿ without priests, and
Latins administrated their villages.￿erefore, theMaronites, having no spiritual and
secular leaders, went under the guidance of the Orthodox Church, who was taxing
them heavier than those of the Christian Orthodox religion. As Hourani explains
“the Orthodox Church could levy taxes on those who came under its jurisdiction;
the Maronites, lacking spiritual and secular leaders, came under the control of the
OrthodoxChurch. It seems that theOrthodox bishops increased the taxes or obliged
the Maronites to pay other people’s share.”￿￿ ￿eir only support during this period
was from Lebanon, by the Patriarch and the College of Bishops, which intervened
whenever injustice happened against them.
By the end of the Ottoman rule, the Maronites were peasants (because of the
high taxes they paid to the Orthodox Church) and most of them lived in rural vil-
lages. Indicative of the oppression that they were under, is the letter of November
￿￿th, ￿￿￿￿, sent to the Maronite representative before the Sublime Porte in Con-
￿￿. Hourani, “￿e Maronites Of Cyprus Under Ottoman Rule,” ￿￿￿-￿￿￿; Skendi, “Crypto-
Christianity In￿e Balkan Area Under￿e Ottomans.”
￿￿. Quote from Hourani, “￿e Maronites Of Cyprus Under Ottoman Rule,” ￿￿￿. She further ex-
plains that “this authority was justi￿ed by the Orthodox bishops as accorded to them by the Emperor
Justinian and with it they claim the jurisdiction over all the clergy on the island.” (p. ￿￿￿)
￿￿￿
stantinople (Elias Hawa) by Patriarch Youssef Raji El Khazen, who explained how
the Orthodox bishops were persecuting them, and how they were asked to pay more
taxes than the Orthodox under the threat that if they did not the latter would close
down their churches.
As Housini explains “by the time the British took over the administration of
the island, the Maronites were worn-out and many of their villages became only a
memory of what was once were.”￿￿
What makes the case of the Maronites distinct, when compared to the rest of
the national minorities in the country, is their linguistic status. Cyprus Maronites,
speak a local language, Cyprus Maronite Arabic. ￿e RoC has repeatedly denied
recognition of this indigenous language. Under the presidency of Tassos Papadopou-
los, the Republic has explicitly denied the existence of such a language, and it was
only a￿er the ￿￿￿￿ intervention of the Council of Europe that it was forced to grant
them recognition. Even then, the RoC, again under Papadopoulos, falsely claimed
that the only people who actually spoke the language were a handful of elderly Ma-
ronites living in the north part of Cyprus, beyond the control of the RoC. As Con-
stantinou shows in his documentary￿e￿ird Motherland the language is spoken
in the RoC as well, and it is now taught at the Maronite State School in Lakatamia,
Nicosia.￿￿ ￿e RoC, to this day, has yet to allow the teaching of Cyprus Maronite
Arabic during school hours and as such, the Cypriot Maronite children need to stay
a￿er hours to learn the language of their culture.
￿e case of the Cyprus Maronite Arabic is not the only piece in the puzzle of
￿￿. Hourani, “￿e Maronites Of Cyprus Under Ottoman Rule,” ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou and Giorgos K. Skordis,￿e￿ird Motherland, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=JVKH￿thX￿vc, ￿￿￿￿ It contains a series of informal interviews at the village of Kor-
makitis. As Constantinou himself says: “the ￿lm reveals the dilemmas of identi￿cation and belonging
and accounts for opposing feelings and beliefs within and beyond the community.” It is “a ￿lm about
cultural loss, co-option, denial of rights and everyday social problems, but also of ethnic pride, cul-
tural revival, communal joy and resistance.”
￿￿￿
the linguistic politics in Cyprus, although it is the only one recognized as indigenous
to Cyprus.
￿.￿.￿ Multilingualism in Cyprus
In Cyprus, the Euromosaic III study recognises three minority languages on the is-
land, the Armenian, Cypriot Arabic and Romani, and also recognises the minority
status of Greek and Turkish language in the area controlled by the TCs and by the
GCs respectively.￿￿ ￿e most interesting case is that of Cypriot Arabic which has
been spoken since the ￿th century. Whilst under the ￿￿￿￿ Charter, the RoC was
forced to recognise Armenian as a minority non-territorial language it refused to
recognise Cypriot Arabic and classi￿ed it not as a language but rather as a dialect.￿￿
Karyolemou explains that linguistically speaking this is wrong, since it goes contrary
to the Charter, irrespective of whether the RoC argues that the Cypriot Maronite is
only spoken by “elderly Maronites who live in the village of Kormakitis” and that
￿￿. European Commission, Euromosaic III, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. ￿e Final Report of theHigh Level Group onMultilingualism explicitly states that “the revival of
the regions and the revitalisation of regional andminority languages are among the most striking de-
velopments in the history of the [European] Union”.￿e research onminority languages in the Euro-
pean Union indicates that minority languages have been excluded because of the institutionalisation
of monolingual ideology. ￿e reality is far from the common perception of French people speaking
French, Spanish people speaking Spanish and so on. In fact, such perceptions concealed “the pres-
ence of other language varieties such as Basque, Catalan, Occitan, Breton, Alsatian, Flemish, Corsican
or Franco Provençal in France and Catalan, Aragonese, Basque Occitan or Galician in Spain.” ￿ere
are approximately ￿￿￿minority languages.￿e EuropeanCharter on Regional orMinority Languages
was a very importantmilestone in the future ofminority languages as it connected recognition of ami-
nority language with the obligation to take action for its survival. As such, as the Explanatory Report
to the European Charter explains, the Charter “not only contains a non discrimination clause con-
cerning the use of these languages but also provides formeasures o￿ering active support to them”. For
the reports, seeO￿ce forO￿cial Publications of the EuropeanCommunities, Final Report: High Level
Group on Multilingualism, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/doc/multireport_en.pdf,
￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ and European Union, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, ￿￿￿￿. For more
discussion on the linguistic politics of Cyprus, see Marilena Karyolemou, “Minorities And Minority
Languages In Cyprus,” in￿e Minorities Of Cyprus: Development Patterns And￿e Inclusion Of￿e
Internal-Exclusion, ed. Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, andMarina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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“the language is not written.”￿￿
Constantinou, in a PRIO Policy Brief, discussed￿e Protection and the Re-
vival of Cypriot Maronite Arabic.￿￿ In November ￿￿￿￿, a￿er a long process and a￿er
the unwillingness of the Cyprus Government (under the nationalist president Tassos
Papadopoulos)￿￿ to recognise the Maronites as an ethnic community with a unique
language, the Council of Europe declared that “it recognises Cypriot Maronite Ara-
bic (CMA) as a Minority Language within the meaning of the European Charter for
Regional or Minority Languages.” As such, renewed interest and funds are now allo-
cated for the survival and revival of such an integral part of Cypriot cultural heritage,
that has been almost extinct because of the unwillingness and ethnocultural bias of
the RoC to ensure the maintenance of all cultures in Cyprus.
￿e neglected state of theCypriotminority language is a product of the lack of
social awareness which relates, ￿rstly to the ethno-religious criteria needed to recog-
nise a group as a minority and secondly, to the classi￿cation of the RoC in the ￿￿￿￿
constitution as a diglossic society (which nonetheless is not bilingual – each of the
two dominant communities speaks its own language).￿erefore, because of the low
minority awareness in Cyprus, there is a “sociolinguistic invisibility,” which results
from the following factors: “(a) reduced size of the minority community, (b) demo-
graphic dispersion, (c) low degree of endogamy, (d) decline in minority language
transmission coupled with a rapid assimilation to another/the dominant language
and culture, (e) absence of codi￿cation [...] (f) absence of linguistic irredentism or
claim.”￿￿
￿￿. Republic of Cyprus, Second Periodical Report On￿e Implemenataion Of￿e Charter In Cyprus,
￿￿ January ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “￿e Protection and Revival of Cypriot Maronite Arabic,” PRIO
Cyprus Centre Policy Brief (January), ￿￿￿￿, ￿.
￿￿. CMAwas o￿cially recognised by the government that succeeded the one led byMrPapadopou-
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￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Multiculturalism and Education: lack of recognition
￿e assimilationist attitude of the Republic of Cyprus towards its non-dominant mi-
norities, was cultivated and perpetuated through education curricula. Having seen
how the Republic uses education to create ethnic citizens that oppose their ethnic
rivals, the same attitude can be seen in the educational policy of the RoC in relation
to the rest of the minorities found in the island.
Varnava examined theGC textbook for history lyceum students, issued by the
Ministry of Culture and Education of the RoC and argues that “the inclusions and
exclusions that form national identity are employed in the case of the minorities –
of ‘others’ around the majorities – and thus there are historical inaccuracies in such
narratives.”￿￿ Especially in the case of non-dominant national groups such as the
minorities in Cyprus, their history is presented as one that is parallel to that of the
GCs implying that they have been assimilated to the GC identity and culture. As
such, a shortcoming is identi￿ed, one that calls for the revision of history books in
order to account for the multicultural history of Cyprus.
As Philippou suggests, Cyprus is similar to Israel in its nation-building through
an ethno-centrism that either excludes or assimilates minorities and immigrants
who do not endorse the dominant ethnic myths.￿￿ ￿erefore, the GC education is
deeply Hellenocentric. In the rare cases where multiculturalism is mentioned, it is
portrayed as a recent phenomenon that is not to be traced in the history of Cyprus.
As a result, historical minorities of the island, like the Latins, Armenians and Ma-
ronites do not have di￿erent chapters in the history textbooks.￿erefore, the teach-
￿￿. Andrekos Varnava, “￿eMinorities Of Cyprus In￿e History Of Cyprus Textbook For Lyceum
Students: A Critique,” in ￿e Minorities Of Cyprus: Development Patterns And ￿e Identity Of ￿e
Internal-Exclusion, ed. Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, andMarina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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ing of history is not one that encourages re￿ection but one that encourages themain-
tenance of Ethnocentricism and the myth of the “clean Helleno-Byzantine cultural
identity of the Greek Cypriots”.￿￿
Moreover, the bicommunal nature of the ￿￿￿￿s constitution is nowhere ex-
plained. Instead, the TCs are undermined with constant referrals to them being a
minority instead of a national partner in the ￿￿￿￿ state. ￿e case with the three
other minorities is even worse, as they are only given minimum space at the end of
the history book. Varnava analyses the order and the space allocated for the three
national minorities. As Varnava explains:
the decision to start with the Armenian minority and to have nearly
four times the content on them shows a bias on the part of the Greek
Cypriot author, which is re￿ected more generally at the o￿cial govern-
ment (Republic of Cyprus) level, such as in the refusal to protect Cypriot
Maronite Arabic and the constant mentioning of the Armenians before
the Maronite and Latin communities in o￿cial government reports.￿￿
Armenians:￿e section on theArmenians is the longest, as GCs tend to iden-
tify with the Armenians since the latter have “experienced displacement at the hands
of the Turks.”￿￿
Maronites: ￿e textbook mentions that since ￿￿￿￿ Maronites have an arch-
bishop in Cyprus and that the language of their religious ceremonies is Arabic and
Syrian, but claim that the language that all Maronites speak is Greek, and that only
￿￿. Varnava, “￿e Minorities Of Cyprus In￿e History Of Cyprus Textbook For Lyceum Students:
A Critique,” ￿￿￿.
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those Maronites living in the village of Kormakitis can speak the “ancient Arabic di-
alect.”￿is is erroneous, because the CypriotMaronite Arabic is a language and not a
dialect and it is spoken outsideKormakitis aswell. AsVarnava puts it “nowhere in the
textbook does it mention that fewGreek Cypriots can understand the liturgy in their
church, while the textbook fails to mention that there are other Maronites across the
island that can speak Cypriot Maronite Arabic, but because of their estrangement
from an environment of Cypriot Maronite Arabic speakers they do not”￿￿
Latins: ￿e Latin Cypriots do not consider themselves to be of separate eth-
nicity. In fact, they do not consider themselves to be of any ethnicity at all. ￿eir
‘homeland’ is Cyprus itself, and not Turkey (TCs), Greece (GCs), or Lebanon (Ma-
ronites). ￿ey self-identify as Cypriots, yet Cypriotness as a form of civil identity
is never explained or researched and Latins are portrayed as Roman Catholics who
have been assimilated into theGC community (and as a result internalized theGreek
ethnic identity). Others: Nowhere in the book are the Roma or the Jews who also
live in the island mentioned and of course, no mention is found of the recent in￿ow
of immigrants on the island, despite some immigrant groups like the Sri Lankans
being numerically bigger than the national minorities (with the exception of TCs).
￿.￿ From Consociational Constitutionalism to Multi-
cultural Citizenship
￿e Cyprus problem is characterised by the failure of the two communities, Greek-
and Turkish-Cypriots, to ￿nd a way to peacefully coexist under the same institutions
of governance. ￿e reasons that explain the failure range from religion, to colonial-
￿￿. Varnava, “￿e Minorities Of Cyprus In￿e History Of Cyprus Textbook For Lyceum Students:
A Critique,” ￿￿￿.
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ism, history, geography and the geopolitics that informed the interventions of the
three guarantor powers. Whereas consensus on the reasons that explain the con￿ict
can hardly be achieved, there is agreement over the type of the desirable constitution.
￿e Republic of Cyprus and all the subsequent solution plans relied on the model of
consociational democracy, as pioneered in the work of the Dutch political scien-
tist Arend Lipjhart.￿￿ ￿is section will discuss the main premises of consociational
democracy, before proceeding to explain why it is not in itself adequate to resolve
the Cyprus problem, and why a more inclusive approach, which is developed in the
next chapter, is preferable over the current constitutional model.
￿.￿.￿ Consociational￿eory and the ￿￿￿￿ Constitution
Lipjhart de￿ned consociationalism as themodel that promotes stability through “co-
operative e￿orts of elites to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural frag-
mentation.”￿￿ ￿e model is founded upon the premise that the instability which is
caused by the antagonisms of groups within a state, can be neutralised by the ac-
tions of their elites. ￿e actions of the elites will not resonate with the majoritarian
sentiment of the two communities, which is characterised by suspicion and con-
￿ict. As Lipjhart explains “consociational democracy means government by elite
cartel designed to turn democracy within a fragmented political cultural into a sta-
ble democracy.”￿￿
￿e four characteristics that de￿ne a consociational democratic system are:
the existence of grand coalitions, proportionality, mutual veto and segmented au-
￿￿. Arend Lipjhart, ￿e Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands
(Berkeley: University of California Press, ￿￿￿￿)
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tonomy.￿￿ As Lipjhart explains, the ￿￿￿￿ bicommunal constitution of the Republic of
Cyprus was based on consociationalism.￿￿ ￿e consociational nature of the consti-
tution can be seen in all three areas of governance: the executive, the legislative and
the judiciary.
￿e executive branchwas comprised of aGreek-Cypriot president, a Turkish-
Cypriot vice-president and a Council of Ministers. ￿e o￿ces of the president and
the vice-president had powers of veto on highly contested issues, such as foreign af-
fairs, defence and security.￿e Council included both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots,
using a ￿:￿ ratio.
￿e legislative branch, the House of Representatives, comprised of ￿￿y Min-
isters of Parliament, allocated to the two communities based on the same ￿:￿ ratio.
Even though the seats were split between the two national groups, non-dominant
minorities such as Armenians, Maronites and Latins also had representatives. But,
since the state was bicommunal, the aforementioned minority cultures were consid-
ered part of theGreek community and thus counted towards the ￿￿%allocated to the
GCs. Decisions in the parliament were taken using simple majoritarianism, except
on issues of local governance, taxation and alteration of the political system, which
required separate majorities.
￿e third pillar of the government, the judiciary, consisted of the Supreme
Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice. ￿e former was comprised of
a GC, a TC and a non-Cypriot judge, and adjudicated on issues pertaining to the
constitutionality of the laws passed in the House of Representatives. ￿e latter was
used as an appeals court and it was responsible for treasonable o￿ences and o￿ences
against the constitutional order. Whereas both courts consisted of a GC, a TC and a
￿￿. Arend Lipjhart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Heaven: Yale
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non-Cypriot, the High Court a￿orded a double vote to the non-Cypriot in order to
avoid a deadlock in cases where the two sides had irreconcilable di￿erences.
￿.￿.￿ New Consociationalism and Multiculturalism
Since the work of Lipjhart, consociational theory went beyond its initial focus on
the three arms of government. Additional areas of focus have been added to the
theory, such as the organisation of the police and the military, the handling and the
integration of formerly paramilitary groups into civilian life, the establishment of
truth commissions, on economic reconstruction and further con￿dence building
measures.￿￿ ￿e new, evolved consociationalism is more appealing since it expands
its focus beyond the institutions of the state.￿e need to move past the institutional
perspective, was highlighted by neo-consociationalist theorists such asMcGarey and
O’Leary, who pointed out that more emphasis was necessary on the e￿ect that ex-
ternal parties can have on the process of reaching and implementing an agreement,
and on themechanisms of transition from a state of war to a state of reconciliation.￿￿
AsChrystalla Yakinthoupoints out,￿￿Ulrich Schneckener has taken the evolved
consociational model and categorised it as “a particular form of consensus democ-
racy,” which is “o￿en linked to ethnically segmented societies, or rather, to multi-
cultural polities, i.e. states or regions in which two or more ethno-national groups
live.”￿￿ ￿erefore, consociational democracy has expanded beyond constitutional-
￿￿. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Consociational￿eory and Peace Agreements in Pluri-
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ism, to become a theory that can provide guidance onhow to alleviate ethnic tensions
and how to facilitate the co-existence of di￿erent groups within the same, multicul-
tural state. As Yakinthou argues, with new consociationalism there is potential for its
“fusion [...] with Kymlicka’s multicultural theories.”￿￿ In the remaining of this sec-
tion a discussion will take place explaining why the proposed fusion is unattractive.
Despite the evolution from Lijphart’s consociationalism to new consociation-
alism, the fundamental ￿aws of the initial theory remain, and it is why the fusion of
consociationalism with Kymlicka’sMulticultural Citizenship is discouraged and will
not be attempted in this thesis. Nevertheless, the criticisms that will be levelled at
consociational theorists should not be taken as an outright rejection of the features
of consociational constitutions. Rather, the unattractiveness of the proposed fusion
relies on the rejection of (a) the premise that the actions of elites alone can yield sta-
bility (the elite motivation criticism); (b) the entrenchment of ethnic divisions at the
level of the constitution (the ethnocentric criticism); and ￿nally, the refusal to engage
with actors and institutions beyond the level of the sovereign state (the domesticity
criticism). Nevertheless, features of the consociational model will inevitably appear
in any constitution that seeks to accommodate diverse groups.
￿us, consociationalism is not altogether rejected but neither is it used as the
basis of the constitutional model that will be presented in the next chapters. Be-
fore proceeding to the three criticisms which will be defended using examples from
Cyprus, a more theoretical challenge needs to be addressed, as it is arguably one of
the most important problems of consociational theory as it stands today.
nic Con￿ict Regulation,” Journal of Peace Research ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿
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￿.￿.￿ ￿eDemocratic Challenge
￿e challenge that consociational theory sacri￿ces democratic legitimacy for polit-
ical stability was originally articulated by Nordlinger.￿￿ An elected politician is a
representative of the political will of her electorate. On what grounds, then, is it le-
gitimate to make concessions that contradict her mandate by undertaking political
action contrary to her electorate? What is le￿ of democracy if stability is prioritised
over the representation of the democratic will of the electorate?￿￿
A further objection that falls within the democratic challenge is that conso-
ciationalism suppresses opposite and con￿ictual views, thus curtailing the political
debate. As Jung and Shapiro explain, in consociational systemsmost political parties
are themselves part of the governing coalition. If most parties partake in governance,
they will have less incentives to publicise their disagreements, to scrutinise the gov-
ernment, andmost importantly, given that con￿ict is to be averted and co-operation
to be promoted, to encourage the exchange of good reasons on contrasting political
views.￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Elite Motivation Challenge
Lipjhart and his followers have developed what is called a top-down theory; one that
is underpinned by the hypothesis that elites, o￿en in opposition to the electorate,
are motivated to work together towards stability and cooperation at the level of the
executive and the legislative. ￿e assumption that elites are motivated to work to-
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wards reconciliation and co-operation, whilst it maybe valid for some cases such as
the Netherlands, it is far from universal, and surely unjusti￿ed in the case of Cyprus
where elite co-operation only takes place as a response to considerable grassroots
pressure.
￿e fact that Cypriot politicians are not motivated to seek a solution to the
Cyprus problem is hardly surprising. A potential solution would entail the transfor-
mation of the Republic of Cyprus, and the re-allocation of the positions of power to
the elites of both communities.￿is, inadvertently,means that therewill be less avail-
able positions of power to be shared amongst the elites of either side. As Yakinthou
argues, “Cyprus provides excellent contrasting examples of the role of grassroots
pressure on elite intransigence.”￿￿￿ On the one hand, during the period leading to
the Annan Plan, the TCs were supportive of the negotiated constitution and elected
a pro-uni￿cation coalition government under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Talat
(June ￿￿th, ￿￿￿￿), which “coalesced with a change in the political environment in
Turkey.￿￿￿ ￿e GCs, on the other hand, did not exert any pressure upon their elites,
and the latter continued being negatively predisposed against the Annan Plan, with
the then President Tassos Papadopoulos asking the GC community to vote against
it.
￿us, a theory that assumes elite co-operation is bestowed with the task of
demonstrating the motives (and the ways by which) they will guide the desired ac-
tion on behalf of political elites. Consociational theory fails to explain how the pre-
dicted behaviour is elicited.￿￿￿ Furthermore, a theory that focuses on initiatives that
originate at the level of the elites and subsequently move down to the society, should
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be able to explain cases such as the TCs during the Annan Plan, where elite action
was motivated by initiatives at the grassroots level.￿￿￿
Most importantly, such a theory should explain why politicians would work
towards cooperation, if that cooperation would jeopardise their own position of au-
thority. ￿e typical consociational feature of cross-voting is paradigmatic of this
problem. Cross-voting requires that each community gives a minority support to
the person most preferred by the other community. If, therefore, a new state was ne-
gotiated, where cross-voting would be part of the new constitution, then nationalist
politicians would know beforehand that their chances of election under the new rules
are scarce. Whywould those politicians work in favour of establishing such a system,
given that it is not in their best interest?￿us, the assumption of co-operation at the
level of the elites, cannot be sustainedwhere the outcome of that co-operationwill be
detrimental to the personal interests of the politicians at hand. An example of this is
the case of the TC leader Rauf Denktaş and the GC president Tassos Papadopoulos.
￿e two leaders, similar in ideology and sharing opposed nationalist outlooks, had
adamantly opposed the Annan Plan, knowing that their political survival would be
threatened.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Ethnocentric Challenge
￿e second criticism that explains why consociationalism is not endorsed in this the-
sis, relates to the ethnocentricity of the model, and the entrenchment of ethnic divi-
sions at the level of the constitution.￿￿￿ In §￿.￿ you can ￿nd an elaborate discussion
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on the reasons why ethnic identities should not become the basis for the allocation
of political rights. For the moment, it su￿ces to say, that by hardwiring ethnic iden-
tities at the heart of the constitution, consociationalists are sacri￿cing pluralism for
the sake of stability.
Ethnicity, as explained in chapters ￿ and ￿, is an umbrella identity that covers
all the domain of social and private interaction, including but not limited to lan-
guage, religion, history and geography. Nevertheless, individuals are bearers of mul-
tiple identities that o￿en contradict some of the individual identities encapsulated in
the ethnic bundle. To promote ethnic identities at the level of the constitution puts
those whose private identities contradict the identities exempli￿ed by the ethos in a
disadvantage.
Moreover, to explicitly a￿ord rights, through constitutional recognition, to
the members of the two ethnic communities, would be disadvantageous to those
groups who are not part of the problem but are nonetheless a￿ected by it .￿e case of
Cyprus provides ample examples of oppression due to constitutionalmisrecognition,
exempli￿ed in the cultural assimilation of Armenians, Maronites and Latins. ￿e
e￿ect of ethnically-based allocation of rights, is discussed in more detail under the
term bicommunal exceptionalism in §￿.￿.
￿.￿.￿ ￿eDomesticity Challenge
￿e third and ￿nal explanation why consociationalism is not endorsed by this thesis
relates to domesticity – its unjusti￿able focus on the sovereign state. Consociational
theorists do not adequately explain how external agents can facilitate or hinder the
process of co-operation. As it is explained in §￿.￿, international organisations such
as the United Nations or the European Union can facilitate cooperation ensuring
￿￿￿
that the right of non-dominant minorities are not violated.
As such, a wider perspective should be adopted, where the institutions of the
state are accountable to international actors, who can facilitate co-operation and help
achieve the much-desired stability. Lipjhart, in his early work, has identi￿ed ￿ve
main characteristics of consociational democracies: proportionality, grand coali-
tions, cultural autonomy, minority veto and plural society. In cases where the con-
￿ict is between two dominant ethnic groups, as is the case in Cyprus, non-dominant
minorities can be subject to exclusion and oppression. In absence of an external
arbitration authority, and with the ethnic identities being the determinants for the
allocation of political rights, at least two of Lipjhart’s ￿ve consociational features –
cultural autonomy and pluralism – cannot be guaranteed, due to the reasons of as-
similation and misrecognition mentioned above and elaborated upon in §￿.￿.
Despite the four criticisms presented above, some of the features promoted
through the consociational model will be relevant to the multicultural theory that
will be defended in the next chapters. Proportionality and minority vetoes, for in-
stance, are crucial in a multicultural constitution for Cyprus, and as such, will be
incorporated into the constitutional alternative developed in chapters ￿ and ￿. ￿e
utilisation of the mechanism for cooperation developed within the consociationalist
framework can also be adopted without an endorsement of the model itself. ￿ere-
fore, whilst consociationalism is not endorsed as a constitutional model, its mecha-
nisms for co-operation can be useful for a theory of Multicultural Citizenship. ￿e
next chapter will provide an alternative to the consociationalism that underpins bi-
communal constitutionalism; one that has an international outlook and which treats
ethnic identities as irrelevant to the allocation of political rights.
￿￿￿
Chapter ￿
Revisiting Multicultural Citizenship
￿e case of Cyprus, outlined in chapter ￿, will be used throughout this chapter, to
problematise the assumptions of liberal multicultural theories when applied to non-
Western contexts. In this chapter, the main pillars of Kymlicka’s theory will be chal-
lenged using examples from the case of Cyprus.
In the ￿rst part of this chapter (§￿.￿) the static and homogeneous concep-
tions of culture that Kymlicka uses will be challenged. It will be argued, contra Kym-
licka, that cultures are ￿uid ever-changing entities that are not inherently important,
challenging his main premise that cultures provide a context-of-choice. ￿eir im-
portance depends upon the value that their members derive out of them.￿e argu-
ment that will be defended in §￿.￿, will be that more emphasis should be given to
the equalisation of opportunities available to members of minority cultures vis-à-vis
the members of the dominant culture and that in order to achieve this, Kymlicka’s
abstract conception of culture needs to be revisited. Whilst his view of cultural be-
longing ￿ts within the archetypal examples found in Canada and elsewhere, they are
at odds with examples found in Cyprus and other post-violent con￿ict situations.
In §￿.￿ the three-fold classi￿cation of culture – national minorities, immi-
￿￿￿
grant groups, aboriginal peoples – that Kymlicka adopts will be further questioned.
It will be demonstrated how Kymlicka’s typology of culture leads to misrecognition
of speci￿c minorities, which o￿en results in their oppression in the name of multi-
culturalism.
An argument in favour of a theory of recognition will be advanced in §￿.￿
through the example of Cyprus. ￿e cases of Cypriot Roma, Latins, Maronites and
Armenians will be used, to demonstrate howmisrecognition can lead to the oppres-
sion of speci￿c minorities that are present in Cyprus. It will be suggested that a more
engaging and inclusive process of recognition is needed, with members of minority
cultures at its core. ￿e aim of §￿.￿ is to point out that theories of MC should not
rely on the dominant majority to classify the di￿erent cultural groups because of the
risk of misrecognition that leads to oppression.
In §￿.￿ the incorporation of multicultural accommodation at the core docu-
ments of intergovernmental institutions will be discussed, in order to suggest a new
process of recognition that works at the international rather than the domestic level;
one that ensures that pre-requisites to communication, such as the accurate classi-
￿cation and recognition of cultural groups, exist prior to the communication of the
claims of those groups at the domestic level. ￿e aim of §￿.￿ is to allow for the ap-
plication of MC in countries where minority cultures have been subject to chronic
and institutional misrecognition.
In §￿.￿ Kymlicka’s ethnocentricism will be addressed, which is considered to
be the Achilles’ heel of his theory (for the purposes of exporting it). ￿e case of
Cyprus provides plenty of examples that can test an ethnocentric theory. ￿e argu-
ment in §￿.￿ is that, based on the examples available through the case of Cyprus, it is
easy to postulate that one should not a priori assume that ethnic minorities should
enjoy a superior status, for that would excludeminorities that lack amotherland, de-
￿￿￿
spite them being identical with ethnic groups who enjoy additional bene￿ts for no
apparent reason other than having an ethnic attachment.￿e argument in favour of
a civic rather than an ethnic conception of nationality that will be defended in §￿.￿,
will be the prelude to chapter ￿ where practical action-guidance will be provided
on how multicultural policies can apply to Cyprus now and should also be factored
in the constitution that is under negotiation for the comprehensive solution of the
Cyprus problem.
￿.￿ Conceptualising Culture
￿is section will explore what the term “culture” entails. Four similar accounts of
how culture should rightly be conceptualised will be provided; examples which crit-
icise the mainstream perceptions of culture as they are depicted in liberal multicul-
tural theories.￿en these criticisms will be directly related to the work of Kymlicka,
and speci￿cally to his own understanding of culture, before proceeding to evalu-
ate and empirically test his abstract understanding of the term using the Reciprocal
Model presented in chapter ￿.
￿.￿.￿ Perceptions of Culture
Political philosophers have challenged essentialised and homogenising conceptions
of culture. Kymlicka, as evident from his response to Susan Moller Okin, is deliber-
ately trying to avoid one-size-￿ts-all de￿nitions, whilst at the same time respecting
the agency of individual cultural members. In this section, the views of four political
philosophers who have engaged with Kymlicka’s work will be addressed. ￿e mate-
rial presented here should not be taken as direct criticism of Kymlicka who, contrary
to themulticultural theorists presented in this section, has taken the next step in pro-
￿￿￿
viding (and subsequently modifying) a typology of culture. Rather, they will be used
as general guidelines that the theory defended in this chapter will follow, as should
all theories of MC.
￿e ￿rst theorist is Seyla Benhabib who advances a Habermasian critique of
the dominant theories of justice and the dominant theories of liberal multicultural-
ism. In doing so, she proposes a theory based on the “discourse theory of ethics; the
dialogical and narrative constitution of the self; and the view of discourses as delib-
erative practices that centre not only on norms of action and interaction, but also on
negotiating situationally shared understandings across multicultural divides.”￿ ￿e
recent debate on multiculturalism Benhabib argues is grounded upon “faulty epis-
temic premises”which lead to the “reductionist sociology of culture”; the assumption
that cultures are coherent wholes whose members agree with the collective descrip-
tion ascribed to them and whose de￿ning characteristics are original and unique.￿
Benhabib dismisses the incommensurability claim that is o￿en made in de-
bates of multiculturalism. ￿is is the claim that cultures are so di￿erent that they
cannot be compared or even understood.￿ Contrary to this claim, Benhabib em-
ploys Gadamer’s position that “all understanding is interpretation.”￿ Her defence of
cross-cultural understanding and interpretation is based onTully’s analysis of Locke’s
Second Treatise.￿ She claims that we engage in such judgments, like Locke engaged
￿. Seyla Benhabib, ￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In ￿e Global Era (Oxford:
Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿. ibid., ￿.
￿. For instanceMichaelWalzer, SpheresOf Justice: ADefenseOf PluralismAndEquality (NewYork:
Basic Books, ￿￿￿￿).
￿. Benhabib,￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In￿e Global Era, ￿￿.
￿. ￿e undemocratic nature of modern constitutionalism is evident in the history of liberal polit-
ical though, Tully argues. A representative example of the appropriation of the language of modern
constitutionalism for the purposes of European and Western imperialism is found in Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government, where he portrays aboriginal peoples as primitive associations living in the
state of nature. In doing so, Locke legitimised the killing of indigenous people by placing them in
the state of nature where the Hobbesian rule of war applies. Moreover, he legitimised the appropri-
ation of their land, since according to the law of the state of nature, property rights apply only with
￿￿￿
“in a complex cultural dialogue that positions and repositions the ‘we’ and the ‘oth-
ers’ in complex, multiple, and unpredictable ways.”￿ In order to reach any level of
political legitimacy, a more inclusive understanding of the other is needed.
Benhabib criticised Kymlicka’s “holism about cultures” and Taylor’s￿ de￿ni-
tion of cultural group as “far too unitary” which “￿atten out the contradictions and
antagonisms that surround group experiences and interpretations of culture.”￿ In
response, she supported Nancy Fraser’s argument that redistribution and recogni-
tion are driven by two paradigms of justice: the redistribution paradigm that fo-
cuses on exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation; and the recogni-
tion paradigm that focuses on patterns of representation and communication.￿ ￿is
analytic division is crucial in Benhabib’s argument because it means that “we can
and should do justice to certain claims for recognition without accepting that the
only way to do so is by a￿rming a group’s right to de￿ne the content as well as the
boundaries of its own identity.”￿￿ ￿erefore, what she calls the “democratization of
collective identities” is a call to abandon the social labelling of collectives and focus
on self-de￿nition of the individuals within them.
She gives the example of the debate around the wearing of the Islamic head-
scarf in France and argues that the symbolic action of wearing a scarf should not be
interpreted as cultural oppression, despite it being defended in cultural and religious
labour, hence any uncultivated land could be claimed as their own since aboriginals were occupied
with hunter gathering rather than agriculture (like the Europeans did) and therefore their ‘unculti-
vated’ land could be appropriated by the imperialists since by Locke’s de￿nition it was ‘vacant.’ Kant
has also followed the same pattern, issuing in the name of European commerce what he described
as ‘the right to hospitality,’ which became the preface for attacking Aboriginal people who refused
that ‘right.’ James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism In An Age Of Diversity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿. Benhabib,￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In￿e Global Era, ￿￿.
￿. Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism: Examining ￿e Politics Of Recognition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿. Benhabib,￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In￿e Global Era, ￿￿.
￿. Fraser ￿￿￿￿, pp. ￿-￿.
￿￿. Benhabib,￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In￿e Global Era, ￿￿.
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terms.￿￿ ￿ere should be a discussion and an exchange of reasons with the women;
an attempt to understand the reasons behind their wearing of the scarf. ￿e lack of
dialogue and the perception of culture as internally uncontested collectives caused
many of the misunderstandings of feminism and multiculturalism. ￿is is why we
need theHabermasian discourse ethics that range beyondRawls andBarry’s versions
of “minimal liberalism of an overlapping consensus,” Benhabib argues.￿￿
Although Benhabib is right that cultural members should be consulted about
the a￿airs of their own culture and that cultures should not be conceived as uncon-
tested wholes, Kymlicka is not guilty of that fallacy. By recognising the internal con-
￿icts of cultures through the “internal restrictions” argument and through his elabo-
rate discussion on what constitutes a substantial right of exit, Kymlicka provides the
theoretical means to conceive cultures as politically active collectives encompassed
by people of di￿erent world views. Nevertheless, the process of recognition that will
be defended in §￿.￿ will provide extra means by which to make sure that the voice
of individual cultural members is su￿ciently ampli￿ed.
In her recent book on multiculturalism, Phillips addresses these worries and
promotes aMulticulturalism without Culture since the classi￿cation of groups as cul-
tural, along with the political claims that are advanced in their name, are such that
reinforce and exaggerate their di￿erences, making other cultures seem more “ex-
otic and distinct than they already are.”￿￿ Many inequalities have group speci￿city
￿￿. An extensive and interesting discussion of competing views on cultural oppression can be found
in an edited book with responses to Okin’s famous essay on multiculturalism (included in the book).
See Susan Moller Okin et al., Is Multiculturalim Bad for Women (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, ￿￿￿￿); Susan Moller Okin, “Gender Inequality And Cultural Di￿erences,” Political￿eory ￿￿,
no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿–￿￿; Susan Moller Okin, “Feminism AndMulticulturalism: Some Tensions,” Ethics ￿￿￿,
no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; SusanMoller Okin, “Mistresses Of￿eir Own Destiny: Group Rights, Gender,
And Realistic Rights Of Exit,” Ethics ￿￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Benhabib,￿e Claims Of Culture: Equality And Diversity In￿e Global Era, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (Oxford: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿),
p.￿￿.
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and at the same time are connected with other group characteristics like race, gen-
der and religion. Phillips promotes a multiculturalism where human agency is at its
core and where individual rather than group rights are those that matter.￿￿ She does
not object to claims for ethnocultural accommodation and/or recognition, but she
is explicitly against policies that empower some of the members of a group at the ex-
pense of others who end up being oppressed in the name of their culture.￿￿ Phillips
summarises her theory ofmulticulturalism as one that seeks “amulticulturalism that
dispenses with rei￿ed notions of culture or homogenised conceptions of the cultural
group yet retains enough robustness to address cultural inequality.”￿￿ Her account of
group di￿erence ismore profoundwhen it comes to basic human attributes, like race
and gender, but is more sceptical of other group divisions like culture, because the
claims that are made in the name of these collectives are not always directed towards
the resolution of structures of inequalities but sometimes act as their guarantor.
Kymlicka’s theory is constructed on top of the early Rawlsian framework of
justice and as such considerations of further inequalities are deemed to be beyond the
scope of the theory – his theory solely addresses cultural inequalities. Nevertheless,
Phillips is right that multicultural policies sometimes exacerbate other inequalities
on the name of culture, despite their intended purpose of enhancing the autonomy
capabilities of individual cultural members. To this end, the theory defended in this
chapter incorporates Phillips’ suggestion that culture should be treated similarly to
other sources of injustice, and places cultural rights on the same level as gay and
other rights.
Modoodproposes a stronger, more holistic conception of culture that is based
on di￿erence, both internal and external. His conceptualisation of culture signi￿-
￿￿. Phillips,Multiculturalism Without Culture, p.￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., p.￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., p.￿￿￿.
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cantly di￿ers fromPhillips andBenhabib, but hisworries are similar. Cultures should
not be considered a coherent whole he argues, since a collective entity can exist,
without essentialised notions of membership and de￿nition.￿￿ Cultures based on re-
ligions, should be seen as any other identity group, and indeed use similar rhetoric
as gay, feminist or racial groups.￿￿ ￿erefore, multicultural equality “when applied
to religious groups means that secularism simpliciter appears to be an obstacle to
integration and equality” and religions need to be recognised in the public sphere.￿￿
Modood’s suggestion that Kymlicka is guilty of multinationalist bias against
religious groups will be addressed and refuted in §￿.￿.￿ but for now it su￿ces to ac-
cept his proposition that cultural identity should be treated as of similar importance
to other individual identities.
Tully in his Strange Multiplicity questions some of the fundamental assump-
tions that liberalmulticulturalistsmake. Whilst themulticultural theorists presented
above debate cultural rights within a liberal framework of advanced western coun-
tries, Tully invites liberal scholars to consider the impact of applying liberal concepts
and values on cultures that did not previously structure their lives around these val-
ues. In doing so, he is raising similar worries as Benhabib, Phillips and Modood,
which centre on the avoidance of the essentialism of culture.
Western liberals need to question their understanding of popular sovereignty
as opposite to cultural diversity, Tully argues. ￿is assumption rests upon the per-
ception that people are “taken to be a society of equal individuals in a state of nature,
behind a veil of ignorance [...] with the aim of constituting one uniform political as-
sociation.”￿￿ Another assumption that needs to be scrutinized is themodern percep-
￿￿. Tariq Modood,Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge: Polity Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿￿. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism In An Age Of Diversity, ￿￿-￿￿.
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tion of cultures as independent and homogeneous entities which are ranked hierar-
chically, starting from the earlier and primitive associations like those of Aboriginals
and evolving to the socio-economically advanced “universal European” culture.￿￿ A
further assumption that needs deconstruction is the perception of cultures as cen-
tralised associations.￿is is a misrepresentation of many cultures, especially ancient
ones of Aboriginal peoples whose organisation is based on “the plurality of ancient
customs” rather than on a centralised, structured and consistent sense of cultural
association.￿￿ Finally, the most problematic principle that underpins modern con-
stitutionalism regards its own self-understanding; modern constitutionalism rests
upon the assumption that it is universal and pan-historical and hence a product of
historical and universal agreement.￿is faulty premise makes modern constitution-
alism “the precondition of democracy, rather than a part of democracy”.￿￿
￿e three assumptions against which Tully urges caution can be manifested
in the case of Cypruswhere cultural groupsweremisrecognised based on unfounded
assumptions that led to the silencing of non-dominant minorities. To this end, an
extended discussion will be provided in this chapter (§￿.￿-￿.￿) to justify a process of
recognition that will enable minorities to challenge assumptions that silence them
(where they exist), dispersing with ￿xed notions of citizenship and culture, as well
as with perceptions of universal agreement on constitutional essentials.
￿.￿.￿ Is Culture Important to Everyone?
￿e question of whether culture is a primary good is central to understanding how
to conceptualise culture. If it’s a primary good, then it’s important to all; if not, then
￿￿. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism In An Age Of Diversity, ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
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it is worth considering what it is that makes cultural structures worth preserving, if
at all.
It is necessary to question the importance of culture, in order to understand
what is at stake when individuals are denied access to a cultural context. It will be
necessary in order to understand the hardships that individuals endure when their
cultures aremisrecognised, as was the case under the ￿￿￿￿ constitution of the Repub-
lic of Cypruswith the non-dominantminorities on the island. Moreover, the concep-
tualisation of culture is necessary in order to understand how people can transcend
their culture, deny their culture, or become multi-cultural members. Otherwise,
the non-dominant majorities cannot be properly understood. ￿ere is a need to go
beyond solidi￿ed and holistic de￿nitions of culture in order to understand how in-
dividual minority members in Cyprus try to reconcile their cultural allegiances to
both their cultural group and to the Greek Cypriots, whose language, education and
customs they use.
Kymlicka explains how culture provides meaning to our lives, by enabling
individuals to comprehend the options available to them.
￿e decision about how to lead out lives must ultimately be ours alone,
but this decision is always a matter of selecting what we believe to be
most valuable from a context of choice which provides us with di￿erent
ways of lives. ￿is is important because the range of options is deter-
mined by our cultural heritage. Di￿erent ways of life are not simply
di￿erent patters of physical movements. ￿e physical movements only
have meaning to us because they are identi￿ed as having signi￿cance
by our culture, because they ￿t into some pattern of activities which is
culturally recognised as a way of leading one’s life.￿￿
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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Once Kymlicka explained that culture is necessary for making autonomous deci-
sions, he proceeded to explainmore clearly how culture provides a context-of-choice,
without which individuals are unable to pursue our de￿nition of the good life, for
they lack the ability to acknowledge and pursue the opportunities available to them.
As Kymlicka argued:
It is of sovereign importance to this argument that cultural structure
is being recognised as a context of choice. [..] Cultural membership is
important in pursuing our essential interest in leading a good life, and so
consideration of that membership is an important part of having equal
consideration for the interests of each member of the community.￿￿
Kymlicka, in his attempt to incorporate culturalmembership into the list of Rawlsian
primary goods, traces the importance of culture as an underlying assumption of both
Rawls and Dworkin. He argues that Rawls and Dworkin “both implicitly recognise
the primary good of cultural membership” and that “the only reason that they don’t
explicitly give it a status as a ground for legitimate claims is that they falsely assume
there is only one such cultural structure in each political community,” meaning that
they employ a simplistic notion of the nation-state, where state membership and
cultural belonging are treated as interchangeable terms. “If we drop that assumption”,
Kymlicka argues, “then the primary good of cultural membership has to be explicitly
recognised as a possible source of unjust inequalities.”￿￿
Kymlicka is right that the association of a nation-state with a speci￿c nation-
culture is mistaken, because nation-states today are multicultural and not mono-
cultural. ￿e traditional conception of the nation-state as it originated in the ￿￿th
￿￿. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, ￿￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
century has now evolved into a multi-national state.￿￿ Kymlicka also claims that his-
torically, culturally homogeneous entities were the exception rather than the norm.
￿e majority of states throughout history, he argues, have been multi-ethnic states
and it is a mistake to uncritically assume that the nation-state is a single-culture en-
tity.
Given the many controversies and con￿icts which arise in multi-ethnic
andmultinational states, some people have expressed a nostalgia for the
sort of culturally homogeneous political units which supposedly existed
in earlier times, before the rise of multination empires and of transna-
tionalmigration. In reality, culturally homogeneous polities have always
been the exception rather than the rule, a testament to the ubiquity of
both military conquest and long-distance trade in human history.￿￿
￿e example of Cyprus is indicative of this claim. As it was argued in §￿.￿ Cyprus
was always multicultural, although there was always a strong majority of Christian
Orthodox people. To argue that Cyprus was monocultural because the majority was
always CO, would be wrong, and would misrecognise the other cultural groups that
have inhabited the island throughout history. Kymlicka is therefore right in estab-
lishing this fact; what is objectionable is that he did not problematise and engagewith
the shi￿ that emerged in the period a￿er the industrialization of Western countries.
In Kymlicka’s latest work on multiculturalism, titled Multicultural Odysseys,
￿￿. “A ‘nation’ in this sociological sense is closely related to the idea of a ‘people’ or a ‘culture’ –
indeed, these concepts are o￿en de￿ned in terms of each other. A country which contains more
than one nation is, therefore, not a nation-state but a multination state, and the smaller cultures form
‘national minorities’. ￿e incorporation of di￿erent nations into a single state may be involuntary,
as occurs when one cultural community is invaded and conquered by another, or is ceded from one
imperial power to another, or when its homeland is overrun by colonising settlers. But the formation
of amultination state may also arise voluntarily, when di￿erent cultures agree to form a federation for
their mutual bene￿t”. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal￿eory Of Minority Rights
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿), p.￿￿
￿￿. Will Kymlicka,￿e Rights Of Minority Cultures (Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
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presented in §￿.￿, he defends the view that cultural rights should be integrated into
international institutions that can, in principle, globalise the values of liberal plu-
ralism and respect for diversity.￿￿ At ￿rst sight nothing controversial seems to arise
out of this, if one subscribes to Kymlicka’s outlook that the values of liberal plural-
ism are worth spreading. In his earlier work, Kymlicka has provided a principled
justi￿cation for group-di￿erentiated rights, that he now – inMulticultural Odysseys
– wants to export and make global by incorporating them into the charters and the
foundational documents of international institutions, in order to enable people to
make autonomous choices through the protection of their cultural context.
￿e proposition that some people derive value from their cultural contexts is
very di￿erent from the proposition that all people derive value from said contexts.
If all people do, then the protection of these contexts is of paramount importance,
since cultural belonging, properly understood in Kymlicka’s formulation, is a pri-
mary good that needs to be upheld. In defending this latter view and in proposing
to promote these primary goods through intergovernmental institutions, Kymlicka
is asserting the role of the state. He is placing the individual within a speci￿c multi-
nation state, and only through that can the individual lay eyes to the rest of the world.
Nevertheless, this view does not represent the current state of a￿airs, since it ignores
the rise of global civil society facilitated through the internet and the social media.
￿e most important issue is whether Kymlicka is still right in claiming that
cultural context is necessary for individuals to realise the options available to them.
￿e answer depends on how cultural context is de￿ned. If Kymlicka’s de￿nition is
followed, then in the absence of a culture as a context-of-choice, people are not able
to realise options that are available to them. On the other hand, if one accepts that
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
now there is a global culture, on top of people’s particular cultures, then cultural con-
text becomes something much more complex, which can indeed enable individuals
to experience options that they could not otherwise have realised, and which do not
depend on their cultural context.
￿e case of Malala Yousafzai is but one example of how individuals within
their cultures can experience additional options despite their culture – in the case of
Malala, the right to education for women.￿￿ It is not only the values of other cultures
that individuals employ to realise additional options; they also use theirmechanisms,
especially those that facilitate social interaction. ￿e classic example is what is now
described as the Arab Spring, where the protesters used social media to mobilise
and to publicise their grievances and activism beyond their borders, using social net-
works and particularly Twitter.￿￿ Similar employment of western technologies can be
seen in less publicised instances. ￿e Arab Women’s Solidarity Association United
(AWSA United) is one such example, where “cyberfeminism” enabled ArabWomen
to interact with each other, bridging the gap between those living in the motherland
and those living in the diaspora; thus transcending and expanding cultural bound-
aries.￿￿
￿ese examples do not dispute Kymlicka’s view that cultures are contexts of
choice. What they do is add another layer on top of it, challenging rei￿ed notions of
culture, and providing amore pluralistic viewonhow culturalmembers interactwith
￿￿. As￿e Guardian writes, Malala “was pro-west, she was speaking against Taliban and she was
calling President Obama her ideal leader [...] She was young but she was promoting western culture
in Pashtun areas, referring to themain ethnic group in north-western Pakistan and Afghanistan from
which the Taliban ￿ndsmost of its followers.” Jon Broone,Malala Yousafzai: Pakistan Taliban Causes
Revulsion by Shooting Girl Who Spoke Out, http://www.theguardian.com/world/￿￿￿￿/oct/￿￿/taliban-
pakistan-shoot-girl-malala-yousafzai, ￿￿ October ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. David Wolman, Facebook, Twitter Help￿e Arab Spring Blossom, http://www.wired.com/￿￿￿￿/
￿￿/arabspring/, ￿￿ April ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Rita Stephan, “￿e Case of ArabWomen’s Solitarity Association United,” Journal of Middle East
Women’s Studies ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿￿.
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each other. ￿e boundaries are less rigid and individuals experience options over
and above those that their cultures enable them to experience. If this is the case, if
individuals experience options beyond their cultures and if cultures sometimes act as
constraints to the realisation of additional options, can one still maintain that access
to a cultural structure is a primary good? And even more pressingly, are cultures
inherently important?
Kymlicka accepts that individual cultural members can be minorities within
minorities, where individuals, and in particular women and children, are victims of
cultural oppression – what he describes as “internal restrictions.”￿￿ ￿ese oppressive
practices are not “the ‘logical’ extension of current ‘multiculturalism’ policies in the
major immigrant countries. [..] ￿ere is no suggestion that ethnic groups should
have any ability to regulate individuals’ freedom to accept or reject that identity.”￿￿
￿e fact that Kymlicka provided the argument against internal restrictions shows
that he is willing to look into the real world and try and provide solutions to current
problems, rather than painting the picture of a perfect society.
Kymlicka’s willingness to take non-ideal societies into consideration is at odds
with his own classi￿cation of culture. His description of society as a set structure that
provides context for all of its members, contradicts how cultures work in the real
world. If one accepts that cultures are not as Kymlicka describes them – conditional
upon the reader’s agreement that cultures do not provide context-of-choice for all
but only for some of their members – then it is important to consider the ways and
the reasons behind Kymlicka’s abstraction, an endeavour that will be attempted in
￿￿. Internal restrictions involve intra-group relations – the ethnic or national group may seek the
use of state power to restrict the liberty of its own members in the name of group solidarity. ￿is
raises the danger of individual oppression. Critics of ‘collective rights’ in this sense o￿en invoke the
image of theocratic and patriarchal cultures where women are oppressed and religious orthodoxy
legally enforced as an example of what can happen when the alleged rights of the collectivity are
given precedence over the rights of the individual. See Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
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Before that, the rejection of the main premise of Kymlicka will be explored,
to consider what it means to reject that culture provides a context-of-choice for all. If
cultural identity is understood as part of individuals’ other identities, then it cannot
be a primary good. If the individual is a bearer of multiple identities, then culture
can be important to some and less important to others. ￿us, it is not a context-of-
choice for all; it is important only for those that classify it high in their individual
negotiation of identities. Personal identities are not amatter of hierarchy, since some
are derived from others or depend on others; identities sometimes crisscross or con-
tradict each other. Individuals constantly adopt new identities, either voluntarily or
as a matter of circumstance, and are in a constant process of evaluation and recon-
ciliation of competing identities. In the end, and only until the consideration of a
new potential identity, they are in peace, having balanced identities that might seem
contradictory to others.￿￿
If one adopts the identity-based perception of culture, then Kymlicka’s justi-
￿cation of group-di￿erentiated rights is not as strong. If culture is not a context-of-
choice for all but rather one of people’s many identities, then onemust consider what
it is that makes culture special. Kymlicka’s argument, which has been weakened, is
that it is conducive to making autonomous choices. What maintains autonomy’s rel-
evance in the defence of group rights is Kymlicka’s de￿nition of culture, which has
a very strong attachment to language. Kymlicka explains that “individual choice is
dependent on the presence of a societal culture, de￿ned by language and history, and
thatmost people have a very strong bond to their own culture.”￿￿ Similarly, he argues
￿￿. Individuals complete a process of evaluation: initially they assesswhether to endorse an identity,
then they considerwhether it contradicts their other values and identities, then they re-interpret them
to accommodate or dismiss currently held views in order to make room for a new identity and ￿nally,
they achieve peace, until the process starts all over again.
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿, emphasis mine.
￿￿￿
that “‘nation’ means a historical community, more or less institutionally complete,
occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.”￿￿
Whereas individuals can reject values upheld by their culture, they cannot disasso-
ciate themselves from the linguistic context that their culture provides, without ￿rst
acknowledging that context as one that provides them access to alternative options.￿￿
Autonomy is a value worth pursuing and one that can be employed in our defence
of group-rights to minority groups.
If, following the argument presented so far, culture is not something that peo-
ple follow, then one cannot meaningfully say that it is a context-of-choice. Yet, indi-
viduals do derive autonomous agency from it, because it provides them with some
of the means that they need in order to comprehend and make sense of the options
available to them, the most important of which is language. Culture has some inter-
pretive function – it enables individuals to comprehend their options– but it is not as
structured and as all-encompassing as Kymlicka describes. ￿is makes the context-
of-choice argument weaker, without necessarily obliterating it. Autonomy is still a
valuable principle that can be used in defence of cultural rights.
￿e main problem lies in the fact that cultural groups and individuals within
their cultures do not socialise in the way that Kymlicka describes in his conceptual-
isation of culture. By implication then, the autonomy argument does not extend to
all the constitutive identities that make the umbrella term that is “culture.” Cultural
rights should be defended not because cultures are contexts-of-choice but because
dominant cultures are promoted by the state, leading to the inevitable extinction
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿, emphasis mine.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿-￿￿. ￿e use of language as a foundational aspect of national minorities is pervasive
throughout his theory, from beginning to end. For instance, in p. ￿￿ he a￿rms this attachment
again, saying that “If people’s bonds to their own language and culture are su￿ciently deep, then
attempting to suppress the cultural identity and self-government claims of national minorities may
simply aggravate the level of alienation and division.”
￿￿￿
(through assimilation) of the rest.￿e argument for minority rights is more persua-
sive if it is one of equality of opportunity (evaluated through equality of outcomes)
rather than one of autonomy.￿is is the view that will be explored in the next section
§￿.￿.￿-￿.
￿.￿.￿ Abstracting Culture
In small countries likeCyprus, the boundaries between cultures are not rigid. Empir-
ical examples are full of contradictions, where individuals endorse cultural identities
of di￿erent, even competing cultures. In §￿.￿.￿. the example of a Cypriot Maronite
supporting a Greek Cypriot nationalist football team was one such contradiction.
Nevertheless, the conception of culture seen thus far is one that does not explain
or provide room for these contradictions, essentially misrepresenting the social and
cultural dynamics of contexts like that of Cyprus. In this section the process that
leads to the distortive abstraction of culture will be explained, in order to proceed in
subsequent sections to examine how it can be amended to account for examples like
that of the Maronite referred to above. To this end, Kymlicka’s abstraction of cul-
ture will be challenged, and an alternative abstraction, that of Chandran Kukathas,
will be adopted as one that is more capable of capturing the diversity of cultural
experiences, both of which will be subsequently subjected to the evaluation of the
Reciprocal Model defended in chapter ￿.
Kymlicka abstracts the concept of culture and gives it a more solidi￿ed def-
inition: a robust context-of-choice within which individuals see the world that lies
outside.￿￿ Any theory of MC needs a working de￿nition of “culture,” which is an
￿￿. ￿is abstraction is made in order for him to defend his ideal principle of autonomy: given that
culture is a context that provides the means by which to understand and evaluate alternative options,
it is necessary for individuals to be able to exercise their autonomy and the only way to achieve this
is by having access to a cultural context, which now becomes a necessary condition for living a good
￿￿￿
endeavour that inevitably requires a certain level of abstraction. Abstraction is nec-
essary for providing a de￿nition that will cover the main attributes of cultural asso-
ciations without homogenising them. Only once the main attributes of culture are
attributed can the rights that cultural groups should be entitled to be considered. A
theory needs to outline how cultures are organised, what is the role of the individual
within their cultural group and how can one negotiate access or dissent to and from
their culture. Kymlicka’s abstraction of culture distorts real cultures in a way that
deprives them of their nature and character. It is only through an abstraction that
the multiplicity of cultural experiences and belongings can be factored into a theory.
￿e oversimpli￿ed conception of culture defended by Kymlicka is driven by
the same mistake as John Searle’s famous thought experiment, the Chinese Room
Argument. Searle wanted to prove that there can never be advanced Arti￿cial Intel-
ligence where computers will be able to learn and acquire new skills. He provided
the Chinese Room thought experiment in ￿￿￿￿ with him as the protagonist, to illus-
trate that using rules to translate Chinese does not constitute learning the language
– the premise being that if rule-following is how computers learn a language, then
this is not learning but only rule-following.￿￿ Computers accept information, apply
certain rules to it and then give an output based on those rules.￿erefore, there can
never be computers that are able to learn, even if those computers pass the famous
Turing test. Based on the Chinese RoomArgument, Searlemaintained that Arti￿cial
life.
￿￿. John Searle, “￿e Chinese Room,” in￿e MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, ed. Robert
A. Wilson and Frank C. Keil (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ￿￿￿￿) summarised the Chinese room as
follows “Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full of boxes of
Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the
program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other Chinese symbols which, unknown
to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following the
instructions in the program theman in the room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct
answers to the questions (the output).￿e program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing
Test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese.”
￿￿￿
Intelligence where computers acquire the ability to learn things could never exist.
Daniel Dennett argued that this is a failed intuition pump.￿￿ Intuition pumps
are thought experiments “cunningly designed to focus the reader’s attention on ‘the
important’ features, and to de￿ect the reader from bogging down in hard-to-follow
details.”￿￿ ￿e problem arises when these abstractions are su￿ciently simplistic as
to distort the way computers work, yielding results that are intuitively appealing but
wrong. In the case of the Chinese Room Argument, Dennet explains, it is the so￿-
ware that actually does the processing and not the hardware; the lion’s share of the
work, and what constitutes arti￿cial intelligence, is not the input a machine receives
and the output it produces, but rather the complex way it is designed. ￿e input-
output depiction of the process, with the philosopher locked in the room translat-
ing letter by letter (as per the thought experiment), is not a representative portrayal
of how AI works, and by extension, the result of the thought experiment, which is
based on the abstraction of AI as an input-output process, is mistaken. To reduce the
whole concept of Arti￿cial Intelligence to input and output through Searle’s thought
experiment is wrong because it misrepresents the way AI works.
Kymlicka is guilty of the same fallacy that Dennett accused Searle of having
committed. He has simpli￿ed a complex process, misrepresenting the way cultures
work.￿e complex process of cultural belonging, individuals’ interactionwith fellow
cultural members and with members of other cultures, the hierarchy within cultures
and the costs associated with dissent, are all issues that Kymlicka acknowledges at
various points in his theory, but which are not a￿orded the necessary attention at
the foundational level of his theory.
￿e challenge is to ￿nd an abstracted account of culture that successfully
￿￿. Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown / Company, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. Daniel C. Dennett, Elbow Room:￿e Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿￿￿
grasps the complexity of cultural belonging. ￿e work of Chandran Kukathas can
be useful.￿￿ Kukathas developed a theory about an abstract, free society. His ob-
jective was to reject the premise of Kymlicka’s theory that minority cultures should
be given assistance by the state. Although Kukathas’s conclusions cannot easily pass
the non-ideal test of levels ￿ and ￿, his conceptual understanding of culture can be
particularly useful.
Kukathas’s abstracted society is advanced through the metaphor of the “lib-
eral archipelago.”￿e archipelago consists of di￿erent islands:
di￿erent communities or, better still, jurisdictions, operating in a sea of
mutual toleration. Political society – and in particular, the good politi-
cal society – is best understood not as a single body, or an ideal realm of
the just, or a ship piloted by a skillful seaman, or even as a single island
rightly ordered. It should be understood, instead, as something alto-
gether less clearly bounded, marked bymovement within those bounds,
and movement across fuzzy boundaries.￿￿
What Kukathas describes as free society resembles the international order, where
di￿erent countries are free to act as they will, provided that they allow theirmembers
to leave the country.
International society is an archipelago – a sea with numerous islands.
Each island is a separate domain, cut-o￿ from others by waters which
are indi￿erent to its circumstances or to its fate. [...] In almost all cases
￿￿. Chandran Kukathas, “Are ￿ere Any Cultural Rights?,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–
￿￿￿; Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder To Kymlicka,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no.
￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Chandran Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Chandran Kukathas, “￿e Life Of Brian, Or Now For Some-
thing Completely Di￿erence-Blind,” in Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture And Equality And Its
Critics, ed. Paul Kelly (Cambridge: Polity, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom, ￿￿, footnote omitted.
￿￿￿
they live under the rule of an authority, though the character, style, and
concerns of that authority vary from one island to the next. Some of
these islands are lush and verdant, while others are barely habitable and
in danger of submersion by rising seas; some are remote and all but in-
accessible across treacherous waters, while others are almost physically
connected by the archipelagic aprons which surround them. ￿e peo-
ple who populate these islands di￿er in aspiration and in temperament.
[...] Each is at liberty to leave, and the sea is thus dotted with vessels,
somemoving along established routes, others wandering into uncharted
areas, none evincing purposes which are readily apparent (and some
without any purpose at all). While conventions have emerged govern-
ing conduct on the seas, and some powers have been established to deal
with problems of piracy, the archipelago is unmanaged.”￿￿
￿e archipelago is a metaphor that captures the way individuals relate to their cul-
tures and each other, and at the same time it explains the code of conduct between
di￿erent groups. Kukathas’s abstraction of the liberal archipelago can be useful,
without necessarily accepting his assumptions about the role of the state within this
archipelago. ￿e usefulness of Kukathas’s theory lies in his metaphor that captures
the way individuals engage with their cultures and how the di￿erent cultures relate
to each other.
￿e ability of individuals to leave their cultures – their islands, according to
the metaphor – is the most important (and the only) condition that Kukathas sets.
He argues that freedom of association is the fundamental principle that should guide
a free society. Two further principles are implied by freedom of association – ￿rstly,
the ability to disassociate from a group freely (Kukathas calls it “the principle of dis-
￿￿. Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom, pp.￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿￿
association”), and secondly, the mutual respect of all associations (“the principle of
mutual toleration”). ￿e liberal state is a political society, which is nothing more
than another association. As such, the only authority that the state has is related to
the freedom of individuals, which means that its role is to safeguard the aforemen-
tioned freedom of association and its two constitutive principles. ￿ese principles
are all grouped under the overarching principle of toleration, which de￿nes freedom
and explicitly rejects autonomy.￿￿
Kukathas account of cultural dynamics is particularly attractive since it por-
trays individuals as cultural travellers and cultures as entities ￿oating in a liberal
archipelago. Sometimes cultures are isolated, making it hard for their members to
leave and for external in￿uence to reach them, and in other instances they ￿oat next
to one another and individuals can jump back and forth between cultures, enabling
them to use the resources of more than one cultural group. Kukathas’ abstraction of
cultures captures the varying agency and the di￿erent options that individuals have
within their cultures, in a way that Kymlicka’s theory does not, despite the latter ac-
knowledging the di￿erent statuses of individuals within their cultures. Kukathas’
portrayal of individuals within di￿erent cultural associations is particularly interest-
ing. In some cultures individuals are more isolated; the cost of exiting their culture
can be so high that they don’t perceive it as a viable option. In other cases individuals
can leave more easily and they choose not to, thus exercising their agency. In further
cases individuals move to another culture altogether and never look back, or they
travel back and forth from the one to the other.
According to Kukathas’ view, the only requirement and the only function of
￿￿. His ideal of freedom then is such that: “recognises the importance of the fact that people think
di￿erently, see the world di￿erently, and are inclined to live – or even think theymust live – di￿erently
from theway others believe they should. It upholds toleration because it respects liberty of conscience.
It upholds toleration by protecting freedom of association so people can live as they think they should
– as conscience dictates.” Kukathas,￿e Liberal Archipelago: A￿eory Of Diversity And Freedom, ￿￿
￿￿￿
the liberal state in regard to cultural groups is for the latter to ensure that individuals
have a right of exit from their cultures at whatever cost. Kymlicka has replied to
Kukathas and argued that the right of exit that the latter sets as a precondition for a
liberal polity is not substantial and does not allow for a realistic chance of exit from
a potentially oppressive culture. Kukathas’ response was that the state should not
get into the business of compensating individuals for the costs of their choices, for
every choice comes at a cost and it would be impossible and unfair for the state to
compensate some and not others.￿￿
Kukathas’ theory cannot move beyond level ￿ of the Reciprocal Model as it is
described in §￿.￿. Kukathas, like Kymlicka has also created an “intuition pump”: a
thought experiment that is intuitively appealing, which nonetheless misrepresents
the realities of a situation. More speci￿cally, Kukathas ignores the culturally biased
role that all states, liberal or not, adopt, and has constructed an idealisation that de-
pends upon aminimal and culturally-neutral state.￿￿ States are naturally incapable of
being neutral, since they have o￿cial languages and o￿cial education curricula that
guide the teaching of their national history, and they are incapable of being min-
imal, since the free market requires substantial state intervention.￿￿ Given these
social realities, it is impossible to move Kukathas’ theory beyond level ￿. ￿e next
level, as described in §￿.￿.￿, addresses issues of sociability and context. Given that
the empirical evidence cannot support Kukathas’ assumption/pre-requisite that the
state ought to be minimal and culturally-neutral, then there is no way of extracting
￿￿. Kukathas, “Are￿ere Any Cultural Rights?”; Will Kymlicka, “￿e Rights of Minority Cultures:
Reply to Kukathas,” Political￿eory ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Kukathas, “Cultural Rights Again: A
Rejoinder To Kymlicka.”
￿￿. See §￿.￿.￿ for a distinction between idealisation and abstraction.
￿￿. For an interesting discussion on the role of the state in modern capitalist economies, see Ellen
Meiksins Wood, Empire Of Capital (London: Verso, ￿￿￿￿). Wood argues that the contemporary free
economy requires substantial involvement of the state, going well beyond its regulatory role that
Kukathas would like.
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practical action-guidance from it, since its foundational assumption that guides his
principled response is not attainable at the level of real societies. Even the assump-
tion the state is indeed able to instigate policies that are culturally neutral is accepted,
there is no way of controlling for the implicit cultural biases of those in the lead of
its structures.
￿e example of the justice system is representative of an institution that is
presumed to be neutral, which nonetheless is not. ￿e justice system in Cyprus is
skewed in favour of the dominant majority culture. Out of the thirteen judges of the
supreme court, none of them is a member of a minority and only three are women,
which is indicative of the lack of diversity embedded in the highest legal institution
of a state-member of the European Union. Likewise, the November ￿￿￿￿ statistics
report of the Ministry of Justice of the UK provides two interesting insights: (a) that
black and Asian o￿enders are twenty percent more likely to be sent to prison and (b)
that the sentence of white criminals is on average seven months shorter than their
black equivalents.￿￿ On the other hand, in cases where “culture” is used as a defence
in courts, when the issue of the cultural defence does not resonate with the value
system of the majority culture, then cultural defence works to the detriment of the
defendant.￿￿ ￿e bias of the justice system, which is supposed to be the pinnacle of
neutrality, demonstrates that the ideal of absolute neutrality is unattainable.
￿e examples of the bias of the liberal state is not only constrained to the
justice system.￿￿ Iris Marion Young has demonstrated how structures that are per-
ceived as neutral treat unjustly members of minorities and other excluded groups.
￿￿. Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System, https : / /www.gov.uk/
government / uploads / system /uploads / attachment _data /￿le / ￿￿￿￿￿￿ / Race - and - cjs - ￿￿￿￿ . pdf,
November ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Anne Phillips, “When Culture Means Gender: Issues Of Cultural Defence In ￿e English
Courts,”Modern Law Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. See for instance Haroon Siddique, Role-Play Exam For Gp Trainees Fails Equality And Race Bias
Test, Court Told, Newspaper Article, ￿ April ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
￿erefore, if Kukathas wants his theory to proceed to level ￿, he has to amend his
assumption of the role of the state.￿￿
￿e next step is to consider how Kymlicka’s theory features on the Recipro-
cal Model. At the ￿rst level of the Reciprocal Model, the conception of human na-
ture that the author of a theory endorses is the primary concern, to ￿nd out what
cross-cultural characteristics he or she ascribes to individuals. In Kymlicka’s case,
individuals are de￿ned through a post-communitarian lens,￿￿ where individuals are
cultural members that gain perspective in their lives through socialisation and cul-
tural belonging. ￿e context-of-choice argument is based upon the conception of
individuals as embodied parts of a collective structure that provides means to com-
prehend options and potentially to alter or overcome the structure itself.￿is thesis
challenges Kymlicka’s conception of human nature and sociability as well as his ab-
straction of culture. Chandran Kukathas has provided a more attractive account of
how individuals relate to their cultures and how cultures relate to each other; one
that doesn’t rely upon rei￿ed notions of belonging.
At the second level of the Reciprocal Model empirical input is factored in,
which pertains to the context that the theory will apply to. In level ￿ the principles
that were presented in level ￿ are ￿ltered through empirical input – issues of socia-
bility – to evaluate the ideal principles presented at the ￿rst level of a theory, along
with the author’s conception of human nature.
In level ￿Kymlicka presents his fundamental account of human nature, where
he describes individuals as members of a cultural structure that enables them to
￿￿. IrisMarion Young, Justice And￿e Politics Of Di￿erence (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press,
￿￿￿￿); Iris Marion Young, Inclusion And Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Iris
Marion Young, “Equality of whom? Social groups and judgments of injustice,” Journal of Political Phi-
losophy ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿–￿￿; Iris Marion Young, Responsibility For Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, “Liberalism And Communitarianism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿
(￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
make autonomous choices. Autonomy is treated as the central principle of his the-
ory.￿en, he proceeds in the next levels to discuss how his principle (of autonomy)
can be applied and upheld in real societies. He uses the abstract principle of au-
tonomy, and the idealised conception of human nature and cultural sociability pre-
sented through the context-of choice argument, to provide practical action-guidance
on how real societies ought to deal with the challenges ofmulticulturalism (e.g. what
self-governmental and linguistic rights should Québécoise be entitled by the Cana-
dian federal state, or what legal exemptions should Sikhs receive in the UK, or what
land rights should Aboriginal people enjoy and so on – real examples from real so-
cieties). In all these cases the principle is used to addressed the dilemmas and the
challenges of multiculturalism, with the rationale being that: (a) if a state is liberal,
(b) then it has certain duties towards its citizens, (c) the most important of which is
their ability to live a free life – meaning a life that they choose as one that is “good”
for them – and in order to do so they (d) need access to a cultural structure because
it is only through our cultures that we can appreciate the options available to us.
When the assumptions of level ￿ are run through the empirical input of level
￿ then certain problems arise.￿e ￿rst has been addressed in this section and has to
do with Kymlicka’s abstraction of culture, and his conception of human nature and
socialisation. He describes cultures as solidi￿ed entities, inside of which individuals
are locked. One cannot easily escape Kymlicka’s conception of culture, and cultural
identity becomes a mega-identity that takes precedence over the other individual
identities that people have, irrespective of whether the identity-bearers believe so or
not.
￿e second problem is that his taxonomy of cultural belonging does not cap-
ture the complex cultural experiences of non-Western countries – i.e. examples be-
yond UK, USA, Germany, France, Australia and Canada – and in particular coun-
￿￿￿
tries that have security concerns attached to their cultural identities that prohibit the
politicisation of their cultural claims and demands.￿is second challenge, the prob-
lematic typology of cultural belonging, will be the subject of §￿.￿ where I will use
examples from Cyprus to illustrate the problem.
￿.￿.￿ Individual and Equality-based Conceptions of Autonomy
It has been established that even if Kymlicka’s conception of culture is holistic and
even if his assertions that individuals become autonomous through their cultures is
not true to the extent that he maintained, nevertheless, given that language provides
the basis for comprehending individuals’ options (or for learning new languages) and
given that language and culture are intertwined, then there are grounds to maintain
a restricted version of Kymlicka’s assertion that culture provides a context-of-choice
conducive to living an autonomous life. ￿e disagreements regarding Kymlicka’s
treatment of culture as constitutive of autonomy are disagreements of quantity not
of kind. Challenging his absolutist approach to cultural belonging is not a rejection
of autonomy-based arguments altogether.
￿ere is anotherway to frameKymlicka’s defence of groupdi￿erentiated rights
that does not require the acceptance that cultural belonging provides a context-of-
choice to all individuals. Autonomy-based arguments can be equality-driven argu-
ments. Kymlicka’s starting point is that (a) autonomy is central to liberalism, (b) it
is only through cultural structures that one becomes autonomous and that (c) if the
state is liberal then it has to guarantee the liberal right of autonomy of all its citi-
zens, through assistance in the maintenance of their cultures. Point (c) involves two
di￿erent defences.
First, it makes a universalist argument that the state needs to guarantee the
￿￿￿
autonomy of all its citizens. ￿e universalist argument explores the relationship be-
tween individuals and the state. It is an individualistically-driven argument of the
sort that libertarians like Kukathas would ￿nd appealing since it stands by itself
without any social or group-based justi￿cations attached to it. ￿e only two enti-
ties present are the individual and the state.￿us, the ￿rst justi￿cation of autonomy
is individualistic and pertains to the relationship of the state and the individual.
￿e second defence of autonomy is relational, not individualistic. Members
of minorities deserve the same treatment as members of the majority and as such,
given the ethnocultural bias of the liberal state, the onlyway formembers ofminority
cultures to enjoy equal treatment by the liberal state is to be a￿orded rights speci￿c
to their culture. Contrary to the ￿rst justi￿cation, the second does not require the
acceptance of the assumption that culture is a context-of-choice. Only the redacted
version of it needs to be accepted – that culture provides some options to some of its
members. If the members of the majority culture enjoy access to their cultural struc-
ture – even if that culture has limited capacities – then the members of minorities
have a right to equal access to a structural context.
￿is second justi￿cation works at a group level.￿e inter-group analysis en-
ables for internal disparities between groups. Whereas the ￿rst justi￿cation depends
upon Kymlicka’s abstraction of culture and its function within people’s lives, the sec-
ond does not; it is only conditional upon a relational evaluation of minorities vis-à-
vismajority cultures.￿e only concession that needs to bemade is that some cultures
provide autonomy-enhancing abilities to some of their members. In this second for-
mulation of the defence of group-di￿erentiated rights, an equality-based argument
for partial autonomy is made – one that disperses with Kymlicka’s abstraction of
culture and one that is more sympathetic to Kukathas’ abstraction as was described
above.
￿￿￿
In this section the shortcomings of Kymlicka’s abstractions have been demon-
strated: his holistic conception of culture and his homogeneising defence of group-
rights on the grounds that culture enables autonomy by being a context-of-choice.
Examples of theorists that warn against essentialist notions of culture have been pre-
sented, which argue for a more diverse account of cultural belonging. Even though
Kukathas’ theory (one that has been advanced in response to Kymlicka) cannot pro-
vide immediate action-guidance for it misrepresents the role of the state within so-
cieties, his account of cultural belonging is more appropriate since it re￿ects the
way individuals relate to their cultures and how their cultures interact with each
other. Once this more useful abstraction was endorsed, the validity of Kymlicka’s
autonomy-based defence of group rights was questioned. ￿e defence of auton-
omy was divided into two di￿erent kinds: the individually-based argument and the
equality-based argument. It was maintained that the latter is more attractive for it
can still be valid a￿er the revision of Kymlicka’s ideal assumptions. ￿is is so, be-
cause it relies on group-comparison and only requires the concession that cultural
contexts provide a(n) (minimal) ability to (some) of their members to comprehend
and pursue the choices that are available to them.
￿erefore in having defended the view that culture might not be a context-
of-choice for many people and that a more minimal equality-based conception of
autonomy ismore appealing, the next question is how to evaluate the ability ofmem-
bers of minority cultures to pursue their choices through access to their context of
choice, and how to compare them with the majority culture. ￿e question of how
to best measure equality of opportunities has already dominated a large section of
political theory and economics.￿￿ ￿e best way to evaluate whether di￿erent groups
￿￿. For a literature review read the excellent chapter written by John E. Roemer and Alain Trannoy,
“Equality ofOpportunity,” inHandbook of IncomeDistribution, ed. AnthonyB.Atkinson and François
Bourguignon (Elsevier, Forthcoming).
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of individuals have equal opportunities is to compare their position at the end of
the process: meaning to compare the outcomes of each group. If, for instance, one
can observe that children from ethnic minorities under-perform in school in com-
parison to members of the dominant majority culture, then there is strong grounds
to infer that there is a structural injustice that hinders the under-performing group
from enjoying equal outcomes as the other group. In addition, if one observes that
poor white children perform worse than their contemporaries from more a￿uent
backgrounds, then it can be argued, judging from the comparison of the groups’
outcomes, that the former did not have access to the same set of opportunities as the
latter. ￿e appeal of this process is that individual variations within groups can be
controlled. Given large enough samples or populations (depends on the access to
data we have) the researcher can discount for individual variations like the laziness
of individual students.
Su￿cient discussion has beenmade to establish the problemswith Kymlicka’s
abstraction of culture and his defence of group-rights on grounds of autonomy.￿e
alternatives presented have been: (a) that a non-essentialist abstraction of culture
like the one of Kukathas is needed and (b) that an equality-driven conception of
autonomy that does not rely on rei￿ed notions of cultural belonging needs to be
adapted. ￿e next section will discuss how Kymlicka’s typology of culture is also
problematic.
￿.￿ Cultural Classi￿cation, Recognition, Oppression
One of the central challenges of Kymlicka’s theory is that it relies upon the tripar-
tite distinction of culture into national minorities, immigrant groups and aboriginal
peoples.￿ese distinctions although representative of theWestern traditional exam-
￿￿￿
ples, do not capture the amalgam of cultural associations in countries like Cyprus.
￿ey cannot explain the di￿erence between a dominant and a non-dominantminor-
ity, neither can they explain how a national culture can be downgraded into religious
association, denying it the rights that should be a￿orded to it. In order to understand
how a theory of MC can be exported beyond the dedicated examples, a process of
recognition needs to be established, whereby the typology of culture is not consid-
ered ￿xed and where the members of minorities are involved in the cultural classi￿-
cation of their group.￿e argument defended in this section will be that a theory of
recognition needs to be at the core of every theory of MC, in order to avoid the cases
of misrecognition, like those institutionalised in Cyprus with the ￿￿￿￿ constitution.
In order to establish the necessity of a process of recognition, it is necessary
to explore how Kymlicka classi￿es cultural groups. ￿e Reciprocal Model provides
the means by which to make sense of Kymlicka’s typology of culture.
In the second level of theModel aspects of sociability relevant to the context
that the theory addresses are factored into the design of the theory itself. Kymlicka
￿rst presents the ideal principle that lies at the core of his theory and he then exam-
ines the empirical evidence in order to identify what types of cultural groups exist
and what sort of demands they are making. Kymlicka argues that there are three
di￿erent types of cultures: national minorities, aboriginal peoples and immigrant
groups. ￿ese groups make demands to the liberal state on the grounds of liberal
pluralism, yet their demands are not the same.
National minorities ask for self-governmental rights. ￿e nature of these
rights is such that distinguishes the members of national cultures from the rest.￿e
extreme end of the spectrum of self-governmental claims is secession. In between
various di￿erent claims can be found. At the level of constitutional essentials, groups
aremaking the case for having special representation in national parliaments, asking
￿￿￿
for quotas that will ensure their fair representation, or for veto on topics that are rele-
vant to their cultural group. At the political level, cultural groups make demands on
education, like the teaching of a speci￿c language at the local schools, or the teach-
ing of the history of their culture. National minorities make language-demands, like
the right to have road signs in their own language, and the right to use their own
language in public buildings and o￿cial exchanges. ￿e list of claims that national
minorities make can go on but for the purpose of this chapter it only needs to be re-
iterated that: (a) national minorities ask for control over their own a￿airs, which (b)
is characterised by a sense of di￿erentiation from the main political culture. For lack
of a better word, their demands are characterised by a spirit of segregation rather
than integration. In Cyprus the national minorities that have been discussed are the
Maronites, Latins and Armenians, and they all lie within the centre of the spectrum
of national minorities. ￿eir demands are such that will enable them to maintain
their distinctiveness, but not to the extreme end of secession, far from it in fact.
￿e second type of cultural group is immigrant cultures.￿eir demands dif-
fer in nature from those of national minorities; whereas national minorities ask for
di￿erentiation from the mainstream culture, immigrant groups ask for integration
to the mainstream culture, like for instance easy access to the job market, language
training provided by the state that would facilitate their integration into the soci-
ety, and the right to practice their religion and to send their children to schools that
teach their religion and language on top of the national curriculum. In Cyprus all
new immigrants lie within this category, which entails groups like the Sri Lankans,
British, Russians and Greeks living in Cyprus.
￿e third type of cultural group is Aboriginal peoples. ￿e typical examples
are found in Canada, Australia and USA, where members of local tribes have been
unjustly treated – including slavery, murder and appropriation of the land of their
￿￿￿
ancestors – by the European colonialists. Aboriginals are typically asking for the
recognition of the historical injustices that they have su￿ered. ￿is involves three
di￿erent kinds of demands. ￿e ￿rst is o￿cial apologies by the state and recogni-
tion of their historical presence in the country (usually predating the creation of the
state). ￿e second involves the incorporation of their unjust treatment into the na-
tional historical narratives taught in schools. ￿e third involves land rights to the
geographical area where their ancestors lived – one of the common practices of the
European imperialists was to displace aboriginal people, so it makes sense for them
towant tomaintain a geographical presence. AlthoughCyprus does not have aborig-
inal people in the sense that Australia, Canada and the US have, the non-dominant
national minorities have received similar constitutional treatment as the aboriginals,
in that they have been misrecognised and denied rights that should otherwise be af-
forded to them.￿￿
Kymlicka accepts that the demands that each di￿erent type of culture makes
might overlap, but he nonetheless argues that his typology represents the vast ma-
jority of cultural groups and the demands that they make.
￿.￿.￿ Classifying cultures
It is not accidental that Kymlicka’s theory ofMC is themost popular of its kind. Kym-
licka was eager to examine the issues that real cultures faced, within the contexts in
which they appeared – thus taking into consideration limitations of feasibility, im-
plementation and other sociopolitical constraints. Kymlicka’s willingness to engage
with empirical data made his theory particularly useful since it had the potential to
￿￿. It is not suggested that non-dominant minorities in Cyprus have been as violently treated as
the Aboriginal in US, Australia and Canada – it is only their constitutional misrecognition that is
compared.
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provide practical action-guidance to policy makers and lawyers. ￿e most striking
example of Kymlicka’s engagement with the non-ideal level is can be seen in his ty-
pology of culture. His decision to split cultural groups into three categories is an
empirically-based decision.
Cultural groups make demands towards the state. ￿ey ask for language
rights, land rights, recognition rights, integration rights, religious rights and so on.
￿e response that they get is largely conditioned upon the societal attitude towards
demands made by other groups of the same type. ￿erefore the initial classi￿cation
of a cultural group largely a￿ects the chances of its demands being met. If, for in-
stance, one group is classi￿ed as a national minority, it will be entitled to more (and
di￿erent) rights than the members of an immigrant culture. Similarly, if a group is
classi￿ed as a religious group rather than a national minority, then only its demands
pertaining to religion will merit a response from the state.
Kymlicka’s theory relies on the initial classi￿cation of culture to distribute
the various cultural rights that are available to minority groups. Although he has
accepted that his threefold typology is not cast in stone, he nonetheless did not pro-
vide a mechanism by which to deal with situations where the threefold classi￿cation
is invalid.￿is is a very serious shortcoming, especially given the fact that Kymlicka
conceptualises access to a cultural structure as a primary good.
Given the di￿erent kinds of cultural accommodation discussed in the begin-
ning of this section (§￿.￿), it should by now be obvious that di￿erent cultural rights
can vary both in extent and in kind.￿e distribution of these goods largely depends
on the classi￿cation of cultural groups. Yet, this process of classifying cultural groups
is a pre-political enterprise in Kymlicka’s theory. It is something that is decided by
the author. Instead of leaving the classi￿cation of cultural groups up to the author,
a theory of MC needs to make it part of the political process, whereby a theory of
￿￿￿
recognition will precede our discussion of group-di￿erentiated rights, for the latter
depends upon the former.
Deliberation and communication between di￿erent cultural groups, and be-
tween cultural groups and the state is encouraged, since it is only through moral
dialogue that decisions gain legitimacy. Nevertheless, the capacity for moral com-
munication relies on recognition, since recognition ampli￿es (when necessary) the
voice of minority members in order to have an equal standing in a liberal polity.
As it was mentioned above Kymlicka divides cultures into three types, each
of which can rightfully be granted rights speci￿c to its type. Kymlicka accepts that
this distinction is not universal since there are exceptions, but he maintains that the
tripartite distinction that he provided re￿ects the majority of cultural contexts.￿us
his argument is an empirically-grounded one.
￿e most controversial aspect of his empirically-based typology of culture
which determine the cultural rights that each type is entitled to is found in his argu-
ment that large immigrant groups with historical presence in a country should still
not be entitled to the same rights as national minorities.￿￿ Consider for example the
Chinese people who live in the UK or the USA.￿eir presence in the two countries
is historical – more than two generations – and the total sum of people of Chinese
origin or descent living in these countries is larger or comparable to some of its na-
tional groups. Why should they be denied self-governmental rights then? Kymlicka’s
response is two-fold.
Firstly, he argues that this is not what the members of immigrant groups are
asking for, so it would be better if theories ofMC focused on the demands that mem-
bers of these groups actually make.
￿￿. Will Kymlicka, “￿e￿eory and Practice of Immigrant Multiculturalism,” in Politics in the Ver-
nacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
So while immigrant groups have increasingly asserted their right to ex-
press their ethnic particularity, they typically wish to do so within the
public institutions of the English-speaking society (or French-speaking
in Canada). In rejecting assimilation, they are not asking to set up a
parallel society, as is typically demanded by national minorities. ￿e
United States and Australia, therefore, have a number of ‘ethnic groups’
as loosely aggregated subcultures within the larger English-speaking so-
ciety, and so exhibit what I will call ‘polyethnicity’. Similarly in Canada
there are ethnic subcultureswithin both theEnglish- andFrench-speaking
societies.￿￿
￿eoretically this is not a very appealing justi￿cation; especially given the
fact that it is hard to account for all the particular demands that di￿erent immigrant
groups make across the world. ￿e position that immigrant groups typically ask
for polyethnic rights, does not explain why they should not be allowed to have self-
governmental rights.
￿e second response that Kymlicka gives is more interesting and engaging.
Immigrant groups do not have the resources to sustain a national culture, he argues,
and therefore if they are granted self-governmental rights without the ability to sus-
tain their national culture, they will end up marginalised. In order for a national
culture to be sustained it needs to be able to support and maintain a societal cul-
ture.￿￿ ￿is response is made of two parts. In the ￿rst, he explains that immigrants
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿ explains that “for a culture to survive and develop in the modern world, given the pres-
sures towards the creation of a single common culture in each country, it must be a societal culture.
Given the enormous signi￿cance of social institutions in our lives, and in determining our options,
any culture which is not a societal culture will be reduced to ever-decreasing marginalisation. ￿e
capacity and motivation to form and maintain such a distinct culture is characteristic of ‘nations’ or
‘peoples’ (i.e. culturally distinct, geographically concentrated, and institutionally complete societies).
Societal cultures, then, tend to be national cultures".
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have forfeited their right to a national culture. For instance, he gives the example of
American migrants in Sweden and argues that they have no right to ask the Swedish
government to provide them with institutions of self-government because they have
voluntarily given up their national rights by leaving their culture of origin.￿￿
￿e second part of the response is more practically oriented. He argues that
immigrant groups lack the ability to sustain a societal culture and as such should not
be given rights similar to those of national minorities. He cites Nathan Glazer, who
argues thatmost ethnic groups are too “dispersed,mixed, assimilated and integrated”
to exercise self-government.￿ey are not su￿ciently “compact, self-conscious [and]
culture-maintaining” to sustain the institutions necessary for self-government.￿￿ And
thenKymlicka concludes that “to try to recreate these prerequisites amongst already-
settled immigrantswould probably require coercion of half-integrated immigrants.”￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Misrecognition and Cultural Oppression
Although Kymlicka’s typology ￿ts comfortably in the standard western examples,
when it is applied to Cyprus, it becomes tool of oppression in the hands of the ma-
jority.￿￿ As argued above, the labels assigned to cultures determine their rights. Clas-
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿ writes: “For example, if a group of Americans decide to
emigrate to Sweden, they have no right that the Swedish government provide them with institutions
of self-government or public services in their mother tongue. One could argue that a government
policy which enabledAmerican immigrants to re-create their societal culture would bene￿t everyone,
by enriching the whole society. But the immigrants have no right to such policies, for in choosing to
leave the United States they relinquish the national rights that go with membership in their original
culture. Similarly, Swedish immigrants to America have no basis for claiming the language rights or
self-government rights needed to recreate their societal culture.”
￿￿. Nathan Glazer, Ethnic Dilemmas: ￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿, ￿￿.
￿￿. Kymlicka,Multicultural Citizenship, ￿￿.
￿￿. Although the labels arbitrarily assigned to the di￿erent cultural groups in Cyprus dispropor-
tionately a￿ect the minority national groups, they nonetheless have a negative impact on the major-
ity national group as well, through the state of exception. As Constantinou explains, the RoC “was
intended to function as a state of exception from its very inception; an exception to the principle of
self-determination, an exception to independence from the ‘motherlands’ and an exception to the
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sifying a culture is a pre-political exercise excluded from the political discussion and
as such the members of minority cultures have their voice silenced or ampli￿ed ac-
cording to the pre-political classi￿cation of their culture. A theory of recognition
is needed that precedes any theory of multiculturalism or any other theory that re-
quires the communication of di￿erent peoples. Any theory of MC must include at
its core a theory of recognition; one that involves the members of minorities in the
classi￿cation of their culture.￿is subsection will explore howmisrecognition leads
to cultural oppression, before proceeding to §￿.￿ to see misrecognition in action
through the examples present in the case of Cyprus.
When there is ambiguity as to what kind of a group a cultural association
is, the members of the majority societal culture that dominate the institutions of
the state try to interpret, understand and de￿ne the group based on the political
classi￿cations that they have in mind. ￿erefore, they are searching for evidence of
certain traits that de￿ne one of the three groups. ￿is is what Tully de￿nes as the
process of recognition in modern constitutionalism that oppresses cultures.
When claims for recognition are expressed, a two-track process takes place.
Initially, the demands of minority cultures are “redescribed” in the language of each
of the three prevailing traditions (liberalism, communitarianism, nationalism). For
example, aboriginal peoples are redescribed as “nations”, with “sovereignty” or a
“right of self determination.”￿￿ ￿en, their claims are put under examination based
on the critical norms of each of the three mainstream traditions. As argued in §￿.￿.￿
the experiences of constitutional misrecognition experienced by the Aboriginals are
very similar to those experienced by the members of non-dominant national mi-
unfettered exercise of sovereignty.” ￿us, the state of exception a￿ects everyone living on the island,
whose rights as citizens of a sovereign state do notmuch those enjoyed by theirWestern counterparts.
See Costas M. Constantinou, “On the Cypriot States of Exception,” Journal of Political Sociology ￿, no.
￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
￿￿. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism In An Age Of Diversity, ￿￿.
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norities in Cyprus, and as such, inquiring into the causes and potential mechanism
of avoidance of such misrecognition, will help theories of MC to be successfully ex-
ported beyond their dedicated contexts.
According to Tully, both the language and the assessment of the claims of
minority groups take place within the modern authoritative framework of liberal
constitutionalism and as such “the language of modern constitutionalism is seen as
an imperial meta-narrative which needs to be thoroughly deconstructed.”￿￿ Mod-
ern constitutionalism has received three set of criticisms: the ￿rst comes from post-
modern critics who argue that identity as perceived in the authoritative framework
of interpretation “is always di￿erent from itself, as well as from others”￿￿; the second
originates in cultural feminism whose proponents maintain that it is not possible to
address feminist claims for recognition in the language of modern constitutionalism
since it entails a “masculine partiality which discriminates in someways against fem-
inine ways of speaking, thinking and acting”￿￿; and ￿nally, the last criticism is that
of intercultural citizens like aboriginal peoples, dual-nationals or linguistic minori-
ties, who claim that the language of the existing institutions “distorts their voice”.￿￿
￿erefore the language of modern constitutionalism has been used as a suppressor
of diversity and as a defender of uniformity. Tully suggests that liberal theorists need
to retrace their steps and question the underlying assumptions, along with the tran-
sition from ancient to modern constitutionalism.
￿e aboriginals did not ￿t within the European understanding of nationhood
and sovereignty and for this reason they were denied basic rights. Although Kym-
licka does not have similar motivations to the Colonialists, nevertheless by not in-
￿￿. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism In An Age Of Diversity, ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿-￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿.
￿￿. ibid., ￿￿-￿￿.
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cluding a theory of recognition as part of his multicultural model, his theory has
the potential to deny cultural rights to certain groups which do not ￿t his threefold
classi￿cation of culture.
￿.￿ Examples of Misrecognition in Cyprus
Two examples from the case of Cyprus demonstrate the consequences of distribut-
ing cultural rights without an underlying theory of recognition. First, the example
of the Cypriot Roma and then the example of Cypriot Latins, Cypriot Maronites and
Cypriot Armenians.￿e historical background of these cultures has been presented
in §￿.￿. In this section, these examples will be used as real-life cases of misrecogni-
tion. It will be argued that the theories of MC seen thus far lack the conceptual tools
to guarantee that these cultures will have a di￿erent treatment which will spare them
from the constitutional silencing that they have incurred. In the next section, §￿.￿,
an alternative suggestion of how to facilitate the process of recognition to avoid the
instances presented in §￿.￿ will be provided.
￿.￿.￿ Erased from History: the Case of Roma
￿e Cypriot Roma have a historical presence in Cyprus for centuries.￿￿ ￿ey speak
languages speci￿c to their culture and also the language of one of the two dominant
national groups inCyprus –Greek or Turkish.￿￿ ￿e Roma of Cyprus are eitherMus-
lims or Christians, depending on which side of the divide the ￿￿￿￿ invasion found
them; those that were in the South (the territory controlled by theRepublic of Cyprus
￿￿. See §￿.￿.
￿￿. Marilena Karyolemou, “Minorities And Minority Languages In Cyprus,” in￿e Minorities Of
Cyprus: Development Patterns And￿e Inclusion Of￿e Internal-Exclusion, ed. Andrekos Varnava,
Nicholas Coureas, and Marina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿),
￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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and the Greek Cypriots) are mostly Christians whereas those that were in the North
(under Turkish Cypriot control) are mostly Muslims.
￿e Roma population living in Cyprus is not even considered Cypriot be-
cause they lack the attributes of a national minority. A largely unknown and partic-
ularly interesting fact, demonstrative of the way the Roma were treated, is that they
were originally recognised in the ￿rst dra￿s of the Annan Plan – a new constitution
dra￿ed on behalf of the then Secretary General of the United Nations Ko￿Annan –
as a national minority, only to be excluded at the last dra￿, thus denying them recog-
nitionwith the approval of theUnitedNations.￿ey were quite literally deleted from
the history of Cyprus. By refusing to recognise them as a nationalminority, or at least
as an old migrant group or a religious group with historical presence in the island,
the Roma were treated as foreigners in their own country.
￿e way the former president of the RoC Mr Glafkos Clerides treated Roma
Cypriots is indicative of the way the state in the South refuses to recognise Roma and
excludes them from the political process. When the borders openedmany Roma liv-
ing in the North crossed to the South to seek employment in the Republic of Cyprus,
wheremore job opportunitieswere available.￿ose that did not have an identity card
of the Republic of Cyprus – something common between the Romani of Cyprus
– were imprisoned and treated as illegal immigrants, despite them being born in
Cyprus where their ancestors lived for generations. Costas Constantinou describes
what happened next very graphically:
When the Greek-Cypriot Attorney-General pointed out that this was il-
legal, and that theRepublicwould be internationally accountable for this
action (especially at the time it was claiming that the Turkish-Cypriot
regime was mistreating Gypsies in the north), the police claimed that
￿￿￿
they were never put into prison as ‘prisoners’ and that nobody was stop-
ping the Gypsies from leaving (Cyprus Mail, ￿￿ and ￿￿ April ￿￿￿￿).￿e
police only put them into prison because they did not know where to
accommodate them! ￿e Greek-Cypriot Minister of Justice and Public
Order also let it be known that the Gypsies were suspected of espionage
for the Turkish army (Cyprus Mail, ￿ April ￿￿￿￿). When all these failed,
and given the media focus home and abroad on the matter, the govern-
ment decided to arrange for ‘appropriate places’ for them to stay. Given
that no Greek-Cypriot village or district seemed keen to accept them
in their locale, the government suggested makeshi￿ places near Kotsiati
next to the Nicosia rubbish site and Ko￿nou near themain Cyprus abat-
toir, both sites quite telling as to how theGypsies were o￿cially and pop-
ularly perceived (Cyprus Mail, ￿￿ April ￿￿￿￿ and ￿ February ￿￿￿￿). In
the end, and following protests from the Gypsies, as well as from locals,
they were moved to the Turkish-Cypriot section of Limassol and the
village of Makounta in Paphos (Cyprus Mail, ￿￿ September ￿￿￿￿ and
￿￿ November ￿￿￿￿). But by this time the Greek-Cypriot government
had realised the communication value of properly treating ‘our Gypsy
compatriots’ who ￿ed the ‘oppressive regime in the north’.￿￿
￿e case of the Cypriot Roma is the most interesting example of misrecognition be-
cause it blatantly shows what happens when a proper mechanism for recognition is
not in place to secure the equal participation of a group in the democratic process –
how can a group whose members are imprisoned as illegal immigrants be expected
to participate on equal footing in a deliberation with the members of the other cul-
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “Aporias Of Identity: Bicommunalism, Hybridity And ￿e ‘Cyprus
Problem’,” Cooperation and Con￿ict ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿.
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tural groups? Deliberation, being a two-way process of communication, requires the
interlocutors to enjoy equal footing in the discussion. Otherwise we are not talking
about an exchange of good reasons but rather about something else, reminiscent of
times when subjects addressed the nobility.
￿.￿.￿ Misrecognition as Nation-building: Armenians, Latins and
Maronites
Asdescribed in chapter ￿, the cultural spectrum inCyprus is rather confusing. Whereas
in the classic examples described by Kymlicka the tripartite distinctions are clear, in
Cyprus one can ￿nd national groups that have majority andminority standing at the
same time.
￿eGreekCypriots are themajority societal culture and theTurkish-Cypriots,
Armenians, Latins, and Maronites are minority cultures. ￿e Roma, as seen above,
are absolutely ignored. What complicates the situation is that the Turkish Cypriots,
who are a minority culture when compared to the Greek Cypriots, enjoy more rights
than the rest of the minority cultures found on the island. ￿erefore, given that the
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots have constitutional control over the institutions of the
state, and given that the negotiated constitution (part of the solution for the Cyprus
problem) is a bicommunal one, the Greek- and Tukish-Cypriots are dominant cul-
tures, irrespective of the fact that Turkish Cypriots are a minority. Turkish-Cypriots
are a minority culture only when they are compared to the Greek Cypriots, and this
is the reason that I label them a dominant minority culture.
In Cyprus the process of misrecognition was used as a political tool to silence
non-dominant minorities. ￿e contrast between the rights a￿orded to the Turkish
Cypriot minority compared to those given to Armenians, Latins and Maronites is
￿￿￿
most telling. Whereas according to the ￿￿￿￿ constitution the TCs shared the power
with the GCs at all the levels of the state – executive, legislative and in the courts
– the rest of the minorities in Cyprus were only guaranteed seats in the House of
Representatives (the parliament) without any power of veto over issues related to
their speci￿c cultural a￿airs. Also, they had no representation in the Supreme Court
that rules on di￿erences between GCs and TCs, nor did they have representation at
the executive level – and contrary to the UKwhere themembers of the PrimeMinis-
ter’s Cabinet sit at the core ofWestminster, in Cyprus the executive is separated from
the legislature.￿e diminished constitutional rights that members of non-dominant
minorities received rendered them dependent upon the Greek Cypriot majority and
the Turkish Cypriot dominant minority cultures, even for issues that had nothing to
do with the two bicommunally supreme communities.
￿e existence and the survival of smaller cultural groups relies upon the good
will of the dominant culture; in the case of the RoC, it relies upon the Greek Cypri-
ots who now, and since ￿￿￿￿, control the institutions of the state. ￿e demands of
minority groups are only likely to be addressed and met if they don’t threaten the
dominant narratives and identities of the main societal culture that is in control of
the institutions of the state. In other words, any demands for rights, or any demands
for recognition, are ￿ltered through the security concerns and interests of the dom-
inant majority culture.
Why then are non-dominant minorities in Cyprus not enjoying the same
rights as the Turkish Cypriots, given that the latter are also a minority group with
historical presence in Cyprus? Part of the explanation is that these groups – Arme-
nians, Latins, Maronites – were perceived and treated as religious groups rather than
as national minorities.￿ey were declined rights usually granted to national minori-
ties, allowing for their swi￿ assimilation into the two dominant cultural groups, the
￿￿￿
Greek and Turkish Cypriots. ￿e cultural characteristics of the non-dominant mi-
norities in question were reduced to politically irrelevant cultural speci￿cities and as
such were not recognised as traits that de￿ne national identities.
In §￿.￿ it will be argued that ethnicity should not be the identity-marker that
de￿nes national cultures using the examples of the minorities in Cyprus. For the
moment, it su￿ces to say that the three non-dominant minorities were forced to
adopt the ethnic identities of the two dominant groups. In ￿￿￿￿ they were asked
to decide whether they wanted to become Greeks or Turks, for there was no other
ethnicity one was allowed to have if they wanted to have legitimate claims in the
newly-found state, the Republic of Cyprus, as was mandated in the ￿￿￿￿ Constitu-
tion. ￿us, despite them having ethnic relations and attachments to motherlands
other than Greece or Turkey (with the exception of Latins who had no ethnic at-
tachment), the non-dominant minorities in Cyprus were forced to give up their eth-
nic identities and adopt those of (one of) the dominant cultures. Failing to do so
would render their claims towards the RoC as illegitimate and also make them look
traitorous, since they would be undermining the new constitution, challenging the
new state, the RoC, which was bicommunally structured.
Challenging the constitution would in turn trigger the security concerns of
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Undermining the sense of security of the two cultures
was not an option. ￿e sovereignty of Cyprus, imposed from outside,￿￿ emerged in
order to ease the bicommunal tensions and stop the civil war that was taking place
and therefore any attempt originating from anyone but the two dominant groups to
undermine the state was considered an act of aggression and o￿en merited the label
of “traitor” upon the “aggressor.”
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “Cypriot In-Dependence And ￿e Problem Of Sovereignty,” ￿e
Cyprus Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿.
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￿e non-dominant national minorities were treated more as religious associ-
ations rather than national minorities, despite the language used in the ￿￿￿￿ consti-
tution, which recognised Armenians, Maronites and Latins as national minorities.
By being deprived of their ethnic origins, denied language rights, and having their
historiography ￿ltered through the dominant narrative of the Greek Cypriots (since
they decided to associate themselves with the GCs rather than the TCs) the non-
dominant minorities in Cyprus were subjected to the perils of bicommunal excep-
tionalism that deprived them of the main identities that constituted their culture.
￿e language rights ofMaronites are an example that resonateswith themain-
stream examples presented in the literature of multicultural citizenship, since it has
considerable similarities to the case of Québécoise in Canada; the seminal case upon
which theorists like Taylor and Kymlicka developed their respective theories of mul-
ticulturalism. Maronites have an ethnic attachment to Lebanon and are geographi-
cally concentrated in two villages in Cyprus – most Maronites live outside the “Ma-
ronite villages,” but it is in those villages that their collective identities ￿nd room for
expression. Maronites have a language speci￿c to their culture; one that fades as the
elders of the community pass away, and onewhich is only spoken at the village of Ko-
rmakitis. ￿e Maronite children attend the state schools of the Republic of Cyprus,
where they are taught the same curriculum as the members of the dominant Greek-
Cypriot culture; they are taught that they are ethnic Greeks of Cyprus that should
believe in the one and only God, the Christian Orthodox God. ￿e qualitative and
quantitative research conducted by Philippou in state schools demonstrates how the
civic and ethnic identities of young school boys and girls are reconciled – the no-
tion of being both Greek and Cypriot – through the common religion that the two
countries are supposed to have and through their links to classical Greece.￿￿ ￿e fact
￿￿. Stavroula Philippou, “Constructing National And European Identities: ￿e Case Of Greek-
￿￿￿
thatMaronites are ethnically Lebanese, that they have a language indigenous to their
culture called Cypriot Maronite Arabic, and that they are Catholics contradicts the
dominant Greek-Cypriot narrative, perpetuated in schools. ￿us, all the identities
cultivated through the educational system contradict and undermine the identities
that are attached to their culture.￿￿
￿e ￿￿￿￿ constitution of the newly-found bicommunal state, the Republic
of Cyprus, recognised only two ethnic identities: the Greeks and the Turks. ￿us,
every other minority even if it was called a “national minority” was not treated as
one, since ethnicity was the decisive factor upon which the political power under
the new constitution was distributed. ￿e forced-adoption of an ethnic identity at
the expense of one’s own had caused an existential crisis to the members of the non-
dominant minorities. ￿e personal re￿ections of people who were young during
the ￿￿￿￿s are illuminating. I will now provide two examples of the identity crisis
experienced by Maronites in Cyprus, showing how misrecognition has a￿ected the
identities relevant to their culture.
￿e ￿rst example has to do with Maronite allegiances to football clubs. Foot-
ball in Cyprus is a highly politicised matter. One’s political leanings can be easily
deciphered with knowledge of the football team that they support.￿e biggest team
inCyprus, calledOmonia, is associatedwith the communist AKEL and is considered
the football team of working-class anti-nationalists that tend to downplay their eth-
Cypriot Pupils,” Educational Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Stavroula Philippou, “On￿e Borders
Of Europe: Citizenship Education And Identity In Cyprus,” Journal of Social Science Education ￿,
no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿; Stavroula Philippou, “What Makes Cyprus European? Curricular Responses Of
Greek-Cypriot Civic Education To ‘Europe’,” Journal of Curriculum Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿;
Stavroula Philippou and Andrekos Varnava, “Construction Of Solution(S) To ￿e Cypus Problem:
Exploring Formal Curricula In Greek Cypriot State Schools,” in Reunifying Cyprus:￿e Annan Plan
And Beyond, ed. Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (London: I. B. Tauris, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Andrekos Varnava, “￿eMinorities Of Cyprus In￿e History Of Cyprus Textbook For Lyceum
Students: A Critique,” in ￿e Minorities Of Cyprus: Development Patterns And ￿e Identity Of ￿e
Internal-Exclusion, ed. Andrekos Varnava, Nicholas Coureas, andMarina Elia (Newcastle upon Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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nic loyalties in favour of Cypriotism as a form of civic identity. Omonia was founded
in ￿￿￿￿ when APOEL, the second largest football team of the island, declared that
it wanted “the communist mutiny” to be seized.￿￿ Le￿ wing footballers le￿ APOEL
either by voluntarily exiting the nationalist team or by being expelled for their polit-
ical views.￿e le￿wing former-APOEL footballers created new clubs like Salamina,
Omonia and Alki that were associated with the communist party, which itself was
associated with its respective Greek one that was ￿ghting a civil war in Greece. Note
that APOEL stands for “Athletic Football Club of Greeks of Nicosia”. As the name
suggests non-Greeks were never particularly welcome in the ranks of APOEL. To
this day, APOEL is associated with the conservative right, ranging from the moder-
ate conservative DISY, to the far-right EVROKO, and to the neo-nazist ELAM, the
sister party of the Greek Golden Dawn.￿￿
What one can safely argue without much controversy is that the mainstream
political views held both from the o￿cial APOEL and from the bulk of its support-
ers, is that Cyprus is Greek and that the priority of the state (that is Greek) should
be to help the Greeks maintain their ethnic identity, which is held in higher esteem
than their civic identity –meaning that their loyalty to the Cypriot state is secondary
to their loyalties to the Greek ethnos, which according to them ought to be main-
tained through the institution of the state. One could therefore argue that APOEL
is largely supported by people who consider their Greek ethnic identity as of par-
ticular importance and Omonia by people who reject (or downplay the signi￿cance
of) their ethnic attachment to a motherland in favour of a Cypriocentric civic and
￿￿. Vasilios Ioakimidis, “Omonoia Nicosia: When ￿e ‘Communist Bandits’ Formed A Football
Team,” in Capitalism and Sport: Politics, Protest, People and Play, ed. Michael Lavalette (London:
Bookmarks Publications, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. I am not suggesting that APOEL supporters are neo-Nazis; rather that APOEL is traditionally
associated with the right and that its fun-base is diverse and attracts supporters across the whole of
the right spectrum of the political scene in Cyprus.
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non-nationalist conception of their identity.
Given the distinction between Omonia and APOEL, a logical expectation
would be that people with non-Greek ethnic attachments and people without any
ethnic attachments at all, would bemore likely to supportOmonia rather thanAPOEL.
￿e Maronites consulted in the course of this thesis maintained that many people
from their cultures support APOEL, despite the ethnocentric rhetoric of the team
and its supporters.
￿is issue came up in the documentary￿e￿ird Motherland.￿￿ Constanti-
nou followed a group of Maronites on their pilgrimage to Lebanon and asked them
questions on camera whilst in the bus. In discussing his identity, a young Maronite
that was part of the group, explained to the interviewer that being a fan of APOEL
was as important as to him as being a Maronite. Recently, this issue became a hot
topic of debate among the Maronites, since an op-ed was published that explained
the rationale behind theMaronite support to APOEL –making an attempt to recon-
cile the Greek ethnocentric views endorsed by APOEL and its supporters, with the
Maronite identity and the ethnic loyalties to Lebanon.￿￿ ￿e op-ed was full of his-
torical inaccuracies; a fact that is important in its own right because it demonstrates
how cultural assimilation works, where members of minorities modify their views
and the historiography of their culture in order to conform to the dominant narra-
tive.￿e paradox of the Maronites supporting a nationalist team is the ￿rst example
that I wanted to include here in demonstrating the outcome of bicommunal excep-
tionalism found in Cyprus. ￿e second example pertains to the non-recognition of
the language of the Maronites by the Republic of Cyprus.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou and Giorgos K. Skordis,￿e￿ird Motherland, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=JVKH￿thX￿vc, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. APOEL.net, Why Maronites Support APOEL (Greek), http : / / www . apoel . net / apoel￿ /
monimesstilesinside.php?news_id=￿￿￿￿, ￿￿ November ￿￿￿￿.
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Maronites are perfectly ￿uent in Greek; it’s impossible to distinguish a young
Greek Cypriot from a young Maronite on the basis of how they converse in the
Cypriot dialect of Greek that is spoken in Cyprus. ￿is is to be expected given the
fact that Maronites attend state schools where everything is taught in Greek. Nev-
ertheless, as it was mentioned above, Maronites have a language indigenous to their
culture, called Cyprus Maronite Arabic (CMA). Every time the Maronite minority
asked for the assistance of the state for the survival of their culture they got turned
down. During Mr Tassos Papadopoulos presidency, a report was issued stating that
theMaronites do not speak a distinct language.￿ey were dismissed on the grounds
that what they perceive to be the language of their culture, was in fact a benign dialect
only spoken by few elders in the Maronite village of Kormakitis.
It was in ￿￿￿￿ that UNESCO declared that the language of the the Maronites
is called Cyprus Maronite Arabic, refuting the claim of Papadopoulos that it is an
irrelevant dialect. Rather, UNESCO recognised the language of the Maronites in
Cyprus as one that is indigenous only to Cyprus, and one that is facing the threat
of extinction; a threat that should be averted since CMA is now considered a global
cultural heritage. It was only then that the Republic of Cyprus decided –was forced –
to allocate funds for the teaching of CMA tomembers of theMaronite community.￿￿
What all non-dominant minorities in Cyprus have in common is that they
have all been victims of misrecognition by the RoC – they have all been denied the
constitutional powers a￿orded to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In fact, if they are
compared to the Turkish-Cypriots, which are also aminority group, one can observe
how they were downgraded and treated as religious associations, despite the fact that
they are referred to as national minorities in the constitution.
￿￿. Costas M. Constantinou, “￿e Protection and Revival of Cypriot Maronite Arabic,” PRIO
Cyprus Centre Policy Brief (January), ￿￿￿￿,
￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Recognition at the State-level Driven by the Dominant Cul-
ture
￿e cases presented above point to two very important problems that demonstrate
the urgent need for the incorporation of a theory of recognition at the core of a mul-
ticultural theory.￿e ￿rst issue relates to the current process of recognition followed
by multicultural theories and the second to the need for a more global response to
what is a widespread problem – misrecognition and denial of rights to minority
groups is not a context-speci￿c issue, but rather one that arises in many societies.
In this subsection the process whereby the state facilitates the process of cultural
classi￿cation which leads to misrecognition will be analysed, in order to proceed in
§￿.￿ to talk about an internationally-oriented process of recognition.
Initially, the current process of recognition inMC needs to be addressed.￿e
￿rst part of the process of cultural accommodation is to have a rough idea of what
kind of rights are typically a￿orded to each type of cultural group. “Rough” idea
since, as it is observable from the case of Cyprus, national minorities might be con-
stitutionally labelled as such but treated more like religious groups. Once a rough
idea of what the rightful claims that each cultural type can make, then the di￿erent
national groups found in a country are accounted for. In a theory of multicultural
citizenship the person who is actually making the judgement of what type of culture
each group is, is the theorist. ￿e theorist is a seemingly neutral individual with no
undisclosed biases or ulterior motives. In real societies this is not the case; political
philosophers are seldom central to the political process of cultural recognition.￿e
decision lies with the state, which is let to decide what types of cultural groups exist
within its bounds to assess whether their claims have any merit.
￿e role of the state is therefore central, for it is responsible for making the
￿￿￿
classi￿cation of cultures in the typology of cultural groups, before evaluating the
claims that each group is advancing towards the state. ￿e discussion here is solely
preoccupied with states that are liberal. Whilst the liberals vs illiberal distinction is
fairly straightforward in political theory, that is far from the case in real societies,
especially in the cases of countries that do not fall within the category of “advanced
western states,” and even more so in countries whose national identities are a highly
politicised and securitised issue.
Cyprus is one such case. It is – on paper – a liberal country that nonetheless
is o￿en found oppressing members of national minorities and immigrant groups.
￿e aggression towards minorities is curtailed only a￿er international bodies point
out the shortcomings or the human rights violations of the government. ￿e case
of the Cypriot Gypsies presented above, the language rights of Maronites and the
fact that political refugees that apply for asylum are locked in Menoyia,￿￿ which has
been declared by the ECtHR as a place were systematic violations of human rights
are taking place, are examples of illiberal policies and practices of a formally liberal
state.￿￿
￿￿. Amnesty International, Cyprus: Abusive Detention Of Migrants And Asylum Seekers Flouts EU
Law, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/cyprus-abusive-detention-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-
￿outs-eu-law-￿￿￿￿-￿￿-￿￿, ￿￿March ￿￿￿￿. AI in its report writes: “Cypriot immigration authorities
routinely detain hundreds of migrants and asylum-seekers in prison-like conditions for extended
periods while awaiting deportation. ￿ose detained include Syrian refugees and women separated
from their young children. Evidence gathered by researchers during a recent visit to Cyprus indicates
that the authorities are exploiting European Union (EU) laws – imposing automatic detention of
migrants and asylum-seekers without implementing the required safeguards, which make detention
a last resort.￿e practice is also a breach of international law.”
￿￿. “While welcoming the appointment of a Complaints Committee in May ￿￿￿￿ to handle com-
plaints regarding ill-treatment and detention conditions in Menoyia Detention Centre, as well as the
decision to refrain from using handcu￿s, the Committee remains concerned by the numerous allega-
tions of ill-treatment by police in the Centre, leading to protests and hunger strikes.￿e Committee
also received information regarding very limited outdoor access, poor quality of food and frequent
resort to solitary con￿nement (arts. ￿￿ and ￿￿). ￿e Committee urges the State party to ensure that
the legal regime at Menoyia Detention Centre is suitable for its purpose and that it di￿ers from the
regime of penal detention.￿e Complaints Committee should vigilantly pursue each complaint and
immediately transmit allegations of ill-treatment to the O￿ce of the Attorney- General for further
investigation. Solitary con￿nement should remain a measure of last resort, imposed for as short a
￿￿￿
￿e liberal values upheld in the constitution can further bemarginalisedwhen
the latter is interpreted through the prism of “security emergency.” Every constitu-
tion has a provision that protects the institutions guaranteed by the constitution.￿is
is guided by “salvus reipublicae suprema lex esto, meaning “the welfare of the people
shall be the supreme law,” which originates from Cicero’s De Legibus.￿￿ ￿ese pro-
visions take precedence when there is an emergency. In Cyprus this constitutional
provision, labelled the “law of need,” has been used to ￿ll the void of the consti-
tutional vacuum that emerged when the bicommunal state became monocultural,
with the Greek-Cypriots dominating the institution of the state.￿￿ A￿er ￿￿￿￿, the
TCs withdrew from the administration of the RoC.￿e then President of the RoC,
the Greek-Cypriot Archbishop Makarios III, was le￿ to rule without the checks and
balances that a TC Vice President provided. Under the constitution, two levels of
checks and balances existed: a mixed Supreme Court responsible for resolving dif-
ferences between the two communities and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President with
veto power, responsible for ensuring that the GC President did not exercise absolute
power.
￿us far then it has been established that liberal states do not always act in ac-
cordance with liberal values. Given that the institutions of the state are usually ￿lled
and run by members of the dominant societal culture, the chances of ethnocultural
bias is more pronounced when there are security considerations involved, like in the
time as possible, under strict supervision and judicial review.” United Nations, Committee Against
Torture: Concluding Observations On￿e Fourth Report Of Cyprus (CAT/C/CYP/CO/￿), ￿￿ June ￿￿￿￿,
￿.
￿￿. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero: On￿e Commonwealth And On￿e Laws, Cambridge Texts in
the History of Political￿ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿), bk III, part III, sub
VIII.
￿￿. ￿e two seminal cases where it was established are Attorney-General of the Republic of
Cyprus. v. Mustafa Ibrahim, ￿CLR ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ and￿e Board of the Registration of Architects and Civil
Engineers v. Kyriakides,￿e Board of the Registration of Architects and Civil Engineers v. Kyriakides,
￿￿￿￿.
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case of the “law of need” outlined above.
When the members of a dominant societal culture feel threatened, they are
likely to use the institutions of the state in order to ensure the survival of their own
culture. ￿us the state is used to enhance the nation-building of the dominant cul-
ture, whose survival and resilience is assessed in opposition to other cultures. When
the members of non-dominant minorities make demands towards the state they are
relying on the members of the majority culture to recognise and legitimise them.
Doing so goes contrary to the interests of the dominant culture since its dominance
is undermined by the emergence of more national groups that make demands from
the state.
￿e minority groups in question then have two options, neither of which ex-
cludes the other. ￿ey will either frame their demands in a language that does not
excite the phobias of the main cultural group (at the expense of their cultural iden-
tity) or theywill bemisrecognised – or denied recognition – by the dominant cultural
group that enjoys monopoly over the institutions of the state.
In Cyprus both can be observed. Minority groups have internalised the dom-
inant narratives that misrecognised them, all the while they are denied basic rights
like the ability to teach their children the language of their ancestors. ￿e case of
the former president of the Democratic Party (DIKO) is most interesting. MrMario
Garoyian is an Armenian-Maronite Cypriot (Armenian father, Maronite mother)
who was the leader of DIKO, a party with a hardcore view on the Greek origins
of Cypriots, as well as the Greekness of Cyprus overall. One could go as far as to
call DIKO a nationalist party, although its members would seldom accept this de-
scription. ￿e fact that an Armenian was in charge of DIKO for seven (￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿)
years, eager to defend the Greekness of Cyprus, illustrates the e￿ect that ethnocen-
tric nation-building had upon the members of the minority cultures found on the
￿￿￿
island.
Another example that demonstrates the e￿ect of nation-building uponmem-
bers of minority cultures is found in reports of older Maronites that were in school
during the late ￿￿s and early ￿￿s. Most participants described feelings of shame and
internal contradiction. Shame towards their own culture that they felt they were
abandoning by not conversing in its language, and shame towards the GCs and the
school for not conversing in the “proper” national language.
￿.￿ AProcess ofRecognition at the International Level
￿e central question that will be addressed in §￿.￿ is what can be done about the
misrecognition of cultural groups, given that this is an issue that a￿ects many dif-
ferent cultures across multiple countries. ￿e process that will be defended in this
section will provide suggestions on how the recognition of minority cultures like
those found in Cyprus can be facilitated.￿e objective is to have a process whereby
cultures take part in the process of their classi￿cation, as part of a democratic de-
liberation where they enjoy equal standing as the members of the majority culture,
who are typically in control of the state.
￿e expansion of the distinction of national minorities, immigrant groups
and aboriginal peoples, is uncontroversial. Kymlicka himself accepts that in places
like Eastern Europe the taxonomy could be expanded.￿￿ ￿e most important and
considerably more controversial issue is how to incorporate a mechanism of recog-
nition into the existing theories and the decision-making process of multicultural
accommodation. Kymlicka in his last book onmulticulturalism declared the victory
￿￿. Will Kymlicka and Magdalena Opalski, Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?: Western Political
￿eory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿), see Introduc-
tion
￿￿￿
of multiculturalism, as observed through the incorporation of considerations for di-
versity into the foundational documents of themajor intergovernmental institutions
like the UN and the EU. His Multicultural Odysseys describes the voyage from the
point of emergence of liberal multiculturalism until the successful implementation
of group-di￿erentiated policies that accommodate cultural minorities.￿￿ Whereas
in Homer’s opus the destination – Ithaca – had little importance, since it was the
voyage that mattered, in Kymlicka’s Odyssey the destination is important, for it al-
lows the theorist to proclaim the success of multiculturalism – multiculturalism has
prevailed, and now it’s just a matter of exporting it beyond its dedicated contexts.
Yet neither the theoretical aspects nor the practical considerations of multi-
culturalism are settled, and victory is far from being proclaimed. ￿e a￿ermath of
the attack at the World Trade Centre in the USA has caused a backlash to multi-
culturalism, both in terms of policy and public opinion.￿￿ ￿e fear towards Islamic
extremism was revived with ￿/￿￿ and has been sustained ever since through various
events that periodically amplify it – like for instance British Muslims going to Syria
and Iraq to ￿ght on the side of the rebels￿￿ – creating a wall of distrust that separates
(and isolates) Muslim people.￿￿ ￿e mistrust persists irrespective of the fact that the
￿￿. ￿eMulticultural Odysseys succeeded at raising the issue of multicultural accommodation high
in the international agenda. Whereas Kymlicka’s contemporaries battle over boring semantics like
“multiculturalism” vs “interculturalism.” See Ted Cantle, Interculturalism: For the Era of Cohesion
and Diversity (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, ￿￿￿￿); Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer, “How Does
Interculturalism Contrast With Multiculturalism?,” Journal of Intercultural Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿):
￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Geneive Abdo,Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life In America A￿er ￿/￿￿ (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, ￿￿￿￿); Costas Panagopoulos, “￿e Polls-Trends: Arab And Muslim Americans And
Islam In￿e A￿ermath Of ￿/￿￿,” Public Opinion Quarterly ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. Suraj Lakhani, What Makes Young British Muslims Want To Go To Syria?, http : / / www .
theguardian.com/commentisfree/￿￿￿￿/jun/￿￿/isis-british-muslims-reality-war-￿ght-extremism, ￿￿
June ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. ￿e public discussion on Islamic extremism occupies such a disproportionately big part of pub-
lic debate creating the impression that it is awidespread and commonproblem. A logical consequence
of the false perception that Islamic extremism is a mainstream problem is the distinction between
“good” and “bad”Muslims.￿is has two purposes.￿e ￿rst is to try and dissuade young BritishMus-
lims from radicalising and the second is to make mainstream British Muslims feel safe. ￿e British
￿￿￿
overwhelmingmajority ofMuslim people living in theWest are political liberals that
accept the values of a liberal well-ordered society that govern the advanced demo-
cratic states of theWest – the same values that the British PrimeMinister has recently
and mistakenly declared as being distinctively British.￿￿
Kymlicka is right in arguing that the West has developed a culture of accep-
tance towards diversity and he is also right that success stories of multiculturalism
could be spread through intergovernmental institutions that can facilitate the trans-
fer of know-how to deal with speci￿c challenges of diversity. What is not clear from
Kymlicka’s latest book onmulticulturalism is how intergovernmental institutions can
be used to facilitate the spread of liberal pluralism; what else other than highlighting
good practices can intergovernmental institutions do.
Little guidance is given into how liberal pluralism can be exported beyond
the archetypal cases. Speci￿cally, we do not know what institutional role intergov-
ernmental organisations should assume in this process. In the case of Cyprus, there
is little guidance on the role of the EU and the UN in the process of recognising and
accommodating minority cultures. Neither are there any suggestions as to the role
of these institutions in enforcing the respect of diversity. A formal process needs to
be established at the international level of intergovernmental organisations; one that
goes well beyond the publicisation of success cases.
￿e usefulness of intergovernmental institutions lies in their ability to pro-
vide a seemingly neutral perspective in cases where the interested parties cannot
reach a middle ground; and this ability is even more important than highlighting
government has not succeeded at doing so. By giving so much emphasis to Islamic extremism and by
emphasising the distinction between moderates and extremists, all moderates are being conceived as
potential extremists, and their demands are ￿ltered through an additional layer with considerations
pertaining to national security.
￿￿. David Cameron, British Values Aren’t Optional,￿ey’re Vital.￿at’s Why I Will Promote￿em
In Every School, http://dailym.ai/￿p￿rP￿b, ￿￿ June ￿￿￿￿.
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good multicultural practices and transferring know-how. Having intergovernmen-
tal institutions with binding decisions that can act as neutral arbiters is of immense
importance, since they can be utilised in the process of recognition, in order to en-
sure that the deliberating parties enjoy equal standing in the debate. Although a
critique would say that by delegating more powers to intergovernmental institutions
would be to the detriment of the democratic process, in this case the involvement
of intergovernmental institutions enhances the democratic process since it ensures
that minorities will have a place at the negotiating table.
￿is argument of course comes with the usual caveat – the one that says that
intergovernmental institutions are far from neutral since they are: (a) ideologically
biased in favour of neo-liberal economic policy; (b) culturally biased since they re-
￿ect andpromote the values held dear by advancedwestern countries; (c) class biased
since the interests of more a￿uent countries take precedent over the rest; and ￿nally,
(d) that the best interest of the involved parties might not be met, in order to avoid
setting a precedent unfavourable to the more powerful countries.
Realising the above challenges to the argument that intergovernmental insti-
tutions can provide a neutral framework, it can still be argued that the bene￿ts of
doing so outweigh the possible shortcomings and is worth the risk.
Intergovernmental institutions can become the facilitators of the process of
recognition.￿is can happen in twoways.￿e ￿rst is to transfer the whole process of
recognition to the international level, where the pre-classi￿catory deliberations – the
process of recognition – will take place, or with the involvement of intergovernmen-
tal organisations at the level of individual countries. Intergovernmental organisa-
tions can provide binding guidelines to state-members regarding the recognition of
cultural minorities, along with an institution that can arbitrate when con￿ict arises;
an arbitration court that has the ￿nal judgement, in the same way that the European
￿￿￿
Court of Justice has the ￿nal say in the interpretation of EU law.￿￿
￿is process would be an extension to Kymlicka’s theory, since it would ad-
dress its major shortcoming, which is the misrecognition of cultural groups; an ob-
stacle that hinders the exportability of his theory in countries where cultural identi-
ties are a highly politicised matter that trigger security concerns.
￿.￿ Culture Beyond the Ethnos
Even if a process of recognition of the cultural type of each group is established,
misrecognition is possible if citizenship to a liberal state relies on ethnicity, because
non-ethnic cultures – cultures that do not conceive themselves parts of a wider imag-
inary community – will be constitutionally inferior.￿e case of Cypriot Latins is one
such example, which has been presented in both §￿.￿.￿ and §￿.￿.￿. In this section, a
preliminary examination of the role of ethnicity within the liberal state will be made,
in order to proceed then in chapter ￿ to demonstrate how the post-ethnic defence
that will be advanced here can underpin the ongoing negotiated constitution for the
comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.
￿e cultures that are ethnic cultures with historical presence in a liberal coun-
try, get to have self-governmental rights. ￿is is problematic because other cultures
might have all the attributes that national minorities possess, yet lack a national at-
tachment to a motherland. At best this is unfair, at worst culturally imperialistic
since it looks for national cultures even when there are none, like in cases where the
concept of ethnicity is alien to the cultural mix.
￿￿. ￿is is called “preliminary ruling,” and it iswhen anation-state asks the ECJ for an interpretation
of a law.￿e ruling of ECJ is the highest authority in the interpretation of that law. Formore, seeKaren
J. Alter, “￿e Transformation Of ￿e European Legal System And ￿e Rule Of Law In Europe,” in
Establishing￿e Supremacy Of European Law:￿e Making Of An International Rule Of Law In Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Banality of Ethnicity
￿e ￿rst question then is “why ethnicity?” Ethnicity as an identity marker is prob-
lematic since it no longer ful￿lls the role or has the context that it once had. One of
themost popular discussions on nationalism is provided by Benedict Anderson who
argues that nationalism is the ability to imagine a community beyond the geograph-
ical and temporal limits of one’s immediate surroundings.￿￿ Once people imagined
themselves as part of a wider whole that spanned beyond time and geography, they
conceived themselves as part of an ethnos.￿e Greek Cypriots for instance, imagine
themselves as part of the Greek nation, tracing their roots back to Classical Greece,
surpassing the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is an independent state recognised
by the United Nations.￿￿ ￿e ability to imagine oneself as part of an ethnos was
achievable, Anderson argues, through the mainstream availability of press. Ander-
son writes:
￿e convergence of capitalismandprint technology on the fatal diversity
of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined
community, which in its basic morphology set the state for the modern
nation.￿￿
Once states acquired the ability to mass-produce written materials, they were able
to spread their message and their myths across larger geographical areas and across
time, giving to the proverb “verba volant, scripta manent” a renewed meaning.￿is
enabled them to create national myths: idealised accounts of one’s country that tran-
scended space and time, and served asmeans to create solidarity between those iden-
￿￿. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re￿ections On￿e Origin And Spread Of National-
ism, ￿nd revised (London: Verso, ￿￿￿￿), esp ch. ￿. Also, see Ernest Gellner, Nations And Nationalism,
￿nd (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿. United Nations, Admission of new Members to the UN: Cyprus S/RES/￿￿￿, ￿￿ August ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Re￿ections On￿e Origin And Spread Of Nationalism, ￿￿.
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ti￿ed as part of that imaginary community.
￿e term nation has evolved, and it can mean a civic rather than an ethnic
nation. For the purposes of the discussion here, the term “nation” is used as short
for “ethnic nation”. In cases like Cyprus, ethnicity underpins the conception of the
nation, and ethnic identities are a source of political contestation. Moreover, in the
Greek language, there is no solid distinction between the terms “ethnicity” and “na-
tionality”. ￿e Greek word is “ethnikotita”, which translates to “ethnic nation,” yet it
has a double meaning depending on context: sometimes it means ethnicity, other
times nationality. ￿e ￿￿￿￿ constitution is explicitly based on ethnic identities: on
“Greeks” and “Turks.” On the other hand, the state-issued identity cards and pass-
ports translate “nationality” to “ithageneia”, whose etymology is based on “ithagenis”,
translated to “indigenous,” but actually meaning “citizenship”; it denotes the legal re-
lationship between an individual and the state.
For the purposes of this thesis, nation is a series of identitymarkers that when
used in conjunction classify someone as part of a group.￿￿ ￿ese markers include
language, religion, attachment to land and to common historiographies. Ethnicity
wasn’t always a problematic term, for it used to serve two purposes: ￿rstly to de-
scribe the political realities of a given time and secondly to enforce new paradigms
that would shape those realities. Nationalism, as it emerged in the ￿￿th century, did
both. It enabled the Westphalian states to establish themselves as independent and
coherent groups and at the same time to explain the international order following the
Treaty. In the early stages of the contemporary international order, stateswere homo-
geneous, self-contained entities comprising of people that shared the same life-story.
￿￿. As David Miller,On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿ argues nationalism and
ethnicity are di￿erent concepts that more o￿en than not are hard to distinguish. For my purposes,
ethnicity and nationality are used interchangeably to refer to the association that shares some of the
attributes referred to in the text. In cases where the ethnic- nation state di￿ers from the civic nation,
I will make a special note.
￿￿￿
It made sense to talk about ethnic groups because national states tended to have only
one ethnic group within their bounds. In the absence of a liberal mindset, the dom-
inant majorities assimilated or destroyed minorities that were perceived a threat to
the coherence of the whole. As argued above, ethnicity was used both to explain the
international order and to enforce and empower the countries that comprised it.
An ethnic identity comes with heavy expectations that prior to the twentieth
century countries and people were more likely to meet. Today, in the era of glob-
alisation, transport and mass-communication, these realities are no longer there,
whereas the expectations of ethnic belonging are, since ethnicity is still used as an
identity marker that determines what political rights people belonging (or partially
belonging) to a group have or should be entitled to.
Ethnicity is a thick identity. It is more aptly de￿ned as an umbrella of identi-
ties with some more important than others, depending on the context within which
it is discussed. In some cases themore prominent identity-marker within the bundle
of ethnicity is religion, in other cases it is language, in others attachment to a piece of
land, or even the experience of common hardships that moulded the group. Com-
binations of the above exist, and are in￿nite. What makes ethnicity a “thick identity
marker”, besides the fact that it encapsulates an array of varying identities that each
has di￿erent status and importance, is its exclusionary nature. Ethnicity is used to
divide people and states from other states or groups, and to establish one or the other
as the rightful authority over a geography or a group of people.￿is was a necessary
– or an inevitable – reality before the existence of the intergovernmental institutions
that facilitated international cooperation and peaceful coexistence (at least between
the countries of the West), in the last part of the ￿￿th century, and especially a￿er
the fall of the Soviet Union. Before the UN, EU, NATO, NAFTA and others, each
nation had to assert its sovereignty, for it was not guaranteed and was constantly
￿￿￿
perceived to be under threat. Ethnicity was used both to de￿ne those nation-states
and to maintain them.
Living in a world where global initiatives are needed to ameliorate or com-
pensate for the adverse e￿ects of climate change, to defend against security threats
and to tackle global health epidemics, an antagonistic way of de￿ning collective iden-
tities is redundant. With global issues and global issue-based pressure groups, with
people who identifymorewith remote people that theymet through the internet, it is
unrealistic to conceive national identities as something that form a coherent whole,
as identities under an ethnic umbrella are expected to be.
In the ￿￿st century people are not expected to have solidi￿ed identities that
are immune to challenge or negotiation. Identities that are considered less important
can be downgraded in one’s list of individual identities, or can even be abandoned.
￿is was not the case in earlier, non-liberal societies. One was expected to hold
certain identities and if they decided to abandon them, then they were considered a
threat to the overall community. Abandoning their religious identities signi￿cantly
reduced their chances of a long life in the community. In the issue-based political
cultures that individuals live in, they are considerably more likely to negotiate their
identities and less likely to conform to social norms.￿￿ InWestern societies identity-
based con￿ict ranges beyond the ethnic identities, making the latter anachronistic.
Given the outdated nature of ethnicity, the liberal state has three ways of deal-
ing with ethnic identities.￿e ￿rst and the less attractive one is to limit the notion of
ethnicity to its bare essentials – to formalise it.￿e second, is to expand ethnicity in
order to include additional contemporary identities. ￿e third, which is supported
in this thesis, is to abandon the notion of ethnicity altogether.
￿￿. ￿e most authoritative account of how individuals choose their political a￿liations according
to certain “valence issues” can be found in Donald E. Stokes, “Spatial Models of Party Competition,”
￿e American Political Science Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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￿.￿.￿ Should Ethnicity be Formalised?
￿e option for the de￿ation of ethnicity rests upon the formalisation and restriction
of what is recognised by the state as an ethnic identity.￿is means that the state will
determine what sort of identities form an ethnic group when they are grouped to-
gether. ￿is is problematic because it does not explain how and on whose authority
the state will legitimately decide which identities matter for a group. ￿e only way
for this option to be viable is to be restricted to a bare minimum content. Yet, the
more ethnicity is restricted, the closer the concept goes to the third (preferred) op-
tion, which advocates the abolition of ethnicity as an identity that is worth yielding
political rights.￿us, the restricted version of ethnicity collapses into a form of civic
nationalism.
Nevertheless, the challenge of misrecognition remains, even under the for-
mal, minimal version of understanding ethnicity. By assuming a uniform account
of ethnicity, even one that is restricted to very minimal characteristics, groups that
de￿ne their ethnic identities in di￿erent or additional terms from the formal de￿-
nition, will still be subject to misrecognition. As such, this option is not attractive
because it does not provide a solution to the initial problem, which is the avoidance
of misrecognition and the false representation of cultures as homogeneous ethnic
wholes whose members subscribe to a bundle of common identities.
￿.￿.￿ Should Ethnicity be Expanded?
￿e alternative second option is to expand the concept of ethnicity in regards to both
its content and its nature.￿is is problematic because it contradicts the very concept
of ethnicity and reduces it to identity politics with a very thin basis, which again is
very similar to the civic account of post-ethnic society that will be outlined in §￿.￿.￿.
￿￿￿
To expand what constitutes an ethnic group is to allow other identities to be
considered as de￿ning of a group. Identities like class, education, attitudes towards
controversial subjects like abortion and so on. Identities that will enable people to
still argue that “this is how we do things around here” in contemporary terms; going
beyond religion, blood, land and history. By expanding the content of the concept
of ethnicity a contemporary appeal is given to it. Nevertheless, the concept remains
as conservative as it ever was, since it is still used to distinguish one group from the
other and to depend upon uniformity and homogeneity.
￿e ￿rst problem is that it would be impossible for the state to identify groups,
given the myriad ways by which identities can be added to them or constitute them,
and therefore cannot distribute rights to them on the grounds of their ethnically-
expanded identities. ￿e second problem is one that derives from the ￿rst. If the
state cannot grant rights based on the sum of these identities, then it does not have
legitimate claims over the conduct of these groups; namely, it cannot scrutinise the
a￿airs of those ethnically-expanded groups.
Leaving these two problems aside, another aspect of the ethnically-expanded
model needs to be addressed. It has been argued that the expanded-ethnicity model
should be extended in context, thus adding more identities to the list of what consti-
tutes an ethnic whole, and also to expand in kind as well. By extending its nature, a
renewed understanding of how social groups ought to behave and how to deal with
descent is needed.
Expanding the nature of ethnicity is an attempt to save it from its conserva-
tive roots. It aims at creating an updated conception of ethnicity that understands
modern individuals as bearers of various identities that might not be reconciled in
the eyes of others, without assuming that they are not reconciled by those that bear
them. ￿is account conceives the individual as a multiple identities bearer that is
￿￿￿
in a constant state of negotiating their own identities, trying constantly to reach a
stable equilibrium of peace – or felicity as Rousseau called it – between the di￿er-
ent identities that are deemed valuable by them. Living in an information-rich and
diverse global society, individuals are constantly confronted with stimuli that cause
the frequent re-evaluation of our pre-established beliefs.
Two things need to be crystallised about this process. Firstly, that it is not
a completely rational process. Individuals might hold unjusti￿able or irreconcilable
beliefs simply because they are prejudiced or otherwise socially conditioned to do so,
or might hold incompatible beliefs because of the great costs involved in engaging in
a process of reconciliation. Secondly, that the costs involved are great indeed, which
explains why people do not change opinions o￿en. People change minds about be-
liefs held when the cost of the non-equilibrium is greater than the cost of examining
and re-evaluating their earlier beliefs in light of the new stimuli.￿us, the reconcilia-
tion of contradictory beliefs only takes place when the cost of the non-reconciliation
is higher than the (potentially) irrational status-quo.
Having given the two caveats above, the discussion of the extended-ethnicity
model can be resumed. Once this model of identity-formation is accepted, it follows
that individuals might hold views and identities that to usmight seem irreconcilable,
or even irrational. ￿is might be because the individual has not tried to reconcile
them, or that she tried but ended up with a di￿erent outcome than the one reached
by other people, or that other people have acted irrationally in adopting these views
because the opportunity cost of the pain involved would be too great to bear. A
direct implication of this and the essence of the extended-ethnicity thesis is that not
all members of the group hold exactly the same identities and by extension, the new
conception of ethnicity is not exclusionary.
For a list of identities to be understood as non-exclusionary they need to be
￿￿￿
conceived as part of awider set of identities. To give a visual illustration, imagine that
all views in the world are dots in a page. One personmay connect a few dots together.
Another person will connect other dots. In the cases where there is an overlap in the
dots selected, then we might have a “group.” Not all people that are in a group have
connected the same dots. Imagine that every person, once they draw a line over the
dots that they deem important, then they put a circle over them.￿e larger the circle
over a dot, the more important the identity depicted by that dot. ￿us each person
has a di￿erent collection of dots. An overlap of dots is what constitutes a group. At
the same time each person selecting similar dots (but not identical) bestow di￿erent
importance to them.
Once the identities that make up an ethnic whole are perceived as only a frac-
tion of the identities that individuals hold, and that these individuals might not en-
dorse all the identities that other people in the group hold, or even that individuals
might have identities that other people ￿nd irreconcilable to the sum of identities
that make up a group, then the conceptual basis for understanding the extended-
ethnicity model is possible – a model that contradicts the previously discussed re-
stricted ethnicity model that limits the concept of ethnicity to a minimal list of pre-
determined identities.
￿e extended-ethnicity thesis is problematic because it goes so far o￿ the tra-
ditional concept of ethnicity that makes it something completely di￿erent, or even
irrelevant. It is irrelevant because under this model an amalgam of groups can be
recognised, making it impossible to devise a principled mechanism for recognition
or distribution of rights. In essence, what we get from the extended-ethnicity thesis
is a realistic and accurate account of identities formation through social interaction.
An implication of this account of multiple, overlapping identities that are open to
frequent renegotiation is that there is no justi￿cation for maintaining a speci￿c set
￿￿￿
of these identities.
By sponsoring a set of identities, the state intervenes in this natural process,
impeding the re-negotiation of identities. Some can consider this a form of harm,
since it prohibits citizens from reaching a state of internal peace, which is produced
from the equilibrium reached at the end of the negotiation of identities. ￿e state
should thus not be the maintainer of people’s identities, but rather the maintainer of
their ability to socialise with people that share similar identities as them. (e.g. with
people that connect similar dots as them). ￿e proposed conception of the state re-
duces the extended-ethnicity thesis to the model that will be presented below, which
calls for the disassociation of the state from the recognition and/or maintenance of
ethnic collectives.￿￿
￿.￿.￿ Should Ethnicity be Abandoned?
￿e option preferred by this thesis is to abandon ethnicity altogether. ￿e implica-
tion of this is that countries that use ethnicity as a way to de￿ne themselves, or as a
way of classifying their citizens and distributing/allocating rights to them, will ￿nd
themselves in a disadvantageous position.￿is is not a real problem though. People
who endorse core liberal values accept the diversity of life-plans that exist in the so-
ciety, along with the fact that di￿erent people have di￿erent conceptions of the good
life.￿￿ ￿erefore, a liberal state can no longer legitimately dictate the attachments
and loyalties of people, especially through the circulation of myths or exaggerated
accounts of national achievements. It is no longer acceptable to conceptualise indi-
￿￿. Note that by “disregard” and “adoption” I don’tmean to restrict people from identifying as ethnic
members or to prohibit the formation of ethnic attachments. By “disregard” I mean that the state
should not use ethnicity as the basis for recognition and de￿nitely not the basis upon which to decide
the distribution of rights to groups.
￿￿. ￿e values referred to here are such that liberals of all strains endorse.
￿￿￿
vidual identities as re￿ections of the idealised perceptions of a group. Today, in the
era of globalisation, or in the era of the post-national state as Habermas depicts it,￿￿
the individual, who is an embodied and a contextually aware being, should be the
original subject of analysis.￿e individual should de￿ne the group and not the other
way around. An ethnic group was assumed to have certain traits and characteristics
that were then used to de￿ne the individual. Today, individuals collectively organise
around speci￿c issues that o￿en range beyond those relevant to the ethnos. To insist
on the importance of ethnic belonging is banal.
Ethnicity should be replaced with a civic identity where loyalties lie with the
constitutional essentials rather than with the collection of identities that make up
an ethnic collective. ￿e claim defended here is that the state should no longer be
based upon, or sponsor, ethnic identities. Communities and groups that want to
sustain their culture along ethnic lines should be free to do so, but the state should
have nothing to do with them; no rights should be allocated on the basis of ethnic
identi￿cation. Rights should be distributed according to individual identities that
are considered valuable to a group of individuals. For instance, a group might make
a linguistic claim – to ask for funds or for teachers in order to sustain their minor-
ity language that is under the threat of extinction – without the need to frame the
issue in ethnic terms. A language is important to maintain in its own right; either as
￿￿. Jürgen Habermas, Notes on a post-secular society, http : / /www. signandsight . com/ features /
￿￿￿￿.html, ￿￿￿￿; JürgenHabermas,￿e Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge,Mass.:
MIT Press, ￿￿￿￿). For Habermas’ view on multiculturalism see Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship And
National Identity: Some Re￿ections On￿e Future Of Europe,” in￿e Condition of Citizenship, ed.
Bart Van Steenbergen (London: SAGE, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿–￿￿; Jürgen Habermas, “Struggle For Recognition
In￿e Democratic Constitutional State,” inMulticulturalism: Examining￿e Politics Of Recognition,
ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Jürgen Habermas, “Faith
And Knowledge,” in￿e Future Of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Jürgen
Habermas, “Equal Treatment Of Cultures And￿e Limits Of Postmodern Liberalism,”￿e Journal of
Political Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿–￿￿; JürgenHabermas, “Religion In￿e Public Sphere,”European
Journal of Philosophy ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿–￿￿; JürgenHabermas, “Religious Tolerance As Pacemaker For
Cultural Rights,” inBetweenNaturalism andReligion (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, ￿￿￿￿),
￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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global heritage or as something that is important to a collective of people.￿e groups
should not have to justify themaintenance of their language through reference to the
added value bestowed upon the ethnic identity. ￿e identities that make up ethnic
collectives are important in their own right. ￿ere is no need for an argument that
defends membership to an ethnic culture as something that enables individuals to
live a good life, with language being a part of what makes an ethnic group a coher-
ent community. Likewise, the religion of minority groups should be funded on the
grounds of equality – provided that the state allocates resources for the sustenance
of the religion of the dominant societal group – without needing an overarching jus-
ti￿cation of what religion o￿ers to the group through an analysis of the contribution
of religion to the ethnic whole and the latter’s ability to provide a context-for-choice.
￿.￿.￿ Civic Nationalism as the Evolution of Ethnic Nationalism
Civic nationalism was one of the three models of national belonging outlined in the
beginning of this section as an example of how the traditional and problematic con-
cept of ethnicity can be replaced. ￿e traditional model was characterised as prob-
lematic because it gives a static and homogeneous account of community that sup-
presses diversity and dissent. It disregards the multiple identities of individuals and
falsely assumes that everyone in a group shares the identities that de￿ne a nation.
￿e two models that have been criticised were the extended-ethnicity model and
the formal-ethnicity model. ￿e former extends the list of identities that count to-
wards de￿ning an ethnic group, thus considering the ￿uidity and negotiation aspect
of identity formation, and the latter restricts and formalises the identities conducive
to an ethnic group in order to create a uni￿ed account of cultural belonging that
can be generalised by being reduced to very basic identities.￿e weaknesses of both
￿￿￿
models have been discussed and it has been demonstrated that, properly understood,
they both collapse into civic nationalism.
Civic nationalism is o￿en conceived as the alternative model to ethnic na-
tionalism.￿￿ A better way to understand it is as the evolution of ethnic nationalism
in light of the diversity of modern cultures. Whereas ethnic nationalism used the
ethnically-based nation-state to enforce the values of the group that monopolised
the state, civic nationalism denies the ethnic monopoly of the state and aspires to-
wards the creation of a state that does not promote a certain ethnic group, or a certain
collection of non-political values that the dominant ethnic group shares, upon the
rest.
Civic nationalism is preferable to ethnic nationalism, especially for the case of
Cyprus that has been discussed in this thesis, because itmoves beyond the ethnically-
based bicommunal constitutionalism and in favour of a multiculturally based con-
stitution, which respects all the cultures within its bounds and does not discriminate
in favour of the ethnic ones. In chapter ￿ the practical implications of the application
of this model in the negotiated constitution of the RoC will be discussed. In the re-
mainder of this chapter, the merits of civic over ethnic nationalism will be outlined,
in preparation for the action-guiding suggestions of chapter ￿.￿￿￿
In an ethnically oriented nation-state the constitution is tailored to the needs
of the dominant culture. It aspires to maintain the order between and promote the
values of the dominant ethnic group. Even if the constitution is written in a neutral
language, the institutions of the state that are founded upon it promote the values
of the dominant group. Civic nationalism, as an alternative to ethnic nationalism,
￿￿. ￿is distinction is defended in Hans Kohn, Nationalism, Its Meaning And History (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿. For a more detailed elaboration of the concept of civic patriotism, see Aleksandar Pavkovic and
Peter Radan, Creating New States:￿eory And Practice Of Secession (London: Ashgate, ￿￿￿￿).
￿￿￿
is a concept that can underpin a political order through its foundational document
– the constitution – that provides legitimacy to institutions under the overarching
goal of maintaining order and democratic stability through a common attachment
to institutions capable of maintaining the aforementioned – democracy and social
stability – values.
A constitution in a polity organised around civic nationalism is supposed to
be neutral. Absolute neutrality is unattainable, even if the best intentions are in place.
A constitution should be neutral to the extent that it does not explicitly favour one
culture over the other, and to the extent that it provides mechanisms for the accom-
modation of minority cultures. Civic nationalism does not rely on bundles of iden-
tities, like an ethnos; rather, it focuses on the constitution as a structure that allows
people of con￿icting world views to live a ful￿lling free life under the same political
authority – the state. Loyalty to the state is not loyalty to an ethnos, and the state
is not bestowed with the task to maintain a speci￿c ethnic conception of the good
life. ￿e so￿ formulation of this argument is that ethnicity is not conductive to the
living-together of people with competing comprehensive doctrines. ￿e hard for-
mulation, and the one that elicits the support of this thesis, is that liberal pluralism
cannot function if ethnicity lays at its core.
As interconnectedness becomes deeper, new localisms emerge that transcend
geography and culture. If one does not acknowledge this, then they are not in posi-
tion to truly understand the evolution of personal identities through the evolution of
technology, and they risk the danger of imposing ethnicity as an important bundle
of identities, even when it is not. If this mistake is made, then those interested in
liberal pluralism run the risk of causing the problem they are trying to solve, which
is how to enable people to pursue and maintain the identities that are conductive to
their living a good life.
￿￿￿
Civic nationalism is therefore the framework that ensures that these identities
can be pursued within the institutions of a liberal country.￿e patriotic loyalties lie
with the defence of institutions of the state that enable people to live free lives. ￿is
is counter to earlier times, where patriotism meant the defence of a certain way of
life attached to a certain ethnic group.
￿.￿.￿ Multinationalist Bias
One of the most important shortcomings of ethnic nationalism, illustrated through
the case of Cypriot Latins which has been repeatedly mentioned in the course of
this thesis, is that cultures that lack a motherland or an attachment to an imaginary
community are treated as inferior to non-ethnicminorities. Whereas this is true, one
should be wary of distinguishing between secular and multinationalist biases, as not
to confuse the duties of the state towards non-ethnicminorities and towards religious
groups. Civic nationalism, which is defended in this section and will be used to
provide action-guidance for Cyprus in chapter ￿. In arguing against the silencing of
non-ethnic minorities, is not advocating for the upgrade of religious groups. ￿e
two types of groups, along with their claims, are separate, and should be treated as
such.
Modood accused Kymlicka of having a secular and a multinationalist bias.
￿e argument was that he favoured ethnic national cultures at the expense of re-
ligious groups and new-immigrant cultures. Modood is misguided on his ￿rst ac-
cusation. He has misunderstood the level of analysis of Kymlicka. He argued that
religious leaders can also be civic leaders, under the proviso that they democratically
represent their members. Nevertheless, Kymlicka is not interested in what kind of
leaders – secular or religious – cultural groups should have, or even in what language
￿￿￿
– secular or religious – they ought to express their demands. Kymlicka adopts Rawls’
earlier framework, so it is unfair to direct the “secularist bias” at him. Maybe the rea-
sonModood considers him to have a secularist bias is because he does not recognise
religious groups as legitimate claimants of multicultural rights.
Modood’s challenge ￿ts better under the “multinationalist bias” criticism.￿￿￿
Kymlicka does favour ethnic-national cultures. ￿e most pressing problem with
Kymlicka’s multinationalist bias is that it excludes cultures that lack a motherland.
For instance, it excludes cultures that feature most of the characteristics of ethnic
cultures except a motherland.￿ese groups are o￿en wrongly identi￿ed as religious
groups and are excluded from the tripartite division of national minorities, immi-
grant groups and aboriginal peoples.
To have a culture with a common history, common attachment to land and a
common religion that acts as the glue that holds the group together, does not make
it a religious group.￿is is the reason Modood’s “secularist bias” critique is rejected.
It is one thing to talk, for instance, about “the Muslims in the UK” and another to
talk about cultures that have common history, geography and religion.￿e former’s
claims are distinctively religious whereas the latter’s are multicultural. ￿e distinc-
tion between non-ethnic national cultures and religious groups is highlighted in or-
der to avoid the confusion of equating the two.
￿e distinction between religious andmulticultural rights is by no means ro-
bust. In many cases the two are the same, or are interwoven. Sometimes political
claims are made in religious language, and religious claims are expressed in political
– secular – language. ￿e reason this distinction is made is because in the former
case of the Muslims in the UK (a group that has only religion as a point of reference
– there are Muslims from all sorts of places, backgrounds and traditions) both the
￿￿￿. Modood,Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, ￿￿.
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issues and their demands di￿er from those of a cultural group with national charac-
teristics.
A religious group whose sole uniting identity is religion will most likely make
religiously-related demands, like asking for exceptions from general laws (e.g. for
clothing, or from employment-related laws), for the recognition of the authority of
religious courts for civil disputes, the ability to have their own religious schools and
so on. On the other hand, a cultural group, even one that does not have a moth-
erland, will make claims that go beyond the narrow con￿nes of religion; it will ask
for historical recognition where there was past injustice, for language rights, for the
incorporation of their culture’s history into the educational curriculum and so on.
￿us the discussion to be had in either case is di￿erent. ￿e ￿rst is about
religion in the public sphere and the institutions of the secular state. ￿e other is
the material discussed in Kymlicka’s theory.￿￿￿ A problem exists when a culture is an
old-immigrant group, thus one that cannot be classi￿ed as a new-immigrant group,
which nonetheless does not have ethnic attachments or amotherland, not being able
to be classi￿ed as an ethno-national culture. In such cases, cultures are o￿en mis-
takenly identi￿ed – recognised – as religious groups, denying them of the political
rights a￿orded to national groups.
￿e case of the Latins inCyprus is paradigmatic.￿ey have been on the island
since the Roman Empire, and they have a common history and common religion.
In e￿ect they are in no way di￿erent than the Turkish Cypriots that are recognised
as a national minority. ￿eir only di￿erence is that the Turkish Cypriots have an
￿￿￿. As I said before, bymaking the distinction between religious and cultural rights, I don’t presume
that the two are not interwoven, for the di￿erentiation is not robust enough towarrant any absolutism
on my behalf. Religious claims might be part of the demands made by a cultural group, and can be
advanced on behalf of national minorities and immigrant groups. My interest is in those groups that
are not recognised as national minorities and are not new- immigrant groups. ￿e question that I
explore here is what happens to those cultures that should be recognised as national, yet they are not,
and they “downgraded” to religious groups.
￿￿￿
ethnic attachment to Turkey, like the Greek Cypriots have an ethnic attachment to
Greece and the Maronites to Lebanon. ￿erefore, Latins are (a) a minority group
that features all the traits of a national group short of a motherland; and (b) a culture
that whilst it de￿nes their collective identity based on their religion, it nonetheless
makes secular demands in secular language. Note that the Latins do notmake ethnic
claims and indeed wish to be relabelled as Catholics, a demand that is not accepted
by the government of the Republic of Cyprus.
In Kymlicka’s formulation, national cultures are ethno-national cultures and
as such the ethnic element is central to the recognition of national cultures and to
the distribution of cultural rights. ￿us, in focusing on ethnic identities, Kymlicka’s
theory does not provide the means to recognise the Latins as a cultural group.￿ey
are not an ethnic national minority, neither are they a new immigrant group, nor
aboriginal people. ￿e only way to classify the Latins is to misrecognise them as a
religious group and therefore silence their non-religious claims; like, for instance,
the right of their children to be taught the history of their culture and religion at
state schools, in the same way as the children of Greek-Cypriots are.
A further reason why it would be wrong to classify the Latins as a religious
group is that many of their members associate with Latin culture without being re-
ligious – lapsed catholics and atheists.
￿e case of the Latins illustrates the urgent need to detach the ethnos from
our conception of nationhood, especially when it comes to the state. Latins are the
most Cypriot of the cultures on the island because they are the only old-immigrant
group on the island that has Cyprus as their motherland – having a sense of civic
Cypriotism as part of their cultural identity – yet they cannot ￿t within Kymlicka’s
classi￿cation and cannot be recognised as a “national” culture, despite their historic
presence on the island and their cultural characteristics.
￿￿￿
If ethnicity acts as the basis for national belonging, we risk looking for attach-
ments that are not there anymore, or that they never have been there to begin with.
Ethnically-based cultural classi￿cations cannot account for individuals that diverge
from the collection of identities that are treated as essential for the existence of an
ethnos, or, like in the case of Latins, it cannot account for situations where groups
may be making cultural claims that are being denied to them because they are miss-
ing a motherland.
￿us, ethnicity, which is central to Kymlicka’s philosophy, is his Achilles’ heel.
Ethnicity is a concept for a di￿erent era. It is all-encompassing in such a way that
cannot be foundational in a theory that tries to ￿ndways of enabling people with dif-
ferent values and life-plans to live together. In the era of globalisation, the identities
that collectively form “ethnicity” are not as powerful as they used to be. In Cyprus,
for example, there is evidence to support that language is less of a barrier than it was
￿￿y years ago, since now the literacy levels in English are higher. Fi￿y years ago one
needed to know Greek or Turkish to function on the island. Now, as evident by the
many British expats, one can live life on the islandwith speaking only English.￿is is
central in the reconciliation process since Greek and Turkish Cypriots can commu-
nicate easily, thus eliminating one of the barriers that di￿erentiated them and kept
them apart. ￿e same logic can be applied to religion: although religion is part of
what makes an ethnic group, people are less likely to be religious today compared
to ￿￿y years ago. When talking about ethnicity holistically one cannot account for
these variations and it makes it hard to understand the interaction amongst cultures
and hard to quantify the progress or locate the main points of contestation.
￿e alternative is to identify the individual as a bearer of multiple identities
that transcend those of the ethnic bundle. Individuals form non-ethnic associations
that might be worth preserving by the state. To realise that cultures di￿er from each
￿￿￿
other and that their value does not depend onwhether they exhibit the traits required
by the ethnicity-bundle. For these reasons, the state must be based around civic, not
ethnic, identities. Not around blood and lineage but rather on values, which are
upheld in the constitution that provides the context for the institutions of the state.
Michael Ignatie￿ gives the example of Britain as a country where nationhood
is de￿ned across civic, not ethnic, terms; around the parliament and the rule of law.
As he explains “civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of
all those – regardless of color, creed, gender, language, ethnicity – who subscribe to
the nation’s political creed.”￿us civic nationalism is “a community of equal, rights-
bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices
and values”. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is centred on the idea that “an
individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen,” with the national com-
munity being the one that de￿nes the individual and not the other way around.￿￿￿
Rights under themodel of civic nationalism are granted based on the guiding
(liberal) principles upheld in the constitution. Underlying this view is that no eth-
nic culture is inherently important – rights to cultural groups are a￿orded to them
because of principles endorsed – and not because of an inherent value of the ethnic
bundle.
In refusing to recognise ethnicity as an identity relevant to the state, the need
for maintaining ￿xed and essentialist notions of culture fades. Individuals will no
longer be oppressed in the name of their culture, or at least they will be to a lesser
extent. A further bene￿t of this model is that it encourages the ￿ourishing of more
organic associations. It extends beyond culture; it treats culture as an identity not
distinct from others, allowing for other personal identities to potentially become
￿￿￿. Michael Ignatie￿, Blood And Belonging: Journeys Into￿e New Nationalism (New York: Straus /
Giroux, ￿￿￿￿), ￿-￿.
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sources of di￿erential treatment.￿is enables the re￿ection back to the beginning of
this chapter, where the view that culture is special for providing a context-of-choice
was refuted.
￿￿￿
Chapter ￿
From Bicommunalism to
Multicultural Constitutionalism
￿is chapter builds upon the model of civic nationalism presented in chapter ￿. It
adopts the modi￿cations to Kymlicka’s MC defended throughout the thesis and con-
siders how the new theory can be applied to Cyprus. To this end, the purpose of the
chapter is to explain how bicommunal constitutionalism can be replaced withmulti-
cultural citizenship, providing a discussion on how to overcome themost immediate
obstacles. It provides insights into how to disassociate ethnicity from nationality in
the context of Cyprus; how to ease the concerns of those opposing a federal solution
or a solution which a￿ords territorial rights to minority cultures; and ￿nally, how
to modify and enhance the e￿ectiveness of the involvement of Intergovernmental
Organisations in the process of reaching a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus
problem based on a constitution grounded on the values of liberal multiculturalism.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ Civic and Ethnocultural Conceptions of GCs
In §￿.￿ various de￿nitions of culture were presented, where theorists urged caution
against homogenising conceptions of cultural belonging. In the case of Cyprus one
must distinguish between the dual-meaning and usage of dominant cultural iden-
tities. ￿e identity and label of the Greek Cypriot can have two completely di￿er-
ent meanings: there is a constitutional (civic) de￿nition and a cultural de￿nition.
￿e civic de￿nition is that which is found in the ￿￿￿￿ constitution of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus, where a GC is a member of the Greek national group. Nevertheless,
the civic de￿nition of being a Greek Cypriot includes Armenians, Latins and Ma-
ronites, who “chose” to join the GC ethnic group back in ￿￿￿￿, only months before
the introduction of the new constitution, as well as recently naturalised third coun-
try nationals. As such, to be a GC in the civic sense does not mean being a member
of a historical association based on a common sense of belonging to a community
of fate, religion, lineage, language and customs. Rather, it means being a member
of a civic group dominated by a speci￿c cultural group. By being a member of this
constitutionally-recognised collective, the groups whose culture is di￿erent from the
civic de￿nition, are subject to assimilation because their own culture is not recog-
nised. ￿e civic de￿nition therefore is: the constitutional recognition of a collective
that identi￿es based on the values of the dominant group of a country, but whose
membership spans beyond the cultural natives of that dominant group; people from
di￿erent (minority) cultures are assimilated to it – they are identi￿ed as members of
the dominant culture and in doing so are denied their native cultural identity.
￿e civic conception of culture is able to accommodate more members than
the alternative, ethnic “cultural” conception, which forms the core of the civic iden-
tity, since the former provides the values upon which the latter is based. ￿e cul-
￿￿￿
tural conception relies upon ethnicity as its determinant of identity and as such,
it is less welcoming and more exclusionary than the civic conception, since it can
only accommodate people who are born into the culture.￿e cultural de￿nition in-
cludes the members of one imaginary community – in the case of the Greek Cypri-
ots it includes those members who are being identi￿ed as part of the Greek ethnos.￿
￿e agency of the individual members has little relevance. One cannot cease be-
ing a Greek Cypriot; membership to an ethnic culture is a blood bond rather than a
product of voluntary decision-making. Individuals need not espouse the bundle of
identities that make up the ethnic whole in order for them to be considered rightful
members of that culture – blood is enough. For instance, one can be a Greek Cypriot
whilst being anAtheist, thus diverging from the ethnic de￿nition of Greeks as Chris-
tian Orthodox; or one can be a GCwithout speaking the Cypriot dialect of the Greek
language, like the children of expats, which are nonetheless considered members of
the GC culture.
As it was pointed out in §￿.￿ during the application of the Reciprocal Model
to the various conceptions of culture found in the literature, essentialised and ho-
mogenising conceptions of culture must be avoided. In the case of Cyprus it is of
utmost importance to understand that the identity of the “Greek Cypriot” can have
a dual meaning, describing two di￿erent groups of people. ￿e civic de￿nition in-
cludes the members of the Greek ethnic group but goes beyond it to include the
post-￿￿￿￿ new recruits – Maronites, Latins, Armenians – whilst at the same time
promoting the values, customs and history of the ethnic group. It would therefore
be a mistake to assume that there is a uniform culture of Greeks Cypriots, conceived
as a solidi￿ed and homogenous group whose values must be guaranteed by the state.
￿. It is important to distinguish between self-identi￿cation and being identi￿ed by others as be-
longing to an ethnic group.
￿￿￿
Only when the dual meaning of being a Greek Cypriot is grasped, will one be able
to proceed and question whether it is desirable, or even politically legitimate, to ap-
ply and reinforce the dominance of the ethnic identity upon the members of the
civic group.￿us, in the ￿rst instance, when one re￿ects on the case of Cyprus, one
must distinguish between ethnic and civic conceptions of national cultures, which
are then to be distinguished from the individual cultural allegiances, or lack thereof,
of their members. In Cyprus, the dominant narrative on both sides of the divide is
to refute the fact that the cultural distinctions established and institutionalised with
the ￿￿￿￿ constitution resulted in the assimilation of people whose ethnic identities
diverge from the two constitutionally-recognised ones, or of people who do not per-
ceive themselves asmembers of either cultural group.￿is dominant perspective has
survived throughout the second half of the ￿￿th century, and has found its way into
all the solution plans (constitutions) negotiated since then. All the constitutional so-
lutions to the Cyprus problem treat the two cultures as exceptional by granting them
more rights than the rest, allowing for the gradual extinction through assimilation
of those cultures that are civically-classi￿ed as members of the GC, but are nonethe-
less cultural members of other associations, and therefore not members of the Greek
ethnic group.
￿.￿ Bi in Bizonal, Bicommunal, Federation
Once the dual conception ofGreekCypriot culture is deciphered, then onemust pro-
ceed to understand the process of misrecognition that took place, which has been
elaborated upon in chapters ￿ and ￿. Non-dominant minorities have experienced
their ethnic, religious and linguistic identities being denied to them in the name of
their membership to the Greek Cypriot culture. ￿is is what has been described
￿￿￿
as the process of misrecognition (§￿.￿), where the initial classi￿cation of a cultural
group conditions the demands that the group is entitled to make. Such acts of mis-
recognition have been legitimised with the ￿￿￿￿ bicommunally-organised constitu-
tion, and perpetuated in all the subsequent solution plans. ￿us, the constitutional
model negotiated since then, called the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF), is
open to challenge on the grounds that it supresses cultural diversity through mis-
recognition and cultural assimilation.
Bizonality is one of the more controversial aspects of the negotiated consti-
tutional model, because it grants each culture speci￿c rights over land. ￿e geo-
graphical area of Cyprus, both north and south, will be divided into two parts of
di￿erent sizes, where each ethnic group will preside over.￿e opponents of bizonal-
ity, like the Social Democratic EDEK, claim that the concept of bizonality is original
to Cyprus, since it has no precedence of application in any other country.￿ Nev-
ertheless, bizonality is another form of territorial rights, similar to those found in
Australia, where certain indigenous populations retain rights over speci￿c pieces of
land. More speci￿cally, in Australia ￿￿￿,￿￿￿ square kilometres of Aboriginal freehold
land are regulated by Land Councils under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act of ￿￿￿￿.￿
￿e arguments against bizonality are o￿endefended on anti-prejudice grounds:
that it is prejudiced to restrict the right of movement of people, but they rest on false
premises because they misunderstand the nature of the territorial rights in question:
freedom of movement is not curtailed, people will still be able to move and live in
the zones controlled by the other ethnic group, the only di￿erence is that local gov-
ernance will be up to the other dominant national group.
￿. Nicos Trimikliniotis, “ProAnnanV: Rethinking theUn-Viability of theConstitutional Arrange-
ment,” in Reunifying Cyprus: ￿e Annan Plan and Beyond, ed. Andrekos Varnava Faustmann and
Hubert (London: Tauris, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿. Central Land Council,￿e Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, http://www.clc.
org.au/articles/cat/land-rights-act/, ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿￿
￿e rejection of bizonality is o￿en intertwined with a rejection of federalism
altogether. To reject a federal solution to the Cyprus problem is not o￿en part of
the public discourse in Cyprus. It is something only featured among the supporters
of the far-right. Supporters of the mainstream political parties, who are critical of a
federal solution, o￿en displace their discontent of federalism through the rejection of
bizonality, although in essence they reject the latter.￿e most popular criticism that
they level against it, again in the name of anti-prejudice, is that it is discriminatory
to violate the premise of “one (hu)man one vote.”￿ Nevertheless, balanced voting
is a de￿ning feature of many federal constitutions, used to protect the interests of
minority cultures.￿emost popular example of this can be seen in theUnited States,
where the weight of individual votes depends on the size of that state.
Irrespective of the popular discourse around the type of the negotiated consti-
tution, certain aspects of BBF cannot be dispersed.￿ ￿e TCs would hardly concede
to a solution that lacked the following three attributes: self-governmental rights in
a federal state, territorial rights in that state, and Turkey as a guarantor of the secu-
rity of that state.￿ It is important to understand that the TCs, in almost an identical
￿. Neophytos Loizides, “￿e Cyprus Negotiations And “￿e One Person-One Vote Principle”: Ex-
amples Of Divergence FromDemocratic Federations,”Memo Prepared For Policymakers And Journal-
ists Interested In Comparative Examples Of Elections And Federalism, ￿￿￿￿, GavinMoore, “Federalism
And ￿e “One-Person One-Vote Principle": Political Accommodation In Cyprus And ￿e Annan
Plan,” Federal Governance ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿.
￿. ￿e public opinion towards Bizonal Bicommunal Federation is ambivalent. ￿e report issued
based on the Cyprus ￿￿￿￿ opinion polls write: “As for the agreed basis of negotiations between the
two leaders – namely that the settlement should constitute ‘a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation with
Political Equality, as agreed in UN Security Council Resolutions, with two constituent states of equal
status and a single international personality, sovereignty and citizenship’ – both communities are
expressing ambivalence without rejecting it outright.￿e skeptic contingent is somewhat stronger in
the Greek Cypriot community, while in both communities ‘moderate support’ of the framework is
a more frequent condition that ’strong support.”’ See Interpeace and Cyprus ￿￿￿￿ Initiative, Solving
the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears, http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/research/cyprus-peace-process/
reports/item/￿￿-solving-the-cyprus-problem-hopes-and-fears, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿.
￿. According to the ￿￿￿￿ opinion polls conducted byCyprus ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿%of Turkish Cypriots require
Turkey as one of the guarantor powers [..] “￿e European Union or the United Nations Security
Council as guarantors would be tolerable to both communities, although this does not resolve the in-
congruence over Turkey’s role as guarantor.” See Cyprus ￿￿￿￿, Research and Dialogue for a Sustainable
￿￿￿
way as the GCs, have experienced the construction of their national identity in op-
position to “the other” – through nation building and competing historiographies.
At the same, the non-dominant minority cultures were assimilated through mis-
recognition and forced membership to one of the two constitutionally exceptional
cultural groups.￿e challenge that a theory of MC needs to tackle is how to ￿nd the
balance between the security-related concerns of the main groups (GCs and TCs),
whilst compensating the non-dominantminorities for the costs imposed upon them
through their constitutional misrecognition.
To resolve these challenges the role of the intergovernmental institutions in-
volved in the process of ￿nding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem
need to be reconsidered, as well as the currently-negotiated constitutional model,
the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation.
Starting with the latter, the reasons why a federal solution is the only type of
constitution likely to be accepted by all the national groups of the island, requires
little discussion – it is the only model likely to be accepted by both sides.
“Greek Cypriots favor a unitary state over other alternatives. Federation
is a distant second, but still acceptable to a majority of the population.
A continuation of the status quo is seen as unacceptable by the majority
of population. [...] Turkish Cypriots favor two states, but are prepared
to accept federation as a compromise. Continuation of the status quo is
also a tolerable option to Turkish Cypriots.”￿
￿e opposite model, that of a unitary state, cannot ease the security-concerns of the
TCs and given the post-violent climate, it stands to reason that a federal solution
Future, http://www.interpeace.org/￿￿￿￿-￿￿-￿￿-￿￿-￿￿-￿￿/latest-news/￿￿￿￿/￿￿￿-dialogue-urgently-
needed-for-cyprus-future, ￿￿ December ￿￿￿￿.
￿. Interpeace and Cyprus ￿￿￿￿ Initiative, Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears, ￿￿.
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with territorial rights to the two dominant groups whose identities are competing, is
the only constitutional model likely to be accepted, and most importantly, the only
likely to be functional and able to provide a structure that promotes the peaceful co-
existence of the two peoples. What must be reconsidered is not the federal basis of
the negotiated constitution, but rather its binary character. ￿is view is one that is
almost never articulated in the discourse of the Cyprus problem, even though it is
clearly the source of much con￿ict. ￿e emphasis is usually placed on whether the
future state should be federal or not, and whether the minority TC culture should
have territorial rights in the formof political control over a zone. Instead, the empha-
sis should shi￿ towards the binary application of those two constitutional provisions,
which exclude the rest of the national cultures of the island.￿
In revising the “Bi” in “Bizonal, Bicommunal, Federation,” onemust consider
what rights must be extended to themembers of the non-dominantminorities of the
island, in order to compensate them for their historically unjust treatment.￿is view
has the implication that Armenians, Latins, Maronites and Roma as citizens of the
Republic of Cyprus, can rightfully advance claims for self-governmental and territo-
rial rights, in the sameway as the TCs do. An argument against this implication is the
impracticability objection: that it would be politically messy in terms of governmen-
tality, and invariably costly in terms of application, to provide self-governmental and
territorial rights to all the national minorities on the island.￿ Although the view that
it would be impossible to extend (some of) the rights that the TCs will be a￿orded
￿. According to Cyprus ￿￿￿￿, Research and Dialogue for a Sustainable Future “Not all the princi-
ples agreed on by the two leaders as the basis for negotiations have been accepted by the grass-roots
of each community. Greek Cypriots still remain ambivalent about the agreed principles of bizon-
ality and the notion that there will be two constituent states of equal status. Turkish Cypriots still
remain ambivalent about the agreed principles of a single international personality, sovereignty and
citizenship.”
￿. Note that besides the Turkish Cypriots no other ethnic community claims territorial rights in
Cyprus.
￿￿￿
in future constitutions to non-dominant minorities has merit, there is no evidence
to support it because it has never been seriously considered. In any case, the devo-
lution of powers to, for example, the local councils of Maronites is not something
that would be either terribly costly or grossly impractical. It is not the academic who
must decide what rights must be granted to minorities. It is the minorities them-
selves that are burdened with the task of articulating their demands. ￿us, until a
process is established where minorities, under full knowledge of their options, can
securely articulate their demands, one cannot know what those might be.
A central argument defended throughout this thesis was that a process of
internationally-facilitated recognition of minority cultures can be particularly con-
ducive to the process of the communication of the demands of minority cultures,
and that it is necessary for the creation of a new negotiating framework for the con-
stitution of Cyprus. In order to compensate for the historical injustice ofmisrecogni-
tion, the exclusion and assimilation thatminority cultures have experienced through
the binary nature of the constitution need to be mitigated. A new constitution, one
that is based on multicultural rather than bicommunal constitutionalism must be
established; one that includes all cultures in the debate, and guarantees their equal
standing within it. To this day, the members of non-dominant minority cultures are
considered part of the GC civic group, and thus denied part of their cultural iden-
tity. In order to overcome this political and cultural deadlock, an external authority
is needed to facilitate the process of their recognition – one that must underpin any
future deliberation between members of majority and minority cultures.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ Intergovernmental Organisations and the Cyprus
Problem
￿e round of negotiations that started in ￿￿￿￿, like the ones before it, is facilitated by
the United Nations, who provide their “good o￿ces” through the o￿ce of their rep-
resentative in Cyprus.￿￿ ￿eUNhave an advisory role, whichmeans that they cannot
force or enforce any decision; it is up to the constitutive sides to reach an agreement.
Nevertheless, the UN are those with the expert knowledge, responsible for dra￿ing
and facilitating the negotiation for the new constitution – they therefore bear part of
the responsibility for the constitutional marginalisation of non-dominant minority
groups.
￿e European Union is also involved in the negotiations, albeit through a
less hands-on approach in comparison to the UN; one that nonetheless spans mul-
tiple domains. ￿e European Commission releases the Annual Enlargement Pack-
age, which includes strategy and progress reports for each country. A lot of political
weight is put in those reports, since they decide whether additional requirements
will be imposed on the accession criteria of states that aspire to join the Union.
As such, the EU has the ability – and does exercise it – to put pressure on Turkey
through its Annual Progress Report. Similarly, the European Commission can exer-
cise pressure on the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community.￿e EC wants to
facilitate the solution to the Cyprus problem through a comprehensive settlement
that will be based on Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. ￿erefore it has set up a
Directorate-general for Enlargement which has, in turn, set up a “task force for the
Turkish Cypriot Community,” that runs a Programme Support O￿ce (EUPSO) in
￿￿. Ko￿ Annan, ￿e Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, Secretary General of the
UnitedNations, ￿￿March ￿￿￿￿; UnitedNations, Security Council Resolution ￿￿￿, ￿March ￿￿￿￿; United
Nations, Security Council Resolution ￿￿￿, ￿￿March ￿￿￿￿.
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north Cyprus.￿￿ ￿e Aid provided by the EU through EUPSO aims to facilitate the
“social and economic development of northern Cyprus,” to “develop and refurbish
its infrastructure,” to support civil society in creating initiatives for reconciliation
and to prepare the post-solution implementation of EU law. ￿e Aid programme
was established in ￿￿￿￿ a￿er regulation ￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿, and it had an initial life-span of
￿ve years, but it was extended from ￿￿￿￿ onwards with an additional ￿￿￿ million
annually, in support of “the on-going UN process.” ￿us the TC leadership has a
very good monetary incentive to abide by the Commission’s guidance, and Turkey –
through the Progress Report and because of the fact that in absence of the EUPSO
Aid given to the TC, the gap in TRNC’s balance of payments would have to be ￿lled
by the Turkish state, which ￿nances the regime in the north￿￿ – is also incentivised
towards ￿nding a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem.
￿at being said, the European Court of Auditors examined the “EU Assis-
tance to the Turkish Cypriot Community” to assess whether the Commission met
its objectives. It audited one third of budget allocations between ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿.￿
million) and issued an unfavourable report, which read:
￿e programme has assisted a great number of di￿erent bene￿ciaries
across the TCc and some important results have already been achieved.
However, the construction of a seawater desalination plant, which is the
programme’s largest project (￿￿￿.￿million), ended in failure. More gen-
erally, the sustainability of projects is o￿en in doubt.￿￿
￿e Republic of Cyprus, on the other hand, is already bound to the EU as all
￿￿. European Commission, Aid Programme For￿e Turkish Cypriot Community, http://ec.europa.
eu/enlargement/tenders/aid-programme-tcc/index_en.htm, ￿ December ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. Turkey has already imposed austeritymeasures upon TRNC. SeeUmut Bozkurt, “Turkey: From
the ‘Motherland’ to the ‘IMF of Northern Cyprus?’,” Cyprus Review ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿–￿￿￿.
￿￿. European Commission, Special report: EU Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot Community
(ECA/￿￿/￿￿), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ECA-￿￿-￿￿_en.htm, ￿￿May ￿￿￿￿.
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member-states are, and as such it is also incentivised for cooperation on ￿nding a
solution to the problem. Since March ￿￿th, ￿￿￿￿, the RoC has an additional moti-
vation to seek a solution. A solution to the Cyprus problem would be bene￿cial to
the economy, and given that the RoC is under a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Troika (European Central Bank, European Commission and International
Monetary Fund)￿￿ it is in dire need of political initiatives that will have ￿nancially
bene￿cial outcomes for the country’s economy.
Nevertheless, the public attitutes towards the EU and theUNare low amongst
both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. According to the latest Eurobarometer data,
￿￿% of the Greek Cypriots believe that their voice does not count in the EU. ￿￿% of
GCs believe that their voice does not count in Cyprus either. ￿￿% of Greek Cypriots
are against the Euro and only ￿￿% believe that they are citizens of the EU.￿e Euro-
barometer results for the TC communirty show that ￿￿% of TCs answered that they
trust the EU and ￿￿% have a “total positive” image of it. Trust towards the UN was
slightly lower at ￿￿%.￿￿
￿e authority of the EU and the UN is deliberately interwoven. ￿e objec-
tives of the UN and the EU in relation to the Cyprus problem are the same, and they
are supported both materially and practically – the Aid and Grants of the EU, the
good services of the UN in Cyprus, and the EU’s role as a guarantor for the suc-
cess of the new constitution. Furthermore, the UN Security Council’s Resolutions
and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights pertaining to Cyprus are
used as political assets by both sides – thus the resolutions, ruling and reports is-
sued by the two intergovernmental institutions can easily shi￿ the balance of power
￿￿. International Monetary Fund, Cyprus: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding,
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/￿￿￿￿/CYP/￿￿￿￿￿￿.pdf, ￿ December ￿￿￿￿.
￿￿. European Commission, Eurobarometer ￿￿: Public Opinion in the European Union, http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb￿￿/eb￿￿_en.htm, Autumn ￿￿￿￿.
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between the two communities. A recent example that followed the rejection of the
￿￿￿￿ constitution dra￿ed by the o￿ce of the Secretary-General of the UN Ko￿ An-
nan (called, unimaginatively, “the Annan Plan”)￿￿ by the Greek Cypriots, has been
the creation of the Immovable Property Commission, where the ECtHR ruled that
a new court would be set up in north Cyprus to resolve property disputes related to
GC properties in northern Cyprus.￿￿ ￿e creation of IPC has shi￿ed the balance of
power between the two sides considerably, because it was the ￿rst EU-sanctioned
institution established in the internationally unrecognised TRNC. Whereas the GC
political elites maintain that taking a case to the IPC means recognising TRNC, the
ECtHR clari￿ed that the IPC does not constitute a recognition of the state in the
north, for it is placed under the authority of Turkey and not TRNC.
￿e opinion polls paint a bleak picture of the UN and EU.￿ere is consensus
of distrust towards the EU and the UN by both GCs and TCs, which is featured
consistently across di￿erent surveys. Nevertheless, the negative consensus can be
justi￿ed – the Annan Plan was rejected, all attempts for reuni￿cation since then have
failed, and both states have been subject to severe austerity measures. In December
￿￿￿￿ the only positive aspects in relation to the EU and the UN are that there is an
institutional presence of the European Union in the north, and that the president of
the RoC, as well as the majority of the political elite in the south, are pro-European
and pro-Western, thus leaving open the prospect of future enhancement to the role
and mandate of the UN and the EU.
￿e success of the model presented in chapters ￿ and ￿ relies upon a positive
consensus on the involvement of IOs in the process of reaching a comprehensive so-
lution of the Cyprus problem. Regardless of the current negative attitudes towards
￿￿. Annan,￿e Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem.
￿￿. European Court of Human Rights, Judgement: Case Of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Application
No. ￿￿￿￿￿/￿￿), ￿ December ￿￿￿￿.
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the UN and EU, neither side’s sovereignty will be jeopardised or eroded if the EU or
UN promote a multiculturally- rather then bicommunally-driven constitution for
Cyprus, and therefore it would be easier for their respective elites and civil society
activists to promote the reformed role of the two IOs. It is less a matter of transfer-
ence of power from the domestic to the international, and more an issue of revision
of the existing involvement of these intergovernmental institutions to the Cyprus
problem; to revise their involvement in order to make sure that it is in accordance
and compatible with the LisbonTreaty and theCharter of theUN,which both explic-
itly uphold the respect of diversity. It would require that the EU or the UN provide
arbitration for the deliberation over the rights of minority cultures, making sure that
cultures are not denied rights because their cultural identities are ignored ormisrep-
resented. As such, the involvement of these institutions would be constrained to the
classi￿cation of these institutions rather than to their day-to-day claims.
￿.￿ FromBicommunal Constitutionalism toMulticul-
tural Citizenship
Another issue defended in chapter ￿, was the abolition of ethnicity as a determi-
nant for the distribution of rights under a liberal and democratic institution. ￿e
issue of abolishing ethnicity for the purposes of civic identities is related to both the
￿rst challenge to the exclusionary nature of bicommunal constitutionalism, and the
second challenge about the need for the realignment and revision of the current in-
volvement of intergovernmental institutions in the process of negotiations for the
new constitution of Cyprus.
In addressing the proposition that ethnicity becomes irrelevant to the classi￿-
￿￿￿
cation anddistribution of group-rights to cultural associations, one needs to envision
and conceptually grasp how a constitution based on multicultural citizenship can
replace the currently-negotiated one, which is wrongly based on ethnically-driven
bicommunal exceptionalism.
In §￿.￿, three di￿erent ways were discussed to accommodate ethnic iden-
tities within a liberal state. ￿e two which were subsequently rejected, respectively
discussed the expansion of the constitutive identities that make up the ethnic bundle
of identities (§￿.￿.￿), or the restriction and formalisation of those identities (§￿.￿.￿).
Instead, it was suggested that ethnic identities become irrelevant for the eyes of the
liberal state (§￿.￿.￿). ￿is argument can be challenged on the grounds that it leads
to the misrecognition of ethnic cultures who will be denied their ethnic identities.
To address this concern, it is necessary to elaborate on how a state would look
if the ethnic identities of the cultures within it were not treated as relevant. How
would a new constitution in Cyprus work, if civic classi￿cation were not based on
the binary division of Greek and Turkish ethnic members? Firstly, the most impor-
tant di￿erentiation between the existing bicommunal constitution and the proposed
multicultural constitutional system for Cyprus, is that the former’s objective is the
peaceful coexistence of the two cultures under a constitution that ensures the sur-
vival of the ethnic identities of both communities, whereas the latter aims at main-
taining the values of political liberalism, which were not available in the late ￿￿￿￿s
when the original constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was dra￿ed. ￿e di￿er-
ence between an ethnically-grounded and a value-grounded constitution is that the
former is static – it recognises speci￿c cultures and allocates speci￿c rights to them
– whereas the latter is dynamic – it is able to accommodate the social, cultural and
technological evolution of the context that the constitution regulates.
By disassociating the umbrella identity of ethnicity from the constitution, the
￿￿￿
biggest challenge becomes how to distinguish cultures from each other. Looking
back to §￿.￿.￿, on the section on conceptualising culture, the work of Anne Phillips
becomes relevant. ￿e combination of her two booksWhich Equalities Matter? and
Multiculturalism without Culture can guide the disassociation of ethnicity and con-
stitutional essentials.￿￿ To achieve this objective, cultural identities must be treated
in the same ways as gender, sexual, class and other identities are treated. As such, the
constitutive identities of an ethnic whole must be divided into their individual parts.
For instance, history, religion, language, land ownership, should all be detached from
each other and treated di￿erently. Most importantly, none of these identities should
be treated as superior to the other identities that people bear, to avoid the ethno-
nationalist bias that Kymlicka has been accused of having embedded in his theory.
In this formulation then, the individual is a bearer of various identities, which should
be a￿orded equal consideration by the state.
￿e challenge of switching to a multiculturally rather than a bicommunally
oriented constitution, one that is grounded on the values of liberal pluralism rather
than on the objective of facilitating the ethnic survival and constitutional exception-
alism of the two dominant cultures, is that it requires the coordination of all consti-
tutive parts – the two dominant majority and minority cultures, the non-dominant
minority cultures, the two motherlands, and most importantly, the UN and the EU
which are the intergovernmental institutions that indirectly steer the negotiation
process between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. ￿eir role is of utmost impor-
tance because they are the guarantors of security on the island. It is therefore up to
them to promote the constitutional alternative defended in this thesis on the merits
of its potential to overcome the deadlock of the post-Annan Plan period, and in par-
￿￿. Anne Phillips,Which Equalities Matter? (Cambridge: Polity Press, ￿￿￿￿); Anne Phillips,Multi-
culturalism Without Culture (Oxford: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿).
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ticular, to help resume the round of negotiations that begun in February ￿￿￿￿ a￿er
the joint statement agreed between Mr Anastasiades and Dr Eroğlu.￿e aforemen-
tioned round of negotiations is currently suspended a￿er Mr Anastasides pulled out
of the talks on October ￿th, ￿￿￿￿, on the grounds that Turkey is violating Cyprus’
Exclusive Economic Zone.￿￿ Even before the violations of Turkey, the two leaders
disagreed on the foundational characteristics of the constitutional model (BBF) ne-
gotiated.￿is stalemate is based on the same issues that are unresolved since the late
￿￿￿￿s when BBF was ￿rst introduced.
￿e role of the local representatives ofCivil SocietyOrganisations (CSOs) and
of the political elites is imperative in this process because it is up to them to lobby and
steer the public opinion towards reversing the negative societal attitutes in favour of
the EU and the UN. In absence of a domestic momentum, the EU and the UN will
not be able to assume the enhanced role advocated in this thesis and necessary for the
application of the civic nationalmodel ofmulticultural citizenship.￿e opinion polls
on CSO representatives are encouraging.￿e latest research on CSO representatives
was conducted by IlkeDağli, who collected data based on surveys duringAugust ￿￿th
andOctober ￿th, ￿￿￿￿. Dağli’s results show that bothGCandTC representatives hold
views favourable towards the EU and the UN, and that they have less pronounced
notions of ethnic awareness compared to the rest of the population. ￿e aspiration
is that they will manage to reverse the negative sentiments in the society, which are
a product of the post-￿￿￿￿ stalemate in the negotiations and the austerity measures
of Troika and Turkey, thus creating a local momentum for the enhanced role of IOs
in the process of the negotiations.
￿e role of political elites is also crucial in this process. ￿e di￿erences be-
￿￿. Jean Christou,Anastasiades pulls out of talks, http://cyprus-mail.com/￿￿￿￿/￿￿/￿￿/cyprus-talks-
suspended/, ￿ October ￿￿￿￿.
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tween GC and TC elites are worth noting, because contrary to CSO representatives,
Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot political elites hold di￿erent views on the EU and the
UN. Whereas the majority of the GC political elite – and most importantly, the rul-
ing party – is favourably inclined towards the involvement of the EU and the UN in
the process of the negotiations,￿￿ this is not the case in the north as the leader Dervis
Eroğlu has, following Turkey’s Erdoğan, repeatedly accussed the EU institutions of
bias in favour of the GCs. On the other hand, the civil society in the north is very
active, especially compared to its GC equivalent, and has more potential to reverse
the public sentiments, possibly enough to outweigh the elite-driven distrust towards
the EU and the UN.￿￿
￿e alternative model presented in this thesis has the potential to overcome
the deadlock and reignite the negotiation process, thus avoiding the eventual parti-
￿￿. ￿e ruling party, DISY, is pro-European and both the president of the RoC and the president
of the party have repeatedly expressed their eagerness for the additional involvement of the EU in
the negotiations for the solution to the Cyprus problem. ￿e second larger party, AKEL, although a
self-proclaimed communist party, does not follow themainstream euroscepticism of the parties in its
European parliamentary group. Even though AKEL supports a Cypriocentric solution – a solution
between the two sides, without interferrence from the IOs and the motherlands – it nevertheless
witnessed the collapse of the talks between Talat and Christo￿as.￿erefore, given the pro-uni￿cation
outlook of the party, it would not be unreasonable for them to support the enhanced role of the EU
and the UN if that would likely result in a solution. In the majority of cases regarding the Cyprus
problem, AKEL is in agreement with the ruling DISY, despite the two being ideological opponents.
Besides DISY and AKEL, the smaller parties, like the Social Democratic EDEK, the centrist DIKO,
and theAlliance ofCitizens, holdmore hardcore views on theCyprus problemand are likely to oppose
the enhancement of the role of the UN and the EU.￿ere are two possible ways to deal with them.
￿e ￿rst is to acknowledge that they are expressing the opinions of the minority and that they will
be politically outweighed by AKEL and DISY. ￿e second is to try and ease their security worries.
￿eir attitudes towards the involvement of the EU and the UN are rather complicated. On the one
hand, they are sceptical towards international e￿orts for the solution to the Cyprus problem – IOs
should only facilitate the process, and any international meeting should have an agenda limited to the
international aspect of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, their political rhetoric is based on
the Security Council Resolutions, the unfavourable Annual Reports of the Commission on Turkey,
and the favourable rulings of the ECtHR, all used to justify their hard line on the Cyprus problem.
￿erefore, it would not be impossible for them to accept – or at least not adamantly oppose – the
enhanced role of the aforementioned IOs, provided that some guarantees are given and that their
security worries are addressed.
￿￿. George Kyris, “Europeanization beyond Contested Statehood: ￿e European Union and
Turkish-Cypriot Civil Society,” Journal of Common Market Studies ￿￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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tion of Cyprus, reinforced every day under the current status quo.
￿￿￿
Chapter ￿
Conclusion
￿is thesis contributes to three primary domains of research – the theorisation of
multicultural citizenship, themethodology of political theory, and the case ofCyprus.
It also makes secondary contributions to International Relations and Security Stud-
ies, through the development of a multicultural model that can be exported to post-
violent con￿ict cases beyond Cyprus.
Exportingmulticultural citizenship is challenging because the dominant the-
ories are developed as a response to speci￿c problems found in the multicultural
countries of the West. ￿ey respond to the challenges found in the UK, USA, Aus-
tralia, Canada, France and Germany, and as such, assume stable democratic struc-
tures that are o￿en lacking in the export-cases.
￿is thesis is predominantly interested in post-violent con￿ict cases, which
di￿er signi￿cantly from the archetypal examples addressed by the dominant theories
of MC. Cyprus was used as a case-study to problematise the uncritical application of
MC. It demonstrated how, in absence of empirical input, the application of a mul-
ticultural theory beyond its dedicated contexts can yield results that counter to the
objectives of the theory. In the case of Cyprus, the oppression of minority cultures
￿￿￿
through misrecognition would be enhanced with the unrevised application of Kym-
licka’s theory. ￿e task undertaken in this thesis was to modify the theory in order
to be applicable to Cyprus, and in doing so, to provide a base-model for further ap-
plication to other post-violent con￿ict cases.
￿e process of modifying the theory for the purpose of making it applicable
to such contexts is facilitated by the Reciprocal Model.￿eModel provides a system-
atic method for the re-examination of the foundational assumptions of a normative
theory. Furthermore, it provides the conceptual tools necessary for the extraction of
policy-relevant suggestions from normative political theories.￿e RM can facilitate
the transition between the ideal and the non-ideal level in theories ofMC. It can also
facilitate other normative theories beyond the domain of multiculturalism; theories
that aspire to provide practical action-guidance and who want to begin the transi-
tion from the ideal level of principles, to the non-ideal level of their application in
contemporary societies.
￿is concluding chapter will re￿ect on the contributions made in this the-
sis. It will consider the implications of Kymlicka’s theory following the criticism it
received in the course of the thesis; the usefulness of the novel methodological ap-
proach developed for extracting action-guidance from abstract theories; and ￿nally,
it will consider the empirical implications for Cyprus in relation to the proposed
model of multicultural citizenship. During the discussion, the implications of each
contributionwill be addressed, as well as the shortcomings of the solutions discussed
in the thesis.￿e chapter and the thesis will be concluded with re￿ections on the fu-
ture research agenda of this project, which aspires to expand across all three of its
primary axes of interest.
￿￿￿
￿.￿ Exporting Multicultural Citizenship
Kymlicka’s theory was used as the basis for this thesis on the grounds that it is the
most authoritative political theory of MC – one (a) that aims at providing practical
action-guidance; (b) which aspires to be exported to other contexts, and (c) whose
provisions have already been incorporated into the norms and rules of Intergovern-
mental Organisations.
Kymlicka’s theory was challenged on three grounds: on its conception of cul-
ture; on its lack of a formal process of recognition; and on its ethnocultural bias. A
new theory emerged out of the three criticisms, which was defended in the course
of this thesis and in particular in chapter ￿.
￿e ￿rst challenge to Kymlicka’s theory was directed at his conceptualisation
of culture. It was argued that cultural membership has a varying function in dif-
ferent people’s lives and as such one should not assume cultural uniformity, neither
should one treat cultural identities as superior to other individual identities. If cul-
tures have a di￿erent function and prominence in di￿erent peoples’ lives, then the
view defended by Kymlicka that culture provides a context-of-choice for everyone
should be rejected. ￿e implication of this argument was that culture, contra Kym-
licka’s view, provides a context-of-choice for some but not for all. It was argued that
a better way of defending group-di￿erentiated rights to minority cultures is through
an equality-based rather than an autonomy-based justi￿cation for cultural rights;
one that maintains that individuals do not need to demonstrate the intrinsic value
of their culture for cultural rights to be extended to them. ￿e disparity between
the rights and opportunities available tomajority vis-à-vis minority cultures provide
su￿cient ground for the extension of these rights to minority groups.
￿e second challenge to Kymlicka’s theory was that it lacks a formal process
￿￿￿
of recognition. ￿e central argument defended was that the tripartite classi￿cation
of cultural groups suggested by Kymlicka and adopted by many others, where cul-
tural groups are divided into national minorities, immigrant groups and aboriginal
peoples, although defended on empirical grounds, leads to the oppression of mi-
norities that do not ￿t within the typology. ￿is implication of Kymlicka’s lack of
a formal process of recognition was demonstrated through examples from Cyprus,
which illustrate (a) that in the absence of a formal process, the members of the ma-
jority societal culture drive the process of recognition resulting in themisrecognition
of minority groups; and that (b) the nation-building endeavours of the majority can
silenceminorities, especially when the latter’s identities trigger the security anxieties
of the dominant majority. It was argued that in order to overcome this challenge a
process of recognition should not be le￿ in the hands and discretion of the dominant
societal culture and should rather take place at the level of intergovernmental insti-
tutions, or be regulated by them under an international arbitration authority with
powers of ￿nal judgment.
￿e third challenge to Kymlicka’s theory was directed against its ethnocen-
tricity. It was argued that ethnic identities should be irrelevant to the eyes of the
liberal state.￿e example of the Cypriot Latins was used to emphasise the impact of
multnationalist bias upon minorities – how Latins have been denied rights a￿orded
to other national cultures solely on the grounds that they lack an attachment to a
motherland. In presenting the case of the Cypriot Latins, a distinction was made be-
tween religious and secularist biases. It was argued that Kymlicka is only susceptible
to the former, since his theory, in absence of a theory of recognition and in absence
of a more elaborate typology of culture, can potentially reduce (throughmisrecogni-
tion) national groups to religious associations, thus denying thempolitical rights that
they would otherwise be eligible for. ￿e implication of this challenge is that civic
￿￿￿
nationalism is the only attractive model to structure a liberal multinational state.
￿e three shortcomings of Kymlicka’s theory were illustrated through the ex-
amples found in the case of Cyprus.￿e revision of the theory and the creation of the
civic multicultural alternative defended in this thesis became possible through the
Reciprocal Model, provided insights into the transition from the ideal to non-ideal
level, and for the formalisation of the process of extracting policy-relevant sugges-
tions from abstract normative theories.
￿.￿ From￿eory to Policy
Kymlicka’s theory was developed in order to provide principled and policy-relevant
suggestions to the challenges of diversity found in speci￿c contexts. ￿e archetypal
challenges are the demands of the Québécois in Canada, the disputes over the legal
status of Amish people in the US, the controversy over the Islamic Scarf A￿air in
France, the religious exemptions of Sikhs in the UK, the status of Turkish migrant
workers in Germany, the claims of Aboriginals in Settler states and others.
￿e task undertaken in this thesis was to apply MC to contexts beyond these
“dedicated cases.” In exporting the theories that respond to the aforementioned spe-
ci￿c problems the theorist must consider whether the principles developed in re-
sponse to these problems can apply to the new export-cases. As such, this thesis diag-
nosed a shortcoming where a theory is needed for the evaluation of the foundational
principled assumptions of ideal theories vis-à-vis the empirical realities present in
export-cases. ￿e Reciprocal Model was developed in order to overcome this chal-
lenge. It focuses on fact-sensitive ideal theories and incorporates a bottom-up ver-
i￿cation allowing for empirical facts to directly in￿uence the principles and/or the
assumptions of abstract theories. ￿e Reciprocal Model provided a step-by-step de-
￿￿￿
tailed approach on how to extract action-guidance from ideal theories following
three levels.
In the ￿rst most abstract level, a theory must take into account fundamental
characteristics of human nature, in order to make sure that the duties that humans
are burdened with are within the limits of their abilities.￿e aim of level ￿ is to avoid
placing unreasonable demands on individuals.
In level ￿, the social characteristics of the context to which the theory will be
applied are taken into consideration and a detailed step-by-step procedure is out-
lined.￿e important aspect of this second level is its potential to alter the principles
and assumptions outlined in level ￿. ￿is is important because it goes a step further
than the Rawlsian view, where the move to the non-ideal can only limit the extent of
the application of the ideal principles, as seen in §￿.￿ and §￿.￿.￿.
Level ￿ examines the relational positioning of di￿erent principles, and com-
prises of two di￿erent serial processes. In the ￿rst, the ideal principles of a theory
are balanced against other desirable principles, to rank their importance and tomake
sure that they can co-exist. Autonomy vs. toleration has been discussed as an exam-
ple of two principles central in every liberal society. ￿e point of contention is not
whether they should be present or not, but rather how far to apply each of them.
Once the relational positioning is done and the principles are ranked, they are al-
most ready for application.￿e only thing le￿ is to make sure that there are enough
resources to do so, which is the second part of level ￿(b).￿e scarcity constraints are
factored in and the principles of the theory are put alongside the other desirable prin-
ciples (again), to determine whether they are feasible or worthy of application. ￿is
decision relies on the cost of the application of each principle and on the assessment
of its importance made during the ￿rst part of level ￿.
￿e RM opens up new avenues for political theory because it adds to the
￿￿￿
growing literature on ideal and non-ideal theory with a novel approach that system-
atises the process by which ideal theories can provide guidance for action in real
societies, as well as by providing the means by which to modify theories in order to
apply them beyond the contexts of their inception. ￿e advantage of the RM is that
it enables the consideration of ideal-level assumptions in light of the empirical char-
acteristics of each export-case. It is only through the methodological study of the
transition to the non-ideal that a theory like that of Kymlicka’s MC can be applied
beyond its dedicated contexts.
￿e case of Cyprus was used in order to examine the adverse e￿ects that
would be generated from the application of Kymlicka’s MC on the island without
modifying its foundational assumptions. As it was demonstrated, in absence of revi-
sion, the application of the theory yields counterproductive results – the oppression
of cultural minorities through misrecognition. As such, RMwas developed to facili-
tate this process ofmodi￿cation of a theory.￿e RM is a tool that can be used beyond
the literature ofmulticulturalism and beyond the case of Cyprus; it can be used in lit-
eratures where empirical challenges are subject to normative consideration, in order
to facilitate the bridging of the ideal and non-ideal levels.
Nevertheless, the RM requires further study, speci￿cally levels ￿ and ￿(a)(b).
￿e steps involved in the transition need to be studied in order to detail the process
whereby desirable principles are weighted against each other, and the process of cal-
culating the opportunity cost of di￿erent principles in light of scarcity constraints.
Moreover, additional work is required on crystalising the kind of action-guidance
that can be extracted from these theories – whether the guidance can only have long-
term application, as philosopher Adam Swi￿ believes, or whether it is indeed pos-
sible, using the Reciprocal Model, to provide practical suggestions in the short term
(policy). ￿is temporal aspect of action-guidance in political theory has not been
￿￿￿
addressed in the course of this thesis and is something that will be considered in
future research in order to improve the model.
￿.￿ Multicultural Citizenship in Cyprus
Kymlicka’s theory of MC has been revised a￿er an internal critique based on the RM
in order to facilitate its application beyond its original cases of interest. To facili-
tate this process, the Reciprocal Model provided the methodological backbone for
the revision of MC in light of its application to the case of Cyprus.￿e culmination
of theory and methodology, along with the study of cultural formation in Cyprus,
allowed for the extraction of ten propositions that would improve the legitimacy of
decision-making pertaining to the negotiations for a comprehensive solution to the
Cyprus problem, as well as any multiculturally related policy-making.￿e proposi-
tions are based on the conclusions and normative arguments reached and defended
in this thesis, and should be treated as the starting point for future discussion on the
constitution of the reuni￿ed Cyprus, as well as for the development of multicultural
policies.
Once the propositions are outlined three responses will be given on possi-
ble objections to the constitutional model defended in this thesis, which aspires to
replace the unfavourable model of Bizonal Bicommunal Federation.
￿.￿.￿ Ten propositions for Cyprus
￿. ￿ere is no need to prove why cultural survival is important in order to justify the
allocation of group-di￿erentiated cultural rights. ￿e demonstration of the preferen-
tial treatment of the dominant cultural group is enough to warrant the extension of
those rights to national minorities. It is su￿cient to demonstrate how the language
￿￿￿
of the Greek Cypriots is promoted by the institution of the Republic of Cyprus in or-
der to justify the claim of Maronites for language rights.￿e Maronites do not need
to prove that language-rights add speci￿c (and demonstrable) value to the survival
of their culture or to their individual cultural members. ￿is proposition shi￿s the
burden of proof for the necessity of cultural rights away from the minority culture
and focuses on the ability of the state to provide equal opportunities to its citizens.
￿.￿ere is no inherent value to the survival of any of the national groups found
in Cyprus or elsewhere. ￿eir value is dependent on the bene￿t of their members.
￿is proposition dispenses with the notion that the constitution of the Republic of
Cyprus must guarantee the survival of the cultural or ethnic groups found on the
island. As such, it puts emphasis on the constitution as a value-driven foundation
for the new state rather than as a framework that aims to facilitate the survival of
speci￿c ethnic and cultural associations. Based on this proposition, the constitution
must not include references to the ethnic identities of the national groups, dispersing
with lists of solidi￿ed attributes that make up idealised conceptions of such cultures.
￿. Cultural travelling should not be discouraged by the state. Members of mi-
nority cultures should be free to disassociate from their culture, join a di￿erent one,
and generally, their blood-ties should be secondary to the exercise of their agency
regarding their cultural membership or allegiances.￿e equality-based justi￿cation
for cultural rights – that nationalminorities are entitled to group-di￿erentiated treat-
ment to counter the preferential treatment that the dominant societal culture enjoys
– does not mean that individuals should be conceptually locked in their cultures;
rather, it means that they should be given the option to ￿ourish within their culture,
without being necessarily expected to do so.
￿. Rights should be given to individuals in order to pursue individual iden-
tities that are important to them. Individuals who have been restricted rights that
￿￿￿
were a￿orded to members of the dominant societal culture are disadvantaged on the
grounds of equality. Given that the principal value underpinning the proposed the-
ory is equality of opportunity, state-led action is needed to ameliorate the aforemen-
tioned injustice. ￿is is why the state has a duty to promote the history of minority
national groups – because the members of the dominant minority culture enjoy this
right solely on the merit of their being the members of that culture.￿ere is no bur-
den of proof for the value of teaching the history of a culture (as per our example)
to justify why it should be extended to minority groups, given that this is a right
already enjoyed by the members of the dominant culture on the grounds of their
membership to that culture.
￿.￿e application of the principle of equality will be curtailed by other consid-
erations. In such cases it might bemore appropriate to restrict a practice exercised by
the majority rather than extend that to the minorities as well.￿e typical example is
freedom of religion of parents and their children. ￿e fact that Christian Orthodox
priests have almost untethered access to state schools of the Republic of Cyprus is
not a right that should be extended to the rest of the national cultures of the island,
because the rights that the majority enjoys violates other liberal values. As such, the
duty of the state to safeguard liberal values trumps its duty to maintain equality of
opportunities between cultural members. Or rather, the way to maintain the equal
opportunity of access to one’s religion, is not to extend access of clerics of all reli-
gions to state schools, but rather, to restrict it to all. As such, the principle of equality
of opportunity can, in certain instances where core liberal values are challenged, be
met with a blanket ban of a practice formerly practiced by a single culture.
￿.￿e self-identi￿cation of national minorities should take precedence over the
perceptions of the dominant culture. In cases where liberal values are not challenged,
like in the teaching of one’s cultural history in state schools, then there is a duty to
￿￿￿
include the history of minorities in the textbooks and in the national curriculum, in
a way that is accepted by the members and intellectuals of those cultures – not like
it is currently the case in Cyprus where the historiographies and the length of the
reference to minority groups in history books depend on whether they challenge the
dominant narrative of the Greek Cypriots.
￿.￿e rights that members of minority cultures should be a￿orded in relation to
the rights enjoyed by the majority, do not di￿er in the least to the rights that, say, a gay
couple would demand in relation to the rights of heterosexual couples. ￿e decisive
factor in both cases is the privilege enjoyed by one group that is being denied to
the other, and the unjust structures that maintain and/or reinforce the asymmetry
of treatment, which restricts the opportunities of the minority group, triggering the
equality-driven obligation for state action.
￿. Multicultural Constitutionalism with an internationally facilitated process
of recognition can overcome the security concerns o￿en present in post-violent con￿ict
cases. In focusing on the values of liberal pluralism, multicultural constitutionalism
becomes an attractive model for many countries, Cyprus included, whose national
identities are a subject of political turmoil, because it puts cultural con￿ict beyond
the domain of the constitution. Under the proposed model it is no longer necessary
for cultures to prove the utility of their cultural context, thus overcoming the need
to provide antagonistic accounts of their cultural identities.
￿. Cultures are not homogeneous entities – they are fractions of people’s collec-
tion of identities and as such should be granted equal, not preferential, attention.￿is
has the implication that individuals who hold in high esteem identities beyond the
ethnic bundle, will no longer be victims of the exceptional treatment of ethnic iden-
tities. To demonstrate how exceptionalising ethnicity can oppress people’s whose
other identities – in this case sexuality – counter the ethnic narrative, the case of
￿￿￿
the Cypriot Alecos Modenos is useful. Modenos, a gay-rights activist, was the ￿rst
person to take the Republic of Cyprus to the European Court of Human Rights for
the unequal treatment of gay citizens. Modenos was subsequently perceived and
treated as a threat to the survival of the ethnic identity of Greek Cypriots because
he challenged its most important pillar, the Christian Orthodox religious identity.
Modenos was repeatedly and very publicly denounced by the church of the religion
of the dominant culture, whose clerics have, to this day, nearly untethered access to
state schools. Modenos was thus discriminated against for believing that his sexual
identity was more important (and in contradiction) to his ethnic identity, the latter
of which is promoted and guaranteed by the Republic of Cyprus.
￿￿. Loyalty to the state does not mean loyalty to any cultural group.￿e accep-
tance of this proposition encourages a sense of constitutional patriotism detached
from notions of blood-ties that currently underpin any discussions of loyalty to the
state. Under the proposed value-driven constitutional patriotism, the emphasis shi￿s
away from narratives of entitlement tied to speci￿c conceptions of identities pertain-
ing to one ethnic group, towards a more cosmopolitan conception of membership
to a state, driven by a commitment to liberal values.
￿.￿.￿ Responding to￿ree Objections
￿ree issues arise as possible ￿rst-instance objections to the constitutional model
that is summed up in the ten points listed above, which aims at the replacement of
bicommunalism with multiculturalism. ￿e ￿rst two are theoretical and the third
practical and requires further unpacking.
￿e ￿rst objection is the following: how would cultures be recognised if the
identities that make-up the ethnic whole which constitutes their culture becomes
￿￿￿
irrelevant to the state? In other words, if ethnic identities do not matter, wouldn’t
ethnic cultures be themselves victims of misrecognition? ￿is question rests on
confusion about the distinction between the recognition of a culture and the dis-
tribution of cultural rights to the members of a culture. A culture as an entity is
recognised through the common identities of their individual members. As such, it
would not be surprising if cultures were recognised for their ethnic identities – they
would be recognised as associations of people with common identities, one of which
is a motherland and an allegiance to an imaginary community that goes beyond the
state-borders and possibly transcends time. Nevertheless, the existence of these eth-
nic identities will not be relevant for the allocation of rights to culturalmembers.￿e
fact that allegiance to a motherland is conducive in identifying cultural groups, does
not mean that any rights should be allocated on those grounds. To illustrate the util-
ity of the disassociation of ethnicity and nationality, one must look not on whether
old-migrant ethnic groups will be recognised as national cultures, but rather what
would happen to the groups that exhibit such characteristics commonly found in
national cultures but nevertheless have no ethnic attachment. According to the view
defended in this thesis, the latter non-ethnic cultural group will be entitled to no less
rights than that of the ethnic groups, provided that their other identities are compa-
rable.
￿e second objection is that which maintains that this thesis is not providing
a coherent list of rights that minority cultures are entitled to, and rather relies on the
injustices that they su￿ered in order to generate retributive policies that then form
a theory of multicultural citizenship. ￿e motivation behind a theory of MC is to
protect minorities against assimilation resulting from the privileged status and treat-
ment ofmajority groups.￿e origins and themanifestation of that privilege vary, and
to assume a uniform structure of cultural oppression would be wrong. In Cyprus, for
￿￿￿
instance, one can trace the origin of cultural disadvantage of non-dominantminority
groups to the British-led introduction of nationalism with the upgrade of social di-
visions from religious, as they were during the Ottoman Empire, to ethnic. One can
also identify the manifestation of that privilege in the institution of the ￿￿￿￿s con-
stitution. Other countries of the commonwealth face similar challenges, but it does
not mean that a theory of MC can be structured on top of a single example. Instead,
it should be able to address other structures of injustice that exist in di￿erent parts
of the world – from the caste system in India, to the post-Soviet Union Ukraine, to
Israel’s occupation of Palestine, and to the Muslim population in Greece – a diverse
theory is needed, equipped to identify the sources of injustices, rather than try to
interpret the di￿erent manifestations of privilege in light of those found in the West
in response to which the dominant theories of MC have been developed.
￿e third objection that a criticmight put forward is the following: the poten-
tiality for action-guidance relies on the premise that the main parties involved will
likely accept the policy-implications of the theory; in the case of Cyprus this is un-
likely because of the securitisation of national identities. In other words, the security
concerns of the locals will prohibit the change in direction on the Cyprus problem
defended in this thesis. ￿is objection can be refuted on four grounds. Firstly, on
its lack of empirical evidence. Secondly, on its mistaken assumption that public atti-
tudes remained the same vis-à-vis the solution.￿irdly, because it omits the bene￿ts
of a negotiating framework that diverges from the Annan Plan and therefore does
not trigger the security concerns associated with it. Finally, because it overlooks the
new economic realities of the island, which favour cooperation between Cyprus and
Turkey.
￿e changing landscape can be observed both at the level of political elites and
in the civil society. Opinion polls suggest that in the post-Annan period both Greek-
￿￿￿
and Turkish-Cypriots consider the solution to the Cyprus problem a highly unlikely
outcome.￿ At the level of political elites, there has been a decline in the bargaining
position of theGC leadership. For instance, in ￿￿￿￿, the return ofVaroshawas treated
as a token of good faith for the participation of the GCs in the negotiations,￿ whereas
post-￿￿￿￿, GCs are facing unfavourable rulings from the ECtHR as an indirect e￿ect
of their vote against the Annan Plan.￿ ￿e sense of security of the GCs relied on
the Resolutions of the UN and in the rulings of the ECtHR, which are no longer
guaranteed. As such, the security concerns generated from the lack of progress in
the negotiations and from the shi￿ in the international landscape will, contrary to
the objection, be eased with a new negotiating framework.
At the same time, the stalemate, indicative of the urgency of change in the
negotiations, is reinforced by the electoral results in both the RoC and the TRNC,
which necessitate a shi￿ away from a solution reminiscent of the Annan Plan. Dr
Dervis Eroğlu, a hardliner, was elected to the leadership of the north, having suc-
￿. “A majority of the Greek Cypriot community would like to see the peace process being con-
cluded successfully and leading to a Comprehensive Settlement while a majority of Turkish Cypriots
similarly espouses the same goal. However, respondents have very little faith there will be a break-
through.” See Interpeace and Cyprus ￿￿￿￿ Initiative, Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears,
http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/research/cyprus-peace-process/reports/item/￿￿-solving-the-cyprus-
problem-hopes-and-fears, ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿
￿. See Farid Mirbagheri, Cyprus and International Peacemaking (London: Routledge, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿-￿￿
and Frank Ho￿meister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession (Leiden:
Martinus Nijho￿ Publishers, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿.
￿. According to Ronen: “In Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (￿￿￿￿), the ECtHR for the ￿rst
time considered the ‘general context’ of the con￿ict in which the property claims arose, including the
Annan Plan. Particularly the protraction of the con￿ict was crucial to the court’s determination that
the ￿￿￿￿ IPC Law is an adequately e￿ective local remedy, despite the fact that it does not guarantee
reinstatement of property. ￿e court did not explicate how the plan is relevant to its ruling, but its
citation of the provision of the plan that parallel the ￿￿￿￿ IPC Law suggests that it uses the Annan
Plan as a yardstick by which to measure the adequacy of the redress mechanisms in the ￿￿￿￿ IPC
Law. Indeed, in some repsects the priority of reinstatement over compensation is more stringently
protected under the ￿￿￿￿ IPC Law than under the Annan Plan.￿us, while formally the Annan Plan
is not binding on any party, its content appears to be the baseline for informing the legitimacy of
TRNC actions. Since what the ECtHR now acknowledges as valid under the Nambia exception will
likely survive the process of transitions, the Annan Plan has in e￿ect already prejudged the future
arrangements in Cyprus.” See Yaël Ronen, Transition from Illegal Regimes under International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ￿￿￿￿), ￿￿￿-￿￿￿.
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ceeded Mehmet Ali Talat, who was considered to be the most likely person to reach
an agreement on a solution to the Cyprus problem, especially given that Demetris
Christo￿as, an ideological ally of Talat and a politician with similar pro-uni￿cation
outlook was president of the RoC. Following their failure to reach a solution, Eroğlu
was elected as leader of the TCs and Nicos Anastasiades as president of the RoC. In
￿￿￿￿Anastasiadesmanaged to persuade his party to support the YES vote to the An-
nan Plan referendum but his party-base did not follow the direction of its leadership,
and themajority voted NO. In ￿￿￿￿ the negotiations are still based on the framework
of the Annan Plan, which was rejected and adamantly opposed by the overwhelming
majority of GC parties. It is thus imperative to ￿nd a solution that does not trigger
the security concerns associated with the Annan Plan, and the model defended in
this thesis can be an attractive alternative, thus challenging the objection that a shi￿
in the negotiations will trigger the security concerns of the locals.
￿e political landscape has changed in areas besides the Cyprus problem. Ac-
cording to the latest research, a solution to the Cyprus problem will secure the eco-
nomic prosperity of both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots,￿ which is currently under
threat – theGCs experienced a slump in their standard of living post-March ￿￿￿￿ and
the TCs are under strict austerity by Turkey.￿ At the same time, reserves of oil and
natural gas were found in Cyprus, but they are not enough to make worthwhile the
￿. FionaMullen, AlexanderApostolides, andBesimMustafa,￿e Cyprus PeaceDividendRevisited:
A Productivity and Sectoral Approach (PCC Report ￿/￿￿￿￿) (Nicosia: Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO), ￿￿￿￿).
￿. ￿e Greek Cypriot community is no longer prosperous in comparison to the Turkish Cypriot
community. Following March ￿￿￿￿, one of the two productive sectors of the economy was destroyed
a￿er the decisions taken at the Eurogroup meeting of that month, which led to the near collapse
of the ￿nancial system, already struggling a￿er the haircut of the Greek sovereign debt Alexander
Apostolides, “Beware of German gi￿s near elections: how Cyprus got here and why it is currently
more out than in the Eurozone,” Capital Markets Law Journal ￿, no. ￿ (￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Athanasios
Orphanides, “￿e Euro Area Crisis: Politics over Economics,” Atlantic Economic Journal ￿￿, no. ￿
(￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿; Alexander Michaelides, “Cyprus: from Boom to Bail-in,” Economic Policy ￿￿, no. ￿￿
(￿￿￿￿): ￿￿￿–￿￿￿.
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investment in a Lique￿ed Natural Gas (LNG) export terminal.￿ According to Fiona
Mullen, themost cost-e￿cientway to export the natural gas is throughTurkey.￿ere
are, therefore, su￿cient economic incentives to support the paradigm shi￿ defended
in this thesis, and amble potential to reignite the hopes of Cypriots for the possibil-
ity of a viable solution; one that disperses with the concepts that trigger the security
anxieties of the locals (like BBF) and that is conducive towards their economic se-
curity – an issue that tops the political agenda of valence issues, as illustrated in the
latest Eurobarometer data.￿
￿.￿ Moving the Research Forward
￿is research contributes to three primary domains; to the theorisation of multicul-
tural citizenship, to methods in political theory, and to the case of Cyprus. It stands
to reason that the evolution of this project relies on collaborations across all three
domains of interest. In crossing multiple disciplines, the research is not only able
to use the tools and the knowledge available in these disciplines, but also to con-
tribute to literatures beyond those of political theory and Cyprus.￿e most notable
example is how this project speaks to International Relations and Security Studies,
as well as to Constitutional Law and Con￿ict Resolution. To this end, the future of
this work depends on the continuation of its research agenda, across and beyond the
three main domains of interest. Below, the future research plans for the three core
aspects of this project – theory, methodology, Cyprus – will be outlined, as well as
￿. Ayla Gürel, Fiona Mullen, and Tzimitras Harry,￿e Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Posi-
tions and Future Scenarios (PCC Report ￿/￿￿￿￿) (Nicosia: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), ￿￿￿￿);
Fiona Mullen,What’s the net present value of peace?: Cyprus’ natural gas export options, http://www.
stratainsight .com/stratain_v￿en/ds/assets/￿les/FionaMullenNetPresentValueGas_￿￿￿￿￿￿ .pdf, ￿￿
November ￿￿￿￿.
￿. European Commission, Eurobarometer ￿￿: Public Opinion in the European Union, http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb￿￿/eb￿￿_en.htm, Autumn ￿￿￿￿.
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plans on how to extract the theory to other cases.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e￿eorisation of Multicultural Citizenship
￿e literature on multiculturalism is at an infant state in relation to its international
application. As such, there is fertile ground for the further development of the the-
ory presented in this thesis. In particular, the suggested process of recognition needs
further study to provide a concrete outline of the design of the institutions that will
facilitate it. In the course of this thesis, the discussion was limited to the justi￿cation
of the necessity of this process, but there was little engagement with the theoretical
underpinnings and practical dynamics of the process. It therefore stands to reason
that the theoretical evolution of the theory of MC defended in this thesis is to ex-
amine the principles that will guide the international process of recognition, which
will enable the extraction of guidance pertaining to its practical dynamics. In other
words, it is only a￿er the development of a principled justi￿cation of the internal
aspects of the process of recognition that we will be able to understand how it can
be implemented in real societies and within existing IOs. ￿us, the ￿rst future ob-
jective of this research pertaining to theories of MC is to develop the principles that
will ground the process of internationally-facilitated recognition.
￿e second future objective relevant to the theorisation of MC is to develop
a typology of culture that re￿ects the cultural realities in post-violent con￿ict cases.
￿is thesis provided the theoretical insight to reject the tripartite distinction adopted
by Kymlicka in favour of a non-essentialist conception of culture that dispenses with
solidi￿ed notions of common belonging. Nevertheless, it refrained from providing
a satisfactory typology of culture which could, in time, replace the one provided by
Kymlicka.￿is will be the second objective for the future of this research in relation
￿￿￿
to the theorisation of MC. To achieve this objective more empirical cases will be re-
searched, allowing for the creation of a comprehensive map of cultural experiences,
with speci￿c emphasis on cases where cultural identities are subject to political con-
￿ict.
￿.￿.￿ Methods in Political￿eory
￿e methodology of political theory is the second of the three primary domains of
interest of this thesis. ￿e development of the Reciprocal Model provides insights
into the extraction of practical action-guidance from ideal theories for the purpose
of applying them to diverse cases. ￿e RM needs further study in order to provide
details on each of its three steps. In particular, it needs to be re￿ned in relation to the
balancing of di￿erent desirable principles and in relation to the process of the dis-
tribution of resources.￿is latter task necessitates further work on the prioritisation
of principles and on the way their opportunity costs are calculated.
To achieve these objectives the Reciprocal Modelmust be put to test on prob-
lems and literatures beyond multiculturalism in order to test, modify and ￿ne-tune
it. Two attractive cases for testing the assumptions of the Model are environmental
justice and the ethics of the family. ￿e RM can be used to facilitate the process of
deciding the distribution of the costs of mitigation against the adverse e￿ects of cli-
mate change, through the examination of the non-ideal application of the principles
that guide the distribution of these costs. Moreover, it can help with the literature
on the adaptation to climate justice. It can, for instance, provide insights into the
trade-o￿s involved when minority cultures are forced (or are required) to abandon
their ways (or places) of life in adapting to the realities of climate change. ￿e em-
ployment of the RM for the purposes of environmental justice will test the model,
￿￿￿
which will enable its modi￿cation based on the input that will be generated from its
application.
Another application of the RM for the purpose of testing its assumptions is
the case of familial ethics.￿is literature is suitable for the consideration of the ideal
to non-ideal transition because of the recent work done in providing principled re-
sponses to contemporary dilemmas like, for example, “under what conditions is it
morally permissible to send one’s child to a private school?”￿ Whereas the princi-
ples are sophisticated and well-argued, there is a long way before they can be applied
in real societies by actual parents. Private schools will not likely be abolished any
time soon, and parents will scarcely do the “moral thing,” when given the option to
enhance the future prospects of their o￿springs. Given the gap between the ideal
principles and their non-ideal application, the RM can be used to consider how sug-
gestions can be extracted from these theories that will be applicable in real societies.
In doing so, theModelwill be tested and its assumptions will be revised based on the
feedback it will receive.
￿.￿.￿ ￿e Case of Cyprus and Beyond
￿e theoretical discussion of multiculturalism and the methodological discussion of
political theory have been provided on the back of the case of Cyprus.￿e case had a
dual function in this thesis.￿e ￿rst was to draw examples to support the theoretical
arguments made – a theory-centric function. ￿e second was to provide normative
support for the desecuritisation of Cyprus throughmoving away from the ethnically-
based model of Bizonal Bicommunal Federation, in favour of a multicultural rights-
￿. For example, Adam Swi￿, How not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed
Parent (London: Routledge, ￿￿￿￿); Harry Brighouse and Adam Swi￿, Family Values: ￿e Ethics of
Parent-Child Relationships (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ￿￿￿￿); Matthew Clayton, Justice
and Legitimacy in Upbringing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ￿￿￿￿)
￿￿￿
based constitution.￿e future aspirations of this research in relation to Cyprus is to
contribute to the case and to the literature on securitisation and desecuritisation.
In the case of Cyprus, the next step is to produce policy briefs that will enable
policy-makers to bene￿t from the civicmulticulturalmodel developed and defended
in this thesis. ￿e nature of this project is such that requires further collaboration
with experts in the ￿elds of Constitutional Law, International Relations, Securty and
the European Union.￿e objective of these collaborations will be the application of
the multicultural model to Cyprus, with concrete suggestions that will assist in over-
coming the post-￿￿￿￿ stalemate through an alternative constitutional arrangement
that disperses with the embededness of ethnic identities at the level of the constitu-
tion. ￿e practical application of the theoretical model defended in this thesis, will
also bene￿t the other two domains of interest – the theory and the Reciprocal Model
– by providing feedback for their improvement.
￿e know-how that will be acquired through the practical application of the
theory to the case will be bene￿cial to di￿erent disciplines and conducive to the fur-
ther application of the theory. More speci￿cally, it will bene￿t those working on
Con￿ict Resolution in Cyprus and elsewhere, the Securitisation and Desecuritisa-
tion literatures and, ￿nally, those interested in institutional design of rights-driven
IOs.
￿e aspiration for this research is that it will be able – grant(s) permitting – to
be exported to additional challenging cases in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; from
Moldova, Georgia, Kosovo and Ukraine, to more “traditional” cases like Israel and
Palestine, which all require diverse solutions to the varying (cultural) con￿icts they
face.
￿￿￿
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